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Preface 
En este Carnaval mi tarq’a le dice a la naturaleza, 
gracias por darme el alimento, 
 el vestido y la felicidad de vivir 
Tarqueada song1 
San Miguel, 13 March 2012. Situated on a hill top, the tiny village of San Miguel finds 
itself quite isolated on the Bolivian high plateau. But today, the plaza de piedras (the 
stone sculptured square), which represents the villagers’ proud tribute to the llama and 
the Tiwanaku culture, is the scenery of ceremony and cheerful celebration. Under the 
burning sun of the Altiplano, coca leafs are shared, libations are poured to the 
pachamama2 – as well as to the “tata from above” –; a sheep has been sacrificed and 
prepared for lunch; a band of drums and tarq’as is enthusiastically playing festive music.  
Little by little all of the few remaining inhabitants of the hamlet come to join the 
gathering on the village square. Meanwhile, the indigenous leaders of the community -
identifiable by their green poncho- are partaking in a community meeting. The 
assembly had been summoned by the maximum indigenous leader of the region, apu 
mallku Máximo Reinaga. Don Máximo’s visit to San Miguel is part of the yearly muyta, a 
series of community consultations to prepare the general assembly of all communities 
of the “Native Nation of Jach’a Karangas” which he represents. During that assembly, 
indigenous authorities are to decide on the plan of action for the region designed by the 
Council of Jach’a Karangas. The preparative muyta serves to detect and ventilate critical 
 
                                                     
1 “In this Carnival my tarq’a tells Nature, / thanks for giving me food, / clothing and the joy of living” (Own translation, 
Rocha Calani 2008, 12). The tarq’a is a wooden aerophones of Aymara origin and is typically played during or to 
announce the harvest season, around Carnival, in the celebration of the Anata and Jallu Pacha (Civallero 2012). 
The tarqueada music counts as the most typical music style in the Carangas region. 
2 For the sake of simplicity often translated as Mother Earth, pachamama is perceived as a living reality that 
entails both time and space. All living things –including humans- form part of, and enter into daily interaction 
with, that reality, which requires regular sacrifices in function of the endeavors people plan to undertake or 
obtain individually or in group (De Munter 2003, 90-2). 
 viii 
regional issues, local concerns and viable development projects. Main challenges are 
identified in the local livelihoods’ vulnerability to frost, floods and drought, the inter- 
and intra-community conflicts over land rights and plot demarcation, lacking road 
infrastructure, and the rural exodus of the region’s youngest generation.  
 
Figure 1 Opening ceremony to receive the muyta. The community of San Miguel, March 
2013. (own picture) 
The proposals presented by the Council are situated in the field of agricultural 
production, land-titling, infrastructure and urbanization, but equally well concern the 
revaluation of native knowledge, the transmission of ancestral customs and the 
rewriting of their own “national history.” While crops are flooded and villages and their 
schools are abandoned for the city, a new project of regional reinforcement is surfacing. 
Underlying to all discussions incited by the muyta and the Council’s proposals is the 
definition and defence of a kind of region-wide program for “national integration,” with 
the Native Nation of Jach’a Karangas as the nation to be integrated. This national project 
can be reduced to an unilateral inscription in nor a straightforward opposition to 
Bolivia as nation-state, but draws from a broader discourse in which Bolivia has been 
redefined as a Plurinational State.  
The conception, viability and marketing of this “Nation” are framed by the 
guarantees provided for the participating communities regarding their self-
determination over land and territory and the prospects for llama-based production 
modes. The basis of this framework is in the central state’s recognition of a legal margin 
for custom-bound land tenure arrangements and indigenous communal territorial 
  ix 
control and in the llama’s durability as the pillar of regional articulation with supra-
local exchange circuits. Both achievements are the outcome of historical trajectories of 
dynamic state-community and state-market interactions that form the central 
storylines of this dissertation.  
The setting of those storylines is the territory of what once was known as the 
province of Carangas, a vast plain situated on the semi-desert Altiplano (the Central-
Andean high plateau), at the Bolivian side of the country’s border with actual Northern 
Chile. The region is a little smaller than Belgium – 26719 km² to be exactly- but situated 
about 10 times higher, on average 3700 meters above sea level with mountain peaks 
reaching over 6000 meters. Sparsely inhabited, this is almost exclusively the terrain of 
indigenous communities whose livelihood conditions and social and territorial 
organization seems underwent relatively few changes over the centuries.3 While the 
region’s first inhabitants, the Urus, are today reduced to one small remote community, 
almost the entire population is since pre-colonial times –and today still self-identifies 
as- Aymara, currently Bolivia’s second largest ethnic group. The Carangas people (or 
“Karankas”) constituted an Aymara federation within the Inca Empire and were, in the 
wake of Spanish conquest and colonization, reorganized into a number of village 
settlements that were incorporated into the Spanish colonial administration as the 
Provincia de los Carangas. In the Bolivian Republic, provincial unity was maintained until 
1951, when it gradually splintered in the face of an administrative fragmentation 
process. At the turn of the 21st century, however, these communities are reintegrating 
as the Native Nation of Jach’a Karangas, while the Uru people, for their part, aspire to 
reconstitute their own “Original Nation”.  
While the dry climate and sterile soils offer little perspective for agricultural 
production, peat lands convert the area in a perfect habitat for Andean camelid species. 
Until today, llamas and alpacas have remained Carangas’ most important and most 
abundant productive asset. The limited importance of cultivation lands explains to an 
important degree why Carangas has remained historically outside the scope of the 
expanding hacienda (large land estate) complex. Together, the vital role of pastoralism 
and the apathy on part of the landlord class towards what was perceived as a backward 
 
                                                     
3 If we take the example of San Miguel, little seems to have changed. More than thirty years ago, San Miguel 
was introduced as one of the small villages dotted across the altiplano, marked by “dirt-floored, thatch-roofed, 
adobe houses, without electricity, running water, or the most rudimentary sanitary facilities and inhabited by poor, 
illiterate, Aymara-speaking peasant farmers” (Klein and Kelley 1981, 44-5; see also Mc Ewen 1975). San Miguel was 
still more isolated, with the sole truck route inaccessible during the wet season and with no telephones or 
newspapers. The approximately 1200 inhabitants, mainly subsistence farmers, grew potatoes, quinoa and 
beans on small individually owned fields ploughed by oxen and kept chicken, guinea pigs, llama and sheep 
herds. The village had never been part of hacienda, but had seen the development of a minority of richer 
peasants that rented their lands for cash or a half share in harvest. 
 x 
province has contributed to the safeguarding of the collective character of land tenure 
until today, thereby favouring a remarkably high level of regional autonomy. This 
impression of continuity has traditionally been explained in terms of isolation and 
stasis, or been reduced to ecological factors. However, quite on the contrary, this 
impression conceals a dynamic trajectory in which the people of Carangas appear as 
people with history, whose land tenure structures were maintained due to an attentive 
positioning in face of the opportunities, insecurities and instabilities emerging in each 
historical context. 
In short, the story of Carangas is the story of how a margin for autonomous 
communal control is being contested, defended, asserted and reinvented. Not in spite, 
but precisely becáuse of the safeguarding of that margin, this story tells a lot about 
participation and interaction rather than isolation or desolation. Beyond the apparent 
continuity, Carangas’ historical trajectory reveals a fascinating terrain of rural 
resistance and renewal throughout colonial, republican and current ‘plurinational’ 
transitions.  
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Introduction. The end of the peasant? 
Humanity depends on us, and we refuse to disappear 
Via Campesina declaration 2008 
Omitted links. Tracing the local trajectories of global rural 
change.  
This research is constructed upon a historical analysis of life, its challenges and its 
achievements in rural communities. Not because rural community life is (becoming) a 
life of the past, but exactly because of its potential for a sustainable future. At the start 
of the 21st century, an old question reappears from never been gone: is there a future for 
peasants? Urbanization, migration, industrialization and related vectors of “modernity” 
seem to obtrude themselves as the incontestable answer to that question. As processes 
of globalization intensify, rural areas and local agro-pastoral production regimes 
experience increasing pressure on their base of existence through the alteration of their 
access to essential means of production, land and labour. This has nurtured the biggest 
shift in human organization since the Neolithic Revolution roughly some 10000 years 
ago. Statistically, 2007 announced the era when for the first time in history, more people 
live in an urban context than on the countryside. And those people need to be fed by 
products cultivated by, indeed, the ever smaller part of the world population that 
continues to live directly from the products of that countryside.  
The impact of this historical turning point cannot be underestimated and has 
nurtured the broader research project of which this dissertation forms a part. 
Subjecting rural-urban transformations simultaneously to a closer scan and a global 
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analysis, the projects seeks to interrogate “The end of peasant societies in an historical and 
comparative perspective.”1 Its premise is that the place and role of peasant societies -often 
overlapping with the position of indigenous groups- in an ever globalizing world cannot 
be understood in a singular way. Their response is essentially one of differentiation, 
generating a multiplicity of work and income strategies that give shape to divergent 
ways of peasant transformation and land and labour organization. Meanwhile, faith in 
haughty Green Revolutions is wavering and attention is increasingly drawn both in local 
initiatives as internationally to the importance of small-scale food production2 and 
principles such as food sovereignty3 in times of agrarian and food crises. Other signs of a 
durable and re-emerging peasantry are in the resilience and global reach of 
organizations such as La Via Campesina4 as in the continuity and reinvention of 
communal social structures, despite continuing challenges stemming from political-
economic conjunctures and their social and ecologic consequences. 
Both at the local and the global level, a “gap” is surfacing between the erosion of 
rural regions, resources and life, and the long-term persistence of local (and alter-
globalizing) peasant communities. This gap raises the question of how to explain the 
simultaneous disappearance of “old” and the emergence of “new” peasant categories 
and rural spaces. The clue to this simultaneous evaporation and renovation must be 
searched for in the spread of capitalism and the nation-state and in the way these 
world-historical developments have fuelled the incorporation of peasantries (Droessler 
 
                                                     
1 This is original title of the project coordinated by Eric Vanhaute with funding from the Flanders Research 
Foundation (FWO). It ran as a subproject (2008-2012) of Polarizations and upward trends in the world-system (1500-
2000), under direction of Immanuel Wallerstein and is being published under the all-embracing title “Peasants” 
(Vanhaute, Cottyn and Wang 2014a). Rather than covering the history of thé world peasant population, this 
project offers a global and comparative analysis of the diversity and parallels of distinct “trajectories of 
transition” (Vanhaute, Cottyn and Wang 2014b). Departing from a broad global scope (Vanhaute 2008; 2012), 
four case regions were specified on basis of Eric Vanhaute’s expertise regarding the North Sea Region 
(O’Grada, Paping and Vanhaute 2007; Vanhaute and Van Molle 2006, 217-48; Blonde , Galand and Vanhaute 
2001), John Wang’s research on the Yangtze delta, Sven van Melkebeke’s research on the coffee plantation 
economy in Central Africa and my own research in the Central Andean Highlands.  
2 The United Nations General Assembly declared 2014 as the International Year of Family Farming, made 
possible by numerous local organizations empowered by the World Rural 
Forum. http://www.familyfarmingcampaign.net/  
3 Although the concept of “food sovereignty” still remains too vague in order to be translated into solid policy 
lines, at least it raises clear questions with the idea of food security. The need for a coherent agenda for food 
sovereignty is advocated by the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC). 
http://www.foodsovereignty.org/ 
4 By attempting to unite diverse struggles of specific rural groups across all continents, the international 
peasants’ movement La Via Campesina hints at what a “globalization from below” might look like. 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php. See also Desmarais 2002; Borras , Edelman and Kay 2008. 
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2013). The observed gap is a matter of ignorance of -and hence the incapacity to bridge- 
the lacuna between theoretical projections and daily strategies of peasant survival and 
revival in a globalizing world (Gidwani 2008, xv), or more broadly, the discrepancy 
between the pretended logic and the factual operation of capitalism (Mitchell 2002). 
To the extent that indications that “global capitalism is far from being a homogeneous and 
continuous totality” (Quijano 2000b, 553-4) are being omitted, global tendencies are being 
explained regardless of their local (diverging) footprints; the other way around, 
localized narratives are being told in an artificial vacuum. Exemplary is how the idea 
that continued globalization announces the end of peasant and indigenous worlds has 
gained the status of an admitted truth. It is the same dichotomist thinking that leads to 
the separation of peasant and indigenous societies from an “outside world” which 
supposedly constitutes an opposite -in terms of non-rural, non-agrarian, non-
indigenous or non-modern- world. To the contrary, that world constitutes the broader 
social contexts within which these communities move.  
These “omitted links”, which prevent us from understanding the paradoxical 
simultaneity of contradiction and complementarity, autonomy and interaction, 
constitute fertile ground for ground-breaking interdisciplinary research. This 
dissertation dares to explicitly address those links, yet it does not pretend to “stitch” 
the detected gap. The questions that guide this research do not seek to iron out the 
discordances noted between what is thought of as strange and even mismatching worlds 
(the continuity of customary land right systems) with unambiguous answers. Rather, 
they aim at a better understanding of the paradoxical nature of capitalist expansion and 
to give meaning to the asymmetric interrelation of subaltern groups and incorporative 
power matrixes. More concretely, this research challenges the common 
misinterpretation that the persistence of small-scale autonomous (often indigenous) 
social structures is the outcome of continued isolation.  
The analytical tools to embark upon this challenge derive from interdisciplinary 
explorations into the question of rural change which, far from a niche topic, constitutes 
a rich research vein, explored in a multiplicity of disciplines. From a global perspective, 
this question is essential to understand how the rise of a capitalist word-system is 
rooted in the transformation of rural spaces. This basically relates to the question of 
global (but also local) inequality, with processes of de-agrarianization in the core zones 
being “subsidized” by the creation and incorporation of peasantries in the periphery. 
Here is a clear crossover between world and rural (historical and political 
“development”) studies. By directly addressing rural history’s difficult marriage 
between the wealth of micro histories and the solidity of macro analysis, this crossover 
offers fertile ground for a more comprehensive inquiry into the multiple ways in which 
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small-scale production modes and social systems are being reproduced within wider 
scales of interaction.5 This is exactly the kind of inquiries that shape the third field of 
my interest, that of Andean ethno-history. Andeanist scholarship has produced a rich 
image of the region as a spatial marker of incorporation, with “Andean peoples as 
fundamentally intertwined with a larger set of economic, political, social, and cultural processes, 
not as a set of inert peasant communities or cultures to which world-historical forces suddenly 
arrived” (Larson 2004, 5-6). In order to contribute to this rich critical-historical research 
field at the junction of global studies, agrarian or peasant studies and Andean studies, 
my explorations into Andean peasant subsistence and indigenous “survival” have been 
subjected to the following set of research questions. 
Research questions, research theme and the delineation of a 
case study. 
Central point of discussion is the presumed incompatibility between peripheral 
localities and peoples and the development of a capitalist world-economy. The 
observation of how global and regional processes of incorporation and peripheralization 
shape and are shaped by the constant (re-)production and differentiation of old and new 
rural spaces and peasant societies urges us to question that presumption. The premise 
of the questions formulated throughout this research is that ‘trajectories of rural 
change’ do not present a story of mere resistance nor passive assimilation, but one of 
dynamic encounter in which local communities creatively negotiate the terms of their 
participation and autonomy in the face of the state-building and market integration 
processes. Through these negotiations, community- and household-based access to 
land, labour, goods and knowledge is contested and asserted, nurturing the 
transformation of rural spaces and livelihoods. In so doing, this encounter “supplies” 
capitalism’s expansive and incorporative drive with essential yet unstable fuelling links 
that trigger different paths of re- and de-peasantization.  
 
                                                     
5 An example of efforts to effectively integrate micro-studies into macro-analyses is the consortium for 
Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area (CORN).  This international collaboration platform has 
produced an expanding Corn Publication Series and a four volume standard work 
(http://www.corn.ugent.be/). The methodological introduction to Part II of this dissertation takes a closer 
look at their research approach. 
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The “ultimate” question. 
In a nutshell, this premise points to the “ultimate” question of this research: how does 
the course of world-systemic expansion give shape to rural “trajectories of transition” 
and, the other way around, how have these patterns of rural change impacted upon 
processes of globalization? Did and do these processes of peasant transformation create 
a more homogeneous world, or do they feed new trends of ? The hypothesis is that 
processes of globalization have nurtured a diversity of transformation trajectories and 
that these diverse local processes essentially “nourish” of the global expansive-
contractive course of capitalist developments. My specific enquiry into this general 
question and hypothesis particularly addresses the erosion and renewal of autonomous 
spaces for communal organization: how have these spaces been asserted or enclosed 
throughout these cycles of contraction and expansion? What are the assets and 
potentials but also the vulnerabilities of these spaces?  
Before delineating the thematic angle from which this general question will be 
approached, the first question that must be addressed is how the “fuzziness” of local-
global interaction can be disentangled without neutralizing the fuzz. This is indeed a 
very abstract question that reveals the need for analytical tools that allow for the 
tackling of local-global entanglements. From my explorations into a diverse literature 
that deals with the challenge of grasping the interactions of peripheral actors and 
places with world-historical developments, the notion of “frontier” surfaced and 
presented itself as the main building block of the analytical framework of this 
dissertation. From a “frontier perspective”, which will be further expounded in the first 
part of this dissertation, local-global interactions must be disentangled in the context of 
a dynamic process of incorporation (the movement of a frontier) which has a spatial 
repercussion (the formation of a frontier zone). The demarcated research theme 
specifies the process of frontier “formation”. 
 
Thematic angle: Land rights. 
My research addresses the question of rural change and the diverging pathways of 
peasant societies from the angle of land rights. The justification for that focus is double. 
“From a world-historical standpoint,” Araghi and Karides state,  “the history of capitalism 
begins with the transformation of land rights” (Araghi and Karides 2012, 1). This 
transformation corresponds to a process of commodification; the assimilation of local 
patterns to homogeneous “global designs” (Mignolo 2000). Over the last five hundred 
years, historical capitalism has developed through the commodification of just about 
everything, especially land rights that allow land to freely circulate within national and 
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international frameworks. The alteration, elimination and/or imposition of specific land 
right systems has particularly strong repercussions for the sustainability of peasant and 
indigenous worlds. Under the pressure for commodification, their semi-autonomous 
spaces of social organization are squeezed and perturbed in function of the 
restructuring of social power relations. However, from a local standpoint, it becomes 
clear that the outcome of these shifting power relations and the implied redistribution 
of land (rights) differed wildly over time and space.  
The question on rural change will thus be concretized along a specific process of 
commodification: the imposition of standardized land rights. The relevance of that focus 
stems from the observation that the outcome of what appears to be a global process of 
land rights commodification is little uniform despite the explicit uniformity of such 
global designs. Historical research has pointed to be different patterns of change in local 
land right systems.6 In this dissertation the focus will be placed on a particular pattern 
or trajectory, that of the Andean indigenous communities. While being the object of 
centuries-long processes of colonial exploitation and post-colonial extractivism, the 
region demonstrates a remarkable (yet over the centuries increasingly more defied) 
“margin” for communal land rights. Why could such rights be preserved in certain 
regions? How were these rights safeguarded throughout cycles of land rights 
commodification? What implications did this have on the longer term? 
These questions can only be assessed in regard of concrete aspects that condition 
customary land right systems in a particular setting for rural livelihood construction. 
Incorporation pressures interact with local environmental and demographical 
conditions and provoke changes in the local organization of production and social 
control as well as in supra-local frameworks for exchange and governance. This 
dynamic process materializes in a “social production system”. The definition of that 
framework stems from questions on the particular function that is attributed to land, 
the conditions under which land is subjected to communal control, what pressures 
market forces exert on the use of accessibility of land and how land access is regulated 
by a state apparatus. These questions come to the fore in the second part of this 
dissertation in which the social production system of the Central Andes is 
reconstructed. This reconstruction does not simply serve to depict the specific setting of 
the research in all its glory details, but tests the “conditions for frontier zone 
formation,” that is, the factors shaping processes of commodification, particularly in 
relation to communal land control, in the Central-Andean and Bolivian context. 
This testing departs from the following hypotheses: In regions were pastoralism 
dominates, communal control over land is stronger. Also, in regions characterized by 
 
                                                     
6 See for instance Van Bavel and Hoyle 2010; Ubink, Hoekema and Assies 2009; Cole and Ostrom 2012.  
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grazing lands, land privatization incentives on part of commercial-industrial and 
landowning actors tend to be lower. At the other hand, subsistence in semi-arid 
highlands essentially relies on inter-ecological exchange which, in combination with 
mobile character of pastoralist societies, nurtures pastoralists’ simultaneous 
participation in “overlapping” circuits of barter and commercial exchange, which 
functions as a “brake” on pastoralists’ “full-blown” integration in market spheres. 
Moreover, where community structures are stronger, the imposition of legal and fiscal 
state regulations is conditioned by asymmetrical though mutual state-community 
bonds.7 Where the central state’s institutional power is less present, there is increasing 
“elbowroom” for (fiscal, political, juridical, landowning) intermediaries, who –however 
powerful- inevitably need to negotiate their local position with the community. 
This bundle of assumptions on the organization of rural life on the altiplano points to 
a number of variables which I have classified into a framework centred on the issue of 
access, both to production means as to decision-making. These factors are: ecology-
infrastructure (pastoralist production and inter-ecological complementarity), the factor 
of demography-ethnicity (demographic pressures and ethnic boundaries), the impact of 
market forces ((dis)connection and (alternative) forms of mobility and exchange), the 
state (institutional power, territorial control), and communal agency (mobilization and 
intermediation). The interaction between these factors configures the context in which 
frontiers (processes of commodification) operate. This research focuses on one specific 
frontier that has challenged the way in which rural life is organized in Carangas: the 
commodification of land, yet in a tight connection to the commodification of trade 
networks, and the ‘commodification’ of national spaces and identities. 
Delineating time and space: Situating Bolivia’s first land reform.  
Peasant and indigenous people’s shared experience of peripheralization in the context 
of the long-term, interconnected and accelerating development of capitalism and 
(neo)colonialism demonstrates that land rights commodification is not a universal nor 
rectilinear process but can be phased and zoned. This dissertation zooms in on a 
particular phase in the historical process of land rights commodification in the Andean 
rural zone during which the communal autonomy and land rights security of Bolivia’s 
highland communities were extremely challenged. The process that structures the 
 
                                                     
7 This refers to Platt’ famous theorem of the state-community reciprocity pact (1982, 20 and 40; see also 4.1). 
This “pact” was installed by the colonial tributo system in which commoners ensured their participation and 
status in a commons regime by paying an indigenous head tax. Though confining them to an unequal power 
position, this bond was perceived as a conditional guarantee for their access to a varied land base. 
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analysed episode is known in Bolivia as exvinculación, referring to the Alienation Act of 
1874, but in fact emblematizing an enclosure process that targeted indigenous 
community land. The central story of this research, however, tells more about the 
enclosure’s standstill rather than its advance. This story is situated on the desert-like 
plains of the Central Andean Highlands; in the province of Carangas, where indigenous 
communities maintained a “free” (non-usurped) status and to date retain a relatively 
high degree of autonomous control over collective lands.  
The timing of Bolivia’s land reform is not accidental. Initiated by the proclamation of 
a short-lived decree in 1866 and a more mature land reform act in 1874, this process 
culminated between 1880 and 1930 to eventually enter a new phase through Bolivia’s 
National Revolution of 1952 and the subsequent Agrarian Reform of 1953. The process is 
framed within what Platt (1987) terms the “Andean experience of Bolivian liberalism.”8 
Taking off in the 1870s and weakening with the First World War, this period faded away 
in the context of post-1929 de-globalization and the political alterations generated by 
Bolivia’s experience in the Chaco War,9 to definitively be replaced by a revolutionary 
(but equally “liberal”) period after Bolivia’s National Revolution of 1952. The case study 
realized in the framework of this research starts already in 1860, because of the 
important antecedents to the 1874 Act, and closes around 1930, leaving a lacuna for the 
period up to 1952.10  
This episode must be positioned within structural processes, waves and cycles that 
can be traced back to the 16th century, when a  world-economy took shape.11 Bolivian 
 
                                                     
8 Rather than the name of a particular political party, “liberal” refers to a pro free-trade economic ideology, 
linked to positivist ideology, which also applied to Bolivia’s Conservative Party. 
9 The Chaco war (1932-1935) against Paraguay was provoked but dramatically lost by Bolivia, leaving a deep 
impact on politics and society and decisively triggering the push for indigenous emancipation. 
10 The decision to close that period in 1930 is debatable and corresponds in the first place to a pragmatic 
decision in view of the time-consuming archive work and in the second place to the observation of impacting 
alterations in Bolivian society from 1929 on with the economic crisis of the Great Depression, the political 
repercussions of the Chaco war and the 1938 formal rehabilitation of “the  community”. The 1930-1952 period 
is far from irrelevant regarding rural changes in Bolivia, but a closer assessment of Carangas’ post-Chaco and 
pre-revolutionary changes is left open for future research. Regarding this period, the work of Gotkowtiz (2007) 
and Smale (2010), amongst others, is very valuable for revealing the rural dynamics at play, yet pays very 
limited attention to “free” communities.  
11 This periodization is ordered into three decisive moments, in line with decisive phases of capitalist 
expansion, starting in the long 16th century with regional incorporations, centred along the mining frontier 
and triggering a process of (re-)peasantization in function of these centres of capitalist extraction, most 
famously Potosí. The next transition is situated in the long 19th century, marked by imperialist incorporations 
implying (re-)peasantization not only in European colonies but also in the post-colonial Andes. Subsequently, 
the neoliberal incorporations of the late 20th century engendered a (re-)peasantization which is however 
increasingly more concealed by processes of urbanization.   
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liberalism emerged in the context of the “second wave” of globalization during this 500 
years trajectory, roughly between 1860 and 1930.12 This is the era in which the world-
system witnessed the “triumph of Liberalism” (Wallerstein 2011), Latin America’s “second 
conquest” (Topik and Wells 1997), the Andes its Polanyian “great transformation” 
(Larson 1995, 29). For indigenous communities it meant “a worldwide extermination (…) 
according to the desires aroused by the exportation of European capital, the expansion of railways 
and of the new communication technologies” (Regalsky 2003, 7). Here lay the roots of Latin 
America’s image as the champion in inequality.13 At the national level, the now 
independent Andean republics integrated into the post-French Revolution interstate 
system, which implied the adoption of “new” principles, including a totally different 
notion of land property and citizenship. Thus, this “globalization wave” was not a mere 
matter of increased international trade relations and new economic policies, but went 
accompanied by a redefinition of the socio-political organization of the country, 
although still within the confines of an “oligarchic modernity” (Larraín 2001, chapters 3 
and 4). The function of the agrarian population in the country’s “take-off” was to be 
defined, involving, among other reforms, a legal-fiscal restructuring of Bolivia’s land 
tenure system. However, the outcome of that land reform was marked by a 
differentiated reach, which brings me to the spatial scope of the case research.  
In spatial terms, this dissertation takes the posed questions to the altitudes of the 
Andean highlands, restricting the case focus to the province of Carangas.14 The 
 
                                                     
12 This period is commonly referred to as Latin America’s “first globalization wave” (Bértola 2006), as 
globalization theories often neglect the previous phase of expansion during the “long 16th century” (Braudel 
1996). 
13 Rather than an attribution acquired in colonial times, this structural feature broke through in the 19th 
century. Frankema’s comparative analysis (2009) adds to this statement in showing that it was particularly 
after 1870 that income inequality in the continent started to shift, both in the degree as in the forms of 
inequality. The discussion over the differentiated economic development of the Americas generally focuses on 
cultural, institutional and geographical factors, with an emphasis on the colonial origins of Latin-America’s 
peripherization (Gootenberg and Reygadas 2010). In contrast to the stress on colonially installed rent-seeking 
mechanisms by new institutional economic history scholars (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2012), recent 
reassessments (of wages, incomes and prices) emphasize the long 19th century as the breeding ground of Latin-
America’s internal inequality and its global peripherality, particularly breaking through with post-1870 liberal 
reforms (Bértola and Williamson 2006; Prados de la Escosura 2007 and 2009; Coatsworth 2008; Williamson 2009; 
Prados de la Escosura et al 2010). Hence, while the great divergence debate (Pomeranz 2000) has been chiefly 
approached from a European-Chinese perspective, Latin-American’s development gap with North-America as 
with the broader world economy has been revealed as equally instructive to  the question of economic 
inequality in the modern world (Fukuyama 2008).  
14 In order to prevent confusion, I will adopt the name of the province that contained the western part of the 
actual Oruro Department from colonial times until 1951. Carangas will be treated as a multi-ethnic territory 
with a plural culture and history of which the Uru population forms an integral part. Instead of referring to 
Jach’a Carangas, which is claimed by the Aymara population, I will adopt the name of the republican province 
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specificity of the region where this research took shape lies in its almost exclusive rural 
and indigenous character and its relative geographical and administrative isolation in a 
borderland on the altiplano “despite” its high (pastoralist-based) mobility, both in and 
outside market circuits, and its strategic position on colonial trade routes that 
connected the Pacific to the mining frontier. In Carangas, an apparent discordance is 
evidenced in the persistence of collective land rights, transnational mobility and the 
recuperation of ancestral territorial and institutional autonomy in a broader region that 
has undergone commodifying pressures for centuries and in a period. However, it 
cannot be simply assumed that Carangas or other (hacienda-)“free” regions were 
“overlooked”; rather the different experience of areas that were less (visibly) connected 
to the most palpable outbursts of this transition should be critically assessed. The 
parallelism between increasing peripheralization of the Andes as a world region and the 
encroachment on Andean communities’ autonomy can indeed not be reduced to a one-
size-fits-all model.  
Here surfaces the previously discussed “gap”. From a distance, this “gap” is simply 
the outcome of a protracted process of marginalization, which indeed constitutes large 
part of the story. However, a closer look reveals how the creation of this gap entailed a 
much more complex process of renegotiation between local communities and their 
leaders with central state institutions and economic and political intermediaries. The 
premise to seize this region is that it offers a relevant case to demonstrate that 
incorporation is not a total transformation but entails multiple “frontiers”. I suggest 
that the communities of Carangas were not just “overlooked” but actively “extorted” 
concessions regarding their space for manoeuver, which is a process of creating 
“counterspaces”. On basis of that premise, an inquiry of the Carangas experience does 
not simply seek to fill out the blanks of what in se is a very variegated picture, but can 
contribute to a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the historically, spatially and 
socially “unevenness” of rural transformations. 
Renegotiating autonomous space for communal control: guiding research 
questions.  
The critical question underlying the choice of the specific case study repeats the 
question formulated regarding land rights commodification in relation to communal 
land rights: how communal “spaces of manoeuvre” have been reduced, negated and 
recreated in the face of old and modern enclosures. The above presented premises and 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
in order to equally integrate the trajectory of the Uru-Chipaya and other -by now disappeared- Uru groups 
that have inhabited the region and equally shaped its history. 
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interrogations regarding this query can now be translated into the set of questions that 
guide the case study on Carangas.  
I start from the observation that the measures of the 1874 land reform were never 
implemented nor did local elite incursions into community lands materialize into a 
hacienda complex. This leads to a first question: why and how was the imposed land 
rights reorganization of customary land systems and the related expansion of the 
hacienda system kept at bay in Carangas? In asking that question, it is assumed that 
these communities and their land systems were not left unthreatened; they were not 
simply “saved”. Rather, the case of Carangas illustrates that “where estates [haciendas] 
were weak, communities organized, and markets limited, communities and cultivators could block 
liberal projects or channel them toward community goals” (Tutino 1999, 655 on Jackson 1997). 
This blocking and channelling hints at a more subtle and more ambiguous process. 
Therefore, the question is not just why this operation was never implemented in 
Carangas, but also which tangible and more underground implications this had for 
further developments in the province.  
Consequently, a second question must be assessed: What were the long-term changes 
in social power relations, in terms of control over resources and vulnerability, spatial 
reorganizations and connectedness, and the strength of community structure? How did 
the land reform impact upon social inequality and ethnic identity? In the first place, the 
region as a whole seems to further peripheralize; however what were the causes of this 
protracted marginalization? Interviews and testimonies by locals about the Carangas’ 
history usually spend little attention to the region’s “experience of Bolivian liberalism”, 
instead elaborating on the region’s rich colonial history, when it constituted a vital 
(transport) link in the Andean (silver) connection to the world economy. The apparent 
“erasure” of this conflictive period from communal historical consciousness suggests 
indeed that the region turned into itself. However, as Platt (1982, 170) explains, it is 
rather through oblivion (either the incapacity or refusal to recognize how these 
communities sustained commercial circuits) that this idea of remoteness (both in its 
physical sense as within the “national history”) is actively imposed upon regions such as 
Carangas. In other words, the impression of isolation and marginalization may not be 
simply assumed as the outcome of supposed indigenous “helplessness” and as the all-
explaining factor but must be critically de-constructed. 
In line with the proposed approach to frontier trajectories, the assessment of these 
two guiding questions departs from a ‘disentanglement’ of land commodifying pressures 
into four “phases”.15 The case study starts with the formal and de facto concretization of 
 
                                                     
15 In the case of rural incorporation, a frontier process can be depicted as an incorporation trajectory that (1) 
stems from a “drive” for incorporation (the objective, for instance land commodification); (2) these pressures 
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the reform, that is, the national legislation of disentailment “on the paper” (how were 
commodification pressures “translated” into a body of laws?) and the impact of 
disentailment “on the ground” (to what extent did it alter the spaces and edges of local 
(rural) livelihoods?). It then particularly looks into the responsiveness of communities 
in order to secure their access to basic communal resource pools such as land (which 
repertoires of reaction were developed?) and how this has smoothened, restricted, or 
halted the incorporation of rural spaces and societies and the effects this had on the 
sustainability of local communal life (what is the “feedback” generated through this 
process?).  
This reconstruction will be related to the factors of ecology, demography-ethnicity, 
market, state and communal agency (see “Thematic angle”), pointing to the role of the 
region’s attractiveness (or not) as a strategic resource frontier, the constellation and 
interplay of Aymara, Uru and mestizo populations, the strength of the connection to an 
expanding market sphere, the institutional strength and local presence of the state, and 
communal organization of representation and resistance. Together, these factors 
determine the research framework within which the communal renegotiation of the 
terms of their participation and autonomy as a landowning, taxpaying and 
representative actor in the Bolivian state-in-formation and its world-economic 
integration will be assessed.  
Far from constituting a neat “incorporation matrix”, this framework presents a 
complex tangle of frontier processes, which are interlinked by the mechanisms (or 
“actions”) that bring land rights commodification into operation. These mechanisms 
relate to processes of legislation (specifically the constitution the Bolivian land system), 
taxation (specifically the constitution of the fiscal tributo system), territorial 
“unlocking” (forms of infrastructure), elite renovation (specifically the ascent and 
evaporation of the “vecinos” class in Carangas) and ethnic identity formation (the 
reconfiguration of ethnic boundaries). Under Bolivian liberalism, this concretized into a 
push for the allocation of “absolute” private property rights, the implementation of a 
cadastral fiscal system, the take-off of a transport revolution, the organization of 
indirect community representation and the dissemination of discursive politics of 
assimilation. The interweaving of these “actions” with the factors upon which a 
research framework was constructed and with overlapping frontier processes has 
resulted in a chapter outline that does not necessarily reflect this framework at a single 
glance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
have an impact upon the spaces and edges of local rural livelihoods; (3) these local actors respond to those 
pressures and that impact; (4) this impact and the response entail a “feedback” effect in terms of vulnerability 
and revitalization. See Part I. 
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Lines and limits of inquiry.  
My endeavour to trace and integrate the presented topics, questions and hypotheses 
has been restricted by several deliberately imposed and unintended limits. This 
restriction is partly motivated by the lack or lacking accessibility of relevant sources to 
properly discuss and integrate certain themes, and partly by intentional choices to 
confine the scope of this research to a workable research outline. Originally, my 
research ambition entailed the tracing of three interlinked frontier processes; the 
commodification of land rights, of trade networks and of national spaces and identities. 
However, as the research advanced and the processes under study gradually showed 
themselves from their most complex side, I chose to somehow order them in a 
hierarchical order. Land thus came to constitute the decisive variable in my analysis, 
however without ruling out its tight connection to processes of economic-commercial 
and national integration.  
As a result, while the importance of mobility and trade is an unquestionable “pillar” 
of Carangas’ history, this angle has been integrated rather as a “side-line” of the central 
line of research. However, this does not mean that it did not receive the required 
attention throughout my research activities. Particularly Carangas’ Pacific connection 
triggered my attention and I decided to further elaborate this link, including archival 
research in Iquique, Arica and Tacna. However, due to restructurings of the dissertation 
and for the sake of tree conservation, I plan to complete the outcome of that endeavour 
as separate publications. The topic of mining, which was initially central to my 
formulation of research questions, moved even further in the background, mainly 
because of the relatively fewer (sources regarding) mining activities in 19th century 
Carangas. Another line of inquiry that difficultly comes to the surface is gender, as 
female voices are relatively difficult to record, both in archival sources as in field work.16 
However, some revealing topics (such as trade and credit; vecino women) indicate that 
this terrain has potential for a closer assessment. An equally “silenced” group is the Uru 
population, who are certainly not absent from this research but a detailed inquiry into 
their history falls beyond the scope of these pages. Their trajectory, in which weak land 
rights culminate in centuries-long (and still continuing) marginalization, deserves 
indisputably and urgently further exploration.17  
 
                                                     
16 In contrast, the court of Corque, where I spent possibly most of my archive research time, constitutes today 
a real women’s bastion,  bringing the management of the former province’s key historical documentation into 
female hands.  
17 Important research has been realized by Pauwels (1983, 186-193, and 1999) and Wachtel (2001 ). 
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Although the case research exclusively focuses on a single provincial unit, my 
assessment of Carangas is framed within a multi-scaled analysis, which may facilitate 
further comparative research with either other sectors of the Oruro or altiplano region 
(think of the Poopó province, the Chayanta and Lípez provinces), and across similar or 
contrasting areas in Latin-America (think of the Mexican ejido system) and other world 
regions (think of the similarities with the Tibetan plateau) in terms of ecology, 
economic integration, and communal autonomy. Also in terms of temporal delimitation, 
my research attests to the value of a comparative diachronic analysis with former and 
later land reforms. 
Indeed, the source situation was decisive in guiding the course of my research. The 
fact that most of the consulted archives were produced by jurisdictional and 
government institutions has contributed to the strong legal-political inclination of the 
case research, rather than an economic assessment of changes in land access. Moreover, 
as the methodological section will indicate, my analysis of the land reform has a strong 
socio-anthropological inclination, given the entanglement with the “Indian question”. 
These methodological considerations have been included as an addendum in the first 
part of this dissertation. 
 
 
Organization of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organized into three parts. The first part constructs the global 
framework, the second situates the setting of the case study in space and time and the 
last part ties that setting to the global framework by reconstructing the land rights 
trajectory of the rural communities of Carangas in the context of post-colonial land 
reform. The introduction to each Part of the chapter includes a more detailed outline of 
the organization of the chapters. 
Part I starts with a brief introduction to how the notion of frontier and how it came 
to figure centrally in my analytical approach to incorporation. The first chapter 
concretizes the use of that concept as a “World-Systems Frontier Perspective”, as I have 
baptized the theoretical framework of this research. In discussing the main inspiration 
sources for elaborating this perspective, it first comments on the world-systemic origins 
of this framework, but also its inherent (epistemological) critique to the blind spots of 
Wallerstein’s “modern” model (1.1). Then, the chapter dissects the building blocks of 
that framework: the frontier, understood as a fluctuating process of incorporation, and 
the frontier zone, understood as a contact zone where incorporation is “under 
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negotiation” (1.2). The question remains how the trajectory of a frontier and the 
transformation of a specific frontier zone can be reconstructed in space and time, 
particularly regarding the process of land commodification. Therefore, the second 
chapter will frame these general theoretical outlines within the entangled fields of 
peasant studies and Andean ethnohistory. It explains that the incorporation of Andean 
“peasants” and “indigenous” people is a process of categorization (2.1) in function of 
hegemonizing states and expanding market spheres, but foremost a process of 
negotiation over those categories, thereby “thwarting” the binary story of peasant and 
indigenous survival or disappearance (2.2). It then specifies these incorporation 
mechanisms and its “feedback effects” in the context of the creation and recreation of 
global frontiers of land control (2.3). Apart from concluding remarks, this first part 
finishes with an addendum on the methodological choices and implications in 
conducting this research. 
Part II sketches the spatial and temporal outlines of the setting of the case study, the 
province of Carangas around 1900. While some readers will be taken to a mysterious 
world of lama’s and mountains, this part may offer others little more than a Wikipedia-
style overview of a familiar terrain. This part is in part rather descriptive, but it forms 
the elementary foundation for the story I want to tell in Part III. The introduction to this 
part gives ample attention to the adopted methodological approach, including 
comments on the use and combination of sources, and specifies the questions that guide 
the following two chapters. It then takes off with a prologue that provides in an 
introduction to the Andean landscape, patterns of human settlement and adaptation to 
this particular environment and the basics of the productive system that materialized. 
In chapters 3 and 4,  the way in which the factors (see “Thematic angle”) determine the 
access to assets, power and sovereignty is concretized with regards to Carangas. An 
introduction is given to the case region, including the demographic developments 
(3.1.1) and the forms of territorial organization (3.1.2) that have shaped its history. 
Then, the local organization of rural livelihoods is analysed, in terms of labour (3.2.1), 
livestock (3.2.2) and land (3.2.3). A third section links up to the next chapter, describing 
how this productive system entangled with broader structures for extraction and 
exchange (3.3). Chapter four scrutinizes these broader structures, first giving a more 
detailed chronology of what has been defined as the period of “Bolivian liberalism”, to 
then dissect the legal-fiscal system for land regulation (4.1), the patterns and practices 
in the circulation of people and resources (4.2), and the cyclical process of rural elite 
formation (4.3) that organized life on the Carangas countryside in that period. 
In the introduction to Part III, my approach and questions underlying my analysis of 
the Exvinculación land reform in Carangas. Chapter 5 gives an outline of national 
developments that preceded (5.1) and backed the take-off of the 1874 Alienation Act (Ley 
de Exvinculación) (5.2) until the eruption of mounting indigenous protest and the ascent 
of new elite forces in the 1899 federal war (5.3). Chapter 6 takes that development to the 
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level of the Carangas province, starting with the how the communities dealt with 
president Melgerajo’s land reform decrees (6.1). It then discusses how the last rented 
valley lands under direct control of several communities of Carangas were confiscated 
in the course of the land reform process (6.2). Then, the focus is put on the repeated 
efforts to implement the Revisita and how these pressures fostered the spread of 
rebellion and internal violence in the 1870s-1890s (6.3). It then scrutinizes how this 
instigated the emergence of a modest apoderados generales movement in Carangas (6.4) 
and how this mobilization erupted in the 1899 rebellion (6.5). Chapter 7 departs from 
the post-1899 context and looks into the subsequent evolution and implications of the 
initiated land reform process in Carangas until around 1930. First assesses the 
(im)mobility of strategic resource frontiers in the province (7.1) and then moves the 
focus to the local dynamics provoked by the imminence of the Revisita, both in terms of 
internal conflict as of communal mobilization (7.2). A third section addresses the 
question of vecinos intermediation in the management and defence of communal lands 
(7.3) and closes with a discussion of the changing national discourse regarding vecinos 
and indigenous peasants in early 20th century Bolivia (7.4).  
In the concluding remarks to the entire dissertation, I recapitulate the main insights 
regarding the trajectory of Bolivia’s first land reform in the province of Carangas, 
formulated as a frontier process, related to the negotiation over processes of 
incorporation and linking up to long-term effects that nurture a “thwarted” trajectory. 
The maps and tables in the Appendixes support the reader’s way through this 
dissertation. 
 
 
  
PART I. A frontier perspective. 
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Introduction to Part I. “Where the action is” 
While capitalism may be “a phenomenon that knew no frontiers” in terms of digestible 
spaces or societies (Wallerstein 1974, 67), this statement in fact implies that capitalism 
constantly creates frontiers. Even more, it needs frontiers. Emerging from the dynamic 
frictions within and at the outer edge of the world-system, frontiers symptomize a 
systemic difference. These differences are not (necessarily) found “on the brink” of an 
expansive system, but on both its external boundaries and internal subdivisions. In 
observing the dialectic of homogenization (the eventual evaporation of systemic 
differences) and heterogenization (their reproduction), it is not so much the finiteness 
but the permanence of systemic differences that must be questioned. The presented 
research addresses the (re)production of frontiers in relation to the question on the 
inevitable, desirable or tragic vanishing of peasantries and of indigenous groups. Central 
point of discussion is the presumed incompatibility –the friction- between peripherally 
located rural groups and the development of a capitalist world-economy. This first part 
of the dissertation introduces the analytical tools deployed to tackle those questions 
and presumptions. 
Instead of pretending to develop an entirely new approach, the presented theoretical 
framework builds further on key insights that have emerged in, or in dialogue with, the 
field of World-Systems Analysis. Thanks to varied contributions by followers, sceptics 
and opponents of the idea of an expanding world-systemic force, my use of the notion of 
a world-system is not directly imported from a closed theory patented by Wallerstein. 
World-Systems Analysis is presented not as the only or the best analytical instrument, 
but as a valid and ‘malleable’ choice for a theoretical framework that prevent multi-
scaled connections of floating somewhere in the air. My approach stays far away from 
imagined all-powerful organisms and their prescribed histories and rather pursues a 
comprehensive analysis of local-global interconnectedness.  
The most essential steppingstones in the fine-tuning of that approach centre on the 
concept of frontier as defined by a host of researchers who either explicitly or more 
loosely relate their work to World-Systems Analysis. My first introduction to these 
concepts were the alternative readings of world-systems analysis offered by 
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anthropologist Thomas Hall (Hall 2000; 2012). Following Hall, frontiers are “where the 
action is” and a frontier zone is the spatial dimension of that action; where “the system” 
enters in interaction with –gets to know, questions, attacks…- forms of organization 
based on an-other logic in the context of incorporation processes (Hall 2012, 51). The 
innovation of Hall’s “frontier perspective” is that it explicitly unveils the margins as the 
pulsating heart of that system. In line and at times in direct collaboration with each 
other, scholars from various disciplines have appropriated, adapted and elaborated 
similar insights on frontier “production”. This has resulted in a diverse and fertile 
“field” of frontier research, situated on the interdisciplinary crossroads of history, 
anthropology and geography. What binds that field is an understanding of frontier as a 
creative process through which social, ecological and epistemological change becomes 
intrinsically entangled in the context of systemic expansion. Noteworthy is that nearly 
all these frontier-related analyses and applications have emerged from the study of 
colonial encounters.  
Rather than a metaphor for ‘naturally given’ contact, frontiers point to the 
construction of encounter, to the asymmetrical power relations behind that encounter, 
and to the agency of both core and peripheral participants in that encounter. Frontier 
as a construct means that contact is presented in terms of a limit between two different, 
delineated groups –categorized as “civilized” and “barbaric”- that must be bridged in 
order to unite both into a settled uniform (hence controllable) social order (Boccara 
2005, 33). In order to eliminate that imagined limit, intercultural contact is remodelled 
from separation to interrelation. This is where frontiers come into play, conceived as 
processes which by definition have a start and an end. A frontier process could be 
defined as the “settling” of things that were first “open”, undecided, under negotiation. 
In a world-systemic perspective the aim of that settling could be defines as the 
expansion of the core-based established order, or at least the attempt to transfer and 
impose (aspects of) that order to peripheral regions. Whereas some may insist on the 
frontier as “a force for historical continuity and conservatism” (Kopytoff 1987, 12) while 
others stress it as a force of change, the bottom-line is that the frontier provides in a 
vacuum for the unfolding of social processes  
Running counter to linear evocations of frontiers, this settling has a more complex 
spatial dimension, structured by new limits functional to the creation of a social order 
whose outlook is still wavering. A frontier zone takes shape where different actors -be 
they individuals, companies, projects, institutions, etc.- embedded in different decision-
making systems come into sustained contact with each other and where there are no 
common rules of encounter defined (Sassen 2012, 1). In that sense, Saskia Sassen 
explains that frontier zones have strategic potential as much for the most powerful as 
for the powerless (loc. cit.). The fundamental point of departure regarding frontier zones 
is that they are connected, mobile, and constantly changing, both in space and in time. 
As instances of discontinuity, frontier zones are traceable in the trajectories of spatial 
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integration of old and new frontier zones of the world-system, produced through 
external incorporation or internal differentiation respectively. Because encounters are 
never static but intensify or dilute, frontiers and frontier zones have many faces and 
masks, with accelerations, retreats and standstills. These transformations in shape and 
content, but also apparent immobility point to the factors of space, history and agency 
in frontier “production,” revealing frontiers as three-dimensional processes.  
Analysing frontier processes is instructive to questions on capitalist expansion. It 
reveals that this expansive drive operates through dynamic feedback links. This means 
that commodified social structures do not expand automatically but generate a 
response, whether anticipated or not, which may alter its course. “To-be-incorporated” 
groups may for instance forge alliances or carve out of concessions. In spatial terms, the 
operation and effect of feedback links gives evidence of the creation and defence of 
autonomous “counter-spaces” (Andolina, Laurie and Radcliffe 2009). Local communities’ 
achievements in extorting and protecting room for manoeuver, a margin for communal 
action, do not merely stem from concrete political demands but from their discursive 
struggles “to mark out relatively autonomous spheres in which to gain control over the meanings 
of their lives” (Abercrombie 1998, 10). Rather than reading these spatial patterns as 
instances of isolation or resistance, they must be interpreted as the lever that converts 
incorporation into a negotiated process.  
A concrete illustration of negotiated incorporation is the “production” of the (rural) 
Andes as a frontier zone, which is an ongoing process that started with the colonial 
encounter. That starting point does not constitute a single shock, but a still unfinished 
process that is continuously reproduced in both the most localized histories as global 
developments in state formation and market expansion. The centripetal force behind 
the intertwinement of the Andean rural zone with global incorporation processes is the 
struggle over the allocation of resources. Access to land, territories and resources 
generate a discord, where peasant and indigenous peoples appear as initiators rather 
than mere reactors, moulding the commodification of land and property rights into an 
“uneven” and intensely negotiated trajectory. 
The following two chapters construct the analytical framework to capture and give 
meaning to incorporation as a negotiated process. In the first chapter, this short 
introduction to the notion of frontier is further elaborated and situated within the field 
of world-systems analysis (1.1). It starts with a brief outline of the model that 
Wallerstein has defined as “the modern world-system” (1.1.1), to then focus on the 
central elements of “World-Systems Analysis”, the research perspective that has 
emerged around that model (1.1.2). This presentation also gives attention to 
epistemological critiques towards the world-system paradigm and how these theories 
nurture the proposed notion of “frontier” (1.1.3). This first section ends by presenting 
the concept of frontier as a vital contribution to world-system analysis for allowing a 
more comprehensive approach to the question of peripheral agency (1.1.4). In the next 
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section, the building blocks of the presented perspective (1.2). It presents frontiers as 
fluctuating processes of incorporation that fuel world-systemic expansion and 
contraction (1.2.1) and explains how these processes create and recreate frontier zones 
where peoples and places are linked and delinked within commodified production 
relations (1.2.2). This movement of frontiers and the related formation and 
disintegration of frontier zones produce a feedback reaction, pointing to the 
simultaneity of integration and differentiation in the context of world-systemic 
expansion (1.2.3). 
The second chapter, then, concretizes the abstract notion of a frontier zone by 
zooming in on the historical trajectory of incorporation of the rural Andes thereby 
explaining key concepts in this research such as peasant, indigenous and community. 
First, it zooms in on how this trajectory involves a process of categorization (2.1). This is 
reflected in the definition of a “peasant question” (2.1.1) and an “Indian question” 
(2.1.2), which run as overlapping leitmotivs throughout the historical processes of state 
and market integration in the Andes. In the next section, the communal framework 
(2.2.1) of both resistant and pragmatic peasant and/or indigenous responses to 
processes of state formation (2.2.2) and world market expansion (2.2.3) is discussed. 
Lastly, these insights are related to the global process of land and property 
commodification (2.3.1) and specified by describing the historical construction of an 
Andean/Bolivian land system (2.3.2). The concluding remarks give a recap of this first 
theoretical part of the dissertation.  
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Chapter 1  
World-Systems Frontier Analysis  
“Truly the world has been opened to the human race”  
Juan Luis Vives, 15311  
 
Figure 2 World map from the manuscript The First New Chronicle and Good Government of 
Guaman Poma de Ayala. With permission of the Royal Library of Denmark, 
Copenhagen (Guaman Poma de Ayala 1615/1616, GKS 2232, 4).  
 
                                                     
1 Own translation. Cited in Pérez Murillo 2003, 131. Juan Luis Vives (1493-1540) was a Spanish humanist who 
spent the bigger part of his life in the Southern Netherlands and contributed significantly to the first 
developments in psychology. In this citation, Vives expresses the impact of the “discovery” of the New World. 
 24 
To understand the reinforced struggle of indigenous groups in the midst of an 
ecologically degrading world or the significance of food crises in a highly industrial 
world that produces ever more food, one needs an appropriate vantage point, that is, a 
global perspective (Vanhaute 2012). This perspective is not simply about enlarging one’s 
scope, but about detecting multiple scales in processes of social change. This points to 
the central challenge in writing this research; to “recreate the lives of real people in their 
broad historical context, but without reducing the human experience to a mere reflection of deep, 
long-term historical forces” (Andrien 2001, 8; see also Marcus 1986). Grand narratives and 
isolated case studies designed on the assumption of a single scale have been pushed into 
the margin. Out of the debates over the powerful yet complex repercussion of these 
global-local entanglements connections in the globalized world of today, world history 
has emerged as a relatively new but intensely expanding academic field. It is the ever 
more perceptibility and “accessibility” of global interconnectedness that made world 
history possible and necessary (Stearns 2000, 1).  
According to one of the key authors/actors in the field, Patrick Manning, world 
history counts “the story of connections within the global human community” (Manning 2003, 
3).2 Rather than prioritizing the global, or any other specific scale, world history insists 
on its interlocking with smaller and larger scales – knowing to link a tree’s smallest 
atom to the entire ecosystem (see Northrop 2012, 3 on McNeill, 82-4). Despite 
constituting a very heterogeneous field in terms of thematic, geographical, temporal or 
methodological preferences, all accounts coincide in their questioning of any assumed 
delineation of the scope of analysis, under the premise that “[s]cales only get their 
meaning from interdependency” (Vanhaute 2009, 25; see also Galaty 2011, 8). In that sense, 
“global history could, or should, become part of any history” as has been testified in relation 
to the field of Latin-American history (Serulnikov and Lluch 2014). 
With respect to the particular area of my attention, it should be noted that “the 
history of Latin America has been instrumental to the rise of world history”, yet the spatial and 
temporal representations of Latin America within global narratives seem to be scarred 
for life by the idea of incongruity (Benton 2004, 423-8; see also Adelman 2004, 400). 
Indeed, the study of world-historical processes –analysing “regimes of territorialisation and 
their permanent renegotiation over time” (Middell and Naumann 2010)- comprises a double 
tension; spatial and temporal. In terms of space, the question of how to give relevance 
to regional historiographies in relation to global(izing) studies constitutes an important 
 
                                                     
2 As approaches and terminologies to address supra-local interactions have proliferated, world history has 
come to overlap or compete with transnational history, universal history and the like. The increasing 
awareness of the constitutive role of connections make some for instance speak of “connected histories” 
(Gruzinski 2001, 86; Subrahmanyam 1997 and 2005). Insights into the intrinsic entanglement of these 
connections has given birth to the field of histoire croisée (Werner and Zimmermann 2006). 
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battleground in the field of world history (Manning 2003, 166; Middell and Naumann 
2010, 156-61). Zooming in a little more, the ways in which very localized trajectories 
“splinter” global trajectories similarly tends to nurture the idea that “there is no global 
history, only local histories” (Mignolo 2000), although this might be rephrased as the 
dictate that “tell the story about the world requires local histories” (Adelman 2004, 406).3 The 
temporal challenge to local-global entanglements addresses the question of how to 
develop an integrated analysis of both the underlying structural patterns and the 
specific stories “on the ground” (and underground). In assessing the dialectic relation 
between the scales of key events and of everyday events, continuities, as also Braudel 
(1980, 172) agreed, may eventually appear more interesting than ruptures.  
Within world history and affiliated fields, there is a -nonetheless modest- move to 
bring the “margins” or “spaces in between” at the centre of analysis. Although (world-
)historical inquiry is still dominantly directed towards “core areas” (Clossey and Guyatt 
2013), many have endorsed and copied Pierre Vilar’s statement that the frontier is a 
privileged place to observe the history of the world (Hall 2001; Sahlins 1989, xv; Vilar 
1985, 23). However, it must be noted that a view from the margin does not simply equal 
a bottom-up view or a non-core view. As Das and Poole emphasize, “the forms of 
illegibility, partial belonging, and disorder that seem to inhabit the margins of the state constitute 
its necessary condition as a theoretical and political object,” converting a “marginal” view 
into a very “statal” view (Das and Poole 2004, 6). 
Accepting the premise that frontiers play a conditional role in world-historical 
processes, I will propose a “world-systems frontier analysis” to address those processes. 
The adopted perspective departs from insights into (not the blind assumption of) the 
workings of what has been formulated by Immanuel Wallerstein as the modern world-
system. It is a choice for a viable –not the exclusive, let alone the best- tool to deal with 
the question of how to integrate the global, the local, and all scales in between. As Hall 
and Fenelon state, “it has developed the analysis of large-scale systems arising from capitalist 
societal controls and yet can identify micro processes of social change on the level of the 
community” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 149). The same authors state that  
“One of the powerful insights from world-system theory is that the fundamental 
entity evolving is the system itself and that the evolution of any component of it 
... must be understood within the context of system evolution. That is, they are 
part of feedback processes through which the world-system at any specific time 
 
                                                     
3 Rather than to withdraw from world history, a more viable answer is in recounting the widening of the 
world through the history of “very small places”. Wright’s account of  such a place that is typically believed to 
have evolved in isolation from “the” world is becoming a classic answer to the question of local-global 
entanglements (Wright 2010, 8). 
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limits the possibilities for its components while simultaneously these components 
constitute the system” (ibid, 15).  
While I do agree on that point, it must be stressed that “the system” is the highest, 
but not the most fundamental level nor has it agency of its own. The common critique of 
world-systems analysis being a purely top-down and economical model that lacks 
dynamics and agency usually disregards that point. It is not because Wallerstein’s model 
is generally applied to explain developments in or radiating from the core, that World-
Systems Analysis is not able to integrate localized and peripheral phenomena.4 After all, 
the clue is in the interaction and interconnection (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 12; Chase-
Dunn and Hall 1997 and 2006; Vanhaute 2013, 10). Instead of fitting that interaction into 
pre-designed patterns, world-systems approach offers a “lens” that may or even must 
be creatively and critically tested and modified by applying unbound interactions to 
that lens (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 11). In that sense, world-systems analysis may profit 
from further research and discussion on persisting centrism’s and blind spots. 
1.1 From the limits of World-Systems Analysis to the frontiers 
of the World-System. 
1.1.1 The Modern World-System 
The World-System perspective, born in the early 1970s, is a child of its time. The 
concrete ideas that would lead to Wallerstein’s theorizing endeavour originated from 
the feeling that a cycle came to an end (Williams 2013). From the 1960s on, the first 
hints at the “limits to growth”, the complicated process of decolonization, the first 
fissures in U.S. hegemony and the general disillusionment with the post-war promise of 
progress started to destabilize what Wallerstein has called “the optimism of the oppressed” 
(Wallerstein 2006, 85). This nourished social scientists’ criticism towards classic 
modernization theories. Around the middle of the 20th century, several fundamental 
critiques to modernization theory -and to the dominant structures of knowledge in 
general- were developed by Third World scholars, Marxists and Annales historians that 
would play a constitutive role in the conceptualization of a “world-system” perspective. 
 
                                                     
4 Think of the African roots of Wallerstein’s own intellectual trajectory in designing “his” model (Wallerstein 
2012b, 6). 
  27 
Also Wallerstein’s personal experience as an Africanist in the context of colonial 
collapse, as an academic in a ‘university in crisis’ and as a young American facing the 
cultural shock of 1968 strengthened his sense that the dominant paradigm of 
modernization was inadequate to explain social change (Wallerstein 2012b, 7).  
A first source of inspiration was the core-periphery model propagated by the 
dependista school that arose in Latin America around Raúl Prebisch and his ECLA 
colleagues, also formulated independently by another UN economist, Hans Singer 
(Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). Core-periphery analysis was based on the observation of 
the inequality between international trade partners. This model was further elaborated 
in terms of “unequal exchange” or, as coined by Andre Gunder Frank, “the development of 
underdevelopment” (Frank 1966; see also 1979 and with Gills 1993).5 Rather than the initial 
condition of a linear and staged evolution, underdevelopment was defined as the 
differentiated outcome of a historical expansive process in which subaltern groups have 
been absorbed through conquest, assimilation, nation-building and internal colonialism, 
camouflaged by a discourse of “development” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 5).  
A second input emerged from the challenge to orthodox Marxism. While post-Stalin 
communists rediscovered Marx’ Asiatic mode of production, a debate over the external 
and internal factors leading to capitalist transition developed among historians. This 
opened up space for less ideologically constrained versions of world-historical 
trajectories (Wallerstein 2006, 13-4).  
Thirdly, a chief and maybe Wallerstein’s most important source of inspiration was 
Fernand Braudel’s insistence on a historical social science that integrates a long-term 
and large-scale approach.6 In order to reveal the commonly neglected underlying 
multiple time frames, he expanded the short-term histoire événementielle with the 
concept of structural time or longue durée comprising the cyclical procedure of medium-
term trends (Grosfoguel 1997). Spatially, Braudel proposed the économie-monde as the 
appropriate unit of analysis to operationalize his theory of economic long waves. 
In 1974, these sources of inspiration and Wallerstein’s own academic trajectory 
crystalized in a first book of what would become his magnum opus. Arisen out of a 
theoretical critique among social scientists but with an essentially historical focus, the 
 
                                                     
5 Similar to Frank’s move from dependista to world systems theory (Kay 2005, 1180; Frank 2011 [1978]), other 
dependency school theorists would later criticize the underlying dichotomy of dependency theories and 
“convert” into world system theorists (Amin 1974; Arrighi 1994). Interesting to note is also how the BRICS 
countries currently challenge this postulation by breaking with dependency “through” capitalism (economic 
growth), thereby countering the prime claim of the dependentistas that capitalism “produces” dependency. 
6 His first work was on the Mediterranean, which appeared first in 1949 and where he presents three levels of 
history: the time of the environment, of the long-term, and of events (Braudel 1949). Subsequently he 
published his most famous work, a three-volume work on material civilization and capitalism (Braudel 1979) 
and “concluded” his master contribution to history and related fields with his “Afterthoughts” (Braudel 1977). 
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volumes of The Modern World-System7 do not simply count the story of a world (let alone 
“the” world) but also offer an alternative model to explain the origins and evolution of 
historical capitalism. Their relevance is not so much in providing in the final account of 
historical capitalism, but in hinting at an instrument to explain the origins, rise and 
future of historical capitalism as an integrated societal model. 
Hopkins and Wallerstein have defined historical capitalism as  
“a system of integrated production processes within a singular world-economy 
based on an axial division of labor, ensconced within an interstate system 
composed of so-called sovereign states, fueled by the objective of the endless 
accumulation of capital” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987, 774). 
Wallerstein explains that system as follows. During the long 16th century (1450-1640), 
a new form of socio-economic organization took shape and expanded cyclically, driven 
by the need for labour, resources and markets. This organization was bound by a world-
economy, and it was capitalist in essence, and as such generated “the modern world-
system” (Wallerstein 2006, 23). First, what defines this world-economy as capitalist and 
makes it to a system is in the first place a division of labour that is shaped and 
reproduced through goods, labour and capital exchange between differentiated regions 
and groups. This exchange implies an unequal transfer between core and periphery 
zones. Wallerstein extended this dual zonation by adding the semi-periphery as a 
necessary structural element that “is not an artifice of statistical cutting points, nor is it a 
residual category” (Wallerstein 1974, 349). Second, these zones do not share a single 
political regime as in world-empires, but are tied to multiple political units that 
constitute a heterogeneous interstate system (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987, 765). 
Third, the division of labour and the exchange between its differentiated zones obeys to 
structural mechanisms that eliminate the limits to the accumulation of capital. This 
distinguishes this world-system from non-capitalist societal structures in that “the 
economic factors operate within an arena larger than that which any political entity can totally 
control” (Wallerstein 1974, 348).  
According to Wallerstein’s definition, capitalism does not simply emerge where 
people accumulate capital, but where priority is given to the endless accumulation of 
capital (Wallerstein 2006, 24). Such a zone only exists since the 16th century in Europe, 
excluding Russia and the Ottoman empire, and Iberian America. The subsequent 
evolution of that zone corresponds to long-term cyclical patterns of expansion and 
contraction that steer the incorporation of new regions and peoples. This is the process 
 
                                                     
7 At this moment the counter indicates four (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989 and 2011 ). 
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of pulsation, observed in the secular trends of Kondratieff waves.8 It entails the “physical 
expansion of its boundaries through the incorporation of new zones” or enlargement, the 
“deepening of the capitalist process via mechanization, commodification, and contraction” or 
intensification, and the polarization by a process of constant “corification” and 
“peripheralization,” expressed in growing gaps (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987, 774).9 
Moreover, this process is interposed by “the constant reproduction of a certain relatively 
small number of “semiperipheral” states which are located “in the middle” and whose existence 
forms a necessary part of the operation of capitalist accumulation” (ibid). A concrete and 
contemporary illustration of the acceleration and ambiguity of this drive for endless 
accumulation is how the soy frontier’s geographical expansion into the Amazon basin 
and the related intensification of genetic modification and mechanized labour methods 
is related to the paradoxical coexistence of global over-production and under-nutrition. 
In providing the world-system with the ability to expand where world-empires 
encounter their limits, historical capitalism has been the only systemic entity so far able 
to cover the whole planet. This was achieved by the end of the 19th century; the first 
moment in human history that no multiple historical systems co-existed with the 
capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 2011). As a result, at the entrance of the 21st 
century, no single individual, economic transaction, political regime or cultural 
expression remains exempt from even the slightest –although often ambiguous and 
hardly noticeable- influence of the modern world-system. Confronted with the question 
how such an extensive structure maintains a minimal degree of cohesion, Wallerstein 
added (later) the notion of “geoculture”. With this addition he indicates that, apart from 
economic ties, the system’s functioning is also supported by a framework of “moral 
 
                                                     
8 Pulsation means that world-systems “expand and contract, or expand more before their expansion proceeds less 
rapidly” (Hall 2012, 48; see also Hall 2006). This movement stems from the inherent drive for and limits to 
systemic expansion, proving the existence of a historical system but simultaneously indicating the level of 
instability in the functioning of that system (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 121). The ascent and decline of Dutch, 
British and U.S. hegemony displays a rhythm of technological and commercial revolutions and how this goess 
accompanied by the escalation and abating of military struggle and the alternation of institutional 
dependency and decolonization (Arrighi 1994). 
9 The transfer of resources to core locations is structured by a social process of polarization, producing the 
peripheralization of the most vulnerable places and groups. A world-economy, Wallerstein wrote, "tends to 
expand the economic and social gaps among its varying areas in the very process of its development" (Wallerstein 1974, 
350). These gaps crystalize around a dichotomist logic that sustains the operation of unequal exchange -both 
in terms of economic as in terms of knowledge exchange- in the modern world-system (Mitchell 2002; 
Mignolo 2000). The way in which a region and its people have been pushed into a dependent position through 
an asymmetrical restructuring of power relations is clearly observable in the Andes. Here, the creation of 
global connections went hand in hand with the absorption of land, labour and capital resources of by capitalist 
sectors, converting the region in a bulk goods-producing zone (Moore 2010c) and reducing its population to a 
segregated and falsely homogeneous “republic” (Thurner 1997, 6). 
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justifications” (Wallerstein 2006, 75; 2011). Although the underlying idea is evident, his 
application of the concept is not very convincing as it fails to include the diversity of 
marginal (that is, without dominant ambitions) cultural and knowledge schemes within 
and beyond the contours of the system (Mignolo 2000, 41-2; Dussel 2002). 
1.1.2 World-Systems Analysis as a lens: a call for creativity 
The idea of a world-system emerged from the feeling that a cycle came to its end and 
found fertile soil in the dissatisfaction with existing models to explain the structural 
character of that cycle. The above presented outlines of a new model and their 
embodiment in “The Modern World-System” volumes of founding father Immanuel 
Wallerstein constitute just one source of nutrition in the development of paradigm of 
World-Systems Analysis.10 Out of the dialogue with a diverse group of scholars, further 
insightful refinements and thought-provoking critiques this became a dynamic and 
essentially interdisciplinary field.11 As a basic condition for this paradigm to be of any 
relevance, it must be approached as a lens, that is, a tool that must “be used” and cannot 
“speak for itself”. More specifically, it concerns a lens that allows for a global, historical, 
holistic and unidisciplinary approach; it has a spatial scope which is wide and multi-
scaled, a time frame which is long and multi-layered, thematic foci which enter in 
dialogue, and a methodological perspective which crosses assumed disciplinary 
boundaries. Let us thus briefly discuss the four constitutive elements of that lens’ 
guidelines. 
First of all, “global” refers to the spatial radius of historical capitalism, which is 
defined by the boundaries of a world; a specific geographical zone that does not 
necessarily equal the globe. This world forms a coherent and structured unit that 
develops according to systemic rules; it is a system. The hyphen, then, is placed by 
Wallerstein in order to indicate that historical capitalism embodies “not the system of the 
 
                                                     
10 Some critics define this development as the transition from World-Systems Theory to World-Systems 
Analysis, the latter having emerged as a multi-disciplinary paradigm in response to the detection of the macro 
and long-term bias of the former (Galaty 2011, 4; see also Schneider 1977 and Kardulias 1999).  
11 Among these contributions, there is the work of Terence Hopkins (with Wallerstein, 1982 and 1987), Samir 
Amin (1974), Giovanni Arrighi (1994), Andre Gunder Frank (1993, 1998 ), Christopher Chase-Dunn (with Hall 
1993, with Babones 2006),  Janet Abu Lughod (1989 ), Thomas D. Hall (1986, 1989, 2000, 2001, 2009 , 2012, 2013), 
Jason W. Moore (2003, 2008, 2010a, 2010c), Philip McMichael (1990), Wilma Dunaway (1994, 1996, 2003), Peter 
Taylor (1988, 1991, 1992; with Knox 1995 ), to name just a few. The Fernand Braudel Center (Binghamton 
University, since 1976) and its journal, Review, as well as the Journal of World-Systems Research have 
provided these authors with a vital platform for the diffusion and fostering of their thoughts and debates, of 
which most recently crystalized in the Routledge Handbook of World-Systems Analysis (Babones and Chase-
Dunn 2012). 
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world, but a system that is a world” (Wallerstein 1987) in contrast to singular world systems 
(Frank and Gills 1993, 292-6). Departing from the assumption that capitalism, its origins 
and development can only be studied within the framework of a system, the system is 
taken as the paradigm or unit (not the object) of analysis. However, this systemic level is 
indivisibly interlocked and interdependent with other, micro to macro scales (Vanhaute 
2009, 25; Galaty 2011). Correspondingly, households, classes, nations, or other 
“institutions” operating in the world-system acquire analytical meaning in their 
interaction. Moreover, such an approach opens options for applying World-Systems 
Analysis from the very local to scales that transcend human interaction, without 
necessarily challenging what is often perceived as Wallerstein’s “prescriptions” of what 
can and cannot be perceived as a world-system.  
Second, world-systems are “historical” in that they have a start, an evolution and an 
end. This implies the acceptance that globalization is neither a new nor a teleological 
process but develops in phases of acceleration and contraction without leading to an 
inevitable outcome to which “there is no alternative.” If only one thing is inevitable in 
World-Systems Analysis, it is that all world-systems at one point will collide with their 
own limits. These limits are only detectable when recognizing a plurality of time that 
combines long-term trajectories with cyclical and secular movements. In line with 
Braudel, Wallerstein starts with the structural level, where he detects longue durées of 
capitalist production, of the inter-state system and of the core-periphery hierarchy 
which constantly reproduce the features that underpin a specific system. In the 
medium-run, cycles and secular trends deliver a simultaneous dynamic input in the 
structural time, resulting in a spiral movement as this input never reappears identically 
nor has much potential for reversal.  
Third, Braudel’s économie-monde may have influenced the world-system’s delineation 
by economic processes and structures, but the inter-state system, social movements and 
power-laden discourses and structures of knowledge are essential pillars as well. Hence, 
World-Systems Analysis is not an exclusively economistic model, but presents a holistic 
scope. Not one thematic pillar, but the interaction between economic, political, social 
and cultural processes delivers the most essential motive for analysis (Hall 2000; 
Hornborg, McNeill and Martínez-Allier 2007; Babones and Chase-Dunn 2012).  
Finally, World-Systems Analysis entails a critique to the premises and the 
exaggerated subdivision of the scholarly disciplines as we know them (Wallerstein 1991, 
1996). It does not simply claim a multi- or inter-disciplinary approach, but contains the 
aspirations of a truly unidisciplinary historical social science (see for instance Hall, 
Kardulias, and Chase-Dunn 2011; Hall and Turchin 2007).  
These four aspects must be understood as the mere start rather than the final point 
to the line of world-systems theorizing. In that respect, resolute relegations of the 
proposed paradigm to the dustbin of master narratives are usually an indication of the 
failure to recognize the multiplicity of applications and interpretations within the field 
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of World-Systems Analysis. On the contrary, a range of scholars continues to approach it 
as a relevant source of inspiration for further theorization and empirical testing. 
Broadly accepting the lines set out by Wallerstein, they are determined to make those 
lines “more workable”, in some way or another appealed by one of Wallerstein’s most 
valid claims, namely that he does not present a theory for the construction of a new 
grand narrative. As will be further discussed, World-Systems Analysis inherent call for 
creativity has produced fruitful insights, which takes us from dependency over de-
coloniality to the multi-dimensional idea of frontiers. 
1.1.3 Dependency, modernity and de-coloniality: Crossing and un-
thinking epistemological frontiers  
As propagated by Wallerstein, new analytical tools can only be constructed to the extent 
that old paradigms are being questioned and “unthought” (Wallerstein 1991), nor can 
they strive or claim to present a “one-size-fit-all” model. Yet, despite or exactly because 
of World-Systems Analysis’ openness to diverse interpretations and inherent status of 
“work in progress”, it remains sensitive to latent pitfalls, widespread 
misunderstandings, preconceptions, controversy and incomplete knowledge. Its broad 
scope exposes incomplete theorizing on several fronts, yet rather due to the way in 
which the perspective has been used than by the perspective in itself (Hall and Fenelon 
2009).  
On a more fundamental level, if Wallerstein’s statement that “the story of the 
emergence of world-systems analysis is embedded in the history of the modern world-system and 
the structures of knowledge that grew up as part of that system” (Wallerstein 2006, 1) is 
further pursued, than World-Systems Analysis prophesizes its own end. Having once 
emerged from the ashes of previous models, World-Systems Analysis is destined to be 
modified or replaced itself by changes and shakeups in the system and the 
underpinning knowledge structures it studies. This implicit undermining of its own 
foundations relates to a fundamental epistemological critique on which the Argentinian 
semiotician and anthropologist Walter Mignolo (2000, 2007, 2009, 2011). In his opinion, 
“to open the social sciences is a welcome move, but an insuﬃcient one” because it “maintains the 
social sciences in an overarching epistemic totality that parallels the overarching totality of 
capitalism” (Mignolo 2002, 76 and 85). As the system expands, Mignolo explains, the local 
histories of subaltern groups become structured by the single logic of “global designs” 
envisioned to reinforce the coherence and expansive course of the modern world-
system (Mignolo 2000, 43). These designs refer to multiple hegemonic projects, such as 
Christianity, Western civilization and the global market, that operate both in localities 
“that devised and enacted global designs” as in those that are pushed “to accommodate 
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themselves to global designs” (Mignolo 2000, 21). The result is that “the world became 
unthinkable beyond European (and, later, North Atlantic) epistemology” (Mignolo 2002, 90).  
When displaying the evolution of Western modernity thinking on a line of shifting 
paradigms, the linear perspective of Western modernization theories of Weber fun via 
Marx to Wallerstein. In Mignolo’s reading, Weber represented the climax of a 
Eurocentrism that knows no frontiers, Marx propagated a Eurocentrism that explains 
agency in the margins within a linear framework and Wallerstein deconstructed and 
differentiated that framework, yet still approaches it from the core (Mignolo 2000, 3). 
Still, Mignolo does not completely withdraw from the world-systemic framework but 
makes a call for “de-colonial options” (Mignolo 2011, 295-336; see also Mignolo and 
Escobar 2009).12 His appeal emerges from one of the most challenging but also promising 
future roads for World-Systems Analysis, located at the intersection of dependency 
theory and postcolonial critique (see also Grosfoguel 2008a, 99-100).13 In line with a 
broader school of de-colonial thinkers that has adopted Mignolo as one of their main 
spokespersons, I choose to adopt a world-systemic lens as means to uncover how 
coloniality and modernity are the sides of one and the same coin which we call global 
capitalism (Pachón Soto 2008, 12; Quijano 2000b, 539-40).14 
Since the 1990s, a global debate has been opened by a heterogeneous collectivity that 
has defined itself as the Modernidad/Colonialidad or Modernity/Coloniality group (Pachón 
Soto 2008). The foundations of this group have been laid by the Peruvian sociologist 
Aníbal Quijano (1991, with Wallerstein 1992, 2000a, 2000b and 2000c; see also 2012), and 
the Argentinian-Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel (1994, 2001), both counting as 
major sources of inspiration for Mignolo. They have been joined by a “second 
generation” including Grosfoguel (1997, 2000, 2008a, 2008b), Edgar Lander (2000) and 
Catherine Walsh (2007). Note that, as for dependency theory with authors as Frank, 
 
                                                     
12 His call propagates an era postcolonial (not post-colonial) epistemology, also defined by closely related 
concepts of post-developmentalism, post-modernity, post-Eurocentrism or dewesternization. 
13 While sharing a historical-critical stance towards modernity, imperialism and developmentalism, 
dependency and postcolonial theories demonstrate “irreconcilable differences”, respectively in neglecting how 
ethnocentric, homogenizing and dichotomist geopolitics structure culture and knowledge, and in neglecting 
how economic inequality and globalization structure subaltern and localized agency (Kapoor 2002, 653-61). 
However, exactly because a structuralist and post-structuralist perspective, and a socio-economic and a 
cultural-political focus constitute each other’s blind spot, these fields can and should be combined. 
14 Latin-America is home to a much ampler and diverse (not exclusive Latin-American) group of critical 
thinkers, triggered by the colonial encounter and its heterogeneous outcome. Think of the Spaniards José 
Medina Echeverria (1963) and Eduardo Subirats (1994), the Bolivian Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (1987), the 
Bulgarian Tzvetan Todorov (1982), and the Peruvian Nelson Manrique (1993) to name just a few. 
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Cardoso and Faletto, the Latin-American roots of this intellectual school.15 Emerged as a 
direct response to the observed lack of a “decolonized” field of Latin America studies, 
this group subjects Wallerstein’s model to a critical deconstruction, “subalternization” 
or decolonization.  
The Modernity/Coloniality group’s critique to the limits of the assumed totality of 
Western epistemology is built on the merits of world-systems thinking for adding a 
spatial dimension to linear Western historiography and for taking the 16th century as a 
starting point (Mignolo 2000, ix-xi). Yet, it reproaches Wallerstein’s theorizations for 
being unaware of these limits (Mignolo 2002). This critique is captured by the notion of 
coloniality, which explicitly “points to the absences that the narrative of modernity produces” 
(Mignolo 2007, xii). First developed by Quijano, the binding factor in their thinking is 
the “coloniality of power”, which points to the mechanism that enable one group to 
dominate, exploit and appropriate the political and productive power of a differently 
identified and elsewhere settled group within the modern world-system (Quijano 1992, 
2000c; Mignolo 2000, 17). Although similar, coloniality does not completely equal 
Wallerstein’s conceptualization of “geoculture” because the latter concept conceives 
coloniality as separated from modernity.16 Postcolonial thinking exactly departs from 
their intimate connection, with underdevelopment proceeding entirely within the 
confines of capitalist and imperialist “development and coloniality constituting 
modernity’s darker side.  
Coloniality is not to be confused with colonialism, the former persisting when the 
latter ends (Quijano 2000b). It refers to a knowledge-channelling medium which 
Mignolo defines as the “colonial matrix of power” that was put in place in the course of the 
15th to 18th centuries, often metaphorically described with Eurocentrism (Mignolo 2000, 
17). Through classification, institutionalization, spatial reorganization and 
epistemological validation, state apparatuses, university systems, clerical hierarchies 
and other institutions have labelled people as citizens, indigenous, peasants or any 
other socio-economically or culturally distinct group that was created in function of 
domination. This has implied processes of urbanization, road infrastructure, border 
control and other mechanisms of relocation of these people and is underpinned by a 
hegemonic discourse, the creation of words that “conceal,” that feign ignorance about 
the practices they pretend to designate (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010). These processes of 
 
                                                     
15 Both Dussel, at his turn strongly influenced by Todorov (1982), and Quijano founded their critique to 
modernization thinking on the specific role of the Americas in the formation of the world-system’s 
conditioning structures of knowledge. “America was constituted as the first space/time of a new model of power of 
global vocation, and both in this way and by it became the first identity of modernity” (Quijano 2000b, 533).  
16 “To understand Quijano’s coloniality of power,” Mignolo explains, “it is ﬁrst necessary to accept coloniality as 
constitutive of modernity and not just as a derivative of Modernity” (Mignolo 2002, 81). See also Grosfoguel 2008a, 95. 
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justification and classification explain how the expansion of the world-system is 
essentially accompanied by the construction of a dual imaginary, both from the inside 
as at the outside (Mignolo 2000, 64). In countering the dichotomizing logic underlying 
the hegemonic projects of the West, the margins, the local narratives, of the modern-
world system are uncovered as the providers of new forms of knowledge and 
responsiveness, which Mignolo calls “border thinking.”17 
Tapping into the local stories of Carangas, which deliver the case study of this 
dissertation, examples can be found in off-market (barter) exchange practices in 
Bolivian-Chilean border fairs, the transmission and refashioning of llama meat and 
weaving production techniques, but also in alternative frameworks for governance such 
as the Council of the Native Nation of Jach’a Karangas. Less tangibly, ‘Andean’ border 
thinking is also propagated through the spread of non-developmentalist paradigms that 
prioritize vivir bien (living well) over living “better”.18 Another vein of border thinking is 
in strengthening non-conformist narratives and the silenced non-linear consciousness 
of past, present and future through creative history writing.19 Yet, what emerges at the 
intersection of local histories and global designs –both “on the ground” and 
“underground”- is not always necessarily an act of resistance against an enemy but also 
of cooperation and assimilation (Mignolo 2011, 25) or co-management (Ross et al 2010), 
as well as co-optation and manipulation. In that sense, the question emerges whether 
this border thinking is still couched by or effectively goes beyond the lines of global 
designs. 
As this epistemological intermezzo reveals, World-System Analysis’ claim to provide 
an emancipatory protest to modernization theories tends to convert itself into the 
target of this rethinking. Moreover, Wallerstein arguing that “World-Systems Analysis is 
indeed a grand narrative” (Wallerstein 2006, 21) might only further the conversion of the 
 
                                                     
17 "Border thinking, in other words, is, logically, a dichtomous locus of enunciation and, historically, is located at the 
borders (interiors or exteriors) of the modern/colonial world system" (Mignolo 2000, 85, see also 33, 37 and 45 and 
Grosfoguel 2008b). 
18 “As long as we do not change the capitalist system for a system based on complementarity, solidarity, and harmony 
among peoples and nature, the measures we adopt will be palliatives that will have a limited and precarious character. For 
us, what has failed is the model of “living better” [vivir mejor], of unlimited development, of industrialization without 
borders, of modernity that disregards history, of increasing accumulation of goods at the expense of others and nature. 
That is why we propose the idea of “living well” [Vivir Bien], in harmony with other human beings and with our Mother 
Earth.” (Evo Morales, November 28, 2008, quoted by the Ministry of Environment and Water, translated and 
cited by Hindery 2013, 2). See also Henrich and Vasapollo 2011 on the ethics of “vivir bien”. 
19 A historical expression of this “alternative” account of history is the illustrated chronicle of Felipe Guaman 
Poma de Ayala written around 1615 and directed to King Philips III. His work covers pre-Inca times, Inca rule, 
and Spanish conquest, and entails a critique on the Spanish colonial institutions (Adorno 1978; Hamilton 
2009). A contemporary example is the work of the THOA or Andean Oral History Workshop (Rivera Cusicanqui 
and Barragán 1997; Cúneo and Gascó 2014). 
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perspective’s solidest merit into its sore spot. In response to that trap, the presented 
critique constitutes at once a key attack and a key effort to deal with a recurrent weak 
point of Wallerstein’s model: the invisibility of the periphery.  
1.1.4 Frontiers and frontier zones: World-System Analysis’ blind spots? 
A prevailing frustration with Wallerstein’s systemic framework regards its limits “to tell 
the history of the concentration of power in particular places without divesting the world's 
peripheries of agentic capacities” (Adelman 2004, 407). An important critique regarding this 
point has been established by Steve Stern, who evaluated Wallerstein’s model as too 
one-dimensional (Stern 1993, 43). Adelman warns that  
“the unum may exist but that its logic doesn't explain life in the pluribus. Instead, 
a world system requires independent local histories that cannot be reduced to a 
monolithic model. Particular and variegated local developments do not reflect the 
absence of a working model or its incomplete penetration of its fringes” (Adelman 
2004, 406).  
The need for more attention to non-economic bottom-up dynamics has been 
particularly propagated by scholars dedicated to the study of peasants, indigenous and 
other peripheral groups. However, if subaltern actors are less present in world-system 
analysis production, it is not because they cannot or should not, but because no one 
took the plunge to fine-tune the theory (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 12). The insights 
distilled from such rare plunges to bring the question of agency in dialogue with the 
theory foreshadow the idea of “frontier” as world-system analysis’ blind spot. 
Recapitulating, understanding historical capitalism implies tracking its rhythm and 
extension, not just tracking the delineation of the system. The key thereto is the 
division of labour which acts as the unifying axis of the capitalist world-system, defining 
not simply its temporal and geographical outlines, but more importantly its expansive 
and contractive pulse. This pulsating flux is evidenced in the mobilization of frontiers 
and transformation of frontier zones. In the effort to eliminate the differences between 
incorporated and new regions and peoples, differentiated zones (external, peripheral 
and core) come to overlap. As a result of overlapping, interaction between these regions 
and groups becomes inevitable. The arena of this interaction is the “frontier zone”. Out 
of this interaction, feedback links are established that nourish the course of 
incorporation processes. Thus, our attention is directed not only towards the 
simultaneous production, transformation and erasure of frontier zones of the world-
system, but also to how this world-system and its expansion is produced by these 
frontier processes. In their elaborations on the multiplicity of (forms of) world-systems, 
Hall and Chase-Dunn unveiled the emergence of dynamic feedback links from the 
margins of those systems (Hall and Chase-Dunn 1991; 1997). “Given that agentive action is 
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at its most vigorous in such zones, and given that (sic) world-systemic change stems from border 
regions,” Galaty states, “we desperately require better models of human behavior in frontiers” 
(Galaty 2011, 12).  
The notion of frontier builds further on a long tradition in “frontier studies.” This 
tradition started with Frederick Jackson Turner’s American frontier (1920) and, later, 
Webb’s Great Frontier (2003 [1951]) which, after a gradual reorientation of these classics 
in Western studies, has resulted in several historiographical reconstructions of frontiers 
settings.20 From political-culturalist approaches, the creation of frontier zones is usually 
traced back to the first developments in state formation, prior to the emergence of a 
capitalist system (Hall and Chase-Dunn 1991; Scott 2009; Kopytoff 1987, 12-3). While 
taken over in economic studies, the focus on frontiers and boundaries as contact 
markers has  also resulted particularly fruitful to anthropological research on identity 
formation – think about Barth’s ethnic boundaries (Barth 1970). Political and 
anthropological approaches have given light to field of borderland studies, dealing with 
either tangible or non-physical, formalized or informal separations and underscoring 
the paradoxical role of borders as both dividers and connectors.21  
The contours of what will be defined below as a “world-systems frontier analysis” 
largely stem from the contributions of “next-generation” world-system analysts 
demonstrating that the multiple inputs received by core-like entities from marginal 
zones are constitutive to transitions in the World-System. Although Wallerstein neither 
denies nor excludes the possibility and potential of peripheral agency, he gives little 
specifications on this issue, but suggests that the creation of these zones has been 
constitutive to the modern world-system’s dynamism since it emerged about 500 years 
ago. Departing from that point and inspired by frontier-related concepts that do not 
necessarily or even refuse to invoke his model, several world-systems analysts have 
accurately shifted their to the movement of systemic boundaries and the effects of that 
movement. This is a shift away from classic core-driven theories of capitalist expansion 
that tend to fix systemic dynamics, usually stranding in one-sided theorizing. 
Three lines of “frontier inspiration” stand out. In the first place, there is Thomas 
Hall’s very general but true principle that “(f)rontiers are where incorporation takes place” 
(Hall 2012, 51). Departing from a different academic tradition, Jason Moore reads world-
systemic incorporation as an environmental history (Moore 2003), contending that 
there is a strong parallel between world-systems and earth-systems in that both 
experience change as initiated from/by frontier zones. In the former, these are 
 
                                                     
20 Schon and Galaty 2006; see for instance Bartlett and MacKay 1989; Peacock 2009; Pohl et al. 2001; Power and 
Standen 1999. 
21 Important contributions have emerged from the field of Latin-American studies, including Baretta and 
Markoff 1987; Herzog 1992; Weber and Rausch 1994; Baud and Van Schendel 1997, 211-42; Baud 2004, 41-86. 
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occurring or felt at the edges of human societies while in the latter at the edges of 
climatological, geological or biological zones (Galaty 2011; see also Hornborg, McNeill 
and Martínez-Alier 2007). From yet another angle and without using the notion of 
“frontiers,” Walter Mignolo’s definition of “colonial difference” expands that notion to 
include a “conflict of knowledges and structures of power” that acts both in the centre as at 
the edge of the modern world-system (Mignolo 2000, 16-7). In his reading, frontiers are 
the fissures that homogenizing pressures aim to erase by legitimizing what he calls the 
“colonial difference” and that subaltern groups aim to restore.  
Let’s go more deeply into these three lines. What started as a research on the 
American South-West (Hall 1989), grew out to a fertile research field that aspires to 
“define the “universe” of frontiers” from “a deep global and historical perspective” (Hall 2013). 
By frontier, Hall refers to “a region or zone where two or more distinct cultures, societies, 
ethnic groups, or modes of production come into contact” (Hall 2000, 241). As “incorporated 
area and peoples experience profound (sic) effects from incorporation even when incorporation is 
relatively weak” (ibid), frontiers are not only a zone of contact, but also a zone of 
interaction and resistance. Whereas Hall, who can be considered as the “godfather” of 
world-systems frontier theories, seems to use frontiers and frontier zones often as 
interchangeable.22 As Hall explains, “[f]rom a global perspective, a frontier is a relatively 
narrow and sharp, but from nearby it is a broad zone with considerable internal spatial and 
temporal differentiation” (Hall 2000, 240). Here, I make a distinction between the frontier 
as process and the frontier zone as setting of incorporation. Both are highly mobile, 
suggesting the possibility of a multi-sited encounter.23 
From a different, but compatible and more concrete angle, the concept of “global 
commodity frontiers” addresses the same process of incorporation and differentiation. 
The geographer Jason Moore seizes the diaspora of silver in the wake of the conquest of 
the Americas to unveil the periphery as a vast and indispensable resource whose 
extraction (in order to prevent or mitigate relative ecological exhaustion) requires the 
transformation of land and labour, “bringing the endless accumulation of capital and the 
production of nature in dialectical unity” (Moore 2010b, 59; see also 2010a, no. 1 and 2 and 
2010c). His definition of frontiers as strategic containers of exploitable natural resources 
runs in line with Barbier’s stress on the relative scarcity of those resources as the drive 
behind world-economic expansion and the consequent agricultural, urban and 
 
                                                     
22 Where I make a distinction between frontiers (the process) and frontier zones (the space), Hall denominates 
the former as “incorporation” and the latter as “frontier”, both concepts being “closely connected, but not 
identical. Frontiers are concerned with the creation, transformation and elimination of boundary zones. Incorporation is 
about how new areas and/peoples are absorbed into and resist absorption into the world-system” (Hall 2012, 51). 
23 Rather than frontier stricto sensu, Boccara adopts the notion of frontier “space” or “complex” because it 
includes its “hinterland” (Boccara 2005).  
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industrial revolutions (Barbier 2011, 7). In that sense, Moore defines historical 
capitalism as “a patterned and expansionary matrix of nature-society relations that responded 
to - and variously enabled and constrained - the gravitational pull of world accumulation” 
(Moore 2010a, no. 1, 34).  This gravitational pull refers to the commodity frontier which 
gives shape to a particular ecological and economic place; the place to which I will refer 
as “frontier zone.”24 
Where Moore defines (the creation of) nature and capital as the two “material” 
(ecological, economic) sides of the same coin, Mignolo points to capitalism’s double 
“rhetorical” face, with modernity as its celebrated side and coloniality as its darker, 
silenced side (Mignolo 2011, xviii). And where Hall defines frontier zones as the locus of 
incorporation, Mignolo defines that setting as the workspace of the “coloniality of 
power.” With these terms, Mignolo mainly refers to epistemological incorporation and 
differentiation, agreeing with Wallerstein’s “metaphor” to address the historical and 
spatial dimensions of that process but renouncing that metaphor for being “perceived 
and theorized from a perspective inside modernity itself” rather than from the world-system’s 
borders (Mignolo 2000, 37). Mignolo contends that expansive powers detect and 
organize included-excluded differentiations which they portray through discourse as 
to-be-erased fissures, which he defines as “colonial difference” (Mignolo 2000, 3; see also 
2005, xii and 2011). Think about the difference between the people with history and 
those without history or the “spaces in between” defined by Bhabha and borrowed by 
Mignolo (2000, 17-8). This production of internal systemic frontiers -the colonial 
difference “at work”- stems from multiple intercultural encounters, both physically as 
imaginary, and provokes de-colonial projects and counter-hegemonic voices (Mignolo 
2000 and 2011, 2; see also Raj 2010 ; Ross et al 2010).25 
As these diverse “frontier contributions” convincingly put forward as one of the most 
powerful perspectives to rethink and “upgrade” world-systems analysis, they convinced 
me to neither add an entirely new critique nor abandon the framework altogether. To 
conclude this long prelude to the detailed dissection of that perspective:  
“the study of frontiers illustrates how much can be learned by the study of 
peripheral regions and peoples and their roles in system change. Indeed, some of 
these processes may be visible only in peripheral and/or frontier areas. This then 
 
                                                     
24 Frontier movement is constituted by “differentiated moments within the geographical expansion of commodity 
production and exchange” (Moore 2010a, no. 1, 34). The outcome of this expansive process, that is, the rise of 
capitalism, “is best understood through the emergence of a peculiar kind of place, one in which the production of nature 
(capitalism as world-ecology) and the production of capital (capitalism as world-economy) were two sides of the same 
coin” (ibid). 
25 A powerful and very personal expression of “border culture” sprouting form the feeling of being trapped 
between multiple excluding dualities is Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera--The New Mestiza (Anzaldúa 1999). 
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becomes a method to explore how it is that actions and changes in peripheral 
areas (and semiperipheral areas) play important roles in world-system evolution. 
A key point here is that many if not most of these questions can only be asked 
from a world-system perspective, even if they must be answered in large part 
locally” (Hall 2013, 50-1). 
1.2 A frontier perspective 
1.2.1 The pulse of world-systems: multiple frontiers of incorporation 
While capitalist expansion seems to simply increase at an ever accelerating rate, this 
ostensibly linear trend is essentially underpinned by a pulsating flux. Downward and 
upward movements in the medium-run are the manifestations of chronic systemic 
problems (respectively surfacing and being “solved”) in the longue durée. Wallerstein 
calls these chronic problems “asymptotes,” symbolizing “a line which a particular curve 
cannot reach in a finite space” (Wallerstein 2006, 91). In the modern world-system, these 
curves map the expansion of commodification, proletarianisation, state formation, 
mono-/oligopolization, international economic as well as political integration and of 
inequality. In order to get out of the downward turn of the cycle each time a chronic 
problem surfaces, the system is recurrently pushed towards reorganizations, either 
internal or external. These are processes of commensuration that will constantly be 
repeated, resulting in a pulsating movement towards this set of asymptotes. As these 
secular trends move closer (without ever reaching) towards the 100% of the curve,26 the 
system runs into chronic problems as a logical outcome of its own in-built 
contradictions (Wallerstein 2006, 31). The need to restructure points to an inherent 
contradiction that, while the externalization of costs via absorption of “spheres” 
beyond control of the capitalist market economy is vital to the growth of the system, 
the tendency towards “commodification of everything” eventually undermines the 
system on the long term. 
 
                                                     
26 The 100% could be envisioned as a world in which all “things” and social relations are valued in market 
terms, the entire population is subject to proletarianized labour relations, every spot of the planet is 
integrated into a nation-state and all production sectors and trade circuits are monopolized. The reason why 
these asymptotes are unviable is for instance visible in the dialectics of wage labour and “housewifization”, 
which is inherent to all forms of capitalist production (Smith et. al. 1984, cited in Dunaway 2012, 455), just as 
other incorporation-externalization interplays. 
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Internal reorganization may include the relocation of production processes, the 
start-up of a new production cycle or the redistribution of production rewards within 
the division of labour. External restructuring stems from the expansion of the 
geographical zones comprised by the division of labour. Both dimensions of 
restructuring involve a process of incorporation. As a result, the modern world-system 
has over time only become more capitalist, by which Hopkins and Wallerstein mean 
that differences between capitalist and non-capitalist production relations are levelled 
off, that is, “the effective transformation of land and labor into commodities, available for 
contract” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987, 772). Incorporation, the authors state, is “to 
make what was external internal, to restructure activities in the zone so that they conformed with 
and fully participated in the ongoing functioning of the capitalist world-economy,” hence not 
only in terms of production (market integration) but also in terms of governance (state-
building) (ibid, 776). Mitchell explains it as the production of space and society through 
violent acts of alienation, that is, by converting living realities into capitalist exchange 
relations and fixing them within a dual logic (Mitchell 2002, 79).  
The process moves in two directions, that is, in extensity as in intensity (Robinson 
2004, 6-7; see also Carlson 2001). This means that incorporation does not simply equal 
the geographical widening but also the deepening of capitalist relations. Initially 
encompassing a Europe-centred system, the need for cheap labour and resources has 
pushed more and more regions and population groups into the arena of the modern 
world-system. “Horizontal” expansion subjected social relations of geographical 
settings that fell outside its reach to the process of commodification, followed by a 
“vertical” expansion that subjected the social relations of more and more spheres 
within those (now included) geographical settings to this process of commodification. 
While the first, external dimension of this movement displays the process of European 
expansion, the second, internal dimension is often termed “transition to capitalism” 
(Moore 2010a, 34) and refers to what Frank has called the “underdevelopment of 
development” (see supra) or the growth of gaps (Hall 2012, 47).  
In other terms, it is stated that incorporation has a formal and a real dimension (Kaup 
2013, 111-2). As the case of Spanish colonization in the Americas demonstrates, a first 
moment of “nominal” incorporation imposed a serious strain on Latin America’s rural 
population yet without adjusting their local livelihood strategies. Interestingly, this 
phase of primitive accumulation generated a dramatic “boomerang” effect on Spain’s 
long-term transformation from a marginal and fragmented country to an imperial 
world power. From the late 18th century on, its downgrading into the semi-periphery 
announced a more “effective” incorporation of its dependent colonies, implying the 
“real” disintegration of local livelihood strategies (Elliot 2002; Kaup 2013, 111-2; see also 
Wallerstein 1974, 336).  
As Moore explains, “[c]apitalism did not form within Europe and then expand” but, on the 
contrary, is “inseparable” from the historical trajectory of multiple frontiers (Moore 
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2010, 37). Rather than a “package deal” of fixed reorganizations, incorporation is a 
spatially, historically and socially uneven process of enlargement and intensification. Its 
forms and directions cannot be recorded by the course of a single line, but are 
evidenced in the simultaneous movement of multiple frontiers of incorporation which 
not necessarily coincide but strongly interconnect. Spatial unevenness refers to the 
subdivision of newly incorporated geographical regions into external, peripheral, semi-
peripheral or core zones. As the administrative as well as imaginary organization of the 
Spanish Americas into “conquered” and “unconquered” zones illustrates, this 
subdivision is internally even more differentiated with the Andean “high civilization” 
heartland distinguished from the “wild” fringes of colonial rule (Boccara 2005, 31). 
Unevenness in time refers to the interference of conjunctures and crises. Also when a 
frontier may seem static, this is usually the result of dynamic counterforces that 
temporally balance the incorporation process. As Hall explains, a “specific frontier often 
follows a complex path, a trajectory, of incorporation with successive strengthening and 
weakening phases” (Hall 2000, 244). This trajectory describes a “dialectical historical 
process” (Dunaway 1996, 467) that can be studied for specific sites through diachronic 
comparison (Schon and Galaty 2006). Out of the same concern to capture multi-sited and 
fluctuating change, McMichael has proposed the method of “incorporated comparison” 
(McMichael 1990). 
Speaking about incorporation relates to the exploration of systemic differences, the 
markers of ongoing incorporation processes. Located both at the external and internal 
boundaries of the system, they are traceable in both obvious economic, political and 
cultural variations as more “fundamental” epistemological differences that are 
reproduced through material (the expansion of agrarian, mining and commercial 
frontiers), formal (the expansion of land titles and citizenship) or discursive/symbolical 
(processes of cultural assimilation) changes. As commodified relations reached into the 
most diverse parts of the world, the differences between the zones outside and inside 
the external borders of a world-economic zone have vanished. Yet, not all zones 
bounded by the division of labour are equally strong integrated in commodity chains 
and the interstate system due to constant changes in technology (the distance that 
transport, communication, etc. innovations can cover) and legitimacy (the distance that 
authority can reach to) (Wallerstein 1974, 338-49). Hence, Wallerstein’s differentiation 
between core and peripheral zones, and the semi-periphery which acts as a kind of 
buffer zone. 
However, despite adding this intermediary zone, integrating the factor of external 
resistance and stressing the growing of gaps, this representation still suggests an overly 
static, state-based and (economically) deterministic process that crystalizes where 
external zones become peripheral zones and where peripheral zones become core 
zones, and -although less probable- vice versa. This tends to reduce incorporation to 
“the moment in which places become “hooked” into the global economy”, ignoring the fact that 
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“places are continually incorporated, disincorporated, and reincorporated into the world-system” 
(Kaup 2013, 112; see also Wallerstein 1989, 130). In his depiction of incorporation, 
Wallerstein tends to turn a blind eye to agency sprouting from the room for alternative 
forms of organization left or created through the constant de- and re-incorporation of 
people and places (Hall 2012, 51). Thus, the outcome of incorporation processes can only 
be captured in wider and more mobile figures which we will call “frontier zones.”  
1.2.2 Frontiers of incorporation (re)creating frontier zones 
History is made through the continuous formation, reorganization and eventual 
dissolution of frontier zones. This linking or delinking of peoples and places within 
commodified production relations occurs through the imposition of socioeconomic and 
legal differences between “not-yet(-fully)-incorporated” and incorporated groups -“the 
raw and the cooked” (Lévi-Strauss 1974)- and the spatial transformations that go together 
with a region’s upgrading or downgrading within the world-economy (Saey and De 
Wachter 2004). Think about the “inclusive” demarcation of zones through trade 
agreements, enfranchisement, the spread of transport infrastructure or the opposite 
trend through practices of “self-barbarianization” (Scott 2009, x-xi) or “slumification”.27 
More schematically, the (re)creation of frontier zones can be envisioned as “fuzzy” 
zones (Hall 2012, 48) being delineated and classified as “settled” zones (as rich, 
acculturated or opened up), their shakeup (revolutions and reforms) and their 
fragmentation (impoverishment, resistance or isolation).  
Closer inquiry into the formation and composition of these zones has given 
additional “texture” to the notion of frontier. Insights into the dialectics through which 
the process of incorporation and those incorporated shape each other urge for a 
reconceptualization of incorporation from an in-out mechanism to a more mobile 
process that operates along a continuum. This continuum “runs from the complete 
economic domination of peripheral communities by core states… to very informal interactions 
between core states and isolated, independent regions”” (Schon and Galaty 2006, 252). As we 
are speaking about a process, the continuum has two extremities, with a very open start 
and a very “hooked” end, the moment of effective incorporation. In other words, the 
continuum runs from a maximum to a minimum of escape options. What follows is an 
intensification, crumbling or revision but never a fixation of that “hook”.  
 
                                                     
27 Lindsey, for instance, coins the term “systemic disincorporation” to describe a particular form of spatial 
inequality and disconnection associated with slum areas in contemporary metropolitan cities (Lindsey 2012, 
351).  
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In Hall’s vocabulary (Hall 2000, 241-4), the continuum starts with “external arenas” 
where incorporation is at its weakest.28 As soon there is any contact, these become 
“contact peripheries,” although this transition is still very susceptible to local changes 
that may weaken (yet hardly reverse) incorporation. As incorporation processes become 
stronger, we speak of “marginal peripheries,” which in fact cover a wide range of 
possibilities of coexistence. At the strongest pole of incorporation, these become “full-
blown” or “dependent” peripheries, where incorporation becomes a matter of cultural 
assimilation rather than material adjustment. Although both poles may still benefit 
further refinement (Hall 2012, 51), the merits of this continuum representation is that it 
broadens the spectrum indicated by Wallerstein’s world-systemic boundaries. It also 
visualizes the irregular rhythm of incorporation, fluctuating according to the interplay 
of incorporating forces and counterforces and developing on multiple spatial scales 
(local, regional, global). As “all these levels of change interact, simultaneously and recursively, 
with class, ethnic, gender, economic, and political relations. Seeking a key factor for these 
processes is a fool’s errand” (Hall 2012, 250). 
Frontiers can be thought of as the “fault lines” of incorporation. The waves that 
shape a frontier between its arrival and disappearance depict a “frontier trajectory.” 
This trajectory becomes tangible through the formation and transformation of frontier 
zones. Whilst most attention has classically been drawn to moments or places when and 
where those waves accelerate as with Revolutions or in semi-peripheries, standstills 
equally count as instances of “frontier volatility.” During such moments, frontier zones 
may appear as stagnated enclaves in a sea of incorporated people and places, suggesting 
an incapacity to join the wave. However, either way, frontier zones give shape to a very 
dynamic environment. Standstills are the outcome of intensive and continuous 
negotiation in an attempt to keep expanding frontiers of incorporation at bay. This 
contention over the movement of frontiers hints at frictions provoked by the 
asymmetric power relations that structure frontier zones. These frictions imply the 
operation of peripheral agency and have a repercussion on frontier trajectories.  
1.2.3 Negotiation and feedback links  
The settling of a new order for territorial and social control involves the restructuring 
of dependency relations and has an asymmetric impact that can be noted in processes of 
peripheralization and hegemonization. However, the dynamics of these processes 
remain often unrecorded, dissociating the movement of frontiers from much 
 
                                                     
28 Carlson suggested even a preceding ‘preparatory step’ which he calls the “zone of ignorance.” Carlson 2001, 
2002 and 2012 cited in Hall 2012, 49. 
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interaction between both sides of the imaginary line. In the first theoretical 
conceptualizations of frontiers, notably Turner’s work on the movement of the U.S. 
western frontier, the concept served to indicate “the outer edge of the wave—the meeting 
point between savagery and civilization” (Turner 1920 [1893], 34). Agency remained usually 
reduced to a one-directional transmission of “modernization.” This classic 
interpretation has been profoundly reassessed, revealing frontiers as the locus of both 
contestation (war, resistance, lawsuits, intolerance, plunder, extraction, sabotage, 
ecological degradation, segregation) and alliance (biological symbiosis, marriage, 
economic partnership, political bonds and treaties, celebration, conversion, gifts). This 
locus is what we call the frontier zone. The increased emphasis on interactions has 
resulted in a wide spectrum of frontier representations, ranging from sharp lines 
between political states to the blurry zones shared between different ecological zones 
and different socio-economically, politically or culturally organized groups.  
Several contributions have further explored “agency in/at/on the margin”, thereby 
fine-tuning the presented continuum. This has resulted in a dense frontier terminology 
which nearly enables one to see the wood for the trees. The list of conceptual gateways 
into frontier processes started with Aguirre Beltrán’s “region of refuge” (1967) and the 
“interface” of Long (1989). However, most stem from the 1990s, including the “middle 
ground” of White (1991), the “tribal zone” of Ferguson and Whitehead (1992)29, the 
“double frontier” (Izko 1992), the “contested ground” of Guy and Sheridan (1998), the 
“hidden frontiers” of Cole and Wolf (1999) and the “negotiated peripherality” of 
Kardulias (1999). To expand the list even more, Cline came up with the “contested 
peripheries” (2000) and Scott with “Zomia” (2009). What many of the investigations that 
stirred these conceptualizations bear in common is the empirical case study-based 
evidence they provide on how peripheral groups exploit their marginality as a 
successful tool to prevent formal incorporation. Sprouting from the attempts to coin the 
observed “manipulation”, the terms ranged above all capture the idea of an “in-
between” space.  
Regardless of how these intermediate (marginal, frontier, periphery) spaces are 
termed, all hint at an inconclusive stage in the transforming process of incorporation. 
They indicate where incorporation is “under negotiation,” resulting in either formal 
agreements such as political borders or more informal pragmatic arrangements  
(Kardulias 2007, 56). Shifts in these arrangements are an indicator for frontiers 
becoming more open or more closed and for cross-frontier interactions becoming more 
incidental or more direct. This demonstrates that groups under incorporation, 
 
                                                     
29 The explicit use of “tribal” is on purpose, to point out the extreme vagueness of transition zones between 
state and non-state territories (Hall 2012, 50).  
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according to the conditions of each moment and place, know to actively participate in 
these processes or rather to tacitly withdraw through “the art of not being governed” 
(Scott 2009). Numerous contributions have attempted to frame this resistance. Ranging 
from overt to covert, material or cosmologic, institutionalized to symbolic, group-based 
or collective strategies, such lists and models should be addressed as a very nuanced 
continuum.30 Following other prominent world-system thinkers, Hall and Fenelon stress 
that (particularly indigenous) resistance movements and globalization fuel each other 
in a “countercyclical” way, having a spiral course and a timing and methods conversely 
proportional to the force of world-systemic processes (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 120).31  
However, the efficiency and diversity of these resistance skills generally remains off 
record.32 This lack of attention impedes a comprehensive understanding of how “even 
the most localized forms of resistance cannot be understood fully without careful attention to 
larger systems and global processes” (ibid, 22). The other way around, it reveals how (which 
classic theories on capitalist accumulation and labour relations have failed to register) 
capitalist expansion fuels itself “by attempting to divert or attach itself to other kinds of 
energy or logic” (Gidwani 2008, xix). Thus, despite certain (systemic) constraints, the 
interaction between core and peripheral peoples is never entirely immune to a certain 
level of input from different logics and in particular those of history’s subalterns.  
“If a profit-centered rationality anchored to a relentless logic of accumulation (...) 
is upheld as the deus ex machina of capitalism, then it is not clear how to talk 
about a social formation where that motive is contaminated, consolidated, and 
continuously interrupted by other logics; where institutional arrangements must 
work overtime to ensure that circuits of capital accumulation do not come to a 
grinding halt” (ibid, xxiv).  
The contamination and interruption referred to by Gidwani hint at the operation of 
multiple and complex feedback links in the process of incorporation. Although 
Wallerstein’s model is punctuated with hints at dynamism and feedback loops, he does 
not manage to adequately address the implications of the unequal exchange that binds 
 
                                                     
30 A key contribution to this nuancing has been Scott’s assessment of resistance in its covert or “everyday” 
disguise, the so-called “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985). 
31 “When hegemony is weak,” they state, “states cannot afford the resources, the political capital, or the moral standing 
needed to crush them. When hegemony is strong, the state often has "bigger fish to fry" and finds it not worth the effort to 
crush the movements; it can occasionally gain moral standing by "tolerating" them or using "kinder, gentler" ways to 
deter them.” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 136). 
32 However, there is a current shift observable in the attention given to grassroots and region-wide resistance 
movements. On the renewed force of these movements in Latin-America and their often successful yet 
ambivalent dialogue with or extorted concessions from central state powers or multinationals, see for 
instance Stahler-Sholk et al 2008; Kuecker 2004; Cúneo and Gascó 2013; Zibechi 2012. 
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the modern world-systems for people who live at, on or even beyond the periphery. In 
his first theorizations, the input from peripheries and external zone to the world-
economy remains reduced to a one way traffic of necessary and less necessary goods. In 
his first volume, Wallerstein establishes that “[t]he dynamics of forces at the core may lead 
to an expansionist pressure (as we saw happened in Europe in the fifteenth century). The system 
expands outward until it reaches the point where the loss is greater than the gain.” (Wallerstein 
1974, 338). Movement seems to be driven from the core and its reach is explained in a 
quite deterministic way. Indeed, as Hall explains, incorporation “is not fully elastic. 
Sometimes changes engendered by incorporation are difficult or even impossible to reverse” (Hall 
2013, 41).33 However, this does not convert peripheral agents into passive recipients or 
constituting “devices” of capitalist expansion as is often assumed in classic 
interpretations of core-periphery hierarchies (Kardulias 2007, 55).  
In the context of flux that marks the incorporation of groups or regions into the 
periphery of an expanding world-system, the dependencies that structured these 
groups or regions are shaken up and the room for individual agency expands (Galaty 
2011, 11). This explains why, as a general rule, changes usually start in frontier zones.34 
However, agency emerging from the frontier is not exclusively translated into a 
reaction of resistance as some authors seem to suggest when describing frontier zones 
as “battle fields”. Only when incorporation is not perceived as unidirectional, it becomes 
clear that, at the one hand, incorporating forces generally never aim at complete 
assimilation and, at the other hand, the reactions of people in the periphery “are clearly 
not haphazard or irrational resistance to change but rather intelligent, often well-chosen attempts 
to control and resist the processes of incorporation” (Hall 2000, 259). This strategic 
positioning gives their resistance a sense of “subversive complicity” (Grosfoguel 1996, 
cited in Grosfoguel 2008a, 103) in order to enlarge the range of response options. These 
responses may “boomerang” the resisted impositions, for instance by developing 
“strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm’s length” by ironically adopting 
exactly the very notions designed to categorize them as peripheral (Scott 2009, x-xi). “As 
 
                                                     
33 As emphasized by postcolonial thinkers, frontier processes entail a dimension of complicity that converts 
encounter into negotiation that marks the negotiators forever “so that it is impossible to recuperate any identity 
uncontaminated by it” (Kapoor 2002, 652; see also Bhabha 1994 and Spivak 1988). 
34 In Bourdieu’s explanation (1977, 168–169), core-like agents are conditioned by doctrinal ideological bases –
termed ‘doxa’- that support hegemonic structures and that are largely taken for granted, while the ideologies 
upheld by marginal-like actors operating along frontiers are more open to question and could evolve. Think 
also about Mignolo’s border thinking (and border gnosis) as a reference to frontiers as places of knowledge 
production; a production process that points at little crises and forms of resistance within the modern world-
system (Mignolo 2000, 88). It is in the production and circulation of alternative concepts, beliefs, myths and 
forms of knowledge that we find evidence of the operation of subaltern geo-cultures or knowledge systems 
(Raj 2010; Jalata 2013; Kaup 2013). 
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frontiers persist,” Hall explains, “knowledge develops on each side. Each side may use such 
intentional misunderstanding to manipulate relations” (Hall 2013, 47). This indicates that 
peripheral agency’s probably biggest hindrance is in the appropriation, neutralization 
and silencing by dominant forces.  
Situations whereby individuals living on the margins of world-systems set the 
conditions of their own incorporation -often to their own benefit- can be defined as 
“negotiated peripherality,” 
“the willingness and ability of individuals in peripheries to determine the 
conditions under which they will engage in trade, ceremonial exchange, 
intermarriage, adoption of outside religious and political ideologies, etc. with 
representatives of expanding states” (Kardulias 2007, 55). 
Being “primary venues of negotiation because it is at these critical nodes that there is the 
greatest potential for two groups to acquire some things that their respective home ranges lack” 
(ibid, 77), Kardulias reveals the periphery as a “zone of opportunity” where peripheral 
groups may manage to outline the terms of encounter. For instance, it will be verified 
how Andean communities, in order to construct and safeguard a “space for manoeuvre,” 
have obtained official recognition of their customary land tenure regulations through 
legal action, political alliances and violent conflict. Their mobilizations and 
achievements demonstrate that “in cultural interactions, you don’t get what you deserve, you 
get what you negotiate” (ibid, 78). While the movement of a frontier testifies a peripheral 
groups’ ability to negotiate over incorporation, “neither change nor persistence should be 
assumed but should be determined empirically” (Hall 2000, 245). 
The impact of incorporation pressures is always asymmetrical and never innocent, 
yet never predictable. This unpredictability stems from the operation of complex 
feedback loops. This feedback creates an ambivalent dynamic often referred to as 
“glocalization” and is explained as follows. Frontiers are pushed by core-directed 
attempts to erase frictions and boundaries within and at the edge of the system, which 
globally appears as homogenizing pressures for a world with ever less human diversity, 
but frontiers simultaneously provoke responses to those pressures at those frictions and 
boundaries, locally appearing in processes of heterogenization. This explains the 
“frequent assumption that world, transnational, or general civilizational developments follow 
internally consistent logics—whether it was the expansion of capitalism (in the singular), 
liberalism (ditto), or modernity (the same),” which has “sometimes made it hard to see that the 
heterogeneous parts were so different not because they were incompletely part of a whole, but 
because creating the whole was itself a heteronomous process and thus could not help but yield to 
diverse parts” (Adelman 2004, 405).  
In other words, the impression that the waves of incorporation proceed towards an 
elimination of frontiers is constantly countered by the observation of human creativity 
contesting and (re)creating frontiers. Without pretending to predict the outcome of this 
  49 
interconnectedness, researching agency of/in/at the periphery tells us not only 
something about how world-systems have formed and transformed marginal zones, but 
also how human agents in marginal zones have transformed world-systems. It is this 
this double incorporation-differentiation dynamic of frontier processes, the 
accompanying (re)creation of room for autonomy, negotiation and resistance and its 
boomeranging effects which I aim to study.    
 

  51 
Chapter 2  
Thwarted incorporation: Negotiating labels and 
land in the Andes. 
Naya saparukiw jiwyapxitaxa nayxarusti, waranqa, 
waranqanakaw tukutaw kut'anipxani... 
Tupac Katari (1781)55 
 
This chapter applies the abstract notions expounded in chapter 1 to a specific frontier 
zone, that of the rural Andes, which can be defined as a rural peasant zone. “Rural zone” 
can be defined as a geographically dispersed frontier zone of the world-system, 
including both old (external incorporation) and new (internal differentiation) frontier 
zones where different production modes (industrial-extractive, commercial, agrarian 
sectors) are in sustained contact with each other. Zones composed by household-based 
communities that guarantee their subsistence through (yet not exclusively) non-
industrial and non-commercial agrarian production forms, that maintain (a degree of) 
local autonomy over their essential means of production (land, labour, capital and 
knowledge), and that are subject to (a degree of) supra-local extraction, are peasant 
zones. Since they came into contact with the modern world-system, the people and 
places that make up these zones are not and have never been able to escape the 
pressures for incorporation.  
Moreover, this chapter specifies a particular frontier process; that of land rights 
commodification, which –as any frontier process- can be tracked in the imposition of 
juridical-administrative regulations that intend to create spaces of control and 
 
                                                     
55 “You will only kill me, but I will return and I as millions.” These are the words attributed to Tupac Katari, Aymara 
leader in the indigenous rebellion of 1781 in Alto Peru, warning the Spanish before they quartered him. Ever 
since, these words have inspired and spurred indigenous resistance movements (Webber 2010, 269).  
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classification. Guy and Sheridan explain that incorporation shapes “zones of historical 
interaction where ... different polities contend (sic) for natural resources and ideological control, 
including the right to define categories of people and to determine their access to those resources” 
(Guy and Sheridan 1998, 10). Their geopolitical approach to the dynamics provoked by 
the expanded reach of hegemonic control links up to economic-ecologic approaches 
that refer to zones of reorganization in function of the extraction of strategic resources 
(Barbier 2011). These reorganizations are triggered by the identification of peripheral 
zones as an indispensable “breathing space” for expansion that needs to be “enclosed,” 
for instance through the reduction of open to closed common-property land tenure, the 
conversion of nature into extractable commodities and the moulding of categories of 
belonging into citizenship. 
As a result, the “breathing space” for people with an alternative or free access to 
certain resource pools, their room for manoeuvre, has been effectively reduced over 
time and across the planet. These reorganizations intend “less to make them productive 
than to ensure that their economic activity was legible, taxable, assessable, and confiscatable or, 
failing that, to replace it with forms of production that were” (Scott 2009, 5). However, seldom 
these reorganizations manage to straightforwardly and completely neutralize the 
manoeuvring capacity of groups that are pushed into a homogeneously envisioned 
sphere of governance. Paraphrasing Scott, this capacity provides those targeted groups 
with an art to “hack” the governed space in order to allow (a degree of) self-governance. 
In the context of the rural (peasant and indigenous) Andes, this self-governance 
corresponds is constructed in the sphere of the community.  
Maintaining a room for manoeuvre nonetheless implies their engagement in daily 
negotiations with the State and the market, and the local organizational frameworks 
and power groups that channel these negations. It is this combination of interaction and 
independence, rooted in the ability to carve out concessions but also to reconcile to 
supra-local control systems, that provides peasant and/or indigenous communities with 
a “frontier” position from where they can tap into different (more, less or not-
incorporated) spheres to advance alternatives. This generates the mentioned feedback 
reaction. However, the context (and “provocation”) of an expanding inter-state system 
with ever more elaborated state-based legitimacy claims and an ever more dire need for 
marketable resources places a growing strain on the contours and autonomy of the 
Andean “communal room for manoeuver.” 
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2.1 Campesinos and indígenas: Labels of incorporation. 
"It is certainly true that rural-dwelling, farming and herding speakers of Aymara 
and/or Quechua, those whom city people and vecinos [non-indigenous villagers] 
call indios or campesinos, are the least privileged, most maligned and disfavored 
sector of Bolivian society, suffering a degree of stigmatization greater than that of 
the recent migrant from the countryside to city. This helps to account for the fact 
that, in most of the countryside, there is for such people no unstigmatized term of 
reference to address." (Abercrombie 1998, 46).   
While this research developed, I detected a specific need to reassess labels of 
indigeneity, peasantry, rurality and “Andeanness” and their stigmatizing/empowering 
capacity within the context of systemic expansion. In contrast to the Andean 
conception of reality as divided into “complementary dualisms” or balanced differences 
that allow “oppositions [to] co-exist without negation”, liberal universalist ideas underlying 
the world-system’s geoculture are oriented towards dividing and labelling reality into 
dichotomous parts (Mignolo 2007, xvi-xvii; Postero 2006; Andolina, Radcliffe, and Laurie 
2009). The act of categorization seems to presuppose the existence of neatly delineable 
homogeneous groups but in fact constitutes the act of inventing and creating those 
groups, contributing to the disconnection of societal structures from their historical 
trajectory. 56 The historian’s task is thus to reconnect (Gruzinski 2001; Subrahmanyam 
1997), to break the moulds imposed through classification and dichotomization. The 
roots of these conditional mechanisms in the commodification of spaces and peoples lay 
in modernity; the invention of universalism. Latour has defined the imposition of a 
nature-culture dichotomy as modernity’s most essential feature (Latour 1993). Once 
installed that rupture, the substitution of pluralism by an improbable homogeneity was 
just one step away, allowing for the imposition of “principles true in every country”, 
achievable through capital and superior to deviant principles (Mitchell 2002).  
Through the widening and deepening of commodified spaces, the people that make 
up these spaces have been designated, have asserted and contested particular socio-
 
                                                     
56 A discrepancy exists between the perception of categories and their markers as abstract or invented 
products of state intervention versus their conception as concrete and instrumentalizable emanations from 
social reality, but in either way this “fabrication of difference” relates to colonially inherited mechanisms of 
control (Lestage and Salazar-Soler 2013). Yet, the act of “positioning” oneself is not unique to the world-
system. Aymara people identify themselves for instance as jaqi or “the proper people”, and refer to outsiders 
as q’ara. As the citation above indicates, this positioning logically interacts with the way in which non-
peripheral groups position themselves in the core and thereto label others as campesinos or -in moments of 
conflict- indios and intermediary groups that “invade” the space of social privilege of “stigma” groups 
(Abercrombie 1998, 46). 
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economic and ethno-cultural categories of “not-yet-incorporatedness.” Their 
categorization as “under incorporation” crystalizes in labels of campesinos, indígenas  and 
comunarios, pointing to partly overlapping peasant livelihoods and indigenous identities 
(Barragán 2000, 143-68). The detected distinctions upon which these labels are 
constructed have been subjected a process of commodification. This “levelling off” of 
markers of peripherality targets community-based structures, such as property, 
exchange and labour relations, and contributes to the convergence of the world of the 
community with the boundaries of world-systemic institutions/categories. 
Thus, classification is functional to the capitalist world-system’s expansive drive and 
materializes through a process of “racial mapping” and the construction of a legal 
framework to incorporate new population groups (Mignolo 2000, 53). At the same time, 
categorization is also an act of homogenization, of blurring and silencing the differences 
among peripheral groups and their historical trajectories. In the process, distinctive 
features have been merged under an umbrella stigma of the poor, the marginalized. The 
colonial encounter stands as a crucial turning point in the creation and amalgamation of 
overlapping categories of “peripherality.” However, the instrumentalization of these 
categories works in both ways and fluctuates over time.57 
In the Andes, this encounter entailed the inclusion of the natives as “vassals” of the 
Crown and their simultaneous classification into stratified racial groups, producing “the 
meltdown of highly differentiated subcultures into one seamless category of “Indian” peasantry” 
(Larson 1995, 23). This “meltdown” also left an impact on the categorization of the 
region, insinuating an idyllic picture of a rural world dominated by a distinctive 
environment and free from capitalist developments. This picture has served as the 
model for “Andeanness” or what is termed as lo andino. As Bebbington states, “an initially 
historicized and hybridizing notion of lo andino thus totters on the brink of essentialism” rooted 
in a certain nostalgia for the “truly” and “traditional” Andean as opposite to anything 
“modern” (Bebbington 2000). If this dissertation would have been restricted to the mere 
exercise of how to fit in a case region as nicely as possible into an andino mould, it would 
have been an easy exercise given that the Carangas region almost perfectly matches the 
idealized prototype of the highland community directly imported from a pre-colonial 
past. Yet, this leaves ethnohistory out of account.  
Particularly from the 1980s on, post-colonial critiques have consciously warned for 
the distorted view on peripheral agency due the act of categorization, triggering a rich 
vein of ethnohistorical research that has destabilized the assumptions structuring that 
 
                                                     
57 Devés-Valdés terms the positioning of oneself and one’s larger group of belonging in relation to the centre 
with “peripheral consciousness” (Devés-Valdés  2012, 466 and 469-74).  
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act. Similar to what elsewhere is called “history from below,” Andean ethnohistory58 
emerged from historians and anthropologists’ shared attentiveness towards the ways in 
which Andean social actors coped with and mediated colonial and post-colonial market 
and state transformations rather than to undergo them. The research agenda that 
backed this endeavour comprised the study of everyday pursuits of livelihood and 
everyday forms of resistance.59 The outcome was twofold. First, by revealing practices of 
indigenous market participation without complete assimilation.60 This seriously 
challenged historical determinism on global capitalist forces to restructure colonial 
hinterlands,61 however without “implicitly celebrating Andean commercial ingenuity (the 
homo economicus of the mountains!) or reifying peasant resistance” (Larson 1995, 18-20). 
Second, by revealing “rural communities as historical constructions, and as the locus of 
struggle and change” (ibid, 19) which allowed for the deconstruction of the allegory of “lo 
andino” (Bonilla 2007).62  
These struggles with determinism and agency are provoked by an inherent 
mechanism of the modern world-system, the act of categorizing. This mechanism lays 
the foundation for two “old” questions that have set the framework of our 
understanding of the fate of the peasantry and of native peoples as capitalism widens 
and deepens. Commonly branded as the peasant question and the Indian question, their 
formulation and reformulation has a political dimension and “reflect (sic) the very 
structure of the society.”63 Our limited understanding of the indigenous and peasant 
encounter with the global forces of capitalist expansion stems from the distortion of 
socio-economic distinctions (peasants as a class) and ethnic distinctions 
(indigenousness as a cultural identity) into categories of passivity (Mann 2005, 1-27; 
Sturgis 2006).  
In this section, these questions and their entanglement will be further explored in 
the Andean context, where both question run as overlapping leitmotivs throughout the 
historical trajectory of Andean communities. The undeniable and very powerful 
connection between ethnicity and social status in the region reflects a shared and 
influential experience of the demographically dominant population groups (Albó 2008, 
13). Some previous notes must be made to understand this connection. In most basic 
 
                                                     
58 Pioneers of (Andean) ethnohistory are Murra (2002), Pease (1991) and Rostworowski (1988).  
59 See for instance Grieshaber 1980; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987; Platt 1982a; Langer 1989; Albó and Barnadas 1985; 
Mallon 1983. 
60 Examples are Rivera Cusicanqui 1978; Spalding 1970; Platt 1987; Glave 1983; Choque Canqui 1991. 
61 See the Stern-Wallerstein debate (Wallerstein 1988). 
62 To name just a (very) few: Wachtel 1990; Moreno and Salomon 1991; Bonilla 1991; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne 
and Harris 2006. 
63 Barraclough and Domike 1970 [1966], 41-4, cited in Roseberry 1993, 321. 
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terms, “peasant” is a way to distinguish individuals or a group in terms of their socio-
economic organization, “indigenous” is a way to identify an individual or group in terms 
of their socio-cultural organization. The former group is usually delineated on basis of –
and located at the edge of- the contours of the prevailing market sphere, the latter is 
delineated on basis of –and located at the edge of- the contours of the prevailing ethnic 
groups (denoted as “civilizations”). While it must be stressed that the labels of peasant 
and indigenous are indeed not identical and moreover overlap with multiple other 
(gender, linguistic, national, rural-urban, regional) identities, they both refer to a set of 
claims that may coincide, but do not necessarily.  
Here, a difference must be made between flexible socio-cultural self-identifications 
and closed statistical-juridical imposed categorizations; in the former they may overlap, 
the latter they either coincide or contrast.64 Either way, they are subject to political 
appropriations which constantly pressures the imposition of “permitted” (read: 
controllable) peasant or indigenous identities.65 In politically less favourable times, 
peripheral groups may turn to alternative categories,66 but when conditions alter, 
stigmatized references may be revaluated and adopted as a honorary nickname, which 
political projects and intermediaries may attempt to instrumentalize.67 The bottom-line 
is that all categorizations are structured by unequal power relations and therefore 
change according to one’s position in relation to the centre. 
 
                                                     
64 In Bolivia, the agricultural censuses of 1960 and 1984, indigenous and peasant were applied to rural 
communities as a single juridical category. Anticipating to the agricultural census of 2013, peasant-supporting 
organizations insisted on the use of differentiated categories. 
65 The separation and merging of both categories remains subject to recurring political games, also in the 
processes of Bolivian state-formation. The Bolivian revolutionary state of 1952 “converted” indigeneity into 
peasantry while its neoliberal version, backed by international institutions, adopted an oblivious stance 
towards class conflict in the name of “multiculturalism” (Albó 2008, 32). In 2013, the distinction and mixing of 
these categories generated an escalation of ongoing struggles between the current MAS government and one 
of the country’s key indigenous movements, the CONAMAQ. Whereas the government party generalizes the 
overlap, CONAMAQ insists on the impossibility of such overlap. In CONAMAQ’s reading, Bolivia’s new 
constitution tends to equal “originario” with “campesino”, denying the difference between those groups that 
maintain their ancestral form of organization (indigenous) and those that have ‘replaced’ that form with the 
syndicalist model (peasant). Attempts to nuance both stances in the public debate remain usually silenced as 
pronouncements get easily stigmatized as either pro or contra any of both stances. See also Erbol, 12.07.2013. 
66 Exemplary is the insistence of community dwellers on their identity as “merchant” -as happened in the 
community of Culta, Norte de Posotí (Abercrombie 1998, 46)- or “livestock breeder” -as happens in Turco, 
Oruro department (own field work 2008-2009). 
67 This happened with the establishment of peasant unions in the context of the Bolivian land reform of 1953, 
serving as an instrument to channel peasant claims into clientelist ties (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013, 36-54) or 
in the rise of paternalistic pro-indigenous movements that provide external spokespersons with a platform to 
represent indigenous voices (see also Coronado 2009). 
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In order to make this overlap workable without falling back into essentialist 
allegories, I will adopt relatively open definitions that allow the integration of several 
forms and scales of action. Therefore, I prefer to focus on the community as the 
framework for intersecting peasant and indigenous identities. In the case of Bolivia, 
Albó and Barrios have defined these frameworks as comunidades campesino indígenas or 
“indigenous peasant communities” (Arteaga 2006, 509), which was later “expanded” to 
comunidades indígenas originarias campesinas and adopted by the Bolivian constitution as a 
legal category for autonomy (“Constitución Política del Estado” 2009, Art. 32). Apart 
from this academic-juridical coinage, the Aymara name for these institutions, the ayllu, 
is still in place (and will be used in this dissertation). The members of these formations 
will be referred to as comunarios. 
2.1.1 Old and new peasantries (the peasant question) 
The most general way to define the peasantry is on basis of a particular production 
mode; peasants live from the land. However, rather than a neutral archetype of anyone 
working the land, peasants are defined by specific power relations they maintain with 
other social groups and states. Peasants are controlled and their resources extracted, 
yet uphold a certain degree of autonomy over their (family) labour and resource base 
(Van der Ploeg 2010, 22). More specifically, I follow the definition that peasants are 
“members of rural, agricultural households who control the land they work either 
as tenants or as smallholders. They are organized in family bonds and village 
communities that meet a large part of their subsistence needs (production, 
exchange, credit, protection) and they pool different forms of income (from land, 
labor, and exchange). They are ruled by other social groups that extract a surplus 
either via rents, via (non-balanced) market transfers, or through control of state 
power (taxation).” (Vanhaute 2008, 42-4).  
Their autonomous strategies for subsistence and protection convert peasantries into 
reserves of cheap labour, which links them to broader frameworks of production and 
control (Smith and Wallerstein 1992 in Vanhaute 2008, 40 and 47). Founded in the 
contested allocation of land and labour, peasantries constitute a social process (Shanin 
1987, 6). They are “the historical outcome of an agrarian labor process which is constantly 
adjusting to surrounding conditions, be it fluctuations of climate, markets, state exactions, 
political regimes, as well as technical innovations, demographic trends, and environmental 
changes” (Bryceson et al. 2000, 2–3). This adjustment shapes differentiated trajectories 
moulded by internal reconfigurations, external pressures and articulations with “the 
outside world” in which land and labour figure as central vectors. Therefore, we should 
speak about peasantries in the plural, both old and new peasantries as the outcome of 
the (re)creation of essential (social and ecological) frontiers of the modern world-
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system. This implies that “the role and fate of peasantries in the last few centuries can be 
understood only in regard to the rise of historical capitalism as an integrated societal model” 
(Vanhaute 2008, 52). The other way round, capitalist (labour division’s) expansion is 
inherently linked to the cycles of reconstruction and marginalization of peasant 
societies (Vanhaute, Cottyn and Wang 2014a). 
Understanding the role of peasantries within broader processes of change is at the 
heart of what has been framed and reframed as “the peasant question” by Marxist 
thinkers, modernization theorists, dependency theorists, world-systems analysts, post-
colonial theorists, etc. Gidwani lays the origins of the ongoing debate in “a gap between 
observed phenomena and the predictions (and embedded political desires) of theory, concerning 
the prospects of a capitalist transformation of agriculture” (Gidwani 2008, xv). Within classic 
Western modernization thinking, this gap is perceived as a wound, converting the 
peasant question in the challenge of how to suture this wound as a precondition for 
national development. In Marxist terminology, this equals the capitalist transformation 
of agriculture through industrialization, which implies processes of depeasantization 
and polarization (ibid, xvi). “Born” at the turn of the 20th century in a Russian context, 
the debate over that transformation was shaped by a dual economy view, first 
formulated by Chayanov in 1925, whose vision contrasted with that of Lenin and 
Kautsky formulated in 1899. The “Chayanov-Lenin debate” could be summarized as the 
discussion whether agrarian change is determined by respectively internal or external 
factors of the peasant household (Roseberry 1993, 334) and settled the peasant 
persistence vs. disappearance thesis as the determinant opposition of the field of 
peasant studies (Araghi 1995).68  
In the latter half of the 20th century, Latin America has proven to offer particularly 
fertile ground for the re-discovery of the topic of agrarian change and its implications 
for peasant households (Roseberry 1993). It was here that a strong critique to the 
common assumption of a universal historical scheme based on modern-traditional 
separations, suggested by the Russian “founding fathers” developed. Departing from 
enquiries into the feudal or contrariwise capitalist character of the hacienda, 
dependency theorists reframed the question within a dialectical and mutually 
reinforcing relationship. Yet, this developmentalist phase of the peasant question 
continued to adopt a dichotomous framework in which the local (the villagers) and the 
global (“the structure of society”) appeared to exist disconnected from each other 
 
                                                     
68 One side of that field is occupied by the teleological disappearance thesis in which the expansion of 
capitalism equals the eventual conversion and hence evaporation of peasant producers into capitalist and 
proletarized producers (Lenin and Kautsky). The other side holds to the essentialist permanence thesis in 
which peasant producers survive as capitalism expands (Chayanov). 
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(Roseberry 1993, 328-30; Edelman 2005, 337).69 From the middle of the 1970s on, a new 
generation of anthropologists and historians re-discovered the peasantry, taking up the 
effort to counter difficultly ineradicable reductions of peasant resilience to exceptional 
eruptions of an otherwise “inert force – dormant, traditional, or ineffectual” (Roseberry 1993, 
318).70 By writing “from below”, they attempted to give more texture to the variety of 
peasant experiences, preferably as detailed as possible. However, while this generation 
includes authors whose work still counts as incontournable, their writings would 
eventually become condemned for propagating essentialist, dualistic and linear 
interpretations, although in a less direct way than the pioneering peasant literature 
such as Chayanov.  
When the exclusive focus on local knowledge was identified as too disproportionate, 
the lens was redirected once more. In view of the effects of neoliberal globalization as 
well as the reinforced vitality of peasant resistance, the field of peasant and agrarian 
studies has witnessed a renewed interest in peasant disappearance and persistence 
theses over the last two decades (Bernstein 2003 and 2010; Barkin 2004; Johnson 2004; 
McMichael 2006; Van der Ploeg 2010).71 Averse from a-historical interpretations of 
rectilinear subsistence-to-capitalism transformations, the agrarian question has been 
taken beyond the parameters of its classic reading. As the important contribution 
compiled by Kay and Akram-Lohdi (2008) testifies, this goes together with an increasing 
attentiveness towards integrating a global perspective in a less or more balanced way 
with local narratives, and theoretical with empirical analysis.  
Triggered by the rise and globalization of agrarian and food crises, the regained 
academic attention towards peasantries and their livelihood strategies demonstrates an 
increasing awareness of the environmental72 and the sovereignty73 dimensions of the 
 
                                                     
69 Influential peasant literature of the 1960s-70s include the work of Polanyi 1958; Wolf 1966; Moore 1966; 
Frank 1969; Stavenhagen 1970; Hobsbawm 1973; Mintz 1974; Kay 1974; Paige 1975; Bartra 1974; Pearse 1975; 
and Scott 1976.  
70 Shanin 1987 delivered an essential contribution to the establishment of this generation. Peasant scholars 
were particularly productive in the Andean region with key publications including Duncan and Rutledge 1977; 
Martínez-Alier 1977; Custred and Orlove 1980; Mallon 1983; Dandler and Calderón 1984; Figueroa 1984; Albó 
and Barnadas 1985; and Stern 1987. 
71 Contrary to Hobsbawm’s interpretation (1994 ), the current that has gained most legitimacy upholds that 
the complexity of peasants’ “agrarian way of life” (in the sense that its internal family- and community-based 
labour regulations allow the coexistence of subsistence and commodity production) undermines linear 
interpretations of the  disappearance of such way of life (Johnson 2004; Bryceson 2000). Indeed, “the campesino 
of today is usually not the campesino of even 15 years ago” (Borras, Edelman and Kay 2008, 83), but the impact that 
agro-food systems undergo due to shifts in the international division of labour is nothing new to that 
campesino, except for the acceleration and intensification of those shifts (Borras 2009).  
72 Moore presents “the Agrarian Question as Ecological Question—whose world-historical import is profoundly 
intertwined with the others, but whose significance (up to now) has been unevenly appreciated” (Moore 2008, 57). 
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agrarian/peasant question and point to their political repercussions.74 Urbanization, 
land grab, the loss of food security and unequal income structures are just some of the 
high priorities on the world policy agenda that are intimately connected to the peasant 
question. This revitalisation of the field and its stronger global focus involves a more 
intensively mobilizing peasantry (McMichael 2008). From the local to transnational 
scales, peasant movements are asserting the importance of as well as the difficulties for 
family-based sustainable production modes within an ever more globalising world 
(Altieri 2002; Altieri and Nicholls 2005; Petras 2005). Movements such as the Via 
Campesina contest the supposed linear outcome of long-term incorporation.75 The 
declining centrality of rural zones in the modern world-system is just one aspect of a 
more complex process that involves the production (peasantization), erosion 
(depeasantization) and recovery (repeasantization) of a peasant lifestyle. These are 
interdependent processes that closely entangle with processes of de/re-ruralization 
(transformations in the spatial ordering of agriculture) and de/re-agrarianization 
(transformations in agricultural production) (Vanhaute 2008).76  
As the effects of the widening (expansion) and deepening (intensification) of 
relations of commodification trigger a diversification of peasant livelihood strategies, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
73 By posing the classical agrarian question as a “food question”, McMichael reveals the inherent question of 
sovereignty, thereby inverting its original focus. “Rather than raising questions about the trajectory of a given 
narrative, the food sovereignty movement questions the narrative itself” (McMichael 2008, 218-9).  
74 Borras 2009; Boutsen 2008; Peemans 2008; De Schutter 2014. See also the contributions in the Symposium on 
the 2007-2008 World Food Crisis published by Journal of Agrarian Change (Johnston 2010, 69-129). 
75 Commenting on the international peasant movement Via Campesina, Borras concludes that “today, perhaps 
more than ever, what happens in and in relation to the rural world is critical to our understanding of the broader world 
and the very future of human society” (Borras 2009, 25). See also http://viacampesina.org. 
76 The break-up of local models for socio-economic organization and cultural-spiritual belonging through 
state intervention facilitates a process of peripheralizing incorporation, defined as peasantization. The 
conscious creations of peasantries is particularly obvious in more extractive societies (Vanhaute 2012, 5) as in 
colonial regimes where collective forms of agricultural labour are replaced by more regulable forms of based 
on family firms with a more direct access to markets. But also post-colonial land reforms tend to have an 
agenda oriented at “peasantizing” the rural masses, think of Bolivia’s revolutionary land reform of 1953 
(Rivera 1987, 100; Urioste 2001, 11-2). Ecological, technological and infrastructural changes, demographic 
trends, political-legal impositions and the intervention of new economic players may alter the access to land, 
labour and/or capital in these reorganized models, thereby undermining of the family basis of small-scale 
agricultural producers. The consequent process of depeasantization, goes together with deagrarianization as 
the income pooling strategies of peasant populations become less reliant upon agriculture (Vanhaute 2012, 6). 
Similarly, de-ruralization, most strongly observed in the reverse side of worldwide urbanization, can be 
considered as a major world-historical tendency (Mears 1997 cited in Johnson 2004, 60). Simultaneously, we 
can speak of a repeasantization, pushing non-rural workers to peasant spaces in times of market contraction 
or the creation of a New Rurality visible in urban-rural linkages, the diversification of rural livelihoods with 
non-agricultural income sources, political decentralization, etc. (Rosas-Baños 2013; Hecht 2010). 
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what globally seems to disappear in essence constitutes an essentially uneven and 
regionally diverse process. The fact that powerful, apparently universal, trends do not 
automatically nor inevitably proceed towards the vanishing and elimination of existing 
“to be incorporated”-zones, exposes peasants as “initiators of change as well as reactors to 
it, as peoples simultaneously disposed to “adapt” to objective forces beyond their control and to 
“resist” inroads on hard-won rights and achievements” (Roseberry 1993, 318). Rather than 
assessing this combination of autonomy and participation claims in terms of opposition 
(or even ineptitude to) versus openness to (or even craving for) capitalist incorporation, 
it attests to a “moral economy” according to which peasants bargain survival 
guarantees with their “extractors”, through “confrontations in the market-place” which 
may include rebellion as well as taxation and trade relations (Thompson 1970 and 1991, 
259-351; Scott 1976; Edelman 2005). This resilience is key factor in the production of new 
and deviation of old frontiers of land control. 
2.1.2 Indigenous autonomy (the Indian question) 
Whereas peasantries are principally defined in socio-economic terms, indigenous 
peoples are usually defined in terms of a recoverable cultural-political identity. 
However, indigeneity is in essence a juridical category that forms the basis for the 
identification, delineation and allocation of individual and collective land, territorial 
and resource rights to ethno-cultural groups. As an effect of colonial and liberal 
projects, the arbitrary, flexible, historically and geographically conditional character of 
indigeneity has been enclosed into taxpayers lists, censuses and other statistical tools as 
well as into a global political category set against nation-state-bound categories 
(Canessa 2012; CEPAL 2005; Zagalsky 2009; Albó 2008). Over time, several determinants 
(residence, language, auto-identification) have served different categorizations, ranging 
from the most oppressive notion of Indian (indio; la indiada),77 and apparently more 
constructive notion of indigenous (indígena) or the more recent self-ascription of 
“originary” (originario), insisting on priority connections between group and locality. 
Yet all these categories are subject to historical reductionism and legal-fiscal 
uniformization (Barragán 2000, 143-68; Subirats 1994).78  
 
                                                     
77 While “indigenous” stems from a positive empowering discourse it may also conceal the discrimination of 
the indio, hence “one can be comfortably indigenous; one can never be comfortably indian” (Canessa 2012, 8-9). See 
also the work of Reinaga (1969). 
78 This confronts population groups with self-categorization dilemmas, for instance in the context of census 
operations or the reclamation of certain rights exclusively attributed to certain groups. Examples are the 
debates in Bolivia and Peru provoked by the entanglement of indigenous (self-)identification with categories 
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From an exclusive/silencing category, indigeneity underwent only recently a more 
inclusive/emancipatory redefinition as the legal basis for indigenous claims.79 In 
international law, the UN definition counts as the most accepted classification of 
indigenous peoples: 
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed 
on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop 
and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with 
their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system” (Cobo 1987). 
This “identifixation” started after the Spanish invasion and is informed by a long 
history of rights attribution in international law. Or rather the other way round, the 
claim upon indigenous rights constitute the raison d'être of international law (Anghie 
2007). Exactly because of the civilization discourse designed to justify the world-
system’s drive for new resources, peoples and places that were to exploited and 
subordinated, the colonial encounter and subaltern agency were far from peripheral 
concerns to the development of international legal frameworks. This worked as follows, 
“jurists using the conceptual tools of positivism postulated a gap, understood principally in terms 
of cultural differences, between the civilized European and uncivilized non-European world; 
having established this gap they then proceeded to devise a series of techniques for bridging this 
gap, of civilizing the uncivilized” (ibid, 37). In other words, framing means closing (a self-
created gap). Here lay the foundations of the Indian question; the attempt to suture this 
gap by capturing its development within a logical and predictable evolution, as 
happened with the peasant question. Sprouting from a classic, Turnerian reading of 
intercultural frontiers in terms of strict boundaries, this attempt has been dominated by 
the idea of the “vanishing Indian”, founded in a dichotomous model of tightly 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of citizenship in the context of census operations (Tamburini 2013) or with the conditions set by 
(international) legal frameworks to grant indigenous groups specific rights such as consultation –and hence 
negate that right to differently (self-)identified groups (Rousseau 2012; Anchante 2013a-b).  
79 Parallel with the reinforcement of peasant movements and resistance, the struggle for indigenous rights has 
revamped since the 1990s. While indigenous people reinforced their organizations, international players such 
as the International Labour Organization (the 169 Convention), the UNO (the 2008 declaration) and NGOs 
“discovered” the indigenous people as a relevant line of approach and developed a “language of global 
indigeneity” which was again appropriated by indigenous organizations themselves as a lobby strategy (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998; Lucero 2008). This tendency has been particularly visible in Latin-America -not the least in 
Bolivia (Albó 1991; Quijano 2006)- yet erroneous representation of this indigenous resurgence as “novel” 
reveals the reproduction of false anachronisms (Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2005). 
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incorporated zones of unilateral assimilation versus distanced zones of stubborn 
persistence (Boccara 2005, 20). This has resulted in a perception of indigenous people as 
“impervious to history,” either due to their “ignorant and malevolent obstinacy” or 
their “resistance to homogenizing imperialist forces” (Abercrombie 1998, xx). 
The uncritical assumption of indigenous survival as a form of enduring/anti-
historical primitivism has been cultivated by typologies constructed since the 1950s that 
pigeonholed the Andean indigenous community in “closed” corporate communities 
such as the “typical” Andean indigenous community or “open” and more capitalist 
communities such as haciendas or plantations (Wolf 1955). In the late 1970s, the 
development of a rich interdisciplinary field started to destabilize such notions out of 
anthropologists’ “move towards the region [Latin America] as an effective frame of reference 
for studies of community formation and linkage with a wider world,” and the intersected (re-
)discovery of the region by historians (Roseberry 1993, 347).80 Andean ethnohistory was 
born out of this intersection, revealing how nearly all indigenous groups (the only 
exception being “undiscovered” groups of the planet’s remaining rainforests) are open, 
and often proof to be indispensable, to other sectors of society for the supply of 
products. In parallel with the development of postcolonial and subaltern studies, the 
academic engagement with the Indian question has gradually moved towards a more 
permeable and malleable notion of encounter.81 Rather than simply reversing the black-
white picture of domination and oppression, this picture is revealed as a criss-cross of 
resistance, acceptance and appropriation reactions. Only when grasping these nuances 
of interaction it is possible to understand the historical invention, appropriation and re-
invention of what it means to be indigenous, indio, or Aymara, and the associated “long 
memory” of mobilization and political organization (Rivera 1987; Albó 2008, 14).  
By actively cooperating with or averting from state-based and capitalist modes of 
organization in view of short- or long-term opportunities, the common claim “to exist 
as separate entities” from the process of globalization is overruled by the indigenous 
groups themselves (Baud 2009, 24; Lucero 2008). It is this participating while retaining 
their distinct identities that makes indigenous cultures more authentic rather than 
inconsistent. Indigenous groups, when organizing against “the dispossessory dynamics 
 
                                                     
80 Antecedents to that move include Wolf 1955, Murra 1975, Rowe 1957; the anthropologists include Orlove 
1977 and Smith 1989; the historians include Spalding 1988, Larson 1988, Stern 1982, Mallon 1983. 
81 Guerrero and Platt 2000, 95-113; Boccara 2005; Mallon 1994. Wachtel’s pioneering reassessment of the 
colonial encounter from the perspective of “the vanquished” still counts as one of the most elementary 
contributions to the field of Andean ethnohistory (Wachtel 1968; 1971). The shift his work initiated was 
carried in Bolivia on under impetus of the subaltern studies, were introduced in the 1990s thanks to people 
such as Silvia Rivera and Rossana Barragán, whose efforts, backed by academics such as Alison Spedding, 
Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar or Luis Tapia, made the work of non-Spanish radical thinkers accessible in a country 
with no tradition of translation. 
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of agrarian capitalism”, expose an ability to understand the entanglement of macro and 
micro scales of capitalism instead of reading them as mutually exclusive (Ghosh 2010). 
Yet this capacity does not neutralize the undeniable discord in their participation. This 
discord does not stem from a “primordialistic” claim, but is rooted in a holistic 
understanding of human-nature relations that is reflected in the collective structures 
that order indigenous life.82 The claim to persist as non-state and noncapitalist entities 
and the challenge of communal organization to privatization and commodification 
mechanisms entail a fundamental questioning of capitalistic processes that makes 
indigenous anti-systemic resistance more “real” than other social movements.83 At the 
other hand, this external and “real” discord does not make internal disharmonies less 
persistent or real; on the contrary (Izko 1992). 
In view of indigenous peoples’ claim to seek assimilation with nor isolation from state 
and capitalist frameworks, I will determine their position within the world-system -
following Kardulias- as a “negotiated incorporation.” This negotiation is oriented 
towards the safeguarding of a room for self-determination. Key to that self-
determination is the right to land and territory.  
“The driving force of the history of Indigenous peoples in Latin America is the 
struggle for territory. This is something that has been difficult for the traditional 
academy to comprehend. If we examine peoples’ uprisings throughout history – in 
the colonial era, the liberal moment, currently – they have always been for the 
defense of territory. For its defense, but also for the drive for territorial 
sovereignty and self-government” (Gladys Tzul, translated by Cuffe in Hernández 
2014). 
Land and territory constitute the alpha and omega of the broader Indian question of 
political, economic and cultural (re)production and sovereignty since that question 
 
                                                     
82 In contrast to nature as culture’s opposite in Western philosophical thinking, indigenous cosmovision sees 
nature as conditional to culture. In line with this from this nature-culture interrelation, indigenous peoples 
adopt and reproduce specific organizational structures characterized by (partially or wholly) redistributive 
economic relations, community-based political and cultural autonomy, symbiotic ecological relations, and 
reciprocal social networks. Subirats 1994, cited in De Munter 2003, 33-4; Hall and Fenelon 2009, 24-6. 
83 Hall and Fenelon (2009) and Mignolo (2011) coincide in categorizing indigenous resistance as a “real” 
version of what Wallerstein defines as anti-systemic movement. While most forms of resistance seek “a larger 
slice of the pie or to tinker with the recipe for the pie,” indigenous movements tend to “reject pies in all forms, or try to 
live outside them,” which is often erroneously understood as a reactionary determination “to recapture a golden 
past” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 121-2). In so doing, indigenous people position themselves as non-state people 
not only against individual state projects but the entire Westphalia interstate system (Wilmer 1993, cited in 
Hall and Fenelon 2009, 10). In that sense, “their practices may be suggestive of alternatives to the current system” 
(Hall 2013, 49). Also Mignolo sees a workable alternative in the “communal” and integrates it as the 
cornerstone of his theory on the “decolonial option” (2011). 
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reached the (inter)national stage (Mariátegui 1928). Until that moment, that question 
largely continued to serve as a vehicle for segregation rather than incorporation. This 
changed under 19th century liberal projects, when “the Andean republics came to naturalize 
the Indian problem and turn it into the political and rhetorical center-piece of their  varied 
nation-building projects” (Larson 2004, 51).  
2.2 Safeguarding room for manoeuvre: State integration, 
market expansion and communal agency. 
Central to our understanding of peasants and/or indigenous responses to processes of 
modernization, state formation and world market expansion is their determination and 
capacity to simultaneously guarantee their autonomy and participation. The 
combination of safeguarding (a minimum of) autonomous control over vital resources 
and secure (a minimum of) involvement in broader structures accounts for a 
multifaceted, apparently contradictory, but above all alert attitude towards 
globalization processes. At the one hand, peasants and indigenous resistance is founded 
in (the defence of) a particular way to regulate access to livelihood resources. At the 
other hand, their pragmatism to adapt or even assimilate to new/incorporating entities 
is reflected in the development of market and trade relations as well as in legal-political 
struggles. Understanding this “negotiated incorporation” is essential to the central 
interest of this research to understand the relation between the formation of supra-
local land rights frameworks and the reproduction of local self-organized communities 
and their resource management regimes (Ostrom and Schlager 1996, 127). 
In its close entanglement with processes of state formation (even those prior to the 
modern world-system), the question over the integration of the “vanquished” generally 
gives “too much agency to the power of the “hegemonizing” state” (Larson 2004, 9), while 
giving too few attention to the economic dimension (Langer 2009, 529). Rather, I will 
present the community/communal as an entry gate to co-existing yet different and 
independent local histories of subaltern (political, economic, cultural) incorporation. I 
conceive the community as a framework for agency beyond resistance, regardless of the 
(politically coloured) debate of whether this agency could/should be defined as peasant 
and/or indigenous. From a world-systemic perspective and averse from essentialist 
umbrella categories, the community will be taken as a mobilizing formation for both 
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self-determination and negotiation within larger, widening and deepening systems.84 A 
focus on the communal character of the organization of rural life –with specific regard 
to land access- circumvents the trap of approaching land rights in too narrow or 
exclusive terms.85 
2.2.1 The communal 
In Zibechi’s words, the communal relates to a continuously (re)created “social machine” 
of political and economic inter-individual and inter-collective links; far from an 
institutionalized model (Zibechi 2010, 14). In a similar style he and Mignolo, both 
inspired by the concrete organization of the Bolivian Aymaras and the Zapatistas, this 
machine is defined as operating by “dispersing” power through rotation, thereby 
preventing hierarchization and guaranteeing the collective control over individual 
usufruct and family labour (Mignolo 2011, 320 and 324; see also Patzi 2004). In the 
Aymara context, this communal system is known as the ayllu, formed by a number of 
extensive families who share real or artificial kinship bonds and occupy a determined 
space.86 Too often, the ayllu has served Andeanists or scholars less familiar with the area 
to sketch an ideal homogeneous and closed self-sufficient mini-society, thereby 
intentionally or unwittingly promoting a status-quo and celebrating the community as 
an indicator of “Andeanness” (Nash 2001, 38).87 At the other hand, neither should the 
community sphere be stressed as a locus of inherent contradiction in Andean society 
(Bonilla 2007, 104). On the contrary, the outlook, functioning and renovation dynamics 
of the ayllu sketch a much more complex picture.  
Since the sixteenth century, community formation has become closely entangled 
with capitalism, while simultaneously continuing to function as the basis for self-
 
                                                     
84 Within the world-systemic landscape of institutions, amongst which Wallerstein distinguishes markets, 
firms (represented by capitalist enterpreneurs), states (bound by an inter-state system), households (such as a 
nuclear groups of rural producers), classes (such as peasants) and status-groups (such as indigenous peoples) 
(Wallerstein 2006, 24), the community could be addressed as an alternative institution on the level of firms, 
represented by commoners rather than “entrepreneurs”, from which anti-systemic responses to core-driven 
processes radiate. 
85 Richard for instance differentiates between indigenous, peasant and (sub)urban land rights, which seems to 
suggest that indigenous and peasant rights are by definition rural rights (Richards 2009, 59). Moreover, it risks 
to mould local land rights systems in a “staged” trajectory, for instance insinuating that the communal 
regulations upheld in the communities of Carangas relegate the region “still” to an indigenous “stage” and 
disallow its treatment as a peasant region. 
86 Chapter three gives more details on the constitution, working and history of the Bolivian ayllu. 
87 See also Salman and Zoomers (2003) and Mayer (2002) on PRATEC (Apffel-Marglin and PRATEC 1998). 
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determination (Mignolo 2009 and 2011, 295-336). In the process, several constitutive 
elements of the ayllu have been appropriated and adjusted by central state powers in 
order to optimize its extractive capacities yet the survival of the ayllu does not merely 
rely on its functionality to state formation but on a dynamic history of resistance and 
renovation (Ticona and Albó 1997; De Munter 2003, 14). As a consequence of this 
continuous reinvention, communal systems are  being revamped in the form of political 
and intellectual projects for an alternative (or reversed) colonization (Patzi 2004; 
Fernández Osco 2000; Cúneo 2011). Similarly, in more integrated sectors of the world-
system, instruments for communal action are gaining ground as an alternative to liberal 
frameworks, think about the current fashionability of “sharing is the new owning”. A 
difference must be made, however, between “the communal” and the liberal concept of 
“the common good” or Marxist concepts of the “commons”. While the latter is a world-
systemic conceptual creation, the former is a pre-existing formation that has been 
gradually caught by the net of those creations, which in many cases (think of the 
communal structures in Medieval Europe) implied its evaporation  (Mignolo 2011, 311).88  
Political schemes tend to cultivate idealized imaginings of the community that stand 
far away from its concrete and daily implications. Its functioning as a public medium 
has a “cost” in that it requires a minimal approval and support by “private” comunario 
households of the intervention of and their participation in reciprocal mechanisms, 
authoritative bodies and collective action (Mayer 2002, 41). As has been demonstrated 
by Ostrom (1990), these regulatory structures determine and allocate rights among 
community members in order to overcome Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 
1968). In that sense, “common resources and empowered communities are two sides of the same 
coin” (De Angelis 2009). To secure communal control over those resources, community 
leaders also take up a representative role, ascribed or recognized by central state 
authorities (Custred and Orlove 1980, 48-9). This intermediation has been pushed into 
clientelist ties in the context of colonial extraction, republican domination, 
developmentalist programs and populist reform. In the other direction, these leaders 
knew to manipulate their intermediary position for their own benefit as well. In short, 
where communal structures have remained in place, we do not find beacons of harmony 
but complex patterns and internal conflicts that make community life “complex, 
conflictive, messy, and contradictory, rather like people's lives anywhere else in this world” 
(Canessa 2012, 11).  
 
                                                     
88 Also in the revived debates in the Andes/Bolivia on the ayllu as a political model, “the communal” is often 
(implicitly) “sold” as a Western-Marxist-communist concept or directly deduced from abstract, homogenizing 
interpretations of the Andean world and cosmovision. An example is how the discourse of the current Bolivian 
regime, and particularly its vice-president Garcia Linera, leads to a devaluation of paradigms such as buen vivir 
(suma qamaña) or “to live good” – rather than better (Spedding 2013a) 
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2.2.2 The loopholes and rebound of assimilationist State projects. 
The Andean peasant and Indian “problems” refer to a long history of struggle shaped by 
the interplay of bottom-up (forms of) mobilization and the development of nation-
states designed in function of the simultaneous marginalization and incorporation of 
rural (indio, campesino) classes (Quijano 2006; Larson 2004). The dialectic between the 
“not-yet(-fully)-incorporated” and the incorporated may take us back to the formation 
of the first states; the moment that announced “the very last 1 percent of human history” 
(Scott 2009, 3). However, a differentiation can be made at the moment the “modern 
state” comes into play; the only instance to “bring nonstate spaces and people to heel” (ibid, 
4). Foreshadowed by Westphalia and European colonialism, this is the moment we live 
since the French Revolution and the “triumph of liberalism” (Wallerstein 2011).  
Modern state projects did not truly get off the ground before new elite groups, 
suspicious of the feudal-like tactics of “old” elite’s capital accumulation, started to push 
more vehemently for “modernization” in the late 19th century. The pursuit of these 
projects went accompanied by increasing pressures on land and labour resources, 
although the processes of dispossession “heralded by dependency theorists and novelists 
sympathetic to the indigenous population (…) were not as clear-cut in practice as has often been 
assumed” (Baud 2009, 23). Around the turn of the 20th century, these pressures became 
increasingly more violent and hence acquired more urgency on the political agenda. 
This announced the shift to an integration policy which included the construction of a 
“political space”. In its mission to ensure the security and productivity of the periphery, 
states were confronted with the imperatives of ecology and infrastructure. Over time 
and specifically in the second half of the 20th century, innovations in “distance-
demolishing technologies” such as railroads, roads,  telecommunication, information, 
air traffic etc. have decisively shifted the “strategic balance of power between self-governing 
peoples and nation-states” (Scott 2009, xii). As a result, hardly a single spot or a single 
person on the planet has remained beyond the reach of such assimilationist state by the 
end of that century.  
Yet, despite its spatial dimension, “no one has ever seen ‘the state’” (Nehring and Schui 
2007, 9). The state becomes visible through its “order-making functions,” which concerns 
the delineation of spaces and social groups as “ordered” or under control and 
“disordered” or on the edge of control (Das and Pole 2004). On the fundament of “one 
people, one nation”, which also implies one language, one culture and one Law, peoples, 
nations, languages, cultures and laws that are not functional to the State were made 
invisible. This implies a process of bordering, registration and taxation, infringements 
justified by the establishment of a “contractual” relation or pact between (sectors of) 
civil society and the state. At the same time, this concerns a differentiated, asymmetric 
relation designed to restructure the relation between the people, their resources and 
the state into a constellation that gives the individual priority over the communal 
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(Mitchell 2002). A good example of an “ordering” (visibilizing-invisibilizing) mechanism 
is the taking of (population, cadastral, agricultural…) censuses (Barragán 2011), through 
which people are counted and subjected to a process of self-identification, properties 
and productive units are classified and georeferenced, their productive potential being 
measured etc.89 
As social relations are (re)negotiated, laws, taxes and borders –markers of ongoing 
commodification- entail a dynamic that generates a paradoxical effect. Laws and 
loopholes are two sides of the same coin, producing “irregular spaces of law” where plural 
arrangements continue to defy an imagined legal hegemony (Benton 2009 and 2011).90 
Parallel to the double role of money,91 taxes have a material as well as symbolic 
function, to generate revenue as well as dependency. Borders, while counting as the 
ultimate symbols of sovereignty, economically translated in customs regimes, are 
equally bear the hallmark of paradox in that they simultaneously divide and connect.92 
Jurisdiction, tax collection and customs are simultaneous instances of consolidation and 
undermining, of attaching to and distantiating from state power and market pressures. 
This paradoxical character is embodied in the ambivalent role of local state and market 
representatives. The efficiency of the post-colonial state is dependent upon the strength 
of its alliance with regional elites, particularly those stationed in the frontier zone (Baud 
2004, 57-8). As political functionaries and economic agents, these village elites (both 
incoming as local) are assigned with the responsibility of enforcing and consolidating 
the rule of law, fiscal bonds and imaginary (bounded) spaces of belonging. However, 
these local elites tend to uphold a relatively high level of independence, just as other 
rivalling/allying institutions (think of the Church) do. 
 
                                                     
89 In that respect, 2012-2013 were very interesting years with the execution of respectively a population and 
an agricultural census in Bolivia. The official objectives that justified these operations were formulated in 
terms of institutional capacity, national development and food security but invariably launches debates over 
the legitimacy of the registered social change and delineations and the consequent allocation of resources. 
Tinkazos 2012; CEDIB 2012; INE 2013; BIF 27.08.2013.  
90 Juridical monism, from the Leyes de Indias to the Code Napoleon, is endorsed as the standard, although a 
recent and fragile pluralist countermovement can be noted -particularly since 1990s with international and 
national guarantees for legal pluralism such as the ILO Convention 169. Cases such as Bolivia demonstrate that 
the imposition of uniform juridical frameworks still forms the exception of history (IIHCE 2012). 
91 Money is never neutral, but “a social relation” that functions as a concrete means of circulation in the form 
of coinage and as a virtual means of valorization hinting at an underlying behaviour and belief system 
(Ingham 1996; see also Platt 2008; Harris 1982; Caro 1994, 36-8). Similarly, one could say that taxes correspond 
to a social relation that extracts surplus and meanwhile incorporates people in an “imagined” community. 
92 Peoples and places are disconnected by physical barriers, political borders, property boundaries and custom 
regimes, but these obstacles at the same time stimulate the organization of inter-ecological exchanges, trade 
agreements, smuggle, migration, and bilateral diplomacy. Baud and van Schendel 1997; see also Torres 
Cisneros 2004;  Perrier Bruslé 2006 and 2007. 
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The formation of Andean states is particularly indicative of the fact that state-
building is nurtured by large ambitions that do not necessarily (and almost never) 
correspond to equal achievements: 
“a colonial state-in-formation maintained an illusion of strength and extensive 
control through a complex bureaucratic apparatus but exercised that control 
through individual agents, officers, and governors who contracted their services 
to the Spanish Crown and who often pursued their own interests and agendas. The 
state was not so much weak as it was thinly and unevenly distributed” (Roseberry 
1993, 348).  
This explains the central state’s (growing) anxiety to create more direct and 
internalized bonds with local populations through military conscription, juridical 
categories, suffrage and particularly through education (Baud 2004, 62; see also Baud 
and Parra 2002, 245-51). Yet, as these aspirations go seldom or difficultly accompanied 
by a real attribution of sovereignty, this remains a very precarious bond, which makes 
Zavaleta speak of the “apparent State” (Zavaleta 1982).  
From a frontier perspective, the expansion of civil rights and the accompanying 
formation and reformulation of common identities/imaginations can be viewed as a 
frontier that –like all frontier processes- creates a rebound effect. This frontier 
corresponds to process of “creating subjects” in function of the state’s internal 
legitimacy or, in the terms of Anderson, generating an imagined community. The 
movement of that frontier stems from an instrumentalization of identities, engendering 
a tension between ethnic identities (diversity) and national identity (homogeneity).  
Both the granters and the grantees of civil rights and the corresponding “self-
identification” categories negotiate the terms of inclusion according to the rhythm of 
interplaying inclusion/exclusion pressures. Through this negotiation dynamic the 
imagined centralized community is destabilized by subaltern claims on an 
“unimagined” participation in that community (Thurner 1997, 20-53). Through this 
destabilization, concessions are extorted that undercut state ambitions with unexpected 
side-effects. This points to a double feedback loop, a “rebound” effect that runs in 
multiple directions. 
Let’s start with the conceptualization and imposition of state-based legal framework 
“that proclaimed the inclusion of all as the definition of the good society” (Wallerstein 2006, 60). 
This goes together with the granting of rights, yet the concession of a particular legal 
status always comes at a certain cost. With regard to indigenous populations, for 
instance, it is a thorny question to determine whether legal privileges can be considered 
a victory or a defeat as it as “by fighting European civilization on its own turf, indigenous 
peoples have had to accept some of the premises of that turf” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 10). 
While legal struggle has proven to be an effective strategy to resist incorporation and 
global capitalism, access to court is conditioned by the legitimacy and representative 
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power ceded to intermediary actors and overturned through mechanisms that 
conditions that access to the structures of internal colonialism. Moreover the security of 
the obtained rights is conditioned by the strength of the rule of law. 
Because legal frameworks are subject to flexibility, oblivion and erosion, the 
production of laws and of its loopholes are two sides of the same coin. The weak control 
of state institutions over their own imposed legal framework creates opportunities for 
non-state actors to appropriate, reinterpret and influence or even “counter” the law. 
Particularly in the context of (post)colonial institutional encounters, the transfer of 
novel (European-style) regulations to newly acquired territories and subjects was 
shaped by a high suppleness and openness to local pressures (Benton 2002; 2011). This is 
particularly notable in the implementation of (Roman Law-based) property rights 
systems (Serrão 2013). It is in that sense very interesting to note that in current Bolivian 
land legislation certain parts of the legislation are deliberately left open to 
communitarian justice systems – a “gap” that points to an interesting history which will 
be further explored in this dissertation.  
Fluctuations in state intervention relate to the way in which a particular territory, its 
resources and people are identified in relation to the strategic objectives of a state. This 
explains why in some contexts a state may make a deliberate decision to nót to organize 
the intervention in and integration of a particular group or territory (Boone 2003). 
However, such decision is also influenced by “the friction of terrain” which gives 
peripheral groups a comparative territorial advantage.93 It may also include more active 
extortion of certain rights through legal actions or revolutions. At the other hand, the 
formal obtainment of specific rights and tools (adopted by the central government and 
inscribed in constitutions) is far from sufficient and requires daily efforts to make them 
respected and tangible “on the ground”. Moreover, such appropriations by subaltern 
sectors are often re-appropriated by the state as an act of window-dressing (an 
“indigenous”- or “peasant”-washing of their agenda). The more successful their 
challenge to powerful dichotomies, the more subaltern action gets embroiled in political 
games and internal leadership struggles risking to overpower and delegitimize their 
resistance.94 
 
                                                     
93 Even though developed from a whole other environment, Scott’s translation of how mountains can serve as 
a refuge for state-fleeing people into the idea of a friction is quite interesting for the Andean highlands. This 
friction is to be understood as a historical construct which in one period might provide inhabitants with a 
comparative advantage, while disadvantaging them in other periods (Scott 2009, xii). 
94 Again, Bolivia is the scenery of such tension, particularly and increasingly visible in the co-optation and 
politics of divide and rule that undercut what had been heralded as a solid collaboration between the MAS 
government and the indigenous movement of Bolivia’s highland communities, CONAMAQ. Achtenberg 2014; 
Apaza 2014; Sammu 2014.  
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2.2.3 The “anti-commodity” side of expanding market spheres. 
To start with, the idea of an “omnipotent” world-system subjecting a passive and 
defenceless class of rural (wo)manpower to maximal exploitation makes as little sense 
as the inverse idea of stubborn off-market producers fending off any form of connection 
or accommodation to that world market. As much as capitalist penetration into local 
production settings follows a deviating trajectory, bottom-up response to that 
interference is not uniform either. In other words, the impact of market expansion into 
peripheral regions for rural livelihoods is not predictable. Assertions pretending 
otherwise usually stem from their oblivion towards the capacity of indigenous and 
peasant groups to combine complementary on- and off-market livelihood strategies and 
networks. This misunderstanding has concealed or downplayed the fact that market 
response is one aspect of a more diverse economic responsiveness, in which market 
access concurs with non-market (barter, smuggle, plunder) activities, to a vision of 
indigenous/peasant market participation as “resistance to the market” (Platt 1995; 
Stern 1995). 95 
The importance of overlapping circuits of reciprocity, exchange and trade96 gives 
subsistence and exchange patterns an “extra” dimension which could be defined as the 
“anti-commodity” side of the organization of production and circulation (IISH 2010). 
The notion of anti-commodities was born out of efforts to bridge the gap between 
economic determinism and subaltern perspectives on the role of commodities in world 
history.97 It thereby links up to the critiques against Frank’s argument on the world-
system as contained by a singular production mode (2011 [1978]). Quite on the contrary, 
economic transformations in the periphery attest to the reinforcement of local pre-
existing production relations rather than their assimilation to the dominant mode of 
production in the core, which moreover underpins the political leverage of local 
producers (Laclau 1971, 21; Jacobsen 1984; Caro 1994, 24).  
Although the term remains somewhat unfortunate, “anti” intends to contribute to a 
more nuanced understanding of subaltern market participation. The suggested 
 
                                                     
95 Gosh detects an example of this trap in Li’s assumption that the “ambiguity” of (self-identified) indigenous 
people rejecting privatization pressures while others embrace them gives evidence of indigeneity is an 
attribution of a “liberal subject of political economy” (Ghosh 2010). 
96 Dominique Temple distinguishes exchange from reciprocity and insists on their opposition (Temple 2003). I 
also make a distinction between different types of exchange, mainly barter as a form of “off-market” exchange 
and trade as market exchange.  
97 See also the debate within the field of commodity chain research (Topik and Wells 1997; Topik , Marichal 
and Frank 2006; Bair 2008). This also links up to conceptualizations of a “metabolic rift” departing from Marx’ 
understanding of rural-urban commodity and labour dynamics (Moore 2003; see also Moore 2000; Foster 1999). 
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dichotomy must in that sense be understood as an allusion to the essentially connected 
yet obscured “shadow” side of what is usually presented as bulldozing market 
expansion. Instead of reducing self-sufficiency strategies to a “non-commodity” or 
purely subsistence economy, it draws attention to (the ability of) combining 
complementary economic activities that allow marginalized groups to enter and 
withdraw from the market according to their own terms. “Anti” refers to the way in 
which local strategies of resource and labour exploitation, and hence of accumulation 
and resistance, put on a brake in the “gearings” of global commodity chains. The 
formation and expansion of these chains is in to some extent counterbalanced by the 
economic resilience of local production modes, founded in a particular logic of 
production, in particular forms of access to the necessary means thereto and in 
particular ethno-cultural traits implied in these access strategies. 
In the field of Andean ethnohistory, insights into how Andean livelihood strategies 
simultaneously tap into kin-based and barter reciprocities as well as market relations 
has yielded alternative concepts such as “ethnic economy” (Harris 1982; Salomon 1985). 
This line of research has demonstrated that the strength of non-commodified exchange 
relations does not automatically exclude an active market participation – therefor not 
rejecting “resistance” altogether.98 While indigenous commoners could not halt 
mercantile interference, they developed strategies that enabled them to satisfy state, 
Church and community obligations while preventing their straightforward capitulation 
to market imperatives (Larson 1995, 21; Stern 1995). These everyday forms of resistance 
designed, employed and defended by “Andeans” included both avoidance (absenteeism, 
migration and resettlement) as deliberate insertion into market circuits (accumulation, 
diversification). 
Different from the pre-capitalist situation in Europe, production and distribution was 
organized through political economy in function of inter-ecological complementarity, 
without interference of markets, tribute institutions, money, merchants, or feudal 
property relations.99 This gave rise to a false duality in which reciprocity and 
complementarity are contrasted with market relations. However, the early colonial 
development of an Andean economic space did not equal a simple substitution, but a 
more complex insertion of pre-colonial reciprocity principles and networks in 
commercial relations and restructuring of economic spaces. The active participation of 
Andean peoples in this emerging market sphere from early on has generated  
 
                                                     
98 Bradby 1982; Harris 1982; Platt 1982; Caro 1994; Larson, Harris and Tandeter 1987 and 1995; Langer 1994 and 
2004. 
99 Key is the work of Murra (1985, 3-13), whose notion of “vertical ecological control” will receive more 
attention in chapter 3.1. See also the recent compilation that offers a comparative view into the economic 
organization of Pre-Hispanic societies (Hirth et al 2013, particularly Burger and Mayer, Dillehay, Goldstein). 
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“a central paradox in Andean history (sic) namely, the long term historical 
resilience and adaptation of indigenous peasant economies, organized around 
reciprocal norms, in the midst of powerful and evolving commodity markets that 
swirled around the mining export economy of the southern Andes” (Larson 1995, 
8).  
Regardless of the strength of their ties to the market economy and their inherent 
economic responsiveness, many community areas have been unambiguously 
categorized as subsistence economies (Rivera Cusicanqui and THOA 1992, 42-3). This has 
nurtured a dichotomous image of separated spheres for non-capitalist or off-market 
versus capitalist or market exchange, oblivious to the capacity of Andean peoples to 
“employ” and handily combine several levels, logics, practices and destinations of 
exchange.  
A very clear illustration of the fact that Andean pastoralists are “not immutably locked 
in a pastoral “mode of production” but rather as actively negotiating encounters between 
themselves and the expanding power of capitalist states” (Chang and Koster 1994, 2; Khazanov 
1994; Medinaceli 2005 and 2010) is the strategic participation of highland pastoralists in 
the supply chains between the Potosí mines and the ports of the Pacific. The 
exploitation of the Cerro Rico (the rich mountain) of Potosí constituted the structuring 
and regionally-binding force behind Andean incorporation into an emergent world-
economy.100 This process relied essentially on the “activation” of the famous silver (and 
other commodity) routes by llama caravan mobility. Indigenous farmers and herders, 
drovers and merchants were present in overlapping circuits of  inter-ethnic east-west 
oriented (valley-highlands) trade and barter, inter-Andean long-distance (north-south) 
exchange in fairs and import-export trade. This combined participation relies on several 
“preconditional” assets and skills to optimize or downplay the factors of familiarity 
(personal contacts and intimacy with a region), technology (transport means and 
infrastructure) and institutions (economic policy and fiscal regimes, diplomacy and 
border regimes, price fluctuations and regulation).  
In post-independence times, simultaneous participation in market and off-market 
exchange continued to interconnect small-scale ambulant trade with transnational 
 
                                                     
100 Potosí was the epicentre of one of the most powerful “open vein” of the Americas (Galeano 2003), the 
pumping heart of a regional labour divisionstructured by the silver economy -the economic backbone of the 
Spanish metropolis- and fuelling numerous provisioning lines towards the Pacific (see also Assadourian 1982; 
Tandeter 1997). It thereby gave shape to an internal market sphere that spread from current Ecuador to 
North-Chile as well as to trans-continental market circuits. The wealth in poetic allusions to Potosí 
metaphorically underscore Assadourian’s ground-breaking contribution in enlightening Potosí “as the principal 
motor force of structural change that affected all facets of economic life and social relations throughout the Andes” 
(Larson 1995, 15-6; Assadourian 1982, 109-221; 1992; 1994, see also Bonilla 2007, 108; Assadourian , Bonilla, 
Mitre and Platt 1980). 
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inter-ecological barter and overseas import-export (Barragán 2011, 90; Langer and Conti 
1991, 95). Yet, since the 18th century, the organization internal (South-)Andean trade 
circuits started to reorient from the Pacific towards Buenos Aires while many camelid-
based groups shifted to sheep and cattle herding. Moreover, the wars of independence 
distorted those circuits which seriously undermined the strength of indigenous 
communities, although the first half of the 19th century knew a revitalization of the 
silver and wool economy that allowed for a re-emergence of indigenous market 
participation, both in export markets (llamas, food, fuel, wool) as in internal markets 
(fairs) (Larson 1995, 28-9). Throughout that century, economic developments in the 
Andean region were marked by Great Britain’s takeover of the Spanish monopoly and 
the introduction of railways which gradually restructured the transportation of silver, 
tin, saltpetre and consumable goods to and from the mines (Contreras 2000, 188–216).  
However, as a wide range of economic players are involved, this form of market 
participation while attaining access to alternative circuits implies continuous 
renegotiation, in large part triggered by monetary and labour exactions from a tributary 
state. Fiscal obligations as well as reciprocal community commitments condition local 
livelihood systems and subject them to the intervention of commercial intermediaries 
as well as trigger the creation of indigenous trade and investment opportunities (Larson 
1995, 28). The development of commercial relations also intensely intersects with 
(fomenting and at the same time fomented by) cultural-ceremonial practices and social 
networks that support community structures.101 Over time, the interaction between 
these diverse (government, merchants, community) actors is marked by a deeper 
penetrating market sphere, reflected in intensifying commodification pressures that 
come with increasing monetization and contractization of exchange and labour 
relations. These effects came with an increasing role for intermediaries. However, 
Andean communities knew to balance their own demands with the imperatives and 
opportunities of commercial interaction which explains how they not only survived 
during Latin-America’s economic expansion, but in some cases even thrived (Klein 1993; 
Platt 1995; Langer 2009). The heterogeneity and overlap of barter, smuggle and 
commerce networks and the pragmatism with which indigenous groups knew to exploit 
these nets allowed the established “off-market” exchange routes, destinations and 
practices to remain operative until well into the second half of the 20th century, 
constantly adjusting to the opportunities and restrictions of the moment.102  
 
                                                     
101 “Festivals and trade went together, for festivals made the personal relations possible that led to common enterprises 
among community members” (Langer 2009, 542). 
102 Until the 1980s, several Altiplano households still travelled on yearly basis with llama caravans in order to 
complement local production with maize, cereals, fruits, vegetables and coca leaves. The continuation of long 
distance barter travels until very recently is evidenced by the studies of West (1981),  Molino Rivero (2006), 
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2.3 Global frontiers of land control. 
From a world-historical perspective, “legitimating ownership by legal title is a fundamental 
process of the capitalist world-economy” and corresponds to possibly “the single most 
important change imposed by the modern world-system” (Wallerstein 2012a, 7). The 
commodification of land rights figures as a powerful frontier that, as any incorporation 
process, aims at “settling” a (new) order and thereby links the question of land to 
several questions at the heart of capitalist development and state formation. This 
pretended order implies the delineation, endorsement and extension of “a systematic 
legal basis for what is called title to the land” (Wallerstein 2012, 7). The movement of this 
frontier intersects with other historical frontier developments, such as economic 
transformations in view of increasing resource competition (Barbier 2011), ecological 
changes (Moore 2010, 2011) and the social reorganization of peasant livelihoods 
(Vanhaute 2012). Indeed, the question of land does not just entail economic, but also 
political, social and cultural questions that link land rights security up to climatological, 
productivity, inequality, gender, and democracy issues at all levels of human-nature 
interaction. 
From the perspective of rural community-based actors, access to the land equally 
constitutes “the single most important” variable in the formation and transformation of 
a sustainable livelihood. Because the use of the land has direct implications for rural 
communities’ economic incomes through exchange (of products of that land) and 
because their sovereignty relations are primarily defined by the regulation of access to 
that land, land constitutes a significant –if not the main- motive to intensive interaction 
with other sectors of society (Wallerstein 2012, 6). Land is moreover a conditional factor 
to rural people’s socio-economic and cultural reproduction and self-esteem (ILC 2013).  
As peasant and/or indigenous claims to land, territory and resources are usually 
communal rather than individual claims (ibid), their control over the land is 
interdependent with a larger “package” of rights that allow them to secure a margin for 
territorial, economic, political and legal autonomy as self-organized group. The question 
of land control is thus basically a question of rights, in the first place the right to self-
determination. However, due to the push for the encapsulation of customary land right 
systems into standardized frameworks for land entitlement, that right is contested and 
undermined.103 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Medinaceli (2005) and Bolton (2007) as well as by the oral testimonies of contemporary Carangas people (own 
field notes 2011-2012; Cottyn 2012c). 
103 The difference in the meaning given to land between indigenous groups and state- supporting groups is 
rooted in a more general discrepancy in their visions over how to organize society. This is clearly the case in 
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2.3.1 The commodification of land rights 
Strongly related to particularly European state expansion, the installation of a (new) 
order to access and use the land has reshuffled the labour, legal and fiscal ties between 
the people that live from the land (the peasants, whether  owning or only occupying the 
land), people that live from the property of the land (private landholders) and state 
structures (with rural and non-rural interests). In pretending to make society “legible,” 
this legal-economic intervention fuels an ideologically coloured, power-attributing and 
hence highly disputed transition process that pretends to put the future of “civilization” 
at stake (Scott 1998; Richards 2009, 55-60; Engerman and Metzer 2004, 17; Cole and 
Ostrom 2012). Time and again, the land question has been reformulated and debated in 
the context of shifting economic conditions and emergent political ideologies. As a 
result, the commodification of land (rights) is not implemented as a clear-cut switch but 
corresponds to a longer history of incorporation that got bogged down in a highly 
debated, strongly contested and largely frustrated process. The outcome of that process 
is witnessed in the constant (re)creation of new frontiers of land control, which 
“are not sites where ‘development’ and ‘progress’ meet ‘wilderness’ or ‘traditional 
lands and peoples’. They are sites where authorities, sovereignties, and 
hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged by new 
enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes” (Peluso and Lund 2011, 668). 
In the words of Wallerstein, “land is fundamentally a political question masked by a legal 
veneer” (Wallerstein 2012, 8). The political question is to enforce a minimal degree of 
loyalty and obtain the necessary revenues to uphold centralized power. Thereto, a 
homogeneous framework, a property-rights system, needs to be created, provided of 
legal and fiscal tools such as property deeds and cadastres (Richards 2009, 58). The 
drivers of this incorporation process are distinguished by Araghi and Karides as the 
formalization (the granting property deeds), fixation (defining physical and legal 
property boundaries), rationalization (in function of a standardized production), and 
privatization (in order to create a land market) of land rights (Araghi and Karides 2012, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Bolivia, where the insistence upon ancestral, communitarian frameworks for ownership and management of 
the CONAMAQ and CIDOB confederations, representing respectively the highland and lowland indigenous 
population, challenges the syndicalist peasant logic that has defined the country’s land legislation since the 
nationalist 1952 Revolution (Alejandro Almaraz, former MAS Vice-Minister of Lands, interviewed in 
Achtenberg 2014). The demands of indigenous movements today make clear that land is essentially 
interlinked with other guarantees within a broader societal level: “Without indigenous autonomy, without 
communitarian economy, without plural justice and without the titling of the Native Communitarian Lands (TCO) we 
cannot speak of a Plurinational State” (David Crispín, spokesmen of the independent branch of the CONAMAQ, 
Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu, in Achtenberg 2014). 
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1). These pressures materialize through commodifying land legislation projects, 
intended to establish an institutional framework for land ownership, use and 
transaction, thereby redefining the property, production and spiritual relations of rural 
agents to the land (Ubink, Hoekema and Assies 2009, 11). Successive land reforms have 
proven to be a crucial instrument in the expansion and contraction of land rights, 
envisioned within a (false) straightforward evolution toward the generalization and 
spread of private property (such as Demsetz 1967).  
The veneer, then, is the erroneous equation between private property and 
“development” on basis of the argument that privatization reduces externalities, 
transaction costs and the risk of resource overexploitation. The prevailing way of 
interpreting the land question is indeed to perceive the land as a frontier of capitalist 
expansion that must be pushed forward, that is, “that must be cultivated” (see for instance 
Clementi 1985, 181-202). Thereto, property rights are designed and allocated with the 
final objective of converting land into a tradable commodity (Weis 2007, 48-50). This 
fomenting of a land market must allow the land’s “mise en valeur” (Wallerstein 2012; 
Richards 2009, 55-6; see also Hertel 2010). In order to facilitate these legislation 
operations, alternative (spiritual, informal, communal, non-European) forms of access 
have been portrayed in terms of dichotomy and anomaly (Engerman and Metzer 2004). 
This legalisation and justification process has nurtured a global trend in the 
incorporation and formalization of customary property relations into dualist and 
exclusivist frameworks (Van Bavel and Hoyle 2010, 12; RRI 2014). 
As states extend and intensify their grip on territories and peoples distant from their 
urban centre of power, local modes to relate to the land become immersed in state-
controlled fiscal and juridical relations. The “state” factor converts property and tenure 
into a question of legality, illegality and extra-legality with the ultimate goal to 
eliminate “extra-legal” situations, which implies a legalisation process (Ubink, Hoekema 
and Assies 2009, 11-2). This is a state-driven process of incorporation by which 
customary systems are positioned on a continuum of tenure security (extensive-limited, 
short-long term, real-perceived, de jure-de facto, etc.) that suggests the superiority of 
private property arrangements (Lund 2000; Ubink, Hoekema and Assies 2009, 13-5). The 
construction of a land system thus implies the intervention by state actors in local 
relations to the land in order to mould and categorize those relations as “legible” and 
hence extractable relations in function of the strengthening of its state power. In that 
respect it must be noted that the state itself is a land owner too and may therefore 
intervene in local occupier-proprietor relations in order to convert both into its tenants 
with labour and monetary obligations to their landlord (Van Bavel and Hoyle 2010, 367). 
However, this trend runs counter to the fact that land systems are usually marked by 
a coexistence of private, common and public rights. Land systems allocate some 
juridical control to actual proprietors over tenants, which may include the exaction of 
labour, species or money transfers in the form of tax, rent, contract or gift, yet this 
  79 
control may cover manifold combinations between very informal to sound ownership 
arrangements. Therefore, land tenure must be conceived on a continuum, ranging from 
open, over limited, to exclusive access (Ostrom and Hess 2007; Ubink and van Rooij 
2011). In view of this pluralism, it must be noted that the (globalizing) local struggles of 
self-organized resource communities are not against individual ownership an sich, but 
question the “absoluteness” of private property arrangements because it negates that 
land is an intrinsic part of the landscape, something the capitalist logic has however a 
hard time to cope with (Greer 2013). Failing or refusing to grasp the value and 
“normality” as well as the effectiveness of such complex systems and the 
responsiveness of the people managing them has allowed for the imposition of 
“principles true in every country”, achievable through capital and superior to deviant 
principles (Mitchell 2002, 54-79). This implied the construction of artificial dichotomies 
that frame communal arrangements for the reproduction and distribution of resources 
in inalienable/collective versus alienable/private categories. As pluralism is being 
substituted by an improbable uniformity, (relatively) open systems for resource 
management have been exposed to commercialization, overuse and degradation 
(Ostrom and Schlager 1996). Thus, self-organized resource societies defending their 
collective rights over land and resources do not deny nor attack individual property 
relations, but confirm “what many environmental movements are beginning to force capitalists 
to accept: most resources are partially, if not wholly, “public goods”” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 7; 
Bromley 1991; Hanna 1996).  
However, this substitution is not enacted in a vacuum, but negotiated between 
peasants, elite and broker groups, state institutions and the forces of nature. Exactly 
because land systems, and more specifically property rights regimes, are instrumental 
to the structuring of social power relations, their evolution is marked by competition 
between the central state and other public authorities, causing interaction, friction and 
conflict. In the light of such competition, Hindery describes how indigenous activists 
“simultaneously embraced Western law as a tool to consolidate rights, while at the same time 
working outside of it, whether through direct actions (marches, blockades, strikes) or electoral 
politics” (Hindery 2013, 7). This multiplicity of tactics endows the trajectory of land 
rights commodification a powerful dynamic. Consequently, this trajectory rarely 
produces a homogeneous outcome or the desired social effects, but nurtures a long 
history of successive transitions. Indeed, a frontier process, which had its symbolic start 
in 1492, announcing a very uneven control that took shape “in the process” an “on the 
ground” (Araghi and Karides 2012; Benton 2009; Serrão 2013).  
This colonially initiated transition was reproduced and accelerated under post-
colonial regimes, with revolutions and alliances, enclosures and counter-enclosures, 
important achievements and bitter setbacks for communal and indigenous land rights 
deviating the story of privatization, displacement and depeasantization from its 
imaginary linearity. The result is hybridism; the creation of a frontier zone. Classically, 
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plural land rights systems in which individual and collective access co-exist are 
perceived as instances of state failure, whereas they rather testify a complex process of 
persistence and reinvention. Such hybrid, community-based systems are not testimony 
of an anachronistic remnant desperately searching the way out to “progress”. On the 
contrary, it is only “when all else has failed” that the pluralist principles that sustain these 
systems are given up. It is the erosion of such systems that reinforces trajectories of 
marginalization and impoverishment. Abundant but generally overlooked evidence 
from local cases of resistance against privatization pressures counters the belief that 
private property entails the promise of long-term balanced social power relations. The 
abandonment of and local struggle over principles of collective rights and inalienability 
stems from the inability to secure one’s economic survival and can not necessarily be 
read as the “disappearance” of peasants or indigenous groups (Ghosh 2010; Johnson 
2004). 
 
Figure 3 “European colonists arrive in America to appropriate land.” Cartoon by Chris 
Madden (licence CartoonStock Ltd.). 
The remaining of this dissertation will focus upon a concrete “fissure” -in terms of 
land control- in the modern world-systemic order, namely a zone where a margin for 
community-based land and resource management has been secured, not despite but 
exactly because of close (but negotiated) interaction in formative processes of that 
order. The focus is placed on the reproduction and defence of a communal room for 
manoeuvre within the Andean context of a mixed land system, in which collective 
rights coexist with private land consolidation, cooperative property and State property 
(Galindo 2007, 85-6). By reconstructing the creation and recreation of such margin, my 
close-reading will put the statement that communal ownership may pose “the most 
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fundamental challenge to capitalism, (…) because it denies the overarching dominance of private 
property rights” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 6; Bromley 1991; Hanna et al 1996) to a test.   
2.3.2 The formation of a Bolivian land system 
The formation of a centralized land system can be conceived as a frontier process in 
which the allocation of standardized (legible, accountable) land rights figures as a 
moving frontier. This is no straightforward process, but covers multiple trajectories in 
terms of regional divergences and local responses. In Western Europe, for instance, the 
long-term trend depicts a strengthening of peasants rights in turn for the consolidation 
of a “tax state” in which peasant surpluses were more efficiently extracted, landlord 
power dismantled and land rights stricter regulated. While the commons disappeared in 
Europe, community land stands out as a decisive component in the constitution of 
Andean land systems and the assertion of indigenous territorial demands still plays a 
major role when those systems are subjected to reform. Their relation to the (much 
weaker) tax state evolved from a contractual pact with a weak protection, high 
extraction and strong landlord intermediation of communal land arrangements under 
colonial rule towards the formal (yet not absolute) dismantlement of such arrangements 
under republican (late 19th century) rule. Under the (post-)revolutionary regimes of the 
20th century, the resulting excesses in land concentration were subjected to a legal 
counter-enclosure and a mediated restoration of community arrangements.  
The survival of communal control systems in the Central Andes despite centuries-
long developed linkages to the capitalist world-economy is an example of how Hardin’s 
theorem (1968) is countered by communal action. Although these are important factors, 
this exclusion from the tragedy of the commons cannot be straightforwardly explained 
by the strength of community organization and communal ethic, the isolation from 
market forces, limited demographic pressures on resources and intra-community 
redistribution mechanisms (Guillet 1981, 145-6). These aspects are generally reduced to 
the factor of ecology: Indeed, privatization had a remarkable stronger impact in regions 
with appropriate ecological conditions for agricultural surplus production. In the first 
place, the preponderance of Andean pastoralism is a key factor in explaining the 
persistence of collective land rights arrangement, yet covering complex regional 
variations between classic open-pool resources to more restricted and differentiated 
organizations.  
However, excessive insistence on the equation between soil poverty with isolation 
risks to ignore underlying local dynamics of negotiation and confrontation, between 
local communities and agricultural entrepreneurs, but more importantly between those 
communities and state powers, and among communities. While unattractive 
agricultural lands may temper privatization pressures by agricultural entrepreneurs, 
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the success of customary systems must also be understood as the result of a deliberate 
state policy of oblivion and non-intervention. In the process of installing a national land 
legislation framework, the Bolivian state did not simply fail to acquire a comprehensive 
understanding of internal procedures nor to intervene in indigenous territorial systems 
(Barragán 2012, 16). What is more, it seems to have made a deliberate choice to “settle” 
this frontier without completely incorporating communal systems as it allowed (the 
creation of) room for heterogeneity and manoeuvre, particularly on the part of 
indigenous communities and their leaders.  
This margin of autonomy for communal land administration stems from the 
communal defence of a colonially installed particular relation to the state. In Spanish 
America, the preservation of indigenous communities suited the Spanish crown, which 
installed a paternalistic/segregation model in which indigenous communities were tied 
to the colonial State through tributary bonds and the purchase of community titles. 
Tristan Platt has coined this asymmetrical relation as a reciprocity pact (Platt 1982, 
1984, 1987).104 According to this pact, the Spanish Crown guaranteed communal access 
to land in return for indigenous loyalty, “sealed” with property titles and fiscal 
obligations and renewed through land inspections. Although the fiscal cornerstone of 
the pact was a prime mover of indigenous protest, it also entailed key benefits, both for 
the treasury and the communities. While securing the former of a major source of fiscal 
revenues, it granted the latter autonomous control over the customary organization of 
communal tenure, which entailed both individual and hereditary usufruct rights as 
access to collective lands, either way not-marketable and non-alienable. 
Fluctuations in this margin have been classically  interpreted in terms of a false 
community-hacienda duality. This has resulted in a dichotomic model between 
homogeneous, unambiguously delineated or even a-historical entities in which the 
community stands for reciprocity, social coherence and continuity, while the hacienda 
stands for extraction, domination and conflict (Custred and Orlove 1980, 21-2). The 
former’s origins are traced in the pre-Hispanic organization of kin groups, while the 
latter’s origins in the Spanish colonial legacy.105 Both landholding institutions are 
indeed quite differently organized and elemental to the Andean rural space, yet 
peasants are not exclusively tied to either of these institutions, but interact in a much 
 
                                                     
104 Rivera and THOA rather refer to a “truce” instead of a pact (Rivera 1991, 625). 
105 Insisting on either their Andean or European roots is too simple. Equally important are for instance the 
impact of the 20th century “rediscovery” of the community by indigenismo intellectuals, revolutionary 
regimes and development scholars and the current “re-invention” of the hacienda in the form of agro-
business companies. 
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more complex landscape.106 Instead of thinking in mutually excluding terms, it is more 
appropriate to break the land system down regionally between a “valley pattern” of 
semi-tropical, cash-crop production in hands of private units (haciendas and 
smallholder estancias) oriented towards to market and within the reach urban centres, 
and an “altiplano pattern” of semi-desert, low-value production organized within 
communal units weakly primarily oriented towards subsistence and distant from urban 
centres. Although both production modes were never strictly bound to either region or 
production unit.  
Regarding their historical evolution, communities and haciendas are entangled in a 
much more complex dialectic relation; Klein speaks of coined as a paradox (Klein 1993, 
124-5). While this interrelation is generally depicted as private tenure increasing its 
“elbow room”, hence pushing indigenous communities beyond the limits of survival, 
communal tenure did not straightforwardly regress, but recovered and even thrived in 
times when private estates declined. This held both categories in a more or less 
controlled balance. As Grieshaber has demonstrated, the regionally varying distribution 
of rural (indigenous) labour in Bolivia over communities, haciendas and “independent” 
households was dominated by a growing communal control, until the balance between 
haciendas and communities broke in the last quarter of the 19th century (Grieshaber 
1980). 
Before dissecting the briefly presented the larger land system that entailed this 
“balance” (chapter 4) and zooming further in on the destabilization of that balance in 
the context of liberal reform, let us take a brief look at the long-term evolution of land 
administration and commodifying pressures in Bolivia. 
Under Inca rule, access to land was subjected to a tributary system in which state 
intervention in local land administrations was backed by a redistribution logic (Murra 
1978). By the time Spanish troops arrived to the Central Andes, the Spanish monarchs 
already disposed of the Leyes de Indias, which defined the juridical foundations for 
indigenous vassalage to the Crown, in line with its governance and taxation rights 
granted by the papal bulls (Schwaller 2011, 47). After a first episode in which the Crown 
indirectly controlled its acquired lands by distributing it as compensation to 
 
                                                     
106 Community and hacienda peasant households equally enjoy usufructuary rights on the land they work, but 
in the latter case the property of that land is in the hands of non-peasants, the individual hacendado or an 
(religious or state) institution (often  substituted by intermediary administrators and straw men), who 
employs colonos (tenants) or peones (peons) and pays them in the form of (various types of) usufruct rights 
over plots of land (ibid, 48-50). In turn, these peasant households are subject to a more or less fixed set of 
obligations towards the landlord. However, in contrast to archetypical image of the hacendado as the 
dominant patron, hacendado-peon relations are usually marked by a pragmatical intersection with extra-
hacienda relations (trade with other elites, surrounding communities, the market).  
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conquistadores, demographic and fiscal pressures imposed the necessity to subject land 
access to a regulated property rights system. To that end, several of the tributary 
mechanisms of the Incas were formerly adopted yet distorted and adjusted to the needs 
of Spanish imperial governance.  
From the 1570s on, the dispersed human settlement into ayllu was concentrated into 
Spanish-designed village structures and integrated into broader territorial units, of 
which the proprietary attributions were to be “consolidated” through the purchase of 
communal land titles. In turn for taxation, extracted in species and labour, the 
commons were protected through the adjudication of such land titles (this mechanism 
is examined in detail in 4.1.1). These titles came to serve as a powerful tool for both the 
central state and the adjudicated communities in the enforcement and contestation of 
monetary and labour extractions and political and social control. While granting 
communities with autonomy over their land administration, this policy instigated a 
shift in control over labour to control over land, evidenced in the expansion of the 
hacienda (large private estates) complex (Yambert 1980, 64). Collective land rights were 
quite easily retained in Carangas and similar altiplano regions which controlled mainly 
land of little interest to private landlords and did not count with large mining 
exploitations and where haciendas hence remained an external phenomenon (Rivière 
1982, 71). 
While the installed land system survived the collapse of the Spanish colonial empire 
during the first half century of Bolivian independence, new ideas on property had 
gained entrance from the late 18th century on and would bring the fundaments of the 
reigning land system under untenable pressure. Bolivia’s land question took shape in 
the context of a wider debate in the region on how to restructure the colonially 
inherited foundations of state-community relations. The transition towards a “modern” 
nation was framed as a question of freedom and equality: equal laws, fair taxes, a free 
market and a civilized society. This society was ideologically founded upon the principle 
of private property as the basic condition for the free movement of goods and labour.  
Because of the incompatibility detected between private and “immobile” corporative 
property (“property in mortmain”), the way in which this question has been (and is 
being) played out in the Andes particularly concerns the fate of land in hands of 
indigenous communities, the tierras de origen. Already in early republican times, the 
landholding position of the Church within the Bolivian land system was subjected to a 
relatively successful confiscation operation (Langer and Jackson 1990), but the 
destination of the indigenous community took a longer time in crystalizing. By the end 
of that century, after a long prologue of inter-elite debates and failed attempts and as 
competition over land increased, communal landholdings became the target of this 
disentailment policy, implying the formal denial and progressive replacement of its 
position within the country’s land system (the subject of Part III). The Bolivian 
government, aspiring the incorporation of corporative landowning entities into a 
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homogeneous legal framework for land tenure, radically and one-sided terminated the 
colonially inherited pact.  
In the  20th century, then, a nationalist-developmentalist paradigm found its entrance 
and eventually broke through with the National Revolution of 1952. A combination of 
peasant mobilization, syndicalist organization and the “discovery” of the peasants as 
political subjects led to a reversal of the private land usurpations and servile labour 
relations on the countryside, at least in the highlands (Stern 1987; Larson 2004; 
Gotkowitz 2007). The 1953 agrarian reform (usually portrayed as Bolivia’s first land 
reform) gave indigenous peasants the option between individual and undivided titles, 
moulding community land tenure patterns into a dual private-collective system. 
Through national revolutions, constitutional change and land reform, communal 
arrangements were restored, yet within the boundaries of a state-centred framework. 
However, the reformed land system failed to halt land fragmentation, extreme poverty, 
and marginalization, and continues to favour capitalist production (Kay and Urioste 
2007; Urioste, Barragán and Colque 2007). In the late 20th century, the adoption of a neo-
liberal/multiculturalist paradigm entailed a major innovation in providing indigenous 
communities with legal tools to guarantee their communal land rights. Under the 
pluralist paradigm propagated by the current government, this innovation was 
reinforced by extending indigenous land rights to territorial rights, yet this does has not  
protected communities from the ongoing land grab in Bolivia’s eastern lowlands nor 
from far-reaching “minifundismo” in the western highlands. Hence, land and land 
reform are from disappearing as conflictive issues on the country’s political agenda and 
touches the sour spot of the extractivist model that continues to shape that agenda.  
Throughout this trajectory, the way  in which state-centred land rights regulations 
were put into operation “on the ground” and being (re-)appropriated by customary 
structures reveals the construction and revision of a national land rights systems as a 
very dynamic and complex process of negotiation and conflict. The outcome of that 
process in the Bolivian context underscores the strength and resilience of communal 
systems for land administration in the face of the central state’s growing claim on the 
land. The concrete implication of that strength is that the Bolivian state has not, and 
never acquired full knowledge and a complete overview of communal land tenure 
systems nor did it intervene in internal procedures such as the transfer of land 
(Barragán 2012, 16). This means that by adjudicating communal land rights, the central 
state recognizes the tenure of a certain territorial unit, which may have broad 
dimensions, without determining or registering its internal organization and 
regularization of land use, tenure and property. This “vacuum” creates an important 
margin for autonomy that is nevertheless subject to recurrent pressures to conform and 
must hence constantly be renegotiated.  
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Concluding remarks. Tools to capture the local in 
the global.  
To the extent that the presented story lives up to the anticipated expectations 
regarding the tackling of local-global entanglements, the remaining pages of this 
dissertation contain more than an isolated case study or an overgeneralized grand 
narrative. Instead of taking the reader straight to the small stories in order to save them 
from oblivion, this first part of the dissertation situates the empirical reconstruction of 
these local histories within a theoretical framework. In a nutshell, the adopted 
analytical approach proposes to trace the local in the global via a “frontier perspective” 
(chapter 1) and to trace the global in the local from a “community perspective” (chapter 
2).  
First I have explained the world-systemic dimension of the proposed framework, to 
then motivate that analytical choice by pointing clarifying the fact that the model of the 
modern world-system in fact was constructed upon the insight that capitalist expansion 
needs and creates frontiers (1.1.1). Moreover, I have explained that this is choice that 
allows for a “creative” approach towards the interaction of global and local processes 
that goes beyond deterministic and dichotomist notions (1.1.2). Then, formulated 
largely as a de-colonial critique, I have pointed to the blind spots, the coloniality of that 
model towards implications of the unequal exchange that binds the World-System for 
groups who live at, on or even beyond the periphery (1.1.3). I have incorporated this 
critique in a ‘constructive’ way, by incorporating the insight that expansive systems 
cannot be understood regardless of the role of agency in/at/on the moving margins of 
these systems at the centre of the proposed perspective (1.1.4). 
Then, I have subjected the notions of frontier and frontier zone as markers of 
ongoing incorporation processes to a theoretical dissection (1.2). To properly explain 
the adopted notion of frontiers, the analytical difference as well as interconnection 
between frontier (the process) and frontier zone (the space) must be made clear. I have 
defined “frontiers” as the social processes of both incorporation and differentiation 
which are at work at the external boundaries and the internal subdivisions of the 
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modern world-system and move according to the rhythm of systemic expansion and 
contraction (1.2.1). I thereby nullified the idea of frontier as a sterile dividing line 
between distant worlds and stressed how its historical trajectory and spatial 
repercussion rather grasp the unevenness and “texture” of core-periphery interaction. 
Frontier processes transfer the social order of a systemic entity to new territories and 
peoples, thereby creating and reorganizing spatial settings which I have defined as 
frontier zones (1.2.2). These are the sites where the change and continuity of a 
“transferred” social order is negotiated; the locus of systemic difference. I have clarified 
that these zones provide in a vacuum for the unfolding of social processes, the creation 
of a new order whose outlook is still open (1.2.3). 
The theoretical outline of chapter 1 suggests a particular trajectory that structures 
the processes of incorporation, composed by four “phases” and pointing to the 
“feedback potential” of these processes. With regard to rural zones, this process can be 
de-constructed as follows: the trajectory stems from a “drive” for incorporation, an 
objective that gains acceptance and is “implemented,” resulting in concrete 
incorporation pressures (1), for instance the design of measures for land privatization. 
These pressures have an impact upon the spaces and edges of local rural livelihoods (2), 
to which local actors respond by deploying diverse strategies (3). The interplay of 
pressures, effective incorporation effects and local responsiveness generates a 
“feedback” effect that can be assessed in terms of vulnerability and revitalization (4). 
This structure will also be applied to the case study by disentangling the effects of 
Bolivia’s first land reform process for rural communities on basis of these four phases.  
Chapter 2 departs from the attentiveness towards the risk that the rich variety in 
subtly differing “frontier” and “frontier zone” concepts can become umbrella terms for 
just about everything. Therefore, chapter 2 has specified how their dynamism is “at work” 
in a particular context, that of the rural Andes, which can be approached as a peasant 
frontier zone. By deconstructing the “peasant” and “Indian” question, I have indicated 
how the power of generalizations, victimizations and dichotomies has moulded the 
historical experience of the rural communities making up this zone into a binary story 
of survival or disappearance (2.1). It thereby stressed the intrinsical entanglement of 
these questions in the Andean context and their intrinsic relation to the “land” 
question. Then, it was expounded how a reduction of peasants and indigenous peoples 
to anachronisms of the new millennium mortgages our understanding of how Andean 
peasant and indigenous groups participate in market and state spheres on basis of self-
developed community-based strategies, thereby nurturing a “thwarted” trajectory of 
incorporation (2.2). Then, it has assessed this “thwarted” dimension regarding a 
particular frontier process, that of land rights commodification, which is the dominant 
line of inquiry of this research (2.3.1). I have finally specified this “thwartedness” by 
giving a historical overview of the construction of an Andean/Bolivian land rights 
system (2.3.2). Here follows a short recap of the Andean incorporation trajectory 
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As one of the first external zones incorporated into the emergent world economy, the 
Andes converted from a disconnected area, politically and economically tied to the Inca 
Empire, through conquest and colonization into an essential frontier zone of the 
modern world-system. This is a transition, the creation of a global interconnection that 
occurred at the junction of state-defined, market-based and community-bound spheres. 
In relation to processes of state formation and market expansion, the community 
present itself, not as a kind of open-air museum for folkloric remnants of the past, but as 
a framework for agency, for participation and counter-action, or what I define as 
“communal manoeuvring”. In that sense, the community is the locus of possible 
answers to why and how the “people without history” have negotiated the “terms of 
participation” as spaces of capitalism and modernity have historically developed. As 
much as peasant and indigenous resistance is not a blunt rejection of participation in 
systems driven by a different –commodifying and colonizing- logic as such, their 
participation is not the unequivocal approval of imposition. Both resistance and 
openness to incorporation are conditional to the reproduction of a peasant, community-
based mode of production and indigenous communal structures. 
Less abstractly, a frontier zone is also the organizational structure of daily cultural, 
political and socio-economic life of the very people whose history is at the centre of this 
dissertation. Starting with the first designed colonial policies, that structure was 
profoundly reformed in function of both the survival of the local population as to the 
extraction of their resources. The territorial, productive and representative 
reorganization of Andean rural communities was essential to the region’s transition 
from an external into an internal frontier zone of a capitalist economic system.  As a 
result, systemic differences which first stemmed from the interaction with external 
variables evolved into internal disparities. While maintaining a relative degree of 
autonomy, the people making up those communities actively participated within this 
differentiated constellation, for instance by entering in a legal-fiscal relationship with 
central state powers and provisioning labour and raw material to the international 
market. These political bonds and exchange relations tied the region and its people 
more closely to the pulsating rhythm of the modern world- system but at the same time 
generated a kind of anti-systemic boomerang reaction. This points to the impetus and 
capacity for “renegotiation” that emerges from peripheral spaces and societies. By 
inserting and combining other “logics” of property, belonging, governance and 
exchange, this renegotiation deviates imposed “global designs,” thereby “thwarting” 
the binary story of peasant and indigenous survival or disappearance.  
Before taking the plunge into this renegotiation process, I make a detour along the 
source material and the methods of combining field work in the archive and with an 
“archival approach” to the field that have allowed me to reconstruct that process. 

  
Addendum. Methodological implications. 
The story I want to tell derives from multiple small stories, rooted “on the ground” and 
passed to me via old crumbling papers written or printed about 100 years ago or via 
long patient talks with the protagonists of those stories or their descendants. Before 
embarking upon that story, some comments must be made regarding the main sites of 
relevant source material for this research, the source situation in those sites, and the 
way I have dealt with the challenges of that situation.  A closer analysis of the specific 
sources that have shaped the narrative of this dissertation will be given in the 
introduction to Part II. 
Traces of 19th century efforts at making society legible, people 
accountable and the State accessible. 
While the 19th century brought the advent of the first serious statistical recording, with 
the notable contribution of Dalence (1851), this was still a “dark age” when assessing the 
available sources that capture the rural (and particularly communal) world of pre-
revolutionary Bolivia (Guerrero and Platt 2000, 96). After independence there reigned a 
climate of administrative neglect and the system of imperial record-keeping was 
destructed. Even though the 19th century This particularly concerns the visibility of 
“Indians” in the sources, who can only be found intermittently, cautioning historians 
for subjecting their analysis to implicit assumptions on poverty and isolation 
concerning the Andean countryside (Larson 2004, 52). This makes clear that we need 
appropriate pathways into the rural Andean world, which consist of a focus on 
legislative relationships that link peasant politics and their “long memory” of 
mobilization to patterns of authority, tribute and land, a focus on the dialectics of 
rupture and continuity, and a focus on knowledge/categorizing systems, worldviews 
and popular culture as a locus of state formation (Larson 2004, 55-7). The exploration of 
these pathways has made that  
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“historians of Bolivia have been especially creative in tracing legal and 
documentary strategies of ayllus and, at a theoretical level, challenging narrow 
conceptions of what constitutes a literate community” (Larson 2004, 54; see for 
instance Mamani Condori 1991). 
The long tradition of communities’ (ant their leaders) interaction with jurisdictional 
institutions and the fact that “courts have been an institutional means of commodifying 
everything; especially land” (Biolsi 1995) have made juridical archives the main locus of my 
investigation. It could be stated that these archives entail the traces (in notarial 
documents, criminal cases, ...) of a frontier-forming battlefield, acting as commodifying 
arenas while at the same time serving subaltern groups (indigenous, peasants, even in 
absence of formal rights of representation) in the defence of their (particularly land) 
claims. For instance, once obtained a title (for Carangas, that moment lays in the 17th 
century), a community in fact obtained a negotiation tool and an entrance to the legal 
system. This became a widespread practice in the wake of the land reform, when 
community leaders travelled long distances to courts, even the Supreme Court in Sucre, 
in search for old titles to copy them and is evidenced in the register books preserved in 
the office of the Property Rights. This process implied, however, that courts and 
notaries were not merely the locus of securing, but also of relinquishing of indigenous 
rights. In fact, the act of taking land issues to court entails signs of community 
breakdown, in pointing to underlying problems that have to do with a lack or reduction 
in resources and the consequent increase of disputes over land and livestock resources. 
In Corque, the capital of the former province of Carangas, I revised the historical and 
semi-historical sections of the Archivo Judicial in Corque (AJC) for the years 1860-1930.1 In 
 
                                                     
1 I analysed 27 dossiers, containing a total of about 1622 lawsuits. Up to 1900 (the historical section), dossiers 
contain all documents made up at the court for a term of half a year to two years, depending on the amount 
and the thickness of the cases. The dossiers are chronologically ordered and the separate cases are numbered. 
However, this archive is still not provided of an inventory. Add here the fact that demands for a permission to 
take pictures were repeatedly denied, the scanning of these cases converted into a monstrous task, even if 
they covered together but a couple of metres of archive material. Moreover, this small court is not equipped 
to receive archival researchers, hence half of the judge’s desk became my working area, mostly collecting my 
findings by hand in note books, except if the single plug was available. However, the friendly receipt of the 
court personnel has ensured that I keep indelible and good memories of  my research stay in Corque. Another 
difficulty stems from the fire in the court in 1908 (see chapter 7) through which much cases were lost or 
severely damaged. For the semi-historical section of 1900 to 1950, dossiers are divided between civil and 
criminal cases and bundled per year. The personnel of the court has taken a modest initiative, however 
without receiving much support from superior institutions, to inventory these dossiers, which has facilitated a 
selective reading of the involved cases. Although the pioneering work of Rivière and Pauwels helped me with a 
starting point, the fact that the numeration has changed over the years while the material conditions and 
accessibility of the archive has altered very little, there is an important agenda item for fomenting historical 
research of/in rural regions in in order to disseminate the potential of this archive. Such an initiative has been 
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the superior court of the Oruro department, I mainly consulted the archive of the office 
of Derechos Reales (ADRO) where properties were registered, for the Carangas from 1894 
on.2 These Property Rights books record the adjudications and transfers of plots, mines, 
houses or other real estate, as well as copies of colonial community land titles, as 
increasingly petitioned by community leaders (see Part III). Previously, these kinds of 
documents were recorded in the notarial register books at the provincial court in 
Corque. In the same court of Oruro, I also consulted the Judicial Historical Archive of the 
departmental court (AHJO), although few cases relate to the province of Carangas. Also 
in the city of Oruro, the Municipal Library and Archive (ABMO) contains several 
published reports which were annually made by the departmental authorities (1910, 
1913 and 1929) as well as copies of provincial taxpayers lists (1838 and 1852).3 Also, the 
library holds a collection of early 20th century publications on Bolivia and the Oruro 
department. The most frustrating archive was without doubt that of the Prefectura, the 
departmental government (APO), from which little was obtained. 4  
In Sucre, I revised the correspondence between the Ministry of the Interior with the 
departmental and provincial authorities in the National Archive of Bolivia (ANB). This 
rich and professional archive also keeps the provincial taxpayer lists; the Revisitas (Rv. 
in the series Padrones y Catastros, 1773-1902), which were made up until 1877 in Carangas 
(see more details in Part II). I also consulted the Cadastre books (1895-1923), to find that 
the section on the Oruro department was completely empty. The series of the Ministry 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
undertaken by the University of La Paz (UMSA) in the provincial court of Poopó, resulting in very valuable 
research tools (which Eric Langer kindly shared with me), yet this has not found following in the Carangas 
region so far. 
2 In the ADRO I consulted 32 “Libros” in the series Propiedades Provincias corresponding to the Carangas 
province, elaborated in 1894, 1903, and then from 1906 on for each year (mainly “property” books, but also 
some “mortgage and tax” books). Here too, my request for permission to make pictures was refused, while–
very ironically- my access to these registers was temporally postponed to allow the personnel to digitalize the 
registers in order to facilitate their work. Nevertheless, my only access to those registers was still to spend 
entire afternoons standing up along the shelves, filling my notebooks (here, the use of a laptop was 
completely imposible). 
3 These documents are generally stored in the national archive, but the ABMO has the advantage of free 
permission to take pictures of these documents. 
4 I received free access to its accounting section, where I however encountered disordered piles of moulding 
account books in front of randomly filled shelves that required too much time to allow a proper scanning and 
analysis. This is a task which I nonetheless undertook, starting by ordering the heavy books in piles per year 
to then make a sample survey of account books for each five years between 1860 and 1930. However, the 
results of this endeavour has not offset the efforts. My quest for the section of official correspondence, of 
which Mendieta (2010) and Smale (2005) have made use, resulted –much to my despair and despite my 
recurrent lobbying- untraceable, which the current people in charge attributed to recent personnel changes. 
This obstacle has been partly overcome by acceding to the annual reports and the correspondence kept by 
“the other end” of the correspondence, in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior.  
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of the Interior (MI, 1825-1899) gave access to official correspondence with the lower 
levels of governance.5 From the 1890s on, this correspondence is indirectly accessible 
via the published annual reports submitted by the departmental authorities to the 
central government and kept by the National Library, accessible in the same institution. 
I also revised several pamphlets regarding land and financial reform in the René 
Moreno collection and documents from the Ministry of Agriculture.6 Although I started 
with an economic analysis of the fiscal information in the account books, I decided to 
restrict my focus to the ministerial reports, in view of the time consuming work in 
Corque, which received priority. 
A specific case of violent anti-land reform rebellion brought me to the library of 
Costa de la Torre, in La Paz, which contains the judicial gazettes and where I also found 
several annual department reports.7 My particular interest in Carangas’ “Pacific 
connection” brought me to the regional archives of Iquique (ITAR), Arica (AHVD) and 
Tacna (ART), and the library of CREAR (Centro de Investigación de la Realidad del Norte, 
Iquique), yet only a small sample of the rich material I found here on cross-border 
exchange circuits has been included in this dissertation, but has nonetheless served a 
detailed analysis of those circuits (see chapter 4.2).8 
Especially in view of the arduous work of processing the judicial documents at 
Corque, I chose to leave a couple of archive sources out of consideration. As indicated, a 
comprehensive economic analysis (based on account books) has not been included in 
this research. Church archives were neglected and the time-consuming analysis of 
(local) newspapers (for which previous thesis result already had indicated to include 
very little references to Carangas) was left aside as well.  
The archive as field event and the field as archive. 
The challenge of conducting archival research on the Carangas region starts with very 
material concerns. The dispersed location and scarcity of archives with material on 19th-
20th century Carangas compels mobility from the researcher, including an inescapable 
 
                                                     
5 I revised the dossiers for every five years (1860-1930) in addition to years which material in other archives 
had indicated as important. 
6 The Ministry of Agriculture was however marked by a very strong focus on colonization and cultivation 
lands, resulting in the main conclusion from this revision that Carangas was almost completely absent in its 
archived documentation. 
7 1918, 1919, 1921, 1923, 1924 and 1927. 
8 Further research in the national archive of Chile, in Santiago, may add to this analysis, moreover taking into 
account that this archive also entails documents on the contested period of the Chilean occupation of what 
before the 1880s still constituted Peruvian territory. 
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travel to the former capital in the remote village of Corque (it is not a coincidence that 
little historical research has been conducted on the region). Moreover, addressing the 
history of a relatively autonomous indigenous region urges not only physical but also 
interdisciplinary mobility, demanding a conscious exchange between “the academic” 
and “the field”. The historian is thus forced to look beyond archive catalogues and to 
incorporate certain anthropological insights and methods. These methodological 
challenges and objectives are best matched by adopting an ethnohistorical perspective, 
combining archives with field work. 
The archival traces at our disposal served several purposes. First, there is their pure 
formal function: every state creates tools to count, register and classify. While 
presented as neutral, these tools serve to make society “legible” (Scott 1998) and make 
people “accountable” (Bolton 2007) by creating ties between social sectors, the central 
state and its local representatives which are regularly renewed through taxes, titles, 
registers etc. This implies the deployment of several mechanisms that allow for a 
systematic recording and controlling of society, materializing in taxpayers lists, 
censuses, account books, notary books, maps, technical inspection reports and annual 
political reports. At the same time, these mechanisms make the state apparatus itself 
more legible, accountable and accessible, allowing non-state actors or lower ranks in 
that apparatus to adopt the created tools to use, defend, contest or increase specific 
rights, as reflected in wills, sale transactions, contracts, lawsuits or official 
correspondence. However, the local producers of these documents, were usually quite 
complexly entangled with the indigenous locals they represented, hence making a 
“reading against the grain”, especially of the most local documents, much more 
complicated than simply turning the dichotomous top-down domination upside down. 
Regarding this complex against-the-grain reading, Abercrombie states that the 
challenge is not just to “do” ethnohistory but to unmask the “extraordinary hubris” of 
historical and anthropological accounts by “violating (sic) the disciplinary frontier between 
ethnography and history” without discounting their methods (Abercrombie 1998, 10 and 
21). 
“in the study of the people and relationships of colonial situations, our motives, 
goals, and discursive strategies are enmeshed in the very kinds of struggles about 
which we write. As we strive to hear an indigenous voice in documents produced 
for the state’s archives, we find those very documents to be a discursive frontier, a 
barrier of miscommunication erected between colonizer and colonized. And as we 
carry out ethnographic fieldwork to find indigenous meaning worlds, we discover 
them to be concealed in clandestine spaces” (Abercrombie 1998, xxiv).   
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Indeed, while archives and field work give important complementary information, 
this combination does not automatically deliver a “waterproof” reconstruction.9 The 
archival sources as well as the interviews with carangueños have a bias which is not 
removed by uniting both stories. However, there is an important added value in the 
combination, on the condition that they are not approached as separated fields. Platt 
has defined this as an approach to “the archive as field event” (Platt 2012). The 
provincial court in Corque is probably where I came closest to that approach. While 
revising numerous lawsuits of which most did not make it to the “final round” in 
writing this dissertation, the mainly trivial data these un-sensational cases contained -
from standard notarial formulations to filthy insults, sometimes deadly boring while 
other times shocking or hilarious- were however pivotal in familiarizing with daily life 
in 19th century Carangas. Moreover, while reading those cases, I was often struck by the 
almost literally identical formulation of juridical cases as they were brought before the 
judge (who I accompanied at the same desk) by local, 21st century comunarios.  
Although this field-archive crossover between the four walls of the court still counts 
as my principal ‘field experience’ and despite the fact that interviews could never give a 
first-hand testimony of the 19th and early 20th century stories I was looking for, I have 
dedicated part of my research efforts to field work. Already in 2008-2009 I had regularly 
visited the village of Turco, where I conducted research on the 1953 land reform. 
Between 2010 and 2012 I revisited the village as well as several villages, individually (yet 
with important ‘coaching’ of CEPA) and in company of the leaders and personnel of the 
COAJK during the annual muyta (see also Preface). I attended community meetings, 
conducted unstructured interviews with community leaders and had long talks with a 
number of comunarios, particularly the eldest members of the community. While my 
interviews in the villages of Carangas were mainly focused on the question of land, I also 
concentrated on the aspect of mobility and exchange, particularly towards the Pacific, 
which was the dominant focus of my field work in a number of villages in the regions of 
Arica and Tarapacá (Tarapacá, Camiña, Colchane, Putre, Belén). 
These visits resulted however a very time-consuming activity that, despite the very 
rich information that these visits and interviews directly and indirectly provided, kept 
me from the archives, to which I eventually gave priority. Moreover, the fact that a 
proper field work would have required months of Aymara language training (indeed, 
language still constitutes by biggest handicap, regardless of the fact that most people in 
 
                                                     
9 Abercrombie formulates a gap between the purposes of history and anthropology and their outcome: "It is 
my hope that the gap between these accounts (a gap unavoidably narrowed by the fact that both accounts flow from my 
pen in the final instance) may serve not to undermine but to supplement each one, and perhaps to cast a critical shadow 
over the interpretive effects that have ensued from the manner in which indigenous cultural forms have been (mis)placed 
in time by Spaniards and creoles, historians and ethnographers." (Abercrombie 1998, 124-5). 
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those villages are proficient in Spanish). A particular aspect of the “field” that captured 
my interest is the practices of indigenous justice. However, I have been unable to attend 
indigenous justice sessions or have interviews with the comunarios in charge of this 
communal institution.  
Despite several setbacks in my wannabe-anthropologist efforts, the contact with 
former community leaders gave access to a processes of communal history writing and 
record-keeping. An ex-mallku of Corque, don Mario Flores, passed me the dossier the 
COAJ-K had elaborated, as well as the individual dossier of his community, that had 
served to obtain the official title of “native community land” (tierra comunitaria 
originaria) in the time he acted as regional indigenous leader (1990).10 Anastacio Canqui 
Mollo, also a former community leader, from Turco, provided me even with a more 
detailed account, materialized in a book project that tells his personal version, as 
carangueño, as comunario, as turqueño and as llama farmer, of the “roots of Jatun 
Carangas, today Jach'a Carangas” (Canqui Mollo 2012). His book as well as the history 
reconstructed in the COAJ-K document can be seen as a product of current revitalization 
processes, the people without history have started to write their own histories.11 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
10 This dossier entails a range of different documents, relating to the history of Carangas, the “rules” that 
regulate community membership and cadastral maps with community boundaries. These aspects had to prove 
the “indigeneity” of the region and its communities, which was the first step in the procedure to be 
recognized as a native community. In fact this document could be seen as a ‘renovation’ of colonial titles and 
their republican recuperation to assert communal land rights. Similarly, it entails a double function, at the 
one hand confining and fixing the communities’ territorial organization, its internal regulation and its 
history, as well as providing the community with a powerful tool to secure that organization, regulation and 
an “own” history. 
11 This is a fascinating ‘new’ source to gain insight in historical trajectories and how they are reproduced in 
collective historical memory. However, this source requires a critical stance from the researcher: while 
documentation from official archives needs to be read “against the grain” in order to discover underlying 
justifying patterns of its producer (often the state or one of its institutions, representatives or ‘sympathizers’), 
these sources are written from a certain perspective and guided by an underlying objective/motivation (e.g. 
obtain formal recognition of a specific status and gain access to the resources attached to such status; thus 
indigenous communities or larger entities need to proof their continuity and hence the legitimacy of their 
claims). In that sense, these written histories can be read as –an indeed, reflect very much- 19th century 
nationalist history writing, legitimizing that they always formed a homogeneous and harmonized whole. This 
comment does not necessarily imply a negative evaluation of such history writing. On the contrary, these 
histories may function as powerful instruments against dominant hegemonic history writing and to unsettle 
grand narratives. 

  
 
PART II. The social agro-pastoral system of the 
Central Andes.
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Introduction to Part II. 
Endowed with a unique combination of ecological factors, the Andes have generated a 
unique human-nature interrelation. The specific answers formulated by the people that 
have shaped the Andean landscape and society give credit to their strong adaptive 
capacities. However, over the long term and particularly since European intervention 
and the ensuing Columbian exchange, ecological and economic changes have gradually 
undermined this interrelation and seriously challenged the elasticity of these capacities. 
Much attention has been drawn to the transition set in motion in the early colonial era, 
both in terms of its ecological, demographic and cultural destructiveness as in terms of 
the resilience of local communities to adjust, resist and recover. In the late 19th century, 
this ongoing transition accelerated under the impetus of an economic revitalization 
from roughly the 1850s until a period of de-globalization in the wake of the 1929 world 
economic crisis abated its speed. Fomented by liberal land-privatizing reforms, export-
oriented economic policies and a state-building discourse, this period saw the take-off 
of a new cycle of agrarian enclosure, of (first silver, then tin) mining exploitation and 
international market integration, and of inter-elite political struggle. Before zooming in 
on how our specific case region has experienced and responded to these post-colonial 
incorporation pressures, this second part of the dissertation will sketch a detailed 
picture of the broader scenery of that case region, its internal composition and the 
historical setting of the transitions under study.   
Methodological approach to Part II  
In order to assess the question of how this negotiated peripherality operated in the 
local-global interaction of Carangas’ communities with the wider environment and 
social context, this interaction will be approached from a multi-layered ecological-
ethnohistorical perspective. Reflecting the interdisciplinary ambitions of the presented 
research, that framework draws quite freely from several methodological approaches in 
an attempt to make the reconstruction how (Central-Andean rural) “households compose 
the broader system, but are also modelled by that system” (Vanhaute 2008, 41; Dunaway 2012) 
a feasible goal. It frames rural life in the Central Andean Highlands within the outlines 
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of a specific social agro-system, within which the household will be understood as a 
“gateway to the wider world”.  
A “peasant” livelihood is essentially based on multiple interactions between 
organizational units of different size and on a wide array of overlapping mechanisms 
and circuits for the production, regulation and circulation of goods and services. This 
hints at a complex intertwining of household formation, inter-household relations, 
frameworks for collective action and supra-local networks which can be disentangled 
from a top-down (explaining local livelihoods from the system level) nor a bottom-up 
(household as entirely “unchained”) perspective. Neither does a matryochka doll-kind 
of order suit the analysis.1 Rather, I envision the formation of rural spaces and social 
structures as a tightly and puzzling interwoven membrane. To make this membrane 
researchable, I bring the model of (social) Agrarian Systems2 into dialogue with the 
concept of livelihood3 and a good share of methodological input from Andeanist peasant 
scholarship on household economy theories.4 A source of inspiration for this particular 
 
                                                     
1 However, the use of “nesting” as a “design principle” for institutions for collective action reflects the idea of 
Russian dolls. This multi-staged principle dissects commons regimes into multiple decision-making units 
across several layers in order to demonstrate the simultaneous “robustness” (Ostrom 1990) and subjugation to 
change (Ensminger 1992).  
2 Agrarian Systems –amongst which the “French” model of Agrarian Systems Analysis and the “North Sea” 
model of the Social Agro-System can be distinguished- have been designed as concrete research tools by rural 
(history) scholars, adept of the Annales school and indebted to the Slicher van Bath tradition. Agrarian 
Systems Analysis was developed at the National Institute of Agronomy (INA, Paris); A History of World 
Agriculture counts as the main reference book (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006). Largely adopting a similar systemic 
framework, the consortium for Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area (CORN) places a stronger 
emphasis on the role of social power (see also footnote in Introduction). Although originally designed 
departing from quite a different regional setting, the framework of the “social agrosystem” is very instructive 
for its focus on social relations between lords, peasants, labourers, moneylenders and the state. In doing so, 
the CORN researchers do not privilege –or even more, pretend to seek a prime mover of- social, productive or 
technological change rahter than to reduce the explanation of long-term change in agricultural efficiency to 
the relationship of social structure and class conflict. In that sense, CORN is contributing to a reframing of the 
famous Brenner debate. 
3 The Sustainable Livelihood Approach has emerged in the 1990s from the work of (rural) development 
scholars, particularly British and Dutch (Scoones 2009; De Haan and Zoomers 2005). It presents an optimistic, 
holistic and actor-oriented response to structural methodologies of the dependentistas, neo-Marxists and the 
household approach of previous decades (De Haan and Zoomers 2005, 28-9 and 32; see also Chambers and 
Conway 1992; Ellis 2000; Scoones 2009). 
4 See the standard yet somewhat outdated publication on land and power in the Andes edited by Custred and 
Orlove (1980), and particularly Mayer’s economic-anthropological work on the Andean household, The 
Articulated Peasant (2002). The emphasis on the household as the basis of the Andean peasant economy runs in 
line with the bulk of (Marxist) peasant studies by pioneering scholars and their successors, testing the 
Chayanov’s standard definition of the peasant household as the “economic unit of a peasant family that does not 
employ paid workers” (Chayanov 1966, 1; Wolf 1966, 2; Mintz 1974; Paige 1975; Kay 1974, to name just a few).  
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combination of methodologies was found in the “Systemic Approach to Rural 
Development” that combines three levels of analysis, linking the configuration of 
livelihood patterns (1) to the heterogeneity of livelihood strategies (2) and to larger 
structures of long-term economic, governance, environmental and agrarian change (3).5  
Thus here is my toolbox that will serve my undertaking to assess the historical 
construction and transformation of rural livelihood patterns in the Central Andes. The 
point of departure is the livelihood perspective, which promotes a combination of 
academic debate and practical action, although this is (still) not a very common angle to 
be taken by historians. Despite recurrent shortcomings, it casts an inspiring and 
refreshing look on rural development and inequality by framing the daily organization 
of production and community life –as in Carangas- in “a complex web of activities and 
interactions that emphasises the diversity of ways people make a living” (Scoones 2009, s.p.).  
The diversity of “making a living” stems from how specific human (labour power, 
knowledge, and know-how), “inert” (productive implements and equipment), and 
“living” (cultivated plants and domestic animals) resources are used and combined 
within a particular ecological setting (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 47-9). This is how a 
particular agrarian regime takes shape. Although labelling these regimes remains an 
artificial act, their conceptualization offers a workable framework to grasp how the 
intersection of shattered agriculturalist and pastoralist “life zones” of Carangas within 
the broader “ecoregion” of the altiplano is embedded in a larger agricultural regime 
(Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 51). The “operationalization” of the natural endowments of 
this ecoregion is fundamentally subject to the structures of social power. While 
definitely playing an important determining role, these relations are themselves the 
outcome of the complex interaction between population pressures, political decisions, 
conﬂicts, and ideas, but also more engrained belief systems and exchange logics (Thoen 
2004).  
Scaling down within this social agrosystem to the very local level, the household will 
be approached as the basic actor in the construction of rural livelihoods, which in the 
Andes corresponds to the nuclear family. By pooling waged and non-waged incomes, 
 
                                                     
5 Different from my use of this model, SARD (not to be confused with the FAO’s reference to “Sustainable 
Agriculture and Rural Development”) has been designed by the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) in function of development project cycle management. Promoting a holistic perspective to 
poverty-reducing rural development, SARD presents an analytical instrument that frames individual 
households within multiple stakeholder interaction and within the broader landscape and history of the rural 
setting (Witteveen and Ruedin 2008, 2). Instead of pretending to provide in a new methodology, the model 
“integrates complementary approaches and methodologies originating from different schools of thought” (Witteveen 
and Ruedin 2008, 2). More concretely, it combines Agrarian Systems Analysis with the Sustainable Livelihood 
Approach and other practical instruments designed by development institutions, such as “outcome mapping” 
model of the Canadian IDRC.  
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households are the key to the question why “the vast majority of the world’s workers have 
never been fully proletarianized” (Dunaway 2012, 454; see also Smith and Wallerstein 1992). 
To understand how this pooling is organized in the Andean context, I adopt Mayer’s 
emphasis on the links between the household economy and communal institutions 
(Mayer 2002),6 thereby extending Custred and Orlove’s insistence on the household as 
the decisive mediator between the individual and the global level (1980, 15 and 31-54). 
Communities must however be approached as historical constructs that are open to 
broader processes of change as well as inputs from the very local level. Rather than the 
boundaries of each level, the focus is placed on the connections between households 
and communities and beyond. These connections become wider and more multifaceted 
as the focus zooms out.  
The link between these scales and frameworks for action is access. The question of 
livelihood formation does not directly correspond to the availability and quality of 
assets but relates to concrete subsistence strategies that are formed by social relations 
and institutions (Zoomers 1999, see also Scoones and Wolmer 2002). These strategies are 
designed, deployed and influenced by deliberate objectives and unintentional 
responses, converting the notion of livelihood into a dynamic transformation process. 
The clue to that process is the question of access, defined by the variables of power and 
sovereignty (De Haan and Zoomers 2005, 36). The challenge is then in grasping this 
access by applying the sketched methodological framework to Carangas. Therefore I 
rely on a bunch of peasant literature produced in and on the region in combination with 
the available sources for the late 19th-early 20th century period.  
Regarding archival sources, I distinguish four main producers of key reconstruction 
material: the Revisita committees, the departmental and provincial state 
representatives, occasional Commissions, and Court.  
A very specific source is the repeatedly executed Revisita (land surveys) and its 
outcome, the padrones (taxpayers lists), providing detailed information on the 
categorization and distribution of rural Indian labour. Far from “innocent” neutral 
devices, these documents give indirectly access to indigenous voices and the structuring 
processes underlying rural change.7 They serve as a valuable “red thread” to reconstruct 
 
                                                     
6 Centred on the elements of house, field and money, Mayer approaches the household economy in the Andes 
from different angles, each centralizing a particular aspect of a household, such as kinship bonds, production 
processes, its boundaries (the black box metaphor), or the rational behaviour of its individual members (the 
rational choice model) (Mayer 2002, 5). 
7 On basis of Zagalsky’s discussion of one of the principal and richest entries into the changing organization of 
life in the ayllus over the centuries, the visitas or colonial land inspection, we can distinguish three approaches 
towards the sources at our disposal. First, there is the positivist stance, adopted in legal and institutional 
historical research conducted up to the 1970s, which perceived the colonial inspections and their “product”, 
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qualitative and quantitative demographic developments of Andean communities as well 
as to assess indigenous demographic strategies and differentiation patterns.8 In that 
sense, this thread gives insight into previous, changing and eroding or reinvented social 
and political organization of the ayllu and hence provide the historian with multiple 
links towards other types of sources. To both the State and the communities, they 
evidence a tributary pact that functioned as a regulator for communitarian land tenure.9 
Because the ayllus of Carangas managed to keep their lands formally exempt from 
cadastral operations, we have detailed similar data on internal land distribution at our 
disposal. As a result, one of the ayllus’ greatest achievements constitutes one of the 
Andeanist’s largest heuristic shortcomings.  
A more narrative source is the yearly reports submitted by the governors of the 
province to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.10 These departmental governors headed the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the padrones or taxpayers lists, as legal mechanisms without going beyond the terms of the initial purpose of 
their creation. From an ethno-historical perspective, which gained ground from the 1960s on, these sources 
were uncovered as new, alternative and more transparent entries to indigenous voices of the past that 
allowed to complement the information derived from chronicles, lawsuits, geographical descriptions etc. A 
third way was proposed by the semiotic and discursive tendency that emerged in the 1980s, revealing these 
documents as testimonies of a structuring process, “a ritualized event that seeks to accommodate the society and the 
conducts to models furthered by the Crown and the Church” (Zagalsky 2009; see also Guevara Gil and Salomon 1994). 
This threefold analysis of a specific colonial source is also applicable to their 19th equivalents century and 
other “legibilizing” sources. It makes clear that they cannot be approached as neutral socio-economic cross-
sections, frozen in time, but must be assessed in light of the historical conjunctures during which they were 
produced and the traces left by the diverse subjects involved in their production. 
8 Grieshaber analyzed the Revisitas of the 19th century to corroborate and evaluate the survival of indigenous 
communities (Grieshaber 1991). For the Carangas region, Rivière has analyzed ten census documents (Rivière 
1982, chapter 2). Demographic “strategies” developed, for instance to lower fiscal pressure or enhance one’s 
fiscal status, are reflected in the proportion of indigenous taxpayers to the entire population and their 
internal dynamics as specific fiscal categories emerged or assimilated. Gavira has assessed the demographic 
strategies -reflected of the Carangas communitis for the late colonial period (Gavira 2010). The last Revisita for 
the Carangas province was taken in 1877. From then on, local censuses became the new taxation tool, 
although information on their execution and results is very limited.  
9 It is in these documents that peasants may find their name and hence an official indication of their fiscal 
status as member of community or tenant of a hacienda. Therefore, the padrones were frequently requested 
by 19th century Bolivians as a legal source for the distribution of land among communities or individual (ex-
)commoners. Still today, these documents function to proof land property; in 2009, for instance, a case from 
1920 on land invasion and farm destruction was requested by the nephew of the original plaintiff (AJC, Penales, 
1920, no. 4). The Revisita -the administrative tool to set and update these taxpayers lists- figured as the “bone 
of contention” between the state and the communities, particularly when deployed to implement land and 
fiscal reforms. In Part III we will see how in the context of the late 19th century land legislation, the usual 
distrust towards this fiscal intervention escalated and converted the Revisita in the symbol of the liberal 
antagonism.  
10 The official correspondence between provincial, departmental and ministerial authorities is filed in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs at the Archivo Nacional de Bolivia in Sucre (ANB) and, from 1896 on, published in 
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Prefectura, which constitutes the link between the functionaries at the provincial and 
cantonal level and the central government. The information provided by occasional 
recording operations, commissioned by the central government, provides quite similar 
information. In the same category, the Bacarreza report of 191011 and the Lima report of 
192112 deserve special attention. Addressing the central state powers, both documents 
offer the most detailed descriptions on life in Carangas in all its aspects, including its 
relation to the rest of the country and the neighbouring country of Chile, as well as 
detected challenges to and opportunities for “development.” The census of 1900 can 
also be categorized under these operations, however recorded in a more statistical 
Revisita-style. To gain an idea of the personal pathways behind those statistical data, 
the juridical apparatus offers a rich vein of archival material. Apart from the insight 
gained into personal relations and conflicts in civil and criminal court cases, notary 
books, including testaments, inventories, and memoranda of association, constitute an 
excellent entry into household formation, economic activities and accumulation 
trajectories and the strength of local elites.13 Wills made-up by people explicitly 
identifying themselves as indigenous are particularly interesting and could be viewed as 
“frontier documents.”14 
As stated in the introduction to this dissertation, the image that emerges from a close 
analysis of these sources is much less essentialist and depicts a society in movement. 
They entail more layers than the detailed snapshot information on the organization and 
continuity of communal landholdings. Yet, while these entrances reflect different levels 
of ayllu-state interaction and dimensions of state and indigenous voices, each of them is 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the form of annual reports by the Prefect of the Oruro department, consultable in the National Library in 
Sucre and the Municipal Library in Oruro. (for the other chapters: see also the regional archives in Chile). 
11 His report has been entirely reproduced, provided with an insightful introduction, in Pauwels 2006, 337-403. 
12 The only version I found of Lima’s report, published as Etnografía de la Provincia de Carangas. Su importancia 
para el Bolivia. Reformas sociales e institucionales, is located in the library of the Department of Anthropology of 
the University of Oruro (Lima 1921). 
13 Inventories cover a wider range of property “pools” (unclaimed or stolen goods, shop contents) than wills 
but provide no extra information on how the documented estate was formed. Similarl insight into the 
products and merchants that made their way to/through Carangas is provided by juridical documents relating 
to the depositors upon whom merchants relied, particularly when their activities or warehouses became the 
object of theft and accusations of theft. The memoranda of commercial (trade and/or mining) enterprises as 
well as their contracts and litigations testify the forging of corporate partnerships and credit relations among 
individual and cooperating business (wo)men in the province.  
14 The indigenous adoption of a Spanish practice evidences that indigenous people did not refuse Spanish 
influences nor did they unambiguously assimilate them (Lopez, Mancini and Nacht 2009, 12; Kellogg and 
Restall 1998; see also Cline 1984 and 1998, 13-33; Eire 1995; del Rio 1997; Rojas Rabiela 1999; Roncancio Vargas 
2008). Wills are made according to a particular structure, procedures and symbolism imported from Spanish 
notarial culture and Catholicism (Nowack 2006).  
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state-created. Both the potential and the risk entailed in these reports is that they are 
direct products of the political-administrative ambitions (and shortcomings) of the 
time. In relation to statistical livelihood-reconstruction sources, it must be noted that 
censuses (increasingly available as a result of a growing role attributed to statistics in 
governmental planning but also part of notarial documentation) must be approached 
with precaution, not only because of manipulations by those who count but also because 
of the distrust on the part of the counted. Thus, we need complementary sources that 
give a closer entry to indigenous “voices”. The communities themselves dispose of their 
own archive, kept, conserved by their indigenous authorities.15 Also ethnographic 
studies produced over the last fifty years on the region or similar and/or broader 
regions that may be based on these diverse archival sources must be taken into 
account,16 in addition to my own field work notes.  
Questions and structure of Part II  
The questions underlying the following two chapters of the dissertation seek to analyse 
the historical process through which Carangas was incorporated into an expanding 
market system and a developing nation-state, both at the regional level as an agro-
pastoralist production zone and at the household level as community-bound production 
units. This reconstruction is informative to the exploration into the conditions for 
frontier zone formation in late 19th century Bolivia in this specific rural setting.  
Most basically, an assessment of these questions starts with reconstructing what 
rural livelihoods look like in Carangas and how the organization of these livelihoods has 
changed when supra-local frameworks for resource management and sovereignty were 
restructured. This reconstruction is based on the factors of (1) ecology, (2) demography, 
(3) production processes and (4) market relations (chapter three),17 in addition to the 
factors of (5) state regulation and (6) communal agency (chapter four). Accordingly, a 
set of sub-questions can be formulated. Chapter 3 is structured by the questions:  (1) 
 
                                                     
15 Platt is one of the few having gained access to the archive of the “moiety” (parcialidad) and the ayllus of the 
community where he conducted his field work (Platt 2012). My efforts to access such sources were probably 
too limited, however I did have the chance of reading the personal version of Carangas’ history of don 
Anastacio, a pastoralist from Turco, who approaches his native region in the light of the recent reunion of all 
Aymara markas (Canqui Mollo 2012). 
16 Mainly Rivière 1982, Pauwels 1983, and the publications of Ayllu Sartañani (1992, 1995) but also West (1981) 
on Pampa Aullagas and Caro (1985) on Ulla Ulla provide in insightful analyses. 
17 These four factors correspond to the CORN classification of rural production (Van Bavel and Hoyle 2010, 2-5) 
and run more or less in line with the research factors established in the Introduction of this dissertation, with 
the important absence of state regulation (5) and communal agency (6). 
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which limits and which comparative advantages did the altiplano present, what 
function was attributed to these natural endowments, did these endowments and their 
function change over time? (2) What has been impact of demographic peaks and 
downfalls on land-labour relations, particularly in terms of access to land, peasants’ 
bargaining position and their consequent tenant status? (3) What has been the impact of 
changes in consumption needs/demands on the organization of productive activities in 
terms of labour intensity, productivity and responsiveness? Chapter 4 puts more 
emphasis on the factors of the state, the market and their local representatives. It starts 
with (slightly altering the factor order) asking (5) which actors claimed land and labour, 
on what basis, and in what kind of land tenure and labour relations this crystalized. How 
did the central state intervene in this organization and how did this mould the relation 
rural dwellers to the state and the representation of their collective demands? It then 
assesses (4) what the impact of developing market structures and the accompanying 
infiltration of new transport modes has been on the access to land and the organization 
of productive and complementary (agricultural and non-agricultural, commercial and 
off-market) activities. Eventually, (6) it queries what conditions this state and market 
penetration shaped for political and commercial intermediation and elite formation and 
which impact this had on communal agency. Who are these local elites, what were their 
origins and why did they eventually “evaporate”? 
In accordance with these questions, the following structure will be followed. A 
prologue introduces the geo-climate setting of the processes under analysis, the South-
Central Andes. The best way to highlight the impressive plurality of this landscape is 
through a west-to-east oriented cross-section. Departing from that broad overview, the 
patterns of human settlement, the principles of verticality and complementarity 
underlying human adaptation to this dense patchwork of diverse ecologies and the 
productive system engendered by this co-evolution are briefly discussed.  
The first chapter, then, starts with an overview of the long-term environmental, 
demographic and territorial-administrative evolutions in Carangas. Subsequently, the 
organization of rural livelihoods around 1900 on this highland plain will be assessed, 
departing from livestock, more particularly the llama, as the main resource that 
“drives” an Andean pastoralist household’s developmental cycle. This vital asset 
influences the strategic choices regarding the accumulation and transfer of assets, the 
distribution of tasks and labour force, land use and settlement and the increase of their 
wealth and status. This development cycle will be described in terms of the tasks a 
household complies with (division of labour), the formation, acquisition and securing of 
its property (mainly livestock), and its use and tenure of land at the household and 
community level. The third section gives a summarizing sketch of an analysis and 
reconstruction (however too extensive to be entirely included here) of the destinations, 
circuits and products that link up as Carangas’ households brought their products, their 
labour and particularly their llamas into circulation.  
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While chapter 3 scrutinizes micro-relations and household-level strategies, chapter 4 
gives more attention to the macro (and meso) framework. It assesses how local 
livelihoods and social networks for production and consumption were linked to and 
shaped by broader frameworks of regulation and collective action. First it dissects 
extensively what has been defined as a mutual state-community pact. The second 
section looks at the effects of an expanding market sphere and how this intervened in 
local livelihood strategies. The last section assesses the intermediary function claimed 
by local elite groups.  
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Prologue: A world of complementarities.  
How to capture the vastness and enormous variety of the Andean landscape on paper? 
An even harder task, how to render account of the adaptive skills developed by the 
Andean population that enabled them to circumvent the improbabilities of subsistence 
in the Andes? For those readers (still) unfamiliar with its (literally!) breath-taking 
grandeur, the subsequent section provides in an introduction to the South-Central 
Andean sub-region and how vegetative, animal and human life is articulated on this 
elevated plateau in close interaction with its adjacent ecoregions.  
A cross section of the Andes: A(n off-)road trip. 
Covering the entire western part of the South-American continent, the Andes are 
geographically constituted by parallel north to south oriented volcanic mountain chains 
or cordilleras, originating from the tectonic encounter between the oceanic Nazca plate 
and the continental South American plate. Extending from the current Colombian-
Venezuelan border to the most southern tip of Chile, these chains form the planet’s 
longest mountain range above sea level with a length of about 9000 km. The area upon 
which this research focuses is situated within the central part of this range, 
climatologically differentiated from the tropical Northern Andes and the humid and 
cold Southern Andes. Spanning from contemporary Southern Ecuador to Northern Chile 
and Argentina, the dry and extreme Central Andes border the seismic Pacific coast to 
the West and vanish into the subtropical valleys and lowlands towards the East. As the 
Andes are geologically relatively young and little affected by erosion, the cordilleras that 
separate the ocean from the Amazon are hard to traverse. Yet it is exactly the 
interconnectedness between diverse ecological settings that range along this west to 
east division that stands out as the formative factor in Andean livelihoods.  
The mountain slopes are split up by altitudinal zonation into different belts or 
ecoregions, regardless of their location within the tropical latitudes. Across these belts, 
a very dense patchwork of so-called “ecological niches” composed by a specific set of 
climatological, geological, vegetative and wildlife features. The ecoregion that stands at 
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the centre of this dissertation is known as the altiplano, a plain only surpassed by the 
Tibetan highland as the planet’s highest continental plateau (Lamb and Hoke 1997). Just 
northwards of lake Titicaca, the Andean mountain range splits into the Cordillera Real 
(western ridge) and the Cordillera Oriental (eastern ridge), engendering a high altitude 
basin with a width of 350–400 km to then merge again about 1800 km further south 
(Allmendinger, Jordan, Kay and Isacks 1997). This vast plain is the heart of the South-
Central Andes, a sub-region within the widest belt of the Andes and corresponding to 
the western part of contemporary Southern Peru, Bolivia and Northern Argentina and 
to North-Chile. The following transection aims to visualize and stress the 
complementarity and interrelation of the altiplano with adjacent and distant zones of 
the wider South-Central Andean environment.  
 
Figure 4 Topographical cross-section of Bolivia (Klein 2011, 3). 
The cross section starts in the Southern Pacific ocean, which formed the key entry to 
this part of the world since the first European who set foot in the Andes, until 
intercontinental airplanes took over. It was the Prussian scientist Alexander von 
Humboldt who during his travels, known as “the scientific discovery of the New World” 
(1799-1804), explained the phenomenon that creates at the shores of this ocean the 
world’s most productive marine ecosystem (Helferich 2004, xvi). The Humboldt Current 
Large Marine Ecosystem is produced by a cold ocean current that flows north-
westwards along the western shores of the Americas’ Southern cone towards the 
equator (Thiel et al 2007). With intervals of about five years, unusual warming provoked 
by the climate pattern known as El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) distortions the 
current, thereby leaving a serious and at times devastating impact on its extensive 
influence zone (Davis 2001, 17).  
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Figure 5 Saltpetre plant “Buen Retiro” in the pampa nearby Pozo Almonte, 1915 (Colectivo 
LER 2007 [1915]). 
The remarkably rich source of marine life offshore, attracting an abundant quantity 
of seabirds that leave thick layers of guano on the coastal islands, contrasts with the 
desert landscape ashore, generated by the permanent anticyclone (Cunill Grau 1999, 98; 
Mann 2011, 212-20). Along the Pacific Ocean, an almost absolute aridity reigns over a 
narrow coastal strip of only some 100 km width, stretching from the driest place on 
earth, the Atacama Desert in current North Chile, to Southern Ecuador. However, 
dryness does not necessarily equal scarcity. Apart from guano, the dry pampa counts 
with another fertilizing source in the form of enormous nitrate or saltpetre reserves 
which would provide Peru, Bolivia and particularly Chile –after it won a war over the 
access to these reserves- with enormous fortunes in the late 19th – early 20th century 
(Cunill Grau 1999, 100-2). 
Moving inland, the rainless coastal belt switches over to the Andean headlands 
(precordillera), cut through by fertile and undulated fissures (quebradas), to then quickly 
incline towards the snowy peaks of the Andes.  Compared to the eastern flank of the 
Andes, the western ridge is remarkably drier and harder to traverse with peaks of over 
6000 metres covered by eternal snow. With average elevations situated between 3000 to 
4000 m above sea level, the altiplano interconnects both mountain chains.  
Walled by the Andean mountains, this tableland forms an endoreic basin, which 
means that precipitation and waterways have no exit to external water bodies but 
through evaporation and seepage. Within this inland drainage system the scarce surface 
water remains contained by interconnected lakes, swamps and sub-basins. Water is 
concentrated into what is known as the “aquatic axis”, starting to the north with the 
Azangaro river that runs into the world’s highest navigable lake, Titicaca, which is 
constituent to a larger basin that goes by the same name and connects southwards via 
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the Desaguadero river to the Poopó basin, formed by the Poopó lake, and via the 
Lacajahuira river to the Coipasa basin. More south, the Coipasa salt flat with the same 
name, the small brother of the world’s largest salt crust, the salar of Uyuni stretching 
over approximately 10000 km² more southwards (Risacher and Fritz 2009, 125). The 
ecoregion of this climatologically semi-arid area has been identified as the puna, 
characterized by wet and dry grassland and scrubland vegetation (Riveros Salcedo 
2001).  
 
Figure 6 Corn field in the valley of Camiña (Chile) in the precordillera (own picture, January 
2012). 
The area houses a range of plants and wildlife that are hunted, gathered, fished, 
raised or cultivated. For all the innovation heralded by the Columbian exchange, the 
potato and camelid species still count as the “pillars” of the local diet and the highland 
productive system. Despite its elevation above vegetation level and restrictions of 
aridity and frost, microclimates scattered over the area offer farming opportunities for 
a wealth of potato varieties, as well as root crops and grains such as the quinoa plant, 
which were originally domesticated in the Titicaca lake area. Peat lands, known as 
bofedales, naturally high soil salinity and several native grasses (particularly the ichu 
plant that serves as pasturage and counters soil erosion) generate excellent grazing 
conditions for South-American camelids. Despite their decreasing number and 
increasing exploitation, these animals continue to play a central role in Andean rural 
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livelihood formation.1 Around the lakes and rivers (Titicaca, Poopó, Lauca river), fish, 
water birds and totora (reed mace, a sedge variety and natural decontaminant) count as 
important resources (Cunill Grau 1999, 129). The salt lakes provide in a highly demanded 
consumption product and means of exchange (Huarachi and Iquize 2003). In contrast to 
its current bare outlook, big parts of the altiplano were originally covered with queñua 
trees and tola and yareta plants.2 Equally threatened with disappearance are many of 
the wildlife species such as flamencos, foxes, armadillos (quirquinchos), chinchillas and 
viscachas, eagles and ostriches. Last but not least, the volcanic subsoil probably foresees 
in the altiplano’s most valuable resource; at least for those who know to get hold of the 
underground’s extraordinary mineral and metal reserves.  
 
Figure 7 Llamas grazing during the rainy season on a bofedal nearby Isluga, Chile, at the 
western side of the Cordillera Real (own picture, January 2012).  
Continuing our transection to the east, the Andes gently loose height into humid and 
outstandingly fertile intermountain valleys. Descending from the altiplano, mountain 
slopes can be subdivided into several vertically layered cultivation niches which have 
become extraordinarily important for world agriculture, evidenced in the amount and 
prominence of the plants that were to be domesticated here (Mazoyer and Roudart 
2006, 190). At an altitude of about 4000 m, pasture zones make way for the cultivation of 
tubers and indigenous cereals. A subsequent limit is crossed at an altitude of 3500 m, 
introducing the maize production zone which foresees in staple products, flour and the 
alcoholic chicha drink (Guillet 1981, 141). Further eastwards, a lower sub-tropical zone 
 
                                                     
1 While the llama and the alpaca count as the sole large herd mammals of the western hemisphere to be 
domesticated, which occurred probably around 5000 to 3000 BC, the vicuña and the guanaco have continued 
grazing in the wild (Mengoni 2008). 
2 Over 90% of the queñua population has been exterminated by colonial mining and post-colonial carbon 
production (Purcell et al 2004) while tola and yareta have become less abundant due to their consumption as 
vegetative fuels (Cunill Grau 1999, 130; Blanco 1904, 18). 
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dominated by the sub-tropical ecoregion of the yungas (approximately between 600 and 
3000 m above sea level) takes over the scenery. Advancing even further east, the 
undulating transition zone announces rainforests and savannah lands. To the north, the 
South-Central Andes border the vast Amazon basin, which southwards become humid 
grassland plains (Llanos de Moxos) and end in the arid pampas of the Gran Chaco (Sanabria 
2007, 32-5).  
 
Figure 8 An agro-ecological community in the grasslands of the South-West Amazon basin 
(own picture, Beni department, December 2008). 
Human settlement. 
Across this Central Andean landscape, the altiplano (particularly its eastern side around 
the Titicaca lake) historically counts as a core zone of human activity in the Andes, a 
place it is only very recently giving up to the lower areas (Klein 2011, 1 and 6). The 
development of a real agricultural system in the region started around 1000 B.C. and 
was situated on the Andean valleys and the Pacific coast, where human presence and 
first settlements can be traced back to approximately 8000 years B.C. and 2000 B.C. 
respectively (Stanish 2002, 1-3; Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 192). Despite the constraints 
of the barren soil, the severe climate and the implications of elevation, these nuclei 
developed into complex societies comprising a remarkably dense population that 
maintained strong links to the valleys and the coast. When Pizarro and his men reached 
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these altitudes, the altiplano was mainly inhabited by Aymara speaking “nations” or 
federations which also included different language groups represented by the 
population today known as the Urus (Sandoval et al 2013). Today a minor and highly 
marginalized ethnic group, the Urus were in fact the first inhabitants of the area and 
settled –as their name of “men of the water” (jasuni) reflects- along the aquatic axis 
(Wachtel 1986). The Aymara only arrived later, occupying the area permanently at least 
by the time of the Tiwanaku horizon (Platt et al 2006, 26). Up to today, this 
ethnolinguistic group dominates altiplano population patterns.  
 
Figure 9 Oruro, an urban island on the altiplano (picture Mathias Monbaliu, October 2011). 
Overall, European immigration remained very limited in what for these newcomers 
presented an uninhabitable environment. The result is that the Andean highlands 
display a segregated society, with an almost exclusive indigenous countryside while 
whites and mestizos constituted the dominant minority in the cities and mining centres 
(Grieshaber 1980, 260-1). A more hybrid constellation structured the eastern valley 
region, where the optimal productive properties functioned as a major pool of 
attraction for human settlement, yet intensely connected to the highland areas. The 
higher stratum of this zone, which is home to Quechua speaking groups, had become 
the “cradle” of high pre-Inca and Inca cultures and was also the preferred setting for 
most incomers from the Old World. Further east, human population remained for long 
time reduced to the seminomadic settlement of hunting and gathering groups until 
major technological and infrastructural breakthroughs of the last fifty years pushed the 
agrarian frontier into the humid lowlands (Klein 2011, 1-3). This caused a historical shift 
in settlement patterns with Bolivia’s lowlands currently housing (nearly) the majority of 
the country’s population.3 At the western side of the cordillera, a similar pattern is 
observable as urban areas and particularly ports on the coast are absorbing an ever 
larger share of the hinterland population. 
 
                                                     
3 The national census executed in November 2012caused quite some controversy when provisional results in 
January 2013 indicated Santa Cruz (for the first time) as the country’s largest city, to then be corrected a 
couple of months later, returning that honour to La Paz (Erbol 23.01.2013; INE 2013). 
 118 
Ecological adaptation and Andean cosmovision. 
Facing very diverse obstacles to exploit the resources of their direct environment, 
Andean communities developed specific land tenure and resource management 
patterns that give credit to a durable human-nature co-evolution (de Blas et al 2000, 17-
21; Cunill Grau 1999, 89-150). Similar to other mountain regions, such as the Himalaya or 
the Alps, human settlement and production patterns were ingeniously adapted in order 
to match starkly contrasting zones located very closely together with each other.4 
Examples of how human intervention knew to convert factors of apparent inhospitality 
into strengths are the acclimatization of selected plants and animals to the puna 
environment, terrace farming, the chewing of coca leaves to relieve altitude sickness 
and fatigue,5 and storage techniques by dry-freezing potatoes, known as chuño (Mann 
2011, 202; Sammells 2010, 101-25), and llama jerky meat known as charque. Essentially to 
their subsistence, this in situ adaptation was combined with intense contacts with other 
environmental zones (Cunill Grau 1999, 124-40). Without falling into the trap of absolute 
ecological determinism, “the thrust is that humanly created zonation is as important as 
ecological zonation in the Andean system” (Bebbington and Turner 1987). As a result from 
this adaptive capacity, the first Spanish to reach in the described environment 
encountered “a far more urban, more populated, and more technologically advanced region 
than generally assumed; and the Indians, rather than living in static harmony with nature, 
radically engineered the landscape” (Mann 2006). 
As Rodas defines, altiplano people combine two ways of ordering and relating to this 
territory, a fixed mode, “practiced” for land allocation, and a mobile mode, performed 
through pastoralism (Rodas 2013, 47-8 and 84). The key word to grasp this extraordinary 
human achievement is complementarity. Still counting as one of the most elemental 
ethnohistorical breakthroughs in Andean studies (Guillet 1981, 142), John Murra has 
coined this notion as the “vertical control of a maximum of ecological niches” (Murra 1967, 
384-6; 1972). In his ground-breaking work, Murra defines how this resource 
management and governance strategy was developed under early Andean processes of 
state-formation. Discontinuous territories were successfully interlinked through the 
distribution of people into colony communities over complementary ecological niches 
in the puna, valleys and coast. Further elaboration of this vertical archipelago model has 
provided in “a dramatic demonstration of the continuing distinctiveness and viability of the 
Andean adaptive repertory,” not only under Inca rule but also of how  
 
                                                     
4 Rhoades and Thompson 1975; Guillet 1983; Orlove and Guillet 1985 cited in Mayer 2002, 16. 
5 However, coca leaves only became a generalized commodity under colonial rule, when limited cultivation 
and use imposed by the Inca gave way to massive consumption (Cunill Grau 1999, 72-4). 
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“many contemporary peasant communities solved the subsistence problem 
through a variety of kin-based strategies, as local peasantries tried to diversify 
agricultural and pastoral production in different ecological niches (…) and to 
coordinate communal work efforts.”6  
However, in an attempt to go beyond the notion of verticality, some authors have 
suggested “ecological complementarity” as a preferable term (Bebbington and Turner 
1987). Particularly scholars of Andean pastoralist societies have stressed the co-
existence of a horizontal mobility and exchange model next to direct vertical control as 
equally important pillars of ecological adaptation (Platt 1975, 33; Mayer 1970; Fonseca 
1972; Browmann 1991; Medinaceli 2010). This horizontal dimension is addressed by 
Murra with the notion of reciprocity, as an alternative strategy to the –in pre-colonial 
times absent- market system (West 1981, 5-6). Indeed, reciprocity is a key word too, but 
should, in line with Temple’s definition, be distinguished from exchange.7 This is the 
point where Browmann (amongst others) goes beyond Murra in insisting on a model of 
parallel structures for the acquisition of livelihood assets between agriculturalists and 
pastoralists, the latter connecting to the former through a system of regional exchange 
that transcends the exclusive dependence on kin ties.8 Thus, in addition to direct 
community-based exploitation of multiple niches, local livelihood construction relied 
on indirect access to complementary resources that circulated through long-distance 
inter-ecological barter networks on a puna-valley-coast axis. Over the centuries, both 
models have continued to complement each other while increasingly entangling with 
expanding market spheres of capitalist exchange (as will be discussed in chapter 4). 
Ecological adaptation also generates -and is generated by- ethical conducts and 
religious-spiritual views (Cunill Grau 1999, 18-21). These conducts and views constitute 
an “Andean cosmovision”, which reflects the presumption that “life is an integrated, 
functional, cyclical entity encompassing all beings and all events that they experience and learn 
about” (Rodriguez and Quispe 2009, 35). This all-encompassing “life” is a guiding 
principle in the thinking and doing of the Aymara, referred to as pachamama. Its 
“simple” translation as Mother Earth (the planet or nature) corresponds to a more 
“sophisticated” Time-Space concept that stands for the harmonizing linkage of 
 
                                                     
6 Larson 1995, 13. See also Lehman ed. 1982; Masuda et al ed. 1985; Mayer 1985, 76-7. 
7 See also footnote no. 96 in chapter 2 on Temple (2003). 
8 Medinaceli 2005, 466. See also Browmann 1991; Browmann and Kuznar and Sedlmeyer in Barnard and 
Wendrich 2008, 160-73 and 557-83. 
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temporal and spatial relations between all forms of life.9 This cosmovision is internally 
balanced by “complementary opposites”, expressed at the family as well as at the 
collective level in the symbolic complementary in husband-wife union known as 
chachawarmi. In respect of this assumed internal balance, community authority is always 
exercised by a married couple together.10 Pachamama entails a reciprocal bond according 
to which cultivating the land or herding animals means taking care of the earth, which 
will be given back by nature. 
If life is integrated, the spiritual and everyday interrelation with nature is perceived 
as a constant dialogue among living creatures, the elements and divinities rather than 
the exertion of human dominion over “the Creation”. This is evidenced in the 
designation of sacred places called huacas  dedicated to the sun, the moon, mountains, 
trees, ancestors, temples, thumbs, etc.11 In fact, anything has the capacity of possessing 
sacral properties. This openness explains how the arrival of the Catholic Spanish and 
the destruction and/or supplanting of tangible expressions of religiously symbolic sites 
or objects were responded by an amplification and syncretization rather than an 
erosion of the Andean religious-spiritual horizon (Andrien 2001, 153-92; Griffiths 2007; 
Arnold and Espejo 2008; Brosseder 2014).  
This amplified religious-spiritual horizon is the ordering principle behind the 
organization of life- and livelihood-forming events, giving shape and meaning to the 
rituals that connect sowing to harvesting and birth to death. Those events are 
harmonizes within an annual agro-productive calendar and a synchronic religious-
ceremonial cycle. In order to obtain a good harvest, a good herd etc., celebrations 
dedicated to mythical ancestors are organized at the family level the whole year long 
and on certain moments in the productive calendar at the collective level (Rivière 1982, 
240-1). Coca leaves, alcohol and livestock, particularly llamas (both its full-grown and 
foetus version),12 forms an elemental part in all rituals related to the personal 
 
                                                     
9 Over the last century, and particularly in the decades after the National Revolution of 1952, there was a 
growing feeling of loss of this balance and of the tight connection between past, present and future in 
organizing community life, which locals expressed as “pachamama gets angry” (Ayllu Sartañäni 1992, 11). 
10 However, in spite of an egalitarian balance in the private family sphere, equal gender participation at the 
supra-household level is but a symbolic statement (Harris 1987). See also Platt 1986 and Harris 1978 cited in 
Mayer 2002, 12. 
11 Huacas (wak’as) refer to the male and female deities of the local pantheon, of which all community members 
consider themselves descendants. They are designated a symbolic location in the surroundings of the 
community’s centre and the cultivation lands which then comes to represent the connection point between 
the community’s members, its history and its real and mythical space (Rivière 1982, 54 and 240).  
12 Due to its multi-functionality, the sacred character attributed to the llama and its ritual use should not 
surprise. Given its extraordinary prominence, the llama is the subject of several myths, folktales and 
superstition, metaphors, songs and dances (Lopez 2003, 38). 
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development of pastoralists as well as to the wellbeing of the entire community. The 
provision of these ceremonial ingredients absorbs an important share of a household’s 
expenses. 
The limits and opportunities of the altiplano. The constitution of an agro-
pastoral system. 
In the “struggle against geography” (Mann 2011, 203), South-Central Andean post-
Neolithic production modes have developed into an archetypal mountain system that 
has been preserved ever since on the high Andean grasslands. Rather than a system of 
slash-and-burn cultivation, it took the form of a “system of pastoral animal breeding,” 
complemented by irrigation systems that developed after 1500 BC (Bowman, Fritz and 
Watson 2009; Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 22). Pastoralism is primarily based on the 
exploitation of domestic Andean camelids, which have constituted the main asset of 
local Aymara livelihoods for over a millennium (Graffam 1992, 888; see also Browmann 
1974; Custred 1977). Due to the factor of aridity, which reduces the relevance of farming, 
llamas and alpacas are particularly important in the southern part of this eco-region 
(Medinaceli 2005, 466). Yet, the ensuing productive system comprises both pastoralists 
and agriculturalists; the former occupying the elevated plains where soil sterility 
impedes cultivation, while the latter encounter favourable conditions in the scattered 
microclimates and the Titicaca basin. This simultaneity of extensive pastoralism and 
raised field agriculture has marked the South-Central Andean productive system 
already since pre-Inca times (Graffam 1992). As for farming, irrigated and regularly 
fertilized terrace cultivation allows the exploitation of a mountain in its entirety 
including above vegetation levels. Consequently, highland agriculture, particularly in 
the lands around the Lake Titicaca, came to play a regionally decisive nutritive role; “as 
if Europe had to support itself by farming the Alps” (Mann 2011, 201).  
After 1531, this Central Andean ecological-productive framework was submitted to a 
filtering process of intentionally and accidentally introduced material elements, 
commonly known as the Columbian Exchange (Crosby 2003).13 In the wake of conquest 
 
                                                     
13 In the other direction, the impact of the Columbian exchange has been at least as significant. Although the 
Andean highlands might seem the least expected place, it was here that Europe found a product that would 
result to be indispensable in the constellation of the “agro-industrial complex” and the overcoming of famine 
(Mann 2011). Initially, the potato was half-heartedly accepted or, to say it with the sharp pen of Galeano, 
“arrived very recommended by the Indians, so that Europe gave it to the pigs, the prisoners and the dying” 
(own translation, Galeano 1990, 71-2). Eventually, the Andean potato and its cultivation techniques came to 
play its protagonist role in the Columbian exchange with such fervour that “the effects of this transformation 
were so striking that any general history of Europe without an entry in its index for S. tuberosum should be ignored” 
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and early colonial encounter, gradual accommodations to these introductions merged 
with native goods and practices, crystallizing  into an extended hybrid production and 
settlement complex that underwent relatively little change ever since (Gade 1992, 473-
4). Selection and adoption in the rural highlands was mainly conditioned by the 
ecological constraints and prior domestication and technological developments found 
by the first European colonizers and facilitated by the population drop in the aftermath 
of their arrival. In terms of implements and equipment, a “simplified version of the Spanish 
inventory of rural material life” was adopted, without Andean technological and 
organizational developments being displaced (Gade 1992, 473).  
 
Figure 10 Cross-section of the cultivation and animal herding systems in the Andes during 
the Inca era (figure 5.2 in Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 197). 
Resulting from the appropriation of a whole range of Old World florae, faunae and 
technologies, production modes on the altiplano developed towards “an extensive pastoral 
adaptation based on the indigenous llama and alpaca, as well as livestock of European origin, 
including sheep, goats, and cattle” (Guillet 1981, 141). Still, Old World introductions were 
not able to significantly alter the agro-pastoral production modes of the altiplano. While 
livestock figures as an important player in the Columbian exchange, these immigrants 
were no match for the perfectly acclimatized Andean camelids (Mayer 2002, 16).14 Only 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Mann 2011, 197-212). Maize and the sweet potato left a similar impact in China. Other New-to-Old World 
transfers include cacao, tobacco, tomatoes and manioc. 
14 In addition to Andean camelids’ environmental adaptation to the highland climate, these animals are 
selective in grazing, without consuming the roots of forage plants nor damaging the field thanks to the 
cushions on their feet (Lopez 2003, 37). Moreover, their transport capacity explains why the wheel -little 
practical in the mountainous environment- did not figure among Andean technological knowledge.  
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sheep were somehow capable of slightly altering the pre-Hispanic outlines of altiplano 
pastoralism. Not of any use as beasts of burden, but an easily vendible and transported 
source of meat, hide wool and cheese, it successfully integrated in the camelid-based 
herding system of the altiplano. While “sheep was the single European introduction most 
valuable to native people,” pigs and chicken were also adopted by highland peasants yet to 
a lesser extent (Gade 1992, 467-8). Nowadays superseded by motorized vehicles, mules, 
donkeys and horses have played a historically important role as means of 
transportation. In contrast, neither goats nor cattle ever found major entrance on the 
altiplano.15  
Regarding agricultural crops, few Columbian Exchange participants have got a 
chance to integrate, given the factor of altitude. Exceptions are the onion, garlic and 
oregano. At the other hand, several native root crops and small tubers marginalized in 
face of Old World introductions (Gade 1992, 465-7). In more fertile parts of the Andes, 
several exotic species were successfully adopted and caused small alterations in native 
nutritional patterns, as did the tropical fruits brought from the yungas, but foremost the 
cereals (wheat and barley) cultivated in the higher valleys.16 Other potential 
introductions lingered (the example of grapevine) or failed (the case of olives) to find 
reception (Gade 1992, 465-7). 
 
 
                                                     
15 Because the great advantage of both animals, dairy products, is absent in the altiplano diet, and because the 
labour input from cattle on the field requires high investment in mountainous and sterile areas, the 
contribution of goats and cows to highland production and consumption remains limited (Gade 1992, 468; 
Lopez 2003, 38-9). 
16 Of considerable importance to global commodity chains, but less relevant for the altiplano diet and 
livelihoods, was the integration of sugarcane with native plants such as coca and tobacco in the plantation 
system of the tropical lower valleys (Gade 1992, 465-6). 
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Chapter 3  
The llama as the pillar of rural livelihoods in 
Carangas. 
 
Con tu caminar ligero 
vas trazando mi camino, 
pronto encontrarás el tuyo, 
quirquincho del arenal. 
Tu historia es la que escribes 
de llareta y altiplano, 
tus huellas son las palabras 
que se pierden en la arena. 
Quirquinchito charanguito – Savia Andina1 
 
“Let’s protect the Quirquincho”  (Own picture, 
Oruro, September 2010; Brigada Negotrópica). 
 
The people of Oruro may bear the epithet of “quirquinchos”, the armadillos that swarm 
the desert-like environment, but it is the llama that has always and remains playing a 
leading (though shifting) role in organizing life on the altiplano. The way in which 
llamas define local production and trade patterns in Carangas gives this agrarian zone a 
strong pastoralist character. Accordingly, the framework for life and livelihood in this 
setting will be defined as an agro-pastoral system. This means that the prevalence of 
Andean pastoralism has particular implications for the local organization of community 
 
                                                     
1 “With your light walk / you are plotting my way, / soon you will find yours, / quirquincho of the sand flat. / Your history 
is the one you write / of yareta and altiplano, / your footprints are the words / that get lost in the sand.”  The song tells 
the sad story of a large number of this (now legally protected though still endangered) animal: to end as the 
sound box of the charango, the typical Andean small guitar 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zIHXnPpJQWk). 
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life, land administration, production and labour and for the development of exchange 
relations and sovereignty relations. The premise is that, due to their high mobility, 
particularly their transport competences and collective land management, pastoralist 
zones and households maintain a specific relation to the market competition as to the 
state. However, “pastoralism” is to be used as a flexible category that shifts over time 
and in space. In line with Khazanov’s insights on the interrelation between pastoralist 
societies and the “outside world” (Khazanov 1994) and Medinaceli’s application of these 
insights to pre- and early-colonial Carangas (2010), the development of rural livelihood 
strategies in Carangas should however be understood on a continuum between 
pastoralism/mobility and agriculture/sedentarism rather than reduced to a singular or 
“non-peasant” production mode.  
3.1 Carangas, an introduction. 
The region to which I will refer as Carangas originally comprised a very diverse 
landscape that reached across its western, apparently insurmountable border towards 
the Pacific. However, over the last five centuries this territory was gradually reduced to 
its highland core, cut from its discontinuous valley lands to the east and the west (see 
1.2.2 and chapter 6). This heartland core is entirely situated on the elevated altiplano, 
comprised by (counter-clockwise) the Cordillera Real, the Coipasa salt flat, the Poopó lake 
and a less definable natural border to the north. Together, this territory covers 26719 
km², comparable to the size of Rwanda or Haiti. 2 In demographic terms, however, the 
area is very sparsely inhabited, with no major centre of population but dispersed 
villages and farms, which is to large extent to be ascribed to the region’s ecological 
features.  
 
                                                     
2 In geo-referential terms, this zone is contained between irregular parallel latitudinal lines roughly at 18°00’ 
to 19°50’ south and between the 67°00’ and 69°00’ meridians West from Greenwich. In his geographic 
dictionary for the Oruro department, Blanco situated Carangas between 17°35’ South 29°30’ West to 17°47’ 
South 67°40’ West, from where it runs southwards towards the southern tip of the Poopó lake (without 
providing in an exact location because of insufficient agreement on the exact division between locals) and 
then westwards until 19°40’ South 68°45’ West, then northwards along the cordillera occidental (Blanco 2006 
[1904], 17-8). The provincial inspector Bacarreza speaks in 1910 of the parallels 17°39’ to 17°41’ in the North 
and 19°10’ to 19°25’ in the South and between the (Greenwich-referenced) meridians 68°15’ to 69°16’ in the 
West and  67°30’ to 67°02’ in the East (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 352). According to Bacarreza, the 
province’s surface corresponded to 21690,77 km², until the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Chili redrew the 
border and reduced the territory to 21240,11 km² (ibid). 
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With minimum altitudes of 3600 m above sea level, the vast open plain offers a cold, 
windy and salubrious climate. The panoramic view is interrupted at several points by 
mountains, most of them extinct volcanoes along the cordillera, including Bolivia’s 
highest mountain Sajama (6222 m) and others further southwards, all endowed with a 
strong symbolic role transmitted through legends and huaca veneration.3 The volcanic 
underground explains the abundance of thermal springs, lava fields and borax deposits 
(particularly Chilcaya4) and of mineral resources which are mainly concentrated in the 
mountains close to the current village of Turco and the Mejillones province. Scarce 
surface water is contained only by the (disappearing!) Coipasa Lake, where the Lauca 
River that rises in the cordillera discharges, and smaller lagoons and a multitude of 
minor streams and brooklets scattered over the territory.  
 
Figure 11 Vicuña crossing ichu grassland at the Huayñacota lake at the foot of the Sajama 
mountain (own picture, Sajama National Park, October 2008). 
At first sight, the semi-desert outlook, the constant wind and the oxygen poor air 
seem all but welcoming. Annual precipitation remains between 200 and 600 mm per 
year (SEDES 2005, 9; Vera 2000) and occurs in ever shorter periods and in more extreme 
conditions due to climate change (Andersen 2009). Temperatures fluctuate between ice-
cold nights and hot days with an average annual temperature of 7°C (Genin 1995). 
During winter, night temperature drops far under zero, but at daytime intense solar 
 
                                                     
3 Apart from Sajama, the cordillera presents from north to south the Guallatire, the Payachata and 
Quimsachata twins, el Capitan and the Tata Sabaya mountain. 
4 Chillcaya is situated in Suriri, in ayllu Collana of the vice-canton Sabaya, but after the War of the Pacific 
passed to Chile. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1909, no. 5 (b). See also 1911 (“Libro de Hipotecas”), no. 
2. and 1913, no. 7. 
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radiation is only tempered by altitude and crude winds arriving from the Pacific. In 
contrast to the open winter skies, summer is known as the wet season (December-
March), including storms and hail, which turn into snowfall in the mountainous parts. 
These challenging conditions convert human adaptation and livelihood sustainability in 
a remarkable tour de force that will be explored in the following pages of this chapter. 
 
Figure 12 A panorama of the central part of Carangas, with a view on the village of Belén de 
Choquecota (own picture, March 2012). 
3.1.1 “Hundreds of kilometres ... without finding traces of a living soul”: 
Demographics.5 
When the first Spanish crossed the Carangas territory (probably the troops of Diego De 
Almagro in 1545), the population in Carangas could be estimated at 36000 people, 
 
                                                     
5 This section is restricted to a summary of overall demographic developments, with a specific focus on the 
long 19th century. For an overview of the fluctuations in Carangas’ demographic constellation, population 
counts and colonial and republican land inspections (Revisitas) are indispensable. This overview is based on 
Gilles Rivière’s analysis of these sources for the Sabaya community (1982, chapter 2) and on 20th century 
census records and demographic studies. All years in this overview refer to census years. Chapter 4 will 
subject these data to a deeper analysis in terms of fiscal-legal differentiations among the Carangas people 
under Bolivian liberalism. The Annex includes graphs depicting the demographic evolution in the Carangas 
region between 1500 and 2000 and a comparative table of population numbers at the departmental (Oruro) 
and provincial (Carangas) level under Bolivian rule.  
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resulting in a density of 1,3 persons/km².6 It is however only by 1573, when an 
administrative inspection was organized, that we dispose of proper demographic data 
on the Carangas population. According to that counting, Carangas was populated with 
28692 inhabitants, which presents a smaller –though still dramatic- post-conquest drop 
than experienced in the valleys, where the demographic decline reached in some places 
to 75% (Sanchez Albornoz 1974, 45-7; Rivière 1982, 57). Only in 1683, Carangas was 
subjected to second census operation, the revisita of viceroy Duque de la Palata (Rivière 
1982, 65). This survey offers a more detailed picture, yet a dramatic picture. In the 
course of the preceding century, the total population had declined with 71%, including 
the near or total disintegration of certain ayllus and the near or total disconnection of a 
considerable part of the native population with their home communities (Rivière 1982, 
65, 69 and 82). The effects of epidemics, violence and migration left Carangas with not 
more than 8382 inhabitants.7  
Within the Central-South Andes, the region that covers the actual department of 
Oruro was subject to the largest demographical drop from which it would not recover 
before the middle of the 20th century. Up to the 1785-‘87 census, the Carangas 
population nearly doubled, reaching up to 15414 inhabitants (Rivière 1982, 90). In the 
following decades, demographic growth lost strength and constancy. After a significant 
increase up to 1796 (15563 inhabitants), the population declined again until 1804 (14650 
inhabitants) due to wide-spread and serious droughts around the turn of the century. 
Subsequently, population numbers started rising again, yet the wars of independence 
seriously thwarted that evolution.  
At the eve of Bolivian independence, Carangas had experienced a major demographic 
increase, counting with 14927 inhabitants in 1838 (Rivière 1982, 90). Growth continued 
over the first half of the 19th century, reaching a population number of 15571 in 1847 
and 17252 in 1852.8 In the 1850s, however, several epidemics such as typhoid, typhus 
 
                                                     
6 This is a rather rough calculation in view of the lack of information for the period of Spanish conquest (1532-
1575). To overcome this difficulty, Rivière bases his estimation on a combination of data provided by a 
counting executed in 1574, after about 40 years of Spanish presence, and data for the ecologically similar 
Chucuito region in the Titicaca area, where the population declined with 25% between 1530 and 1567 (Wachtel 
1971, chapter 2; Rivière 1982, 63).  Overall, the Central Andes contained an estimated 2026108 to 2933670 
inhabitants, according to Shea’s projections for 1520, on the presumption that population decline during 
conquest was not that much larger than during the first recorded period at the turn of the 17th century 
(Denevan 1976, 153). 
7 In early colonial administrative terms, this corresponds to Carangas and the neighbouring Paria province in 
relation to the 10 central and southern provinces of Upper Peru. 
8 These numbers are based on the Revisita documents analysed by Rivière (Rivière 1982, 102-3) and consulted 
in the municipal archive of Oruro. ABMO, no. 426, Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas, 
1852. 
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and yellow fever, in addition to the effects of (labour) migration towards the Peruvian 
valleys put a strain on that growth (Rivière 1982, 99-101).9 Yet, over the following years, 
the population reached its peak, augmenting from 17343 (1860) over 18339 (1864) to 
19474 inhabitants in 1867.10 Nevertheless, the pest epidemics and famine of the next 
decade undercut this increase, with numbers falling to 18762 (1871) and 18537 
inhabitants (1877).11 After 1877, no complete land inspection was executed in Carangas 
and new demographical data were only collected in 1900 when Bolivia’s first national 
census was executed. The 18811 registered inhabitants (Bolivia 1902, vol. I) suggest a 
stagnation, although partly stems from underreporting and other manipulations in the 
census operation (Pauwels 1983, 230).  
Throughout the 20th century, the population of Carangas knew an enormous increase, 
with a rise of  45% over the course of the first half of that century. In 1910, no less than 
27202 inhabitants were counted (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 366), which is a much 
higher number than the 1900 census and the 21820 people estimated in 1920 (Lima 1921, 
5). Yet, because of the rigorousness of Bacarreza’s report, his deviating number may be 
closer to reality; the dips in the curve (see annex) are probably on account of the errata 
of prior and posterior surveyors.  By 1950, when the next national census was executed, 
41534 inhabitants were counted in Carangas (Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos 
1951; Rivière 1982, 108).  
While the registered increase is in line with the overall growth in Bolivia for the past 
fifty years, in the following decades Carangas demographic evolution started to diverge 
from the larger picture. Here, migration and urbanization come in the picture.12 The 
changes brought (or indirectly fomented) by the National Revolution of 1952 triggered a 
country-wide massive rural exodus, demonstrating a general shift towards the lowland 
area.13 While population numbers at the departmental and national level got an 
unprecedented boost, Carangas saw its population falling with 13% (Rivière 1982, 108). 
 
                                                     
9 Epidemics in Carangas were reported for 1849-52 and 1855. Grieshaber 1980, 268-9 and ABMO, no. 426, Libro 
de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas, 1852. 
10 ANB, Rv, no. 225, 226 and 227. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1860, 1864 and 1867.  
11 ANB, Rv, no. 228 and 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, front page, and 
1877, front page. 
12 Urbanization got its first boost with the arrival of the Spanish, first in 1545 with the foundation of Paria by 
Diego De Almagro, to the east of Carangas (Rivière 1982, 15), followed by the founding of Oruro in 1606. Yet, it 
is only in the 1950s that urbanization really broke through on the altiplano. Migration –as will be discussed 
with more detail in chapter 4.1.3.- was also nothing new to Andean rural life, but no change had been able to 
unlock the countryside as the infrastructural improvements of the second half of the 20th century did. 
13 This demographic shift towards lower areas has been observed for the entire Latin American continent. It 
had started in the late 19th century, producing a decline in highland population from 61% in 1870 to 44% in 
1930 (Bértola and Williamson 2006, 28). After 1950, this trend would only intensify. 
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According to the census of 1976, Carangas, which by then had fragmented into multiple 
–still entirely rural- provinces, comprised 47512 inhabitants (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas 1977). At the regional level, this census represents a turning point, as for the 
first time, more people within the department of Oruro to which the Carangas region 
belongs lived in an urban area (see table).  
Table 1 The Rural-Urban divide in Bolivia and in the department of Oruro, 1950-2000. 
  
Carangas is at the weaker pole of an out-migrating dynamic. This disequilibrium 
would further intensify in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, which must be related to 
the backlash of the severe droughts and the general crisis that hit Bolivia in the 1980s. 
This extraordinary situation that undercut all prospects for a future life on the 
countryside probably explains the kink in the rural-urban relation around 1992, after 
which rural-urban migration pressures again lowered (yet not disappeared). While the 
1992 census counted only 35194 people in the administrative units previously 
corresponding to the Carangas province,14 by 2001 this number had increased up to 
49267, product of a growth rate of 4,18% for the 1992-2001 period (INE 2001; INE Oruro 
2002). These people made up the bunch of the department’s rural population, which by 
then only represented 37,6% and found themselves ever more lonely in an almost 
deserted countryside.15 Projections for 2011, suggesting a population of 70627 
inhabitants in Carangas (INE 2001; INE Oruro 2002, 4), seriously underestimated this 
process. The recent 2012 census points to a demographic stagnation on the countryside 
 
                                                     
14 Division Política Administrativa de la Repúbica del Bolivia 1995, cited in COAJK 2001, 13. 
15 At the departmental level, population density is 9 inhabitants per square kilometer, but within the 
surroundings of the departmental capital that number reaches almost 50 and only 3,9 in the rural zones (INE 
2013; Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011, 35). 
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with a growth of only +0,5% over the last decade (2001-2012), while urban centres 
continued strongly growing at a rate of +2,5%.16 
Although Carangas never counted with more inhabitants than today, the toll of over 
half a century of strong rural-urban migration leaves the ever fewer people choosing to 
continue their lives in Carangas with an uncertain future. This was not very different 
over hundred years ago. A clarifying comment was left 1867, when it was stated that 
“the immediacy of the Peruvian Coasts stimulates the emigration of the 
Carangueña youth with the daily wages they pay very well there, and (...) alcohol 
which is brought in large quantities from the mentioned Coasts causes the death 
of an infinity of taxpayers through religious or domestic consumption of excessive 
liquor, leaving infinite widows and orphans numbers in the registers. These two 
notorious causes produce the effect that in Carangas the population does not 
augment in a discernible way.”17 
With the importance of out-migration in mind, the stability in the population’s 
gender balance is quite remarkable. The proportion between male and female dwellers 
hardly altered over the last 150 years, with a minor “peak” at the time of the above 
citation. While early colonial sources seem to point to gender imbalances at the village 
level, this did not necessarily imply a real absence of men, but rather their integration 
into new social categories that were not registered in (fiscally motivated) census 
operations or the employment of disappearance strategies to escape labour and tribute 
obligations (with large role to be ascribed to their wives or mothers) (Saignes 1995). By 
the same token, when gender groups are balanced, this neither implies a static society 
but rather an underlying divestment process of labour surpluses through migration of 
sons and young couples. For those years that could be documented, this appears to have 
been the case. Since Bolivian independence, the gender balance in Carangas 
demonstrates a remarkable stability, fluctuating between 47,9% to 53,6% male presence 
(see table). Migration and mortality appear as important factors, with women 
outnumbering men in times of high labour out-migration, as during the 1860s or the 
late 20th century, and reverse proportions in the late 1870s, when epidemics may have 
particularly hit the female population. Today, the equilibrium seems to remain more or 
less in place with a slight male preponderance, particularly among -22 age groups (INE 
Oruro 2002, 11-2). The effect of migration on population structures is particularly 
 
                                                     
16 According to the latest census, 67,3% of Bolivia’s inhabitants lives in urban areas, an increase of 4,9% 
compared to 2001 produced by a growth rate over five times higher than on the countryside, leaving a rural 
population of only 32,7%. Montero, 06.01.2014; La Razón, 11.01.2014. 
17 Own translation. ANB, Rv, no. 227, “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1867, f. 197.  
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notable in terms of generational shifts, with more than 50% of the Oruro department’s 
rural share being younger than 22 (INE Oruro 2002, 11-2). 
Table 2 Gender balance in Carangas since Bolivian independence (irregular snapshots).18 
 
Although urbanization and migration have dramatically altered the picture of the 
countryside, Carangas still counts as a “100%” rural and almost entirely indigenous 
region. Not any of its districts is or can be classified as urban and there are hardly 
people who do not manage one of the region’s native languages.19 Yet “rural” and 
“indigenous” imply strong connections to urban worlds and a fundamentally pluri-
cultural environment. While Aymara pastoralists and agriculturists coexist with Uru or 
“Chullpa” groups of hunters, fishers and gatherers within Carangas, most rural migrants 
maintain strong ties to their home community as residentes. Apart from the 
municipalities of Chipaya and Carangas, still 91,6% of the inhabitants of the other 
 
                                                     
18 19th century fiscal surveys might overestimate male presence as assumed categories such as “taxpayers” 
(contribuyentes) often, particularly in times of crises, were taken up by women. For the 20th century, no detailed 
data for Carangas are available, but overall numbers for the Oruro department’s rural population in 1976 and 
1992 point to a female majority. Sources: ABMO, no. 426, Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de 
Carangas, 1852; ANB, Rv., no. 225-229. INE Oruro 2002, 3-4. 
19 Today, over 70% of the population of the departmental rural area is multilingual, speaking Spanish in 
combination with a native language; 13,7% is monolingual without speaking Spanish, while only 12,1% only 
speaks Spanish (INE Oruro 2002, 30). 
0,0%
50,0%
100,0%
1852 1860 1864 1867 1871 1877 1900 1992 2001
% male % female
 134 
municipalities auto-identified themselves as Aymara anno 2001.20 While the Aymara 
have quite successfully maintained their culture and are currently even reinforcing 
their position within Bolivia’s pluri-national state, the story of the Uru is absolutely 
dramatic. In the 16th century, these “men of the water” still represented one quarter of 
the Andean highland population (22% in Carangas in 1574), but today they are reduced 
to approximately 2000 people divided into 4 or 5 isolated groups. Due to strong 
historical processes of aymarization and marginalization, the small village of Chipaya, 
where bad detrimental living conditions remain unparalleled in the wider region, is all 
what remains in Carangas of its original inhabitants.21  
 
Figure 13 Typical Uru dwelling in the village of Chipaya, 1920s.22  
While today we dispose of quite specific tools and detailed data to gain insight in the 
living conditions in Carangas, lacking data make a reconstruction of demographic 
indicators a much harder task for the period of our interest.23 At the turn of the 20th 
 
                                                     
20 While the Chipaya are Uru, a curious case is the municipality of Carangas where the majority identifies her-
/himself with not any ethnic identity. According to Gilberto Pauwels this former mining district still seeks to 
be considered as Spanish. SEDES 2007, 16 and personal communication with Gilberto Pauwels. 
21 Wachtel 1978, 1154; 2001, 15-6. See also de la Barra et al 2012; Pauwels 1999.  
22 Photographed in the early 20th century by Arthur Posnansky, a pioneering researcher of what he called the 
“until that time completely unknown tribe of the ‘Chipaya’” (Posnansky 1924, 88; digitalization by the ANB). 
23 While the living conditions for one third of all households in the department can be classified as good and 
for half of the houses as regular, 35% of the households within the Carangas region is burdened with bad living 
conditions (SEDES 2005, 18-9). A quick scan of the region’s demographic indicators today reveals that life is 
relatively short, vulnerable and likely to finish in an urban setting, either in nearby or further away 
departmental capitals or across national and continental borders (SEDES 2005; INE Oruro 2002). At the 
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century, the province’s sparse population was distributed over the territory into over 
5000 households made up by nuclear families of on average 5 members (Bacarreza 1910 
in Pauwels 2006, 366; Mayer 2002).24 Through native forms of communal organization, 
these units link up to small hamlets and provincial towns dispersed over the territory 
and ordered into municipalities.25 Most of these households lived in extremely harsh 
living conditions, reflected in the long lists of misery-related adjectives adopted by 
contemporaries to introduce the region.26 A hint at these “miserable” or “sad” social 
circumstances is given in a monograph on Carangas written in 1921 where the author 
emphasizes child mortality as one of the region’s major problems apart from its 
disconnectedness (Lima 1921, 197).27 From the 1920s on, preoccupation over the effects 
of alcoholism, epidemics and lacking public infrastructure incited a more systematic 
collection of data on birth rates, mortality and health and the establishment of a 
sanitary commission in Carangas, although the planned statistical and medical actions 
only reached a particle of the Carangas population (Arce 1923, 36-8 and 1924, 22-4; 
Calderón 1927, 41; Fajardo 1931, 20).28  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
departmental level, the birth rate for 2012 is estimated at 22,74/1000, the total fertility rate at 2,94 children 
per mother and the death rate at 8,98/1000. Once born and “survived” the high infant mortality rate (46,01 per 
1000 live births), a child born in 2012 within the Oruro department is not likely to reach an age over 64 
(projections on basis of INE 2001). In 2001, only 21% of the households was connected to the electricity 
network and hardly 32% had access to drinking water while the majority still relies on wells, waterwheels, 
rivers or ditches (SEDES 2005, 21 and 23). In every sector of the region, over 70% of the households does not 
dispose of basic sanitary infrastructure (bath room, toilet or latrine), in several places even reaching over 99%. 
See INE 2001 (http://www.ine.gob.bo). 
24 The number of households can be deduced from taxpayers’ lists in which each taxpayer represents a head of 
household (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 375). Anno 2001, Carangas counted 24119 households units, each 
comprising only 3 members on average (INE 2001). 
25 A more detailed description of this administrative division is given in 3.1.2. 
26 The province was generally introduced in ways similar to the description given by the Prefect of Oruro his 
annual report of 1898  to the Ministry of Internal Affairs: “Carangas, is a vast territory inhabited in its totality by the 
indigenous race which is still conserved there in a semi-savage state and in some districts even in complete savageness” 
(Aramayu 1898, 3). 
27 Although based on rumours, the practices he mentions of indigenous parents asphyxiating their own 
children remind of the desperate early-colonial practices of “vital reluctance” in which indigenous mothers 
consciously assassinated their own children to spare them from all the misery to come (Pérez Murillo 2003, 
208-10). Child mortality was indeed a persistent problem, it was the indigenous population group that most 
strongly declined in the course of the 19th century as they were more vulnerable to epidemics, but also to 
under-enumeration (Grieshaber 1980, 266-7).  
28 After a gradually increasing pressure for means to combat epidemics such as in the countryside (Ascarrunz 
1918, 25 and 1918-1919, 15; Tejada 1921, 21-2), a commission was assigned to Carangas. In 1931, the Prefect of 
Oruro reported a severe typhoid fever and pertussis epidemic in Carangas (Fajardo 1931, 42). In addition, flue, 
tuberculosis, mumps and varicella were indicated as the most common diseases, but also dysentery, measles, 
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Important long-term factors in the erosion of sustainable livelihood construction are 
ecological vulnerability and infrastructural disconnectedness. Indeed, “[t]he Province of 
Carangas quite broad in its extension is very deserted because of lacking cultivation terrains, as in 
its majority it is formed by rugged mountains and immense sand flats.”29 Natural disasters in 
the form of frost and hailstorms and sporadic droughts, hail and floods constitute an 
important threat for agrarian-based households which are already subject to water 
scarcity and the effects of soil erosion, degradation and desertification.30 As will be 
clarified further on, the key underlying process to this vulnerability, yet only visible 
from a long-term perspective, is the communities’ loss of their direct access to 
ecologically complementary regions. Infrastructure in itself figures among the local 
population’s strongest demands today, although “[t]he lack of roads (...) only represented 
isolation in the Andes in the second half of the twentieth century, when transportation in Bolivia 
shifted from mules to motorized transport” (Canessa 2012, 11).  
At the other hand, the factors of ecology and infrastructure provided the local 
population with certain comparative advantages in that the lack of interest by outsiders 
in these rather unfertile terrains and the region’s inaccessibility to “modern” transport 
abated population pressures and competition over resources. While this resulted in 
limited commercial potential of local agrarian production, it enabled the communities 
to secure a relatively strong autonomous control over land and (caravan) exchange 
routes. This was key to the upholding a minimal level of household livelihood 
sustainability31 and the reproduction of ethnic boundaries. Yet, these livelihoods and 
boundaries were not free from changes as the region experienced increasing state-
driven and market-oriented pressures to “people” this strategic borderland (today 
mostly famous for the illegal exportation of drugs and importation of unregistered cars, 
autos chutos) and bring the resources of this “empty” land in circulation.32 Despite these 
aspirations, the first impression of Carangas is still one of “[h]undreds of kilometres (...) 
travelled, without finding traces of a living soul.”33 One of the most intriguing processes of 
change is rather internal, one of reconfiguring ethnic boundaries. As the remaining 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
fevers, typhus, encephalitis, meningitis and diphtheria were frequent causes of (child) mortality (Fajardo 1931, 
18-21). 
29 Own translation. ANB, Rv, no. 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877, front 
page. 
30 These are currently intensifying in the context of climate change (Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de 
Oruro 2011, 102-3). 
31 As Klein states, “the more secure the land claims and the larger the land resources, the larger were the family sizes, the 
fewer the number of widows, and the more balanced the sexual division of the population” (Klein 1993, 165). 
32 La Patria, 6.9.2011. 
33 Own translation. Fajardo 1931, 41. 
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chapters of this dissertation will explore, this is related to the delineation and alteration 
of social categories in which the labour and fiscal relations among dwellers and 
newcomers of the region were structured. 
3.1.2  (Re/de)territorialisation and community (re)creation.  
Although the way in which territory is being “produced” (Lefebvre 1974), “inhabited” 
(Paul-Lévy y Segaud 1983) and “practised” (De Certeau 1984) in Carangas seems to have 
remained quite stable over time, this administrative “ordering” of the population has 
undergone considerable pressures. The consequent re-ordering of space and power is 
marked, as will be discussed with more detail throughout the following, by the co-
existence of two different, increasingly coordinating logics of territorial control. An 
“Andean” logic, based on territorial discontinuity and inter-ecological 
complementarity, can be distinguished from a “European” one, based on fixed borders 
and homogeneous territories. Through the Andean-European encounter and 
consequent spatial reorganizations and collective negotiations, both systems of 
territorial organization have come to intersect and accommodate, resulting in a 
fluctuating balance of power that clearly tips over to the “European” side. At a supra-
local level, the collision of both logics has generated a long-term “amputation” process 
that has gradually reduced Carangas’ circumscription to what is now the western half of 
the Oruro department in Bolivia. Internally, centuries-long subordination to state-
imposed functionaries did not simply replace communal structures but led to a complex 
intertwinement of both ordering logics.  
While autochthonous territorial units and their corresponding authorities have 
remained in place as the most local building blocks of the rural landscape, this does not 
correspond to a direct import from an immanent pre-Hispanic past, but stems from a 
continuous reinvention of that past and coordination with state-imposed subdivisions. 
As a result, the community has come to function as an important unit of state/national 
integration and citizenship, rather than (exclusively) as its adversary. Although the 
indigenous communities we encounter today on the rather desolate high plain generally 
serve to evoke “typical” Andean images detached from any colonial or post-colonial 
intrusion, the physical and political delineation of these entities has no pre-Hispanic 
origins (Mayer 2002, 35). On the contrary, Andean community organization is a creation 
of early colonial administrative reform, after which it remained remarkably stable. As 
Lehmann summarizes, the Andean “community” (la comunidad) connotes  
“not a place nor is it necessarily a group of people living in close proximity, let 
alone solidarity. It is an institution of land tenure which regulates access of 
individuals to land. It is also a creation of the state, recreated over centuries by 
the Inca, the Spanish, and the modernizing governments” (Lehmann 1983, 22).  
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The “community” refers to a multi-layered framework for group formation, task 
distribution and territorial control. The organizational axis behind this framework is 
land, attributing communal leaders of each level with the vital tasks of usufruct rights 
distribution and the collection of usufruct contributions among all members. At the 
most local level, nuclear households cluster around one or more patronymics in a 
shared site of residence, referred to by the Spanish term of estancias, also known as 
comunidad or ranch (as in Shanin’s “farm”). Varying according to ecological conditions, 
one estancia may comprise tens up to hundreds of persons, ranging from fifteen up to 
about hundred houses (Rivière 1982, 238). Acting as both a social space and a material 
space, estancias represent the lowest level of community integration. Internal cohesion 
is created and reproduced respectively through shared mythical ancestry, shared access 
to land and the rotating responsibility to organize the corresponding ceremonies (as 
pasantes).34  
 
Figure 14 The caciques of Totora Marka with their authority attributes, the poncho and the 
ceremonial staff, 1920s.35  
At their turn, estancias group together in ayllus, which embody a more 
institutionalized degree of group formation. The ayllu corresponds to what most people 
 
                                                     
34 Goodale and Sky 2000, 9; Rivière 1982, 54 and 232-42; Guillet 1978 cited in Mayer 2002, 40; Custred 1980, 43-8. 
35 Early 20th century photograph by Posnansky, who was not averse of racial theories such as the 
“anthropological orientation according to the convention of Frankfort” (Posnansky 1924, 101; digitalization by ANB). 
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understand as the Andean comunidad or community, although these remain very 
superficial translations of this complex quechua-aymara term. Decision-making, 
ceremonial-political representation but also the organization of productive processes in 
the ayllu are community responsibilities that are distributed among its members via the 
appointment of a group of people to formulate and enforce rules, the summoning of 
general assemblies and the organization of public tasks (Mayer 2002, 40). Leadership at 
the ayllu level is a rotating office with the annual election of a couple, the jilaqata or 
awatiri (man) and the mama t’alla (wife). Their responsibilities include land 
administration, customary jurisdiction, political representation and tax collection.  
At a higher level, ayllus interconnect via what can be most easily imagined as the 
village level or the “urban” space of the community, the marka.36 This nexus for 
ceremonial and administrative life among several ayllus is headed by the mallku de marka 
and the mallku de consejo (although the denomination of these terms may vary), 
respectively the  marka’s internal (towards the ayllus) and external (towards state 
institutions) representatives. In colonial and republican times, until the National 
Revolution of 1952, these representatives were called “Cacique” and “Cacique 
Segundo.”37 At the regional level, indigenous territorial and political control is being 
reclaimed (since 1987) by the Western Council of Ayllus Jach’a Karangas, echoing the long 
term memory of mayor political units of the “suyu” (the ethnic federation or nation) 
and represented by two apu mallkus. The double function of the mallku and apu mallku 
corresponds to the hierarchic division of marka and suyu spaces into an upper and 
lower parcialidad (faction) or mitad (half), respectively referred to as (h)aransaya and 
urinsaya (with changing denominations).38  
Apart from its practical administrative or economic function, the community also 
gives shape to a ceremonial and mythical space. Through rituals, legends and 
celebrations for the local divinities and the patron saint of each community, this space 
is symbolically reproduced. All these ceremonial and regulatory duties are incorporated 
in the range of community tasks through what is known as the fiesta-cargo system. This 
is a cumulative system in which fiesta stands for the important moments of the 
ceremonial cycle (any festivity and public celebrations of a patron saint in particular) 
and cargo for an annual office and implied financial burdens (ranging from the 
organization and sponsoring a local deity’s or patron saint’s celebration to taking up the 
internal and external political representation of the community). Each member is 
 
                                                     
36 The marka corresponds to the territory of all its component ayllus, with its symbolic centre located in the 
village of this larger community. Each ayllu occupied its own space in the urban centre of the community, at 
least until the urban reform of 1954 (Ayllu Sartañäni 1992, 55-6). 
37 After 1952, the “Cacique Segundo” was renamed “alcalde mayor” (Ayllu Sartañäni 1992, 72).  
38 Rivière 1982, 189 and 219-22; see also Bouysse-Cassagne 1978; Medinaceli 2009, 349-51.  
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initiated into this cycle, initiated as youngster with small tasks such as postillón (post-
boy) or the mayordomo, in charge of Church service, and his assistant, the alférez, 
assigned with the organization of a religious festivity at the ayllu level (Ayllu Sartañäni 
1992, 68). Other (higher) responsibilities (up to the apu mallku) in this cycle required 
members to be married; the other way round, all married all couples (i.e. “fully 
established” households) are supposed to, step-by-step, traverse a “road” or thaqui in 
which they take up ever more important and costlier responsibilities.  
Figure 15 Hierarchy of indigenous authorities in Carangas. 
 
 
The fiesta-cargo principle demonstrates that the community is a stratified space that 
does not automatically neutralize socio-economic differences nor is it free from 
external interference. Internally, it functioned essentially and simultaneously as a 
mechanism of control, social mobility and impoverishment. For instance, while the 
organization of yearly festivities offers the opportunity to expand and fortify intra-
community networks, it also prevents people “in charge” of continuing their agro-
pastoral or commercial activities. In order, full integration in the community implied an 
investment of time and capital, in turn for an increased prestige (and hence higher and 
costlier cargo). This explains why elites are not antagonistic to community coherence, 
“on the contrary, they benefit directly from it” (Mayer 2002, 39), reflected in mutual power 
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and credit among rich and poor, full, half and non-community members. While 
consolidating the bonds of individual members to their community, many of these tasks 
corresponded to deliberate creations of the colonial and republican state apparatus as 
an essential means to unite the sparse population of a remote area. In effect, these 
“ambiguous” offices enabled local church and state officials to control the indigenous 
population (Rivière 1982, chapter 8). The following gives a brief overview of how 
dynamics of elite, state and Church intervention have shaped a long trajectory of 
community creation, transformation and reinvention in Carangas (which will be 
scrutinized regarding the long 19th century in the remaining chapters).  
When the first Spaniards set foot on the altiplano, the population of Carangas lived 
distributed over 147 dispersed hamlets, each counting with 140 to 252 inhabitants 
(Rivière 1982, 57). Today referred to as estancias, these “small communities” were the 
site of residence of extensive families, usually located close to the most fertile lands of 
the area. Under Inca control (1450-1530), these nuclei were grouped into basic units of 
land tenure, the ayllu, each corresponding to a local endogamous kin group and headed 
by a mediating ethnic leader, the kuraka.39 Integrated in “larger communities” headed 
by caciques,40 they were organized within four sub-zones, Colquemarka-Samancha, 
Choquecota-Sabaya, Totora and Andamarka-Orinoca which formed together the suyu or 
“nation” of the Carangas (Qaranqas, Karankas) (Pauwels 1983, 77).41 According to the 
thesis of Gilles Rivière and of Gilberto Pauwels, also formulated by Durston and Hidalgo, 
and supported by local oral history evidence, the political and territorial centre of this 
suyu was located in the settlement of Jatun Carangas (Hatuncaranga), close to the 
current village of Guallatire in Chile until the eruption of the Guallatire volcano in the 
late 16th century.42  
 
                                                     
39 See also Collier, Rosaldi and Wirth 1982; Andrien 2001. 
40 The Spanish adopted the Caribbean name of caciques to refer to the local community authorities.  
41 Together with eleven other “señoríos”, Carangas formed the Collasuyu, which can be seen as the Aymara 
(although not homogeneously) branch of the Inca empire. The origins of the Carangas people, probably 
arriving from the north, and boundaries of their territory remain a matter of debate (Medinaceli 2009, 344-5). 
While Gilberto Pauwels posits that this Aymara federation was an Inca creation, resulting from the typical 
forced-migration (mitimae) strategy of the Incas to discipline rebellious groups, Rivière suggests they arrived 
earlier (Pauwels 1983, 70-1, 2006, 343-4 and personal communication; Rivière 1982, 15-6; Michel 2000; 
Medinaceli 2010, 95). In any case, sub-provincial structures definitely stem from a local logic that precedes 
Inca incorporation.  
42 Hatun means “Great” in quechua and today reappears in its Aymara version, Jach’a, in the name of the 
Indigenous Council of Carangas (COAJK). This centre probably integrated as a third parcialidad. Rivière 1982, 
21-2; Pauwels 1983, 82-92; Durston and Hidalgo 1997 cited in Ruz, Díaz and Fuentes 2011, 24-5; Medinaceli 2009, 
349; Lima 2012. 
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Figure 16 Inter-ecological mobility and exchange patterns of the Qaranqa people.43  
It is clear is that the pre-Hispanic delineation of Carangas reached further than the 
boundaries of its altiplano communities, although there is still little knowledge and 
hence much debate on the exact boundaries of that territory (Rivière 1982, 19-24; 
Pauwels 1983, 91; Hidalgo and Durston 2004, 471-534; Ruz, Díaz and Fuentes 2011, 24-25). 
Carangas circumscribed a discontinuous but interconnected, east-to-west structured 
territory that was directly controlled through political ties and by sending out colonists 
to occupy and cultivate the distant terrains and indirectly through llama caravans to 
barter agrarian products which the altiplano cannot give. Under Inca dominion, this 
discontinuity was reinforced by allocating complementary cultivation lands to highland 
communities.44 The lands off the altiplano stretched over different ecological niches in 
actual Bolivian, Chilean and Peruvian territories.45 There is a division observable 
 
                                                     
43 Source: Lima Tórrez 2012, 53, based on Harris 1987. 
44 Examples are the corn producing lands of Illaurco, Chulla, Colchacollo and Anocaraire in the valleys of 
Cochabamba, which had been obtained through the land reform of Inca Huayna Capac (Wachtel 1981, 49-52 
cited in Medinaceli 2006, 512; ibid, 360-6 and 470; Larson 1998, 39). Also the lands in Arequipa had originally 
been assigned by the Inca (Pauwels 1983, 116).  
45 Clockwise, these territories were situated in Quime (today in the Inquisivi province of the La Paz 
department) to the north-east, in valley communities such as Quillacollo or Cliza (located in the actual 
Cochabamba department) to the east, in valley communities such as Liquinas (currently in the Chuquisaca 
department) to the southeast, and to the west in the canyons of Chiapa and Camiña in the Tarapacá region, 
the Azapa and Lluta valleys in Arica and even in the Arequipa region in actual Peru. Both Pauwels (1983) and 
Rivière (1982, 21-2) discovered in Sevilla that the Caranga also had lands at the coast where they cultivated 
coca and corn. The Cochabamba and Arequipa territories had been allocated to the Carangas by the Inca 
(Bouysse-Cassagne 1978 cited by Pauwels 1983, 72-3). The Chuquisaca, La Paz and current Chilean areas were 
 
  143 
between the western communities of Carangas controlling the lands towards the Pacific 
(internally differentiated between the northern communities accessing lands in the 
actual Arica region, while southern communities such as Sabaya had land in the 
Tarapacá region of actual Chile) and the eastern communities maintaining control over 
lands in the eastern valleys.46  
After the first chaotic period of conquest, the indigenous population was brought 
indirectly under control of the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru, established in 1542, through 
the encomienda system. Different from a landholding, encomiendas corresponded to a 
specific division of indigenous people over which a conquistador, as reward for 
delivered services, was granted right to collect and receive a portion of their taxes and 
labour in turn for their protection and evangelization (Andrien 2001, 44).47 In order to 
enhance its direct control, the Spanish Crown sought to replace the communities’ ties to 
the encomenderos by integrating Carangas as a corregimiento (provincial unit), headed by 
a tax collecting corregidores de indios, under the Audiencia de Charcas (Barnadas 1973, 426-7 
and 514-5).48 Under the Bourbon reforms, Charcas was replaced to the in 1776 newly 
erected viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. 
It is however in the aftermath of the resettlement program introduced under viceroy 
Toledo, from the 1570 on, that the pre-conquest community organization underwent its 
most thorough transformation.49 Hamlets were concentrated into Spanish-style villages, 
called reducciones de Indios, under local control of the traditional chiefs, the caciques.50 
While the Spanish reused pre-existing power centres to affirm their importance, this 
reorganization replaced “traditional” societal bonds and implied a demarcation of 
boundary markers (mojones) between the villages and ayllus. This triggered a whole 
series of inter-community litigations over land, which sometimes led to definite 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
also mentioned in several interviews with locals from the current Carangas communities as well as in 
registered documents of the COAJK (2001). 
46 However, this was not a strict division, with for instance Turco controlling lands to the east. Often, this was 
based on co-ownership with other groups, such as the lands controlled in Cochabamba shared with the 
Quillacas, Asanaques and Aullagas. Pauwels 1983, 92; Medinaceli 2006, 362-5; 2010, 98-9.  
47 In 1538, the Caranga were assigned by viceroy Toledo to G. de Luna and F. de Isasaga, in 1540 joined  by F. de 
Retamoso and in 1548 again distributed under several encomenderos (Pauwels 1983, 112; Medinaceli 2009, 353-
7).  
48 The Audiencia de Charcas was the jurisdictional circumscription of “Upper Peru,” roughly corresponding to 
actual Bolivia, established in 1563 (Andrien 2001, 48).  
49 See Rivière 1982, 149; Gade 1991; Klein 2011, 40-42. 
50 Probably, the Spanish-appointed authorities were recruited from the kuraka lineages, which is indicated by 
the ‘patronymic’ Willka which was generally used until the beginning of the 18th century to indicate the 
cacique, as is also evidenced by the oral tradition on Pedro Martin Kapurata Condor Villca, lord of Sabaya, and 
other Condor Willka’s in the region (Rivière 1982, 51). 
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annexations by larger neighbouring regions of Tarapacá, Pacajes, Paria (Rivière 1982, 
65). These reducciones were integrated into broader administrative units, the 
repartimientos, which at their turn formed provincial units, the corregimientos. While 
unavoidably distorting community life, the reducciones policy were in fact intended to 
guarantee the survival of the community, for the sake of an optimal evangelization and 
labour and tax extraction, however allocating community life to a racially segregated 
sphere.51 
In the “Provincia de Carangas,” people were “reduced” into eight “principal” rural 
towns, Corque, Choquecota, Huayllamarka, Totora, Curahuara, Turco, Huachacalla and 
Andamarka, controlling each over 1000 and up to 7000 inhabitants, and two secondary 
villages, Sabaya and Orinoca (Rivière 1982, 58-9; Pauwels 1983, 122-4 and 162). Moreover, 
this constellation was integrated within an economic extractivist superstructure, with 
the establishment of the Royal Treasury (Caja Real) in 1652 in the mining district of 
Espíritu Santo de Carangas.52 Overall, the reducciones policy was one of the most un-
settling steps as it was a formative step in the creation of the indigenous communities 
that we know today (Mumford 2012). It caused a gradual shift in ayllu formation 
towards a “territorialized” configuration and a redefinition of its fiscal ties to central 
state powers, which are both essential factors in explaining why and how Carangas’ 
village order and internal ayllu subdivision has largely been preserved until today.53  
At the supra-regional level, early-colonial restructurings cut off altiplano 
communities from their ecologically different and non-contiguous territories, 
condemning them to an inconclusive “search of lost space” (Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne and 
Harris 2006, 487-540). By containing these communities within the political-
administrative boundaries of a coherent province, the population’s inter-ecological 
 
                                                     
51 Based on the thesis of the dos repúblicas, Indians were kept in the rural villages and the “outsiders”, which 
remained limited in number due to restricted trans-continental migration, in urban areas although there was 
a “merging of pre-Colombian village self-government with the Spanish-imposed city council [, which] nevertheless helped 
the Indians survive in the countryside” (Hoberman 1996, 247). 
52 The establishment of the Caja Real was motivated by Carangas’ strategic location on the royal road (el camino 
real) to Arica and its nearness to that important port (the mining site is located in the actual province of 
Mejillones, on the border with Chile). The objective of this office was to prevent extracted minerals from being 
exported via Arica without paying the due taxes, but contraband was nonetheless a constant problem. In the 
late 18th century, in the wake of the Bourbon reforms, fraud, bankruptcy and decline caused its closure and the 
loss over the mineral production in Tarapacá with the liberty of silver production registration in 1767 and the 
opening of a Royal Treasury in Arica. See Gavira 1999, 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
53 According to Rivière, what changed was not so much a physical restructuring but rather a reorientation of 
the interrelation between administrative centres and estancias towards the exploitation of the latter in 
function of the former which afterwards remained remarkably stable (Rivière 1982, 59). See also Gade and 
Escobar 1982; Gade 1991; Ayllu Sartañani 1992 and 1994; Choque Capuma 2004; Assies 2006, footnote 8. This 
fiscal dimension  receives ampler treatment in chapter 4.  
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mobility and its direct control over complementary territories was seriously restricted 
and forced people into the market sphere to obtain the food they needed.54 This was a 
slow divorce, initiated by the purchase of land titles.55 While direct control was lost, first 
over lands in Arica, and subsequently in Arequipa,56 various valley people probably 
maintained fiscal and political ties to the altiplano communities.57 Subsequently, at the 
start of the 18th century, litigation processes between the governors of Carangas and 
Arica over their mutual western border would complete the rupture of vertical control 
between the western valleys and the puna (Rivière 1982, 25).58 Some communities even 
maintained effective land rights over private estates in the eastern valleys, but those 
 
                                                     
54 Medinaceli states that the strain on (pre-colonial) mobility, reflected in the spatial dispersal and fluidity of 
organization patterns, was already imposed under the Incas with measures seeking to discipline the Urus and 
Caranga population (Medinaceli 2006, 232). 
55 The composición policy will be assessed in chapter 4. 
56 Due to their distance from the altiplano metropolis, corn producing lands and mitimaes (dispatched 
commoners who worked distant cultivation lands) belonging to Carangas on the coast (Arica region) were 
most easily repartitioned among encomenderos of Arequipa by the Spanish. AR, Cochabamba, 1540, 353v. and 
Bouysse-Cassagne 1978, 1068, cited in Rivière 1982, 20; Pauwels 1983, 91 and 116-7; COAJK 2001.  
57 Control over most of the lands in Cochabamba was confirmed through auction purchase from the colonial 
authorities (Medinaceli 2006, 362-5, 470 and 512). 
58 The limits settled with the repartimiento of Lluta in 1578 foreshadowed the actual western (international) 
border of Carangas with the Arica y Parinacota region in Northern Chile (Durston e Hidalgo 1997, cited in Ruz, 
Díaz and Fuentes 2011, 25). In his work on the corregimiento of Arica, Vicente Dagnino refers to a document of 
1578, starting with the most southern border stone in the summit of the Coipasa mountain, where four 
corregimientos connected (Arica, Lípez, Paria and Carangas), followed by a long string of (completely 
erroneously ordered) border places including the swamps of Pisiga, Tres Cruces (which has a border stone on 
each side of the border), the Capurata mountain, Caraguano, Parajalla, the Capitán mountain, the lake of 
Surire, Chilcaya, the Quimsachata mountain, until the Sajama mountain, where Carangas encounters the 
Pacajes corregimiento, in addition to a series of other place names that seem to have disappeared from the 
map by now (Dagnino 1909, 26). Several documents on the Arica border were reproduced in the early 18th 
century in the context of an accusation of the governor of Arica for having invaded lands in Pachica, Esquiña 
and Guallatire that were claimed by Turco. The plaintiff presented several documents from the 17th century 
that affirmed Turco’s rights over these lands, where since Toledo “not any Spaniard had sowed or lived” 
(Saavedra B., “Límites de Lipez y Carangas con la provincia de Tarapacá” Informe del Director de la Oficina de 
Límites. La Paz, 13 de octubre de 1902. Recompilation in Blanco 2006 [1904], XXXIII-XLIX). A couple of years 
later, also Sabaya, bordering the Tarapacá region, would request a demarcation because of incursions (ibid). A 
couple of decades later, the transfer of the Audiencia de Charcas to the newly created viceroyalty of Río de la 
Plata in 1776 generated a legal dispute between the Audiencia de Lima and the Audiencia de Buenos Aires over the 
Tarapacá border as the silver extracted in Tarapacá was now to be deposited in the royal coffers of Carangas. 
At that time (1780), the Charcas administration still claimed jurisdictional power over Guallatire, Pachica, 
Esquiña, Timar and Belén, on basis of colonial documents that even extended its dominion “until close to the 
coast” (ibid). 
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claims would be definitively defeated by late 19th century liberal policies.59 Despite this 
clear enclosure on the Andean plateau, a remarkable continuity can be observed in 
altiplano-valley connections in the form of long-distance exchange contacts. Frequent 
inter-ecological travels and exchange were organized into the second half of the 20th 
century, mitigating the effects of territorial amputation. 
 
Figure 17 “Jardin Caranguitos.” The name of this day nursery in Camiña refers to a local 
folkloric dance which still reflects the century–long interrelation between both 
sides of the Cordillera Real (own picture, January 2012). 
Through the abolition of the viceroyalties and the installation of the Bolivian 
Republic, the French system of departments, provinces and cantons was adopted. 
Carangas came to constitute the largest province of the Oruro department, covering its 
entire western section. Across the international border, which Bolivia shared until 1883 
with Peru and was in 1904 officially resettled with Chile, the territory adjoined the 
regions of Tarapacá and Arica. To the north, Carangas was delimited by the 
interdepartmental border with the Pacajes and Sicasica provinces of the La Paz 
department, to the east by the Cercado province that includes the city of Oruro and to 
the south-east by the Paria province, which was in 1903 subdivided into the Poopó and 
Avaroa provinces (Ascarrunz 1905, 4), all three of the Oruro department, and to the 
south it bordered the Lípez province of the Potosí department.  
At the head of the province, a sub-Prefect residing in the provincial capital of Corque 
and depending directly from the Prefect in the departmental capital Oruro, represented 
the central State. The province was subdivided into eight cantons and seven vice-
cantons, each headed by a corregidor with authority over the entire canton and was 
assisted by two judges (jueces parroquiales), a councillor and alcaldes. There was a 
 
                                                     
59 See Rivière 1982, 20-5; Pauwels 1983, 89-92 and 151; Durston and Hidalgo 1997 cited in Ruz, Díaz and Fuentes 
2011, 25; further details in chapter 6.  
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separate office for the governance of the village (the urban centre), assigned to the 
municipal agent. The cantons coincided with the level of the marka, indicated as the 
comunidad, and hence contained a number of ayllus. The caciques (marka)60 and jilaqatas 
(ayllus) were obliged complete obedience and free services to the corregidor (this would 
remain so until the mid-20th century), who nevertheless was “almost always rated lower in 
authority and prestige to the cacique (Mallcu), who, by nature of traditional authority that was 
vested in him by the indigenous, exerts greater influence and dominance over them” (Bacarreza 
1910 in Pauwels 2006,, 372). In addition, all commoners were bound to the execution of 
tasks, included in the fiesta-cargo system as mentioned above continued.  
In the late 19th century, slightly later than other Andean countries, Bolivia witnessed 
several frustrated attempts to formally abolish the community as such. Influenced by 
the emphasis posed on private property by Enlightment and liberalist ideas, the 
community became viewed as an obstacle to the indigenous population’s integration as 
citizens, independent economic actors and private landholders into “modern” society 
(Yambert 1980, 65). While a large share of Bolivia’s highland communities were 
absorbed by the hacienda system, the ayllus of Carangas entered the 20th century “free”, 
demonstrating a higher level of self-determination and a lower level of inequality, 
although with a clear tendency towards concentration of power in mestizo and male 
hands (McEwen 1975, 413).  
The National Revolution of 1952 constitutes a next key transition in the historical 
trajectory of Bolivia’s rural communities, nurtured by radical pro-indigenous social 
thinking that had emerged in the previous decades.61 Yet, in contrast to what happened 
in the largest part of Bolivia’s countryside after the National Revolution of 1952, the 
“free” communities of the Carangas province and their collective decision mechanisms 
underwent relatively little change. The imposed syndicalist model did not find entrance 
and despite the crippled power of the caciques in favour of the corregidor, indigenous 
authority sustained a relative level of continuity. However, changes in the official 
territorial order of the Republic instigated a disturbing process.  
From the middle of the 20th century on, a double process took place. With the split up 
of Carangas, which until 1951 continued constituting Oruro’s largest province, the idea 
 
                                                     
60 In the wake of the Andean indigenous rebellion of 1780-’81, the colonial caciques lost their privileges and 
under Bolívar, the cacicazgo institution was abolished as a whole (see also Choque Canquí 1991), allowing for 
the appropriation of its tax collection attributions and its accompanying privileges by the corregidores and 
their assistants. Yet internally, the mallku or cacique maintained its legitimacy in Carangas. 
61 The indigenismo movement, with intellectuals such as the Peruvian Mariátegui, stressed the strength and 
elementary economic function of the community, thereby suggesting parallels between socialist organization 
and the ayllu structure (see Yambert 1980, 69-70). Although paternalistic in principle, this current was key in 
placing “the community” (again) at the top of the political agenda. 
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of Carangas as a cohesive administrative unit was definitively displaced as a thing of the 
past.62 The multiplication of provinces and municipal sections63 resulted in a 
fragmentation into the provinces of Carangas, Nor Carangas, Sud Carangas, Totora, 
Sajama, Litoral, Sabaya and Mejillones. Internally, these provinces comprise today a 
total of nineteen hierarchically ordered municipal sections (the former cantons) headed 
by a mayor, while the corregidores only exercise a ceremonial function at the village 
level.64 Meanwhile, the breakthrough of trade, schooling and roads on the countryside 
triggered the temporal and permanent influx of residents from the estancias to the 
village and the temporal or permanent exodus of villagers to principal towns, mainly 
Oruro (Rivière 1982, 118). Rural villages gained dynamism, functioning as permanent 
residence for state officials, schoolgoing kids and shop keepers, and as temporal 
attraction pools for estancia-members during ceremonies, fairs or community meetings. 
In contrast to this disintegration, indigenous leadership started to gradually reinstall 
its legitimacy. Similar to other Andean countries, the Bolivian National Revolution of 
1952 and the Popular Participation Act of 1994 –in conjunction with other initiatives of 
government agencies, foreign development-oriented NGOs or religious groups and the 
input from scholars, particularly anthropologists- pushed for a community-supportive 
decentralization, which simultaneously provoked a closer attachment to the central 
State. This restored the legitimacy of the mallkus in Carangas, and even their supra-
marka collaboration to reclaim the region’s historical unity. Referring to the native pre-
Hispanic federations that originally overextended the colonially and post-colonially 
imposed provincial, departmental and international boundaries, the suyu of Carangas 
became subject to a reintegration initiative by the Aymara leadership which was 
institutionalized in the form of the Consejo Occidental de Ayllus “Jach’a Karangas” (COAJK) 
 
                                                     
62 The division of the province was not a new idea (Tejada 1921, 24-5; Calderón 1927, 32-9). Pauwels 1983, 150-
1; Arteaga 2006, 522.  
63 This process is referred to as cantonización (and its equivalent, provincialización), which had already 
started in previous decades (Fajardo 1931, 41). This was a discontinuous process due to dictatorial regimes in 
the 1960s-80s. Its outcome was the (partial) conversion and fragmentation and of ayllus into cantonal units, 
while others maintained their ayllu structure (Ayllu Sartañäni 1994, 56-61). 
64 The introduction of municipal councils as administrative instruments in the late 19th century defined the 
entire province of Carangas as one municipality. The “municipalization” of the country was a decentralization 
measure implemented through the Law of Popular Participation of 1994. This introduced the administrative 
entity of the municipal council or alcaldía which absorbed the official power of the corregidor while 
simultaneously re-establishing the representative power of the mallku at the marka level. Both exercise their 
function in relative coordination. (Quite remarkably, the recuperated organization into markas rather than the 
current official administrative order better reflects the ancient colonial division.)  
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or the Western Council of Ayllus of Jach’a Karangas.65 Through an intense debate over 
decentralization, interculturalidad and autonomy, new formats for indigenous self-
governance were integrated more coherently into the official territorial order of the 
country (Galindo et al 2007). Since the adoption of the new Constitution of 2009, 
municipalities, regions and indigenous territories can obtain the status of Original 
Indigenous Peasant Autonomy (autonomía indígena originaria campesina).66 Still, this is far 
from a harmonious process, as the secession of some communities and the forgotten 
struggle of the Uru population testifies.67 
At the entrance of the 21st century, the communities of Carangas seem to stay behind 
as dismembered archipelago fragments, high and desolate on the barren altiplano. 
However, despite migration, ecological degradation and enduring poverty, the ayllus of 
Carangas -fragmented into, to date, 111 ayllus, grouped into twelve markas (TCO COAJK)- 
still provide in a workable (though delicate) framework for settlement and tenure, 
village life and local authority as well as for extraction and collective action. Not just its 
“skeleton” but also its content is still in place. Eroded, transformed and complexly 
 
                                                     
65 In 1987, the authorities of all markas of the area held a historic meeting, which formed the start of the 
region’s reintegration as the suyu or nation of Jach’a Carangas or Great Carangas - initially referred to by its 
quechua version “Jatun Carangas”. Until that time, the continuation of customs and traditions that were 
“clandestinely” reproduced received a new impetus and let to the establishment of a concrete framework, 
baptized as “Jach’a Carangas”, for the restitution of original ayllu structures. This reunification formalized by 
the Supreme Resolution of September 20th, 1990. Its reinstitution is founded in the recovery of indigenous 
territorial rights fomented by the Convenio 169 of the ILO (ratified by Bolivia in 1991) and the 1990 “March for 
dignity and territory” which enforced the adoption of the TCO status as inalienable, indivisible, irreversible, 
collective, unconfiscatable and imprescriptible land units in the new land legislation (ley 1715 or INRA law, 
1996). The concrete establishment of the COAJK has its roots in syndicalist and developmentalist initiatives in 
the Oruro department during the 1980s, which explains its bureaucratic and technocratic character, revealing 
its “artificial” creation (Ayllu Sartañäni 1992, 75). Jach’a Carangas functioned as the “cultural arm” of the 
Federación de Trabajadores Campesino de Oruro, which encouraged the organization of cabildos of indigenous 
leaders, but even more decisive was the intervention of the Programa de Autodesarrollo Campesino (PAC), a 
State program for rural development with financial support from the European Economic Community.   ,). 
(Izko 1992, 105; Ayllu Sartañäni 1995, 270; COAJC 2011; Sanjínes 2005, 35-7; Canqui Mollo 2012. 
66 Some  indigenous communities may choose not to adopt this specific privileged legal status, as did 
Curahuara de Carangas, which as only municipality in 2009 refused to adopt the status of Autonomía Indígena 
Originario Campesina (FAM 2010, 5, cited in Rodas 2013, 13-4). By 2011, the only administrative entities been 
granted this status in Carangas were Totora and Chipaya (Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011). 
Of the eleven other municipalities in Bolivia who did carry out the procedure, Totora Marka was the first to 
have its autonomous status declared constitutional (Fundación Tierra 06.02.2014).  
67 Since 2012, the border provinces Sabaya, Huachacalla and Mejillones are seeking to secede and form their 
own autonomous indigenous federation. Moreover, the Council –as does the umbrella organization 
CONAMAQ- feels increasingly thwarted or provoked by regional syndicalist counterparts. The Uru Chipaya, for 
their part, do not participate in this process, although they form an important however ignored part of 
Carangas’ history. 
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overlapping with state-administrative subdivisions, yet still stronger than researchers 
in the 1970s and 1980s would have expected. “[A]nd not, as is often expressed, a declining 
left-over of traditional backward rural systems or an empty shell of colonialism that should be 
abolished” (Mayer 2002, 35-7), nor can it be reduced to an imposed developmentist 
instrument (Yambert 1980, 63). The recuperation and performance of an indigenous 
spatial logic and the transformation of territorial control in terms of mobility, land 
appropriation and livestock management is an ongoing and dynamic process (Rodas 
2013).  
3.2 The livelihood strategies of pastoralist households  
This sub-chapter concerns a further examination of the ways in which local families and 
communities organize their subsistence within the described environment and socio-
productive system, zooming in on the specific time frame of this research, 1860-1930. 
Around 1900, peasant livelihoods in Carangas were marked by a semi-sedentary 
pastoralist lifestyle. The acquisition, use and reproduction of means of production and 
the satisfaction of consumption needs was organized in the first place at the household 
level and through inter-family reciprocity ties in function of family subsistence. 
Property, production and exchange was to large extent structured by communal access 
regulations, highly reliant on interregional exchange relations and intervened by 
external and intermediary extractive actors, integrated and interacting within a 
broader social agro-pastoral system. 
Within the Andean agro-pastoral system, the household constitutes the basic 
institution of social and economic organization (Custred and Orlove 1980, 23; Bolton and 
Mayer 1977; Deere 1982; Mayer 2002). In most cases, the Andean peasant household can 
be delineated by the members of a nuclear family, including the husband and wife and 
their children, summing up to an average of five members.68 Provided a certain level of 
elasticity and adaptability, nuclear domestic units based in a common site of residence 
pool labour, land and capital resources to secure their production, consumption, 
reproduction, decision-making, socialization, welfare and safety. However, despite the 
apparent autonomy of Andean households, their subsistence and reproduction can only 
 
                                                     
68 These constructs are however more complex than simple equivalents of “the family”. In some cases, 
additional associates such as siblings, aged parents or adopted children may complete this set (Custred and 
Orlove 1980, 37). 
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be ensured by their embeddedness in larger corporate groups (Custred and Orlove 1980, 
34; Mayer 2002, 35-42). The combination of various forms of household labour is very 
flexible as there are no syndicalist or feudal structures that fix their work schedule 
(West 1981, 42). Yet, this does not downplay the role of regulative arrangements 
establishing links towards the wider social setting, in the first place the community. 
Even more, “the capacity to act collectively is the most outstanding characteristic of Andean 
households,” making household boundaries secondary to community-bound household 
interdependence (Mayer 2002, 35). 
Households are the site where particular livelihood strategies are selected and 
designed in function of daily subsistence needs (foodstuff), fiscal duties (money), 
reciprocal obligations towards the community (time and capital, for instance to 
organize a public celebration), occasional spending (funerals, weddings, etc.) or crisis 
management (reserves in times of bad harvest). Based on her research of how peasants 
in the Southern Bolivian Andes build up a living in the aftermath of the severe drought 
of the 1980s, Zoomers identified accumulation, consolidation, compensation and 
security as four (flexible) “stages” of livelihood formation (Zoomers 1999; De Haan and 
Zoomers 2005, 39-40). This differentiation of strategies can equally be applied to the 
arrangements made by Carangas households in the studied framework and registered  
in court archive.  
Accumulation refers to a long-term quantitative strategy to achieve a minimum 
manoeuvring space necessary for upward social mobility. This strategy is at stake when 
households, usually rich pastoralists or merchants, request title to (more) land, migrate 
completely or partially to places with more labour opportunities, or recruit (poor) 
herders to take care of their livestock.69 Consolidation aims at the short-term 
stabilization and qualitative improvement of the accumulated assets, for instance by 
investing surplus livestock to obtain motorized vehicles (Rivière 1982, 302-3). In crisis 
situations, abrupt or structural shortage is sought to overcome through compensation 
strategies. This refers to multiple forms of credit relations such as families contracting a 
loan from relatives or powerful moneylenders, assigning the care and education of their 
children to other families,70 or calling in other forms of (kinship-based) social security. 
They may barter, sell off their capital or even go begging.71 When such strategies come 
into play, a household finds itself in a downward spiral of social mobility. A line of 
strategies particularly pertinent to high altitude environments are long-term security 
 
                                                     
69 AJC, Civiles, 1903, no. 3; 1904, no. 3; 1906, no. 3, f. 12v-15v.  
70 Examples are AJC, Civiles, 1905, no.3, fs. 3v.-6. 
71 In times of crisis, such as during the drought of 1905, the margin of survival of indigenous households in 
Carangas was squeezed to such extent that many had to ‘include’ begging into their daily strategies. AJC, 
Civiles, 1905, no. 4, f. 9. 
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tactics developed to withstand the ecological challenges such as the diversification of 
agricultural and non-agricultural products and labour, sharecropping and storing (De 
Haan and Zoomers 2005, 40).  
In broad outlines, rural livelihoods in Carangas highly rely on security strategies but 
with an underlying regional specialization pattern that runs parallel with ecological 
variations between a very dry zone in the South and West, a less dry central zone and a 
more fertile area with micro-climates in the North-East. This has generated a 
differentiation between respectively llama herding, sheep herding and agricultural 
households. The fish and water bird resources, particularly in and around the Coipasa 
lake, where the Uru Chipaya reside, converts this ethnic group into a third –often 
ignored- category of production modes based on fishing and hunting-gathering. In 
addition, and close to the mentioned lake, saline sediments are responsible for the 
integration of salt extraction into local livelihood patterns. Yet overall, the most 
constant and reliable option in terms of risks and flexibility in this entire region was 
offered by pastoralism, even though, compared to agriculture, it  might appear as an 
illogical strategic decision in terms of energy input and profits (Mayer 2002, 17). Thus, 
despite slight alterations in the exact constitution of livelihoods according to ecological 
variations, in Carangas “the principal industry is animal husbandry and therein consists its 
wealth” (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 394), specifying this husbandry as llama 
pastoralism (and not intensive cattle breeding). According to Khazanov’s approach, 
economic activities in a pastoralist society implies are a) in mainly (but not exclusively) 
herding, b) performed at an extensive scale, c) inevitably combined with periodical 
mobility to obtain complimentary means, and d) oriented to subsistence rather than 
accumulation demands, although this last point has is becoming ever less influential 
(Khazanov 1994, xxxii).  
However, the significance of pastoralism to understand daily life in Carangas exceeds 
its economic implications; it goes together with a specific lifestyle, worldview, cultural 
and ethical code and it has repercussions on the role of pastoralist groups within wider 
social contexts.72 Within (Central) Andean studies, there exists extensive literature that 
 
                                                     
72 Still following Khazanov, these pastoralist livelihoods are structured by a) weak specialization (because it 
limits independence), b) economic but also cultural and ideological interaction with sedentary societies, 
which function as a criterion for comparison, imitation and refusal, c) limited political centralization, d) weak 
ties to urban life, e) combined communal (pastures) and familiar (livestock) property, f) strong kinship ties, g) 
a segmented social organization with collective and mutual self-preservation mechanisms, h) the existence of 
and “license” by an “outside world” and i) a significant yet negated social and political influence on the 
sedentary world (Khazanov 1994, xxxi). 
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give more history and texture to this specific role of pastoralists in Andean society.73 In 
contrast to typical representation of pastoralist societies as isolated, little innovative 
and static, camelid-based communities, as those encountered in Carangas, have 
successfully linked up to regional commodity markets and in the ways they remained 
out of the scope of land privatization processes (Larson 1995, 27-8; Medinaceli 2010). 
Table 3 Central components of the social agro-system that structures rural livelihoods in 
Carangas around 1900.  
Soil and environment Poor soil, few arable lands, rich grazing 
lands.  
Property relations and power relations  
diversity of rural agents: peasants, 
communities and elite groups 
Agrarian land under communal tenure, 
which includes collective and individual 
rights. Variations from 40 to 100 ha 
land/household.74 
Size of holdings and labour input (Ever more fragmented) small cultivation 
plots per household and collectively held 
extensive open pasture fields; labour 
extensive exploitation, primarily 
provided by the own household. 
Labour relations  
free and unfree, intra-household and external, 
on and off land, family development cycle 
 
and income strategies  
market access, access to credit, extraction, 
risk/diversification 
Mainly intra-household, on-land, and 
free labour relations; additional 
obligatory services to the community, 
the government and the local elites.  
Annual rather than frequent provisioning 
of consumption goods, based on a 
combination of reciprocity, barter and 
trade. 
Agricultural technology  
mixed or specialized, intensive or extensive, 
collective or individual, traditional or 
innovative 
Extensive use of traditional technology, 
shared use of utensils between relatives. 
Interregional and/or inter-systemic links  Vital importance of long-distance 
 
                                                     
73 For a detailed analysis of the different “waves” in this literature and their principal representatives, see 
Medinaceli’s assessment of historical, archaeological and anthropological research on Andean pastoralism 
(Medinaceli 2010, 25-54). 
74 On basis of a case study in Turco, a large community  provided with excellent llama grazing lands, one 
household is estimated to occupy approximately 300 ha, which may vary from 40 up to 1000 ha (HAM Turco 
2007). 
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migration, diffusion, supra-regional power 
and market structures 
exchange relations (caravan trade) that 
combine off market (barter for own 
subsistence) and (world) market (mainly 
contracted as transporters, e.g. silver and 
wool export economy) circuits. 
 
3.2.1 Labour division and social networks  
Regarding the inner working of a household, this “black box” (Mayer 2002) can be 
described on basis of the development cycle through which it evolves and reproduces 
itself. In the case of the Andes, this cycle generally starts each time a couple marries 
(Custred and Orlove 1980, 37; Mayer 2002, 7). Spouses reside as a separate family unit in 
the husband’s parental place of residence (the estancia), although the break between 
women and their parents is never complete either (Rivière 1982, 270).75 At marriage, 
both partners bring in resources acquired from their former household which now 
become co-ownership, except for livestock.76 These resources are multiplied or acquired 
through different forms of transfers such as inheritance, partition, exchange or 
purchase resources or the allocation of usufruct rights. Over the course of this cycle, 
relational networks are extended and fortified in function of labour or credit inputs, 
particularly through fictional kinship (see infra).  
The optimum point in a household’s labour capacity is the moment a senior domestic 
unit is able to control the labour of several married children and their wives/husbands 
(Caro 1994, 27). When a household hits its minimal capacity, several cooperation 
mechanisms come into play in order to attain the necessary amount of labour force 
(compensation strategies). When children are born, their labour is inserted into the 
cycle according to age and sex, in turn for the gradual transfer of the household’s 
resources and rights through repartition and inheritance. Once these children marry, a 
new cycle (or at least a next stage), overlapping with the previous cycle, starts. At this 
point, the household subdivides and distributes its resources. When the parents who 
 
                                                     
75 Habitation patterns follow patrilocal principles, which means that after marriage a wife will follow her 
husband to his estancia. An estancia is usually an exogamic unit, which implies a taboo on marriage between 
equal patronymics, and often between different patronymics, within a single estancia (Rivière 1982, 238). 
Although marriage across community boundaries has become more common in the course of the 20th century, 
Rivière found that most marriages in the 1970s were still intra-ayllu, based on a case study in Sabaya for the 
1771-1974 years (ibid, 246). 
76 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1925, no. 10. 
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initially started the cycle at marriage retire and are assisted by their children, the cycle 
is “reverted” (Custred and Orlove 1980, 38).  
In Carangas, herding and cultivation tasks require a limited labour force that is 
generally met by the owner of the land, his wife and children, except in those parts 
where agriculture is more important (Rivière 1982, 271). In function of domestic 
activities, a household adopts an internal gender- and age-based complementary 
division of tasks. As male and female camelids are separated, a household usually needs 
labour for two herds (West 1981, 59). Here, children come in the picture, starting to take 
up herding responsibilities at the age of  five or six (Caro 1994, 27; Rivière 1982, 71). 
Regarding gender, this division “is so interdependent that it is a rare adult who does not rely 
on the labour of the opposite sex to survive” (West 1981, 108). While men function as the 
producers, including work on the fields -although women might help during harvest- 
construction work and tool making, women are the allocators of the household, which 
includes managing the herd, the harvest yields and the necessary sales and purchases, 
as well as spinning and cooking (Mayer 2002, 11).77 Labour migration is generally male, 
while women will stay behind and take care of the children and the daily household 
activities.78 
The organization of labour tasks follows a productive calendar. Major moments in the 
production cycle of the llama include earmarking, called k’illpha in Aymara, mating, 
calving, dipping (insecticide wash) and shaving, which are reinforced by rituals, 
collective ceremonies and (inter)communitarian festivals.79 These are organized during 
the rainy season (December-March), constituting the busiest time of the year for 
pastoralists. By the end of the wet season, while female llamas are going with young 
 
                                                     
77 Spinning is an activity incessantly performed, particularly by women while pasturing, although the skill is 
equally acquired by girls and boys and can be combined by virtually any other activity (Murra 1975, 149 and 
Flores 1977, 142, both cited in Lopez 2003, 30). Weaving is marked by a specific gender division of tasks, with 
some types confected by women while other applications, such as slings, sacks, ropes etc., are made by men 
(ibid, 31). 
78 Deere’s research demonstrates that the more rural Andean households are integrated in capitalist 
production relations (which is overall rather low in Carangas), the more the gender balance in intrahousehold 
labour relations comes under strain (Deere and León 2001, 2003). 
79 A good example is the k’illpha, which usually takes place between Christmas and the end of February, often 
before or on Carnival. During this event, the livestock –camelids, but similarly applied to sheep and cattle- are 
paid tribute by perforating their ear tips in special forms and decorating them with multi-coloured earrings. 
The accompanying ceremony includes an offering (la mesa), the scenting of the herd and corrals, the sacrifice 
of a llama and shedding of its blood in all directions towards the huacas and uywiris (protector spirits) and the 
pachamama, alcohol libations (ch’allas), coca chewing (akulliku) and the performance of chants. Through such 
rituals, the herd is protected from illness and predators, and its multiplication is secured by particular 
protector spirits, called illas, which are represented by small stone animal figures guarded in small pits in the 
corral. West 1981, 62; Abercrombie 1998, 366; López 2003, 18-25; Layme 12.02.2013. AJC, 1888, no. 2066, f.5v. 
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during eight to nine months of gestation, a household’s energy shifts to other tasks. 
Harvest takes place in April-May, around Easter. From September to December the 
subsequent agrarian cycle is prepared by working and sowing the land. Until the last 
quarter of the 20th century, those dry months, from approximately May to December, 
were used to travel with large caravans of male llamas to and from regional fairs and 
other regions where complementary products to those of the altiplano where offered 
(López 2003, 20 and 28). The structuring power of this productive calendar has 
implications for the availability of surplus labour for other sectors of the economy. 
Agriculturalists-pastoralists may for instance place their bets on offering (his) labour to 
the mines, but the other way around mining companies’ labour demands were 
dependent from seasonality and low labour discipline (Langer 1997; Platt 1995). 
Throughout its development cycle, the household creates, extends and maintains 
various forms of formal and informal interaction with other households through trade 
partnerships, credit arrangements, labour cooperation and friendships. A lot of 
productive tasks (harvest, sheering livestock etc.) and infrastructural means (canals, 
irrigation, roads etc.) simply cannot be achieved by a sole household. Another key 
reason to bring these relations into operation was for comunarios to their settle debts. 
Most of these strategies are based on reciprocity and the manipulation of kinship 
relations and constitute a vital network to access the necessary subsistence means that 
operated in parallel -but “neither conservative nor isolationalist”- from the marketplace 
(Caro 1994, 39).  
Cooperation was organized at several levels. Consumption, trade and barter are 
organized among biological kin, within the boundaries of a single nuclear family 
(Custred and Orlove 1980, 40). Labour relations extend to the level of the extensive 
family but generally do not surpass these boundaries (Rivière 1982, 270-1). The next 
level, of ritual kinship, is of crucial importance in order to gain access to assets that 
result inaccessible within the own social unit (ibid, 278). Fictive ties to nonrelatives are 
primarily created through compadrazgo (co-parenthood), which facilitates the 
integration of both parties into each other’s social networks.80 Far from converting 
ritual kin into equals, the established bond served often as a credit source for money, 
 
                                                     
80 A compadre or comadre (the spiritual father or mother) are expected to act as a social guide and economic 
promoter for their aijado or aijada (their spiritual son or daughter), but this relation often decays into a 
patron-client relationship. An interesting point made by Lehmann is that, in contrast to classic interpretations 
that tend to equal an organization of production on basis of nuclear family labour with a peasant (non- or pre-
capitalist) economy, various case-studies point to the importance of ritual kinship rather than tight family 
networks for economic systems based on non-capitalist production. Rivière noted that compadrazgo was 
usually employed as a strategy for livelihood diversification by establishing alliances with complementary 
producers that offered commercial or barter opportunities. Lambert 1977, 22 cited in Mayer 2002, 11; Custred 
and Orlove 1980, 229; Rivière 1982, 278-9; Lehmann 1983, 11-2. 
  157 
livestock or silver objects when disposing of insufficient means to comply with 
community duties, taxes, and ceremonial costs.81  
Now we move to reciprocity mechanisms that are not necessarily confined to kinship 
bonds. The ayni is a social duty in which one offers help that is supposed to be returned 
on a later non-specified moment in at least the same quantity (De Munter 2003, 176 and 
186; Temple 2003). It stands for a reciprocal labour exchange on a short or long term 
that is compensated with food, coca leaves and chicha and an equal amount of labour 
time and recruitment (Custred and Orlove 1980, 35-6). A similar relationship is called 
mink’a, established among a number of people (for instance to pasture herds together) 
and may be compensated with a feast, goods or cash (Custred and Orlove 1980, 41; Lopez 
2003, 43-4). The importance of such long-term reciprocal ties stems from the scarcity of 
cash; principally invoked during harvest time.82  
In between reciprocal and non-reciprocal systems, there is a whole range of labour 
exchange arrangements that lay outside the kinship-based labour-pooling model. These 
mechanisms seldom involved money remuneration.83 A typical kinship-creating labour 
strategy is for poor young men to pasture the herd, often for several years, of the 
household by which they wish to become accepted as son-in-law or godson.84 When 
peasants are lacking production assets such as sowing seed or labour time and without 
means to pay a peon, they may establish a kind of deal denominated al partir, in which a 
plot of land is shared with another peasant in turn for providing him with the needed 
input.85 Contracting usually occurs between impoverished young men or couples and 
households with insufficient members to pasture (or caravan with) their herds and has 
increasingly contributed to asymmetrical dependence relations and the decline of 
pastoralism over the 20th century (West 1981, 60). This form of servitude is usually 
rewarded with daily shelter and subsistence items as well as a yearling sheep or llama 
per year or half of the young born during the contract duration (Lopez 2003, 43; Caro 
 
                                                     
81 AJC, 1873, no. 1284, fs.14v; 1875, no. 1422; 1883, no. 1775; 1892, no. 2190; 1893, no. 2240; 1896, no. 2330. 
82 When a comunario was mistreated for not having complied with ayni tasks, the judge, rather than protect 
the injuried, concluded the accused was in default and sentenced him to a fee. AJC, 1880, no. 1634, f.3.  
83 Some cases involving money are registered, however. AJC, 1871, no. 1224, fs.2-2v and 1873, no. 1276. 
84 Details on the conditions and services to be fulfilled in order to become accepted as legitimate son-in-law 
are given in AJC, 1871, no. 1224, fs.2-2v.; 1873, no. 1292. 
85 This system is equally applied in livestock management, where a pastoralist migrates as a seasonal worker 
to a rich pastoralist, generally in Chile, in order to obtain livestock he cannot afford to buy; the arrangement 
being made is that the contracted pastoralist receives half of the young born during his service (Rivière 1982, 
274). Today, the same practice is recurred to in the wider region to access land to grow quinoa which is 
currently booming on the world market (personal communication with Gilberto Pauwels, March 2014). 
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1994).86 Moving further on the reciprocity to non-reciprocal labour continuum, peonaje 
is a mechanism of acquiring additional labour input by paying a worker in species 
(Rivière 1982, 273). This strategy is generally relied upon by more wealthy households 
and/or with insufficient time to cultivate their lands themselves due to duties outside 
the community time to complete such as transporters, merchants or comunarios 
executing a community function. 
3.2.2 Capital: Livestock property. 
Even though local livelihoods are subject to historical fluctuations and fundamentally 
dependent from a combination of complementary activities, the vital role attributed to 
livestock and more specifically Andean camelids surfaces as a constant throughout 
Carangas’ entire territory and history (Medinaceli 2010, 99). However, their exact 
significance in size and value is hard to reconstruct, as agro-pastoralist censuses are 
unlikely to give a correct depiction of herd sizes, if they can be executed at all. 
Comunarios are reluctant to reveal details on the exact size of their herd and, rather 
than to number their animals, they inventory their herd on basis of a rough estimation 
(Rivière 1982, 275; see also Bolton 2007).87 Still, reports, surveys and notary documents 
offer insight into the importance of livestock property in the altiplano peasant economy. 
In 1910, a provincial inspector Zenón Bacarreza counted 483909 animals, held in 
property by the approximately 27000 inhabitants, divided in little over 5000 households. 
Camelids counted for nearly 57% of the total livestock, of which over 80% were llamas. 
Sheep represented 37%, and only secondary 5% asses, mules and horses, hardly 1% cattle 
and some 1857 pigs, of which 85% was in Uru Chipaya hands who kept the animals 
(Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 341). About ten years later, Lima’s update of this 
inventory demonstrated barely any variation in distribution, except for a slight 
reduction of llamas in favour of the alpaca population and an increase in the mule 
population (Lima 1921, 45; see table in Appendix 5). A livestock count in 1929 registered 
almost 10000 animals more than in 1910, an increase almost entirely absorbed by the 
horse and pig population which were three to four times higher in number, leaving a 
 
                                                     
86 In one lawsuit, a herder who had pastured over 8 years the livestock of a fellow pastoralist of the same ayllu 
in Corque complained not to have received the due “salary” of 3 female llamas and 9 lambs or sheep. AJC, 1880, 
no. 1634, f. 1-1v. 
87 In their perception, the counting of their animals separates the animals from their reproductive group, 
hence “neutralizes” the coherence and undermines the reproductive potential of the herd ,which explains the 
distrust of Andean pastoralists towards such fiscal interventions (Urton 1997, 103–4, cited in Bolton 2007, 11). 
This distrust also explains why attempts at introducing new methods for livestock breeding failed (Pauwels 
1983, 266). 
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hardly altered distribution among other animals (González 1929, 214). Throughout the 
20th century, these proportions seem to have undergone little or no alteration, the only 
difference being the depreciated importance of mules, which has been absorbed by 
Andean camelids thanks to enlarged commercialization options and the introduction of 
motorized vehicles.88 Today, the entire Oruro department counts with almost 1,4 million 
domesticated camelids (of which about three quarters llamas), representing about 60 to 
70% of the entire livestock, compared to 30-40% sheep and less than 1% cattle.89  
The llama, a European traveller stated in 1914, “is to the Indian what the reindeer is to the 
Lapp,” in short, everything (Walle 1914, 379). The llama has been providing Andean 
peasants with meat for calories, coat for textile applications which also provided in a 
marketable surplus, bones and leather for construction material, fat for medical use or 
candles, dung for fertilizer and heat and its carrying capacity for transportation 
(Graffam 1992, 888; Browman , Fritz and Watson 2009). Strikingly, dairy products do not 
figure in this wide range of applications (Gade 2000, 102-17), nor does its use as draught 
animal (Mann 2011, 203). However, stirred by the booming international wool market, 
outsiders’ and governmental attention was at that time particularly drawn to the more 
delicate alpacas, which share many of the llama’s practical sources but have been 
particularly appreciated for its fibre (Custred 1977, 65; Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 
399-401; Walle 1914, 381). Sheep too were principally kept for their wool. Apart from 
wool livestock, the large number of asses grazing Carangas’ vast plains, particularly in 
Turco and Corque where Bacarreza counted respectively about 4000 and 7000 animals 
was also stressed at the time.90 These pack animals were also commercialized in adjacent 
provinces or in the famous livestock fair of Huari. Mules and horses served for trade and 
individual transport, cows for livestock export to the coast as well as for domestic 
agricultural use, and pigs for lard that was traded across the border.  
The distribution of the region’s animal stock indicates llama abundance over the 
entire territory, while other animals were more susceptible to specific local grazing 
conditions. Among pastoralist households, only those residing in the north-eastern 
districts such as Llanquera tend to keep more sheep than camelids. Alpacas were very 
unevenly distributed, conditioned by altitude and the presence of bofedales to the 
 
                                                     
88 A recent study of herd structures was executed by the FAO in the community of Turco (Rodríguez and 
Quispe, FAO 2009). In 2005, law no. 3157 granted Curahuara de Carangas and Turco, which together compose 
the province of Sajama, the title of “Bolivian Capital of South-American Capital Camelid Husbandry” (Capital 
Boliviana de la Ganadería Camélida Sudamericana) (Rodríguez Veltze 2005).  
89 Hence, camelids easily outnumber the human population, counting with a little less than 400000 
inhabitants. Based on UNEPCA 1999 cited in FAO 2007, 33; Rodríguez and Quispe, FAO 2009, 38; INE Oruro 2002. 
90 Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 357; see also the account of Paul Walle, an English visitor in Bolivia in 1914, 
who seems to have largely copied Bacarreza’s report; Walle 1914, 381-2. 
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(north-)west.91 Donkeys grazed in the central plains of Carangas, small troops of mules 
and horses were found more eastwards as well as in the bofedales close to the north-
western border, and cows in the northern mountains. Only in the case of the Uru 
population, pigs were also important, which were hence exclusively found in the 
swamps around the Coipasa lake were totora  and grass roots abounded (Pauwels 1983, 
186; Morales 1910, 99).92 In broad outlines, there was a distinction between a more 
camelid-adapted environment in the higher and dryer west and a more appropriate 
area for herds based on imported species, amongst which sheep and donkeys best 
adapted.93 
 
Figure 18 Announcement of the first “festival of the llama and crafts” in Turco, “Bolivian 
capital of camelid breeding law n° 3157”. Organized by the Association of Centres 
for Camelid Improvement in Turco (ACEMCAT) and the indigenous authorities. 
Turco, 21-22 December 2007. (own picture, November 2008) 
The enthusiasm with which contemporary visitors of the province commented on 
the abundant herds contrasted starkly with their criticism about the management of 
 
                                                     
91 See the sample of livestock properties in annex. It is mainly one rich pastoralist of Sajama, with over 284 
alpacas in his possession, who distorts the analysis. AJC, Civiles, 1915, no. 21. 
92 Only a single will in the sample included 30 pigs. AJC, 1861, no. 844. 
93 Wills of comunarios in the most fertile (north-)eastern area such as Llanquera and San Miguel demonstrate a 
greater reliance upon sheep, supplemented with cows, asses and mules, rather than llamas. AJC, Civiles, 
respectively 1901, no. 9 and 1909, no. 8. In contrast, herds in the western communities (Turco, Curahuara, 
Sabaya etc.) were dominated by camelids, thanks to the bofedales. Conditions for donkey and mule breeding 
were limited as was firmly stated in 1864, when the comunarios of Sabaya and Huachacalla refused to put their 
livestock at the disposal of the national army simply because they did not possess animals suitable (strong 
enough) for this service. AJC, 1864, no. 964 and 968. 
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these herds. People such as Bacarreza and Lima identified wool livestock as a potential 
resource frontier, but saw local pastoralist methods and knowledge as obstacles of 
primitivism and negligence to the “scientific preparation” of the region’s 
“industrialization” (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 396; Lima 1921, 46). They designed 
programs with model farms designed to mitigate the decimating effect of epidemics and 
foment livestock multiplication and genetic regeneration but ignorant towards the 
centuries-long developed expertise of these pastoralists in managing their herds94 and 
would eventually all fail (Pauwels 1983, 266; Lima 1921, 46-9).95 Today, this 
developmentalist push that converts llamas in mere products seems to have found an 
entry, yet with gradually more attention to local methods and demands (Rodas 2013, 87-
92; Healy 2001). Over the last decades and strongly incentivized by NGO intervention, 
several cooperatives and other initiatives have been established in the region to foment 
the production and commercialization of llama meat, in the form of the freeze-dried 
charque. 
The pastoralists of Carangas perceive camelids as “their most valuable possession and 
only livelihood”.96 Notwithstanding the risk of epidemics,97 livestock is a secure capital, 
grows constantly, requires less intensive labour than agriculture, and is an easily 
transferable property. Pastoralists compare their herd with “money in the bank,” a 
capital asset that needs to be managed with care.98 Moreover, Andean livestock had an 
additional value for its employability and profitability as transport means, which gave 
households access to barter contacts for primary provisions and commercial caravan 
trade, and became the llama’s historically most valued function. For merchants or non-
 
                                                     
94 This close interrelation is for instance reflected in the numerous terms that differentiate llamas on basis of 
sex and age, function and color. AJC, Penales, 1911, no. 12. 
95 In fact, this ‘proto-industry’ is exclusively concentrated in Carangas, mainly in the actual provinces of 
Sajama (including Curahuara and Turco, both in possession of the title of “camelid capital”), Carangas and 
Sabaya (Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011, 69). Although there is large potential, 
commercialization has not come to full development due to transport, sanitary and other quality-
guaranteeing aspects. 
96 In Turco, one of Carangas’ most prominent llama-producing communities, a recent FAO inquiry found 94% 
of all producers liable to that evaluation of their capital (Rodríguez and Quispe, FAO 2009, 43). This counters 
Terry West’s statement in the early 1980s that by the second half of the 20th century, it was no longer true that 
“the ownership of vast herds of animals was the major determinate of wealth and prestige in the township.” (West 1981, 
56).  
97 Llamas and alpacas are not free from any threat derived from  disease and parasites. Particularly sarna 
(scab), but also cenurosis (parasite illness)  and foot rot cause preoccupation to pastoralists, particularly 
during the dry season (AJC, 1897, no. 2372). 
98 Terry West gives the testimony of a pastoralist, stating that “too many withdrawals will so severely deplete the 
herd that natural reproduction will be inadequate to compensate for over consumption” (West 1981, 81-2). 
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pastoralists households, other livestock was more important; non-Andean pack animals 
(mules, asses, horses) for the former and cattle for the latter. 
Archival evidence, particularly notarial wills and inventories, constitute a rich source 
to reconstruct the size of herds, their internal constellation and their significance in 
relation to the main income-generating activities (pastoralism or commerce) and the 
broader set of production assets acquired and managed by an average Carangas 
household.99 Wills follow a precise structure in which the first and most completely 
described asset of carangueño pastoralists was livestock property, starting with female 
llamas and their offspring, followed by male (pack) llamas, then sheep and asses, and 
concluded with mules, cattle and horses. An analysis of 43 wills and inventories for the 
period 1860-1925100 comprises an animal stock dominated by llamas and sheep. 
Individual herds restricted to this wool livestock are likely to correspond to an 
indigenous commoners’ household, identified as “pastoralist” (27). To the extent that 
other animals are included, in particular more pack animals (male llamas, mules and 
asses) and horses, the herd owner is likely to be more inclined towards trade activities 
and was hence identified as pastoralist-merchant (4), in case of holding rights to 
community land, or merchants, when it concerned white-mestizo village residents (9). 
Of course this categorization remains speculation based on incomplete data and 
concealing mutual overlaps but it gives an insight into the composition of this 
pastoralist society. 
Though a rather arbitrary reconstruction, the general picture runs in line with 
Bacarreza’s observations and more recent ethnographic studies of pastoralist 
communities in the broader region. These establish 50 llamas as a culturally established 
lower limit for a herd size (Caro 1994, 27); a limit which seems to prevail up to today.101 
 
                                                     
99 However, they seldom mention the exact value of herds, although a combination of sources suggests that 
prices for llamas underwent little change. Generally it is stated that the weight of the semestral indigenous 
head tax equalled the price of a mature llama, which flutuated indeed around 4 to 5 pesos (the head taks was 
set on 9 pesos and 1 real yearly (2 semesters) for “full” community members, see 4.1).  
100 This sample unavoidably relies only on those estates registered in the notary books, which were probably 
more recurred at by richer people, more inclined to revoke a will. Hence it offers but a tiny and little 
representative image, yet still a useful exercise. The overall animal stock per analysed indicates an average of 
73 female llamas (including their young), 20 male llamas, 10 alpacas, 47 sheep, 10 asses, 1 mule, 2 cows, 1 horse 
and 1 pig per pastoralist or merchant household. Of course, these following averages must be broken up into 
regional varied clusters, with particularly alpacas and pigs concentrated in few hands. See appendix 6. 
101 Today, the 50 limit-rule seems to prevail as pastoralist producers in the Oruro Department possess on 
average 52 camelids, both llamas and alpacas (data from SEDAG-ORURO 2006 in Gobierno Autónomo 
Departamental de Oruro 2011, 67; see also West 1981, 77).  In areas where pastoralism is solidest, this number 
is even higher, for instance in the Mejillones province (Todos Santos, La Rivera, Carangas), where the average 
is set on 209 animals (UNEPCA 1999, 89; Medinaceli 2010, 103-4). In Turco, locals such as don Anastacio 
estimate that virtually no one possesses less than 50 animals, although some may just barely reach that level, 
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In economic terms, this quantity is critical to the viability of a pastoralist livelihood and 
allows a pastoralist a comfortable position. Archive evidence suggests that this limit was 
even higher in Carangas, especially if no other animals were included in their livestock 
base. At the other hand, there was a discrepancy between poor families falling under the 
limit, while others were able to build up an impressive herd. As Bacarreza wrote, “there 
is no indigenous family that does not possess even five specimen, as there are many that count 
with troops of up to 1000 heads” (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 401). Regardless of 
evolutions in the exact lower limit, it becomes clear that the inequality existing in 
Bacarreza’s time has further developed, creating a widening distribution gap.102  
Wills are more than static snapshots, but give insight into how an estate was build up, 
serving hence as excellent sources for a regressive reconstruction of what could be 
called a household’s “accumulation trajectory.” This trajectory of obtaining and 
reproducing capital is in the first place activated by the designation and assignation of 
animals, which occurs on key moments of a pastoralist’s life. What follows may seem a 
simple sequence, but as several inheritance cases demonstrate, often constellates into a 
complex “pedigree.” It is therefore crucial to both parents and children, husbands and 
wives to meticulously keep record of the constitution of their herd; from whom they 
received, bought or inherited, how the herd “multiplied”, how many animals had served 
to finance community tasks, to whom they farmed out animals, etc.103 
While wills will generally trace this trajectory back to marriage, the formation of an 
own herd is a lifetime-long process that starts for boys and girls alike at a very young 
age. Somewhere between 2 and 9, a child receives its first “gift animal” during the 
yearly earmarking ceremony, the k’illpha (West 1981, 61). In that way, gift animals 
foresee in a form of gender-equal social security (activated when parents decease or in 
cases of divorce) and creates a first sense of ownership and affection towards the llama, 
encouraging children to take up pastoralist tasks (Lopez 2003, 21). Inheritance and 
dowry might increase this first stock. Luck is also a crucial factor and reflects the 
individual dimension of wealth (West 1981, 71-2). Although in daily practice, the flock 
size of the total household prevails over the individual property of each member, gift 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
but most own between 100 and 150 llamas, in some cases even going to 200 animals. Many of them also keep 
sheep and only those with access to bofedales have also alpaca. Interview don Anastacio Canqui Mollo, Turco, 
25.3.2012.  
102 Recent data demonstrate that all pastoralist producers in the Oruro department, 79% count as small 
producers, owning less an average of only 34 animals and with a yearly income of 131 US dollar, 17% 
represents small intermediate groups, owning between 90 and 210 animals and an average income of 389 to 
740 US dollars per year, and just 4% are large producers, on average owning 315 animals and earning 1213 US 
dollar annually. The first group possesses 43% of all camelids, while 22% of all camelids are in hands of the 
latter group (basedon SEDAG-ORURO 2006 in Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011, 68).  
103 Examples of such descriptions are AJC, 1861, no. 847, fs.11v-13v and Civiles, 1908, no. 8. 
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and dowry animals and their offspring remain one’s exclusive property, also after 
marriage unites two separately created stocks.104 Throughout this sequence of herd 
formation, a wide range of strategies to increase one’s livestock property are called into 
play. Animals can be obtained through purchase, swap,105 or registration of unclaimed 
livestock,106 in turn for labour,107 on basis of claims as will executor or through the 
settlement of credit and debt relations. Less lawful tactics form an essential aspect of 
this sequence, with abundant cases of illegitimate declarations of “vacant” livestock,108 
animal theft,109 and authority abuse.110  
Wills, but also lawsuits and (rare) contracts, give moreover insight into the settling of 
credit relations, although they remain generally a hard to trace relation. Debts were 
usually stated in money, but often settled in the form of a livestock transfer.111 Often 
this monetary or other transaction corresponded to the refund of obtained money from 
transported and traded goods to the contracting merchant and the possessions that 
mortgaged this deal. These relations forged an interdependence among comunarios and 
 
                                                     
104 Even after marrying or when joining their children’s household, husbands and wives continued to treat 
their livestock as personal property rather than a collective household asset. In wills, it was usually clearly 
indicated which animals they had brought to the marriage, how many were added during the marriage. AJC 
1869, no. 1058 and Civiles, 1910, no. 5. 
105 AJC, 1861, no. 852. 
106 Examples of the numerous cases in which animals were (falsely) claimed to have no owner, or a deceased 
owner with no heir, are AJC, 1877, no. 1524; no. 1553; 1878, no. 1564. In 1927 (circular of 25 June), stipulations 
were set regarding the auction sale of stolen and unclaimed goods (Calderón 1927, 196). 
107 When possessing no or too few animals to make a living, poor pastoralists might obtain livestock in turn 
for extending herding or other services. Examples are AJC, 1880, no. 1634; 1882, no. 1687, f.4 and 1883, no. 
2240. 
108 A typical case where this “alternative way” to appropriate livestock was recorded, was when a peasant 
claimed his cows had arbitrarily been declared as strayed (mostrenco) and put under supervision of someone 
else, usually a powerful villager such as the corregidor. AJC, 1868, no. 1040 and no. 1048(b). 
109 Rustling (abigeato) can be seen as a very common strategy in livestock-based agrarian societies that serves 
to increase one’s position or to restore a more equal balance (see Orlove 1980, 179-94). A small sample of 
examples was researched, with most cases concerning only a couple of animals, but in other occasions it could 
include entire herds. AJC, 1878, no. 1595b; 1888, no. 2095; 1894, no. 2272 and no. 2276; 1900, no. 2425; Civiles, 
1901, no. 3 and Penales, 1906, no. 1. 
110 A frequent abuse was when corregidores, in this case of Totora, were accused of coerced extraction of 
animals. AJC, 1877, no. 1525.  
111 Wills included a regular section on credit relations, stating the money, livestock or goods one still owed or 
others owed to her/him. One example is that of a comunario who was ordered to transfer a part of his herd to 
a fellow pastoralist to whom he still owned money, a transfer that counted “as proof the arrangements and 
payment of the pending debts around the mutual wills and the greatest harmony.” AJC, Penales, 1910, no. 6. 
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very often with individual and cooperating business (wo)men112 which could entail a 
complex tangle in which companies often functioned as a node in the web of creditors 
and debtors in the province. While it is not always possible to precisely reconstruct this 
tangle, most documented credit relations give evidence of how comunarios were 
incorporated in this node in the capacity of contracted and indebted transporters. 
Whether among merchants, between merchants and indigenous llameros, or among 
llameros, most of these contracts concerned the acquirement of pack animals or cargo 
(the loss thereof motivating the registration of these agreements in the sources).113  
Apart from its economic value, camelid property also functions as a sign of social 
prestige. While the amount of animals owned determines the income rate of a 
household internally, it also fortifies the social status of a household within the 
community.114 Given that any communal ceremony is unthinkable without the presence 
(and sacrifice) of a llama, owning a minimal number of llamas is a requisite to 
participate in the fiesta-cargo system. As a consequence, signs of a shrinking animal 
stock may in fact point to an increasing social (and political) position within the 
community.115 Thus, livestock property in notary documents do not straightforwardly 
reflect the socio-economic position of a household, but must be related to overall 
patrimony information and the importance of non-herding activities.116  
3.2.3 Land use and tenure 
Even Lima –who at some points in his description tends to extol the region as the most 
valuable of the whole continent- had to admit the productive limits of Carangas’ soil 
(Lima 1921, 67-8). Apart from those spots where pools, springs and summer rains offer 
irrigation options, the largest share of the soil is so sterile it hardly produces enough to 
 
                                                     
112 However, few of the bonds among comunarios or granted by merchants are registered in the archivesSome 
indications are AJC, 1869, no. 1083; 1893, no. 2259; Civiles, 1901, no. 8; 1907, no. 23; 1915, no. 15. 
113 Given the transnational character of trade and transport, a considerable share of these debts had an 
international dimension. AJC, 1871-1874, no. 1224, f. 21v; 1876, no. 1494, f. 2; 1888, no. 2097, f. 21 and f. 23. 
114 This connotation was reinforced by the importance given to wealth in Andean society under Inca rule, 
including both economic as social and cultural capital. Owners of relatively large herds being called qamiri 
(“rich” in Aymara) and those with an insufficiently large herd to organize community festivals are called 
wajchas (“orphans” in Aymara). Lopez 2003, 25. 
115 AJC, 1866, no. 962, f.9v-10v. 
116 The poor-average-rich distinction made in the table in Appendix 6 is based on a more complete picture of 
the assets managed by a household (indicated in wills or inventories) controlled by a proprietor or household. 
Thus, someone categorized in the table as poor may possess more animals than a rich merchant, who hardly 
possesses any animals but is abundantly supplied of real estate and commodity stocks. 
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sustain a household’s auto-consumption, leaving land almost exclusively to livestock 
herding (Blanco 2006 [1904], 18; Lopez 2003, 12). While the slightly more fertile soil and 
the protection by mountains chains in the north-east of the province (including Corque, 
Huayllamarca, Chuquichambi, San Miguel and Llanquera) favoured small-scale 
agriculture, cultivation in the more occidental cantons (Turco, Curahuara and 
Huachacalla, but also in Andamarca) was only reported in places covered by the 
mountains (Bacarreza 1910, 394; Lima 1921, 42). However, mountain torrents, bofedales, 
lakes, rivers, and the salubrious climate shaped excellent grazing conditions in the 
latter districts, particularly in the north-west.  
 
Figure 19 The most fertile soils are located in the north-east of Carangas. These are terraced 
cultivation plots in the outskirts of the village of San Miguel (own picture, March 
2012). 
Around 1910, most household labour was dedicated to agricultural subsistence 
production, mainly the cultivation of potatoes and barley and a minor quantity 
(especially in the micro-climate zones of Llanquera, Chuquichambi and Huayllamarca) 
of quinoa, beans, cereals, alfalfa,117 and some vegetables (Bacarreza 1910, 394; Lima 1921, 
189). Together, these products constituted the basic consumption pattern, dominated by 
the potato.118 Livestock production was of course key too, providing in meat, but also in 
 
                                                     
117 The production of alfalfa points to the presence of mules, donkeys and horses. 
118 According to West’s reconstruction of rural consumption in the Oruro countryside in 1977 (West 1981, 117), 
an average nuclear family of 6 consumers needed 10 quintales of fresh potatoes, which were the year round 
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a transport means.119 This transport was vital as most cereals, fruits and vegetables had 
to be obtained from the valleys. Thus, the maintenance of inter-community exchange 
contacts across ecological divides was key to altiplano livelihood construction (see 3.3).  
In response to ecological factors such as frost, rain or hail that hamper agriculture, 
altiplano households employ a dispersed settlement and land use strategy. While 
pastoralism relies on the rotational use of vast grazing spaces, agriculture is based on 
sectorial fallowing and crop rotation, both requiring a well-organized communal 
control (Guillet 1981, 143-4). The core site of residence and operation is the estancia, or 
the ranch, which is usually established on an advantageous location, such as close to a 
bofedal or near other estancias. The best cultivation land is usually comprised by the 
terrains of the estancia. In addition, each household accesses scattered small plots on a 
short distance and a number of outlying, mainly grazing fields, provided with 
temporary dwellings (Llanque 1995 cited in Rodríguez and Quispe 2009, 35). This way, a 
varied agricultural production, including several kinds of crops or several variations of 
one crop, is achieved and combined with pastoralist activities (Rivière 1982, 256).  
In contrast to the maize zone where irrigation is crucial, the altiplano’s climatological 
constraints enforces a system of sectorial fallowing (more land is left fallow than 
cultivated) and crop rotation, mainly between potatoes, native tubers and cereals 
(Guillet 1981, 143-4). At the foot of the hills until their cultivation limit at 3800 m, 
quinoa and tola are grown (Rivière 1982, 234-5). Higher on the mountain slope, potatoes 
are cultivated until about 4100 m, with the highest zone reserved for chuño potatoes. 
Higher up, when even pasturage becomes impossible, yareta and queñua are collected 
(ibid). This management of multiple ecological niches converts mountain slopes into a 
dense collage of cultivation plots or canchones, fenced by stone walls in order to prevent 
herds from invading (ibid, 261; see also Goodale and Sky 2000), and organized into 
different terraces. Due to the altiplano character of the soil, these terrains usually 
remain uncultivated for a couple of decades.  
Livestock management in Carangas is based on an open field system for Andean 
camelids which need much space to thrive; hence pasture land constitutes an 
abundantly needed resource. According to Bacarreza, Carangas was provided with more 
than 40000 ha herding land and artesian wells of which a vast part was left unused 
(Pauwels 2006, 398). Bacarreza was clearly pushing for a more intensive land use, 
ignoring the system of rotational use of communal grazing lands in order to prevent 
over-grazing (West 1981, 59; Rodríguez and Quispe 2009, 37). These long-(and still-
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
stored in underground silos, and 3 to 4 quintales of chuño between 2 harvests, which makes 1 arroba of fresh 
potatoes per week. 
119 With the breakthrough of trucks, transporters and traders shifted to a new means of capital formation, 
reducing the importance of livestock (for caravan mobility) and hence the reliance upon grazing lands. 
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)standing practices of “free pasturing,” without the use of stables, allow a pastoralist 
household to manage an ample workspace.  
 
Figure 20 An estancia with corrals keeping a llama herd together, along the road between 
Chuquichambi and Choquecota (own picture, March 2012). 
The constitution of a herd starts with selecting the animals on basis of age and sex; 
from then on the males and the females with offspring are perpetually kept apart for 
the sake of genetic control (West 1981, 59; López 2003, 14). An internal equilibrium is 
sought of one male for every ten female llamas,120 keeping all additional male llamas as 
pack animals for caravan trade while female llamas served the herd reproduction and 
for meat (Molino 2006, 112). Familial flocks graze continuously on other pastures, 
however always within the same fixed area and according to a defined logic. In an order 
from most to least selective forage consumers, cows are the first to enter a meadow, 
followed by llamas and then by sheep to “finish” the pasture (Lopez 2003, 37). Cows are 
herded separately by men, often left unwatched in the highest areas for several days 
(ibid, 36). Male llamas may also be left alone for several days on outlying pastures in the 
highest zones (over 4200 m). Female llamas, however, are kept lower (approximately 
3700 to 4200 m), often together with sheep (Custred 1977, 68-86). The latter are herded 
closer to the pastoralist dwelling by women but also children and youngsters. The 
animals are spurred with whistles and a sling, which serve to guard them against 
 
                                                     
120 The analysed data in Appendix 6 suggest however an equilibrium of one male to four females. 
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predators such as foxes, pumas and condors, but also against other herds or stray llamas 
(López 2003, 16-8). At night they are locked in corrals constructed around the estancia.  
This way of putting altiplano land to adequate use is bound by a tenure system in 
which the community, as has been alluded to, constitutes the axial space of regulation. 
In the following, a brief assessment is given of how the most vital means of ensuring a 
household’s subsistence and wealth is accessed in Carangas. Of course, this system is 
fundamentally shaped by and embedded in a state-managed land system, but that 
broader picture will be scrutinized in chapter 4. Land tenure on the altiplano is marked 
by a strong coordinated control of the ayllu over the distribution of land among its 
members. In pasture zones such as Carangas, communal land administration is exerted 
in its most “complete” form, based on indivisible use rights, while highland agriculture 
zones, dominated by tuber cultivation, is administered also communally but with 
divisible use rights, in contrast to the lower irrigation production zones (maize and 
tuber), where private property defines the local land tenure system (Guillet 1981, 142-3; 
Urioste, Barragán and Colque 2007, 79).  
The way in which property was regulated within the community in 1910 was 
explained by Bacarreza as follows:  
“the property of the land is maintained communally by aillos [ayllus], distributed 
in ainocas [aynuqa], and no one of the co-proprietors can extend its cultivations at 
will. The aillos are divided into 10 or more ainocas, destined one for each year, in a 
way that the community must sow in one single ainoca, leaving the others for the 
pasturing of their livestock. This system of rotation that is applied in the 
cultivation lands restricts the area to which agriculture could extend” (Bacarreza 
1910 in Pauwels 2006, 394).  
His comment reflects how contemporaries understood cultivation, private property 
and “progress” as entangled frontiers whose standstill, as in Carangas, was undesirable. 
Yet this evaluation was short-sighted regarding the ecological aptness of this system 
and its internal complexity. In Carangas, the lion’s share of all the land was and still is 
indeed held as indivisible property, yet tenure entails varying degrees of collective 
ownership. Rather than an all-encompassing control over the land, each household 
combines access to dispersed plots of pasture, cultivation, and fallow land, preferably of 
a varied as possible quality. This heterogeneity of production options guarantees a 
diversified production in a fragile environment and endorses the principle of 
complementarity, which until the amputation of Carangas’ valley lands was upheld on a 
much vaster scale. Quite different from pre-designed theoretical and exclusive models 
in which collectivist overrule individualist principle such as communism, this 
communal land administration comprises several types of tenure that flexibly co-exist 
and may change according to context and changing state and market imperatives.  
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In concrete, all land within the territorial reach of an ayllu is divided into four, 
interlinked categories, allowing households to control different ecological levels (see 
figure 21). Closest (but not identical) to private property are the individual inalienable 
usufruct rights corresponding to the nuclear family. These rights endow each household 
with a sayaña, which contains several cultivation fields, differently located within the 
territory of the estancia.121 The counterpart of these privately used lands is the saraqa, 
which are communal terrains over which the extensive “family” of one estancia holds 
collective usufruct rights. These terrains comprise a geographically discontinuous 
territory, including fallow, water, pasture and wood lands dispersed over the ayllu to 
which the respective estancia belongs, sometimes at several days walking distance 
(Rivière 1982, 237). More outlying from the permanent settlements and much larger in 
extent are the qallpa,122 for cultivation, and the aynuqa, used as pasture or in fallow. 
These are communal lands, administered at either the estancia or ayllu level by 
distributing temporal, collective non-adjudicated usufruct rights to member households 
(Galindo 2007, 85-6) and often lay fallow, functioning as a reserve for future internal 
redistributions. Sayañas are found everywhere, on the slopes, in the bofedal and spread 
over the plain. Communal cultivation lands are usually located on the highland plains at 
about 3700 m altitude, either non-irrigated or with bofedales for female llamas and 
young and provided with permanent dwellings and corrals. A little higher, between 4200 
and 4300 m, aynuka grazing lands are used for the (male) herd.  
For households incorporated into a community, access to land is fundamentally 
determined by its membership of the ayllu (Custred and Orlove 1980, 21; Rivière 1982, 
269). The social control over the size, use and distribution of the communally held lands 
and the allotment of individually cultivated lands to all members of the ayllu is 
entrusted with the jilaqatas (Urioste, Barragán and Colque 2007, 79). In order to be 
granted sayaña land rights and obtain the associated status of sayañero, but also to 
usufruct collective lands, households are demanded to make a yearly contribution 
(which shifted over time from labour and agricultural yields to money) to the 
community and take up their responsibilities in the fiesta-cargo cycle (yet exempt from 
this contribution while executing a higher cargo). Under Spanish influence, a patrilineal 
inheritance system was imposed upon the sayaña allocation, with the sayañero status 
and associated lands passed from father to son (Rivera and Platt 1978). 
 
                                                     
121 Rivière adds that the verb sayaña means “get up, stand up” or –more broadly- the place where a person 
“raises; builds” his space. According to Bertonio’s Aymara dictionary, the verb entails the meaning of 
“delimiting, establishing the limits of a property” (Bertonio I.N.E.L. 1979, 95, cited in Rivière 1982, 258). Naming the 
sayaña is a way of formalizing the estancia’s territorial rights and the chosen name often refers to a place on 
its edges because the act of naming gives legal value to the boundaries. 
122 However, equally as saraqa, the term qallpa is hardly mentioned in local sources or testimonies. 
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Figure 21 Altitudinal varied land use. Adaptation from Rivière 1982, 234. 
While these rules are still in place and no individual or institutional proprietor but 
the community and its member households have exerted ownership over these lands, 
arrogations or effective interventions by non-members, usually tied to the local elite, 
and state powers are not uncommon. As a result, the way in which someone is affiliated 
to a particular ayllu has included various positions. The most formative step in shaping 
this formal bond to the land was the incorporation and monetization of the internal 
“contract” between sayañeros and their communal authorities by the state apparatus; 
establishing a mutual state-community pact (Platt 1982, 100). By guaranteeing the 
protection of collective land rights in return for taxation, community land became an 
important revenue source and loyalty lever. The colonial origins and republican 
defiance of that pact is subject to chapter 4. 
Apart from distributing land among all members, collecting the contribution from 
those members and negotiating the community’s land rights with the central state, 
community authorities are entrusted with the supervision of how rights are exerted and 
the mediation of conflicts over those rights. As the existence of individual and collective 
rights within the ayllu in combination with fluid land boundaries provokes frequent 
dispute between households, estancias and ayllus, this is not a minor task. Cases on 
disputed property rights, trespassed boundaries and violently invaded land abound in 
the analysed court archive. Land boundaries were usually indicated by stones 
(“mojones”) representative for imaginary, fluid lines and could hence be easily moved 
(see also Goodale and Sky 2000). Most commonly, the collective use of grazing lands 
adjacent to cultivation plots often leads to accusations of land invasion into private 
plots, while the plaintiffs are blamed of attempting to establish de facto ownership over 
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communal land (West 1981, 88-9).123 The inherent mobility of Carangas households –and 
hence their absence from the land- was equally seized to appropriate land.124 However, 
the Uru population has fallen most strongly victim of this kind of disputes and 
usurpations, under the pretext that they were “people of the water”. Some state that it 
was the arrival of the aymara that imposed the “dominance” of strict land regulations 
upon the Uru system and pushed them into a marginal position. While it is indeed 
foremost the water, the lake, that is essential to Uru livelihood and culture, this does 
nevertheless not downplay the fact that land is vital to their existence too.125  
Inter-community and inter-household competition over land, its use, its boundaries 
and its access and transfer rights has become increasingly interspersed by competition 
with “outside” (non-community) actors.126 This has resulted in the creation of several 
privatized “enclaves” within the Carangas territory. The only marketable private lands 
are comprised by the “urban areas” of the rural towns127 and the subsoil, which could be 
 
                                                     
123 A typical case occurred in Turco in 1908, when a couple of pastoralists was accused of usurping land in 
Cotasi, locted on the international border. The pastoralists, who were mestizo merchants simultaneously 
holding a sayañero status, asserted their usufruct rights of the disputed bofedales on the argument that these 
pasture lands were for common use. AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 18. Similarly, struggles ensued when the communal 
use over salt was restricted (7.1.1). Struggles over land are indeed a recurrent topic in this research and were a 
key line of inquiry during my archival research, resulting in an ample file of land intrusions triggered by the 
trespassing of boundaries and claimed ownership rights. 
124 A common motivator for land usurpation was the frequent and sometimes protracted absence, particularly 
of trading and bartering comunarios, but also of those who went working in the mines or haciendas, and from 
the early 20th century on, the young men who left to fulfil their military conscription. Another case is that of a 
comunario defending the lands of his sister against dispossession while she was absent for years in Peru; not 
knowing whether she is still alive or not. AJC, 1868, no. 1038.  
125 To insist on their status as “people of the water” is in fact a false excuse to ignore their basic rights and still 
seems to recur as an argument, reflected in their current precarious access to land. 
126 In 1827 a land dispute over a mining terrain developed. José Villegas, miner in La Rivera, accuses 
comunarios from ayllu Sacari and La Rivera of intrusion into the grazing lands pertaining to the mining 
concession he bought in La Rivera. According to Villegas, these lands were originally from Sacari but since 
they were granted to the azogueros in order to graze their livestock, the comunarios of La Rivera only 
maintained rights to comunity lands. The comunarios never intruded the azogueros’ properties in the last 200 
years, but now they took advantage of the abandonment of the mining plants. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, 
Carangas, 1920, no. 1. 
127 The lands of the village, the “urban centre” of the canton, were private and hence subject to purchase 
transactions. Sales of urban plots usually comprised houses, shops or rooms on or at the plaza of a village, in 
most cases Corque. These sales are usually registered in the notary books. AJC, 847, fs. 3, 4-6, 11v; 956, f.6-7v; 
962, f. 6-7v; 1028; 1069; 1159, f. 1-3; 1919, fs. 26; 2112, fs. 3v-11, 35v, 43v-47v; 2151, fs. 22v y 24v; 2281; 2410, f.3 
and 12v.  Another category of marketable land were the commercial districts, such as Tambo Cosapa, of which 
the land rights were sold and consolidated in the 17th century and ever since remained in private (merchant) 
hands. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 40. 
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subject to mining concessions.128 While figuring as equivalents of private estates, they 
remained but enclaves, while vast parts of the Andean countryside were absorbed into 
the hacienda system in the course of the last five centuries.129 On the contrary, several 
communities of Carangas continued to possess “private” enclaves in other territories, 
which they rented as estates (see 3.1.2. and chapter 6). Launched in the late 19th century 
and particularly targeting communal fallows (categorizing the communities non-
cultivated “reserves” as “residual” land), the strongest attempt to eradicate communal 
tenure successfully deprived them from those estates, but failed to make any progress 
within the province. However, there are some remarkable cases registered of effective 
sales and transfers of sayañas, although it is not always clear when the indication of a 
monetary value of a certain plot also went accompanied by an effective sale 
transaction.130 
While individualization pressures have not brought the community down as primary 
landowning institution nor altered the inalienability of land, communal land rights 
security –which entails virtually all land in Carangas- has been seriously debilitated. The 
20th century brought important achievements for collective land rights security, but 
meanwhile various risks related to land use and land access undermine the persistence 
of this “Andean” pastoralist production system (Lopez 2003, 10; see also Grau and Aide 
2008). Ecological degradation and demographic pressures create a problem of over-
pasturing, causing soil erosion and the disappearance of certain forage plants, and 
contributing to the abandonment of certain customs and practices, particularly the long 
fallow periods (Lopez 2003, 45-6; Preston et al 2003).131 Meanwhile, the gradual 
integration of sayaña rights by individual households as part of a family land patrimony 
 
                                                     
128 The subsoil was however clearly separated from the cultivable soil, hence the overlap of mining 
concessions and community lands does not seem to have played strongly as a motive to conflict. 
129 As the safety and size of a herd is essentially based on the input of extra labour force and the availability of 
abundant grazing lands, hacendados did not easily sideline the pastoralists and their communal land system 
(Caro 1994, 33). 
130 A sayaña of 5000 m², for example, was valued at 100 Bolivianos, but his “owner” assured it was transferred 
for free, so to prevent disputes with others. In 1930, a sayaña including several fields, an estancia, and a house 
in the village of Chuquichambi was sold at 200 bs. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1930, no. 6. Another 
sayaña transfer, in which a “new” sayañero took over the land of a “fiscally retired” commoner, went 
obligatorily accompanied by resuming the implied community duties, but also the costs of the commoner’s 
funeral expenses. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1930, no. 5. 
131 This ecological pressure on the land also has a negative backlash on capital (livestock property). According 
to locals, cultivation was less important before the middle of the 20th century because pasture was still 
abundant, allowing the management of much vaster llama herds, with an average of 200 to 300 llamas and 
extremes of over 500 animals in addition to lesser numbers of sheep and a small number of mules (West 1981, 
58). 
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has fomented inheritance practices, which are applied through the masculine line.132 As 
a result of demographic growth, inheritance has accelerated the fragmentation and 
differentiation of land, particularly since the middle of the 20th century.133 As a 
consequence of the previous points, rural exodus and land abandonment constitute a 
third major threat to the continuation of well-functioning communal system.  
3.3 Pastoralists in motion: a complex exchange chain. 
A vast territory with potential, but remote and uncontainable. This combination of 
regional opportunities and limits generated an extremely mobile rural zone. Carangas’ 
mobility was in the first place driven by ecological factors, by the complementarity of 
the Andean zonated landscape and the mobilizing capacity of the llama that facilitated 
the development of vital exchange contacts. While marked by a subsistence economy, 
household livelihoods in Carangas were essentially reliant upon complementary income 
sources and production activities. Moreover, the entanglement of Carangas’ rural 
livelihoods with broader structures of production and circulation relied on its 
historically strategic location, not only within barter circuits that provided the altiplano 
with an indirect access to valley and coastal products, but also as a vital commercial 
passageway between the mines and valleys of the interior and the ports of the Pacific. 
The simultaneous participation in inter-ecological exchange networks and in an 
expanding market economy triggered the interregional circulation of agricultural 
surplus production, commodities, pack animals and people. Carangas thus developed 
into a pastoralist-trading economic region where long-distance caravan mobility 
constituted an essential strategy of rural livelihood diversification. 
While Carangas production system is marked by limited surplus (and cash is only 
searched for when needed) and visits to “the market” are hence sporadic,134 exchange 
 
                                                     
132 An example is a case in 1901 in Llanquera, where two brothers had shared a small plot of 70 to 100 ha, but 
when their sons grew up (cousins) they decided to divide the terrain in order to both having property 
documents for the land they occupied. The procedure required them to travel to the court in Corque, assign a 
lawyer, present evidence, assign experts and witnesses etc. AJC, Civiles, 1901, no. 10. 
133 The resulting unequal subdivision of plots activates several compensation strategies to overcome land 
shortage, such as the offering of labour in turn for usufruct rights and migration. Moreover, it has produced a 
“stabilization” of the allotment of cultivable land in the communities (Rivière 1982, 239 and 251). 
134 Even in the 1970s, when a regional market complex had extended deeper into the countryside, an average 
household frequented the market only a couple of times a year (West 1981, 203). Regular market visits is only 
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and trade were important, relating the comunarios of Carangas to a tangle of economic 
circuits which were however occasionally “activated”, mainly during annual travels. 
The active participation of the comunarios of Carangas in this tangle of cantered around 
the households’ offer of potatoes, livestock products, salt, charcoal and labour and their 
demand for agricultural products, exotic products and money. The “activation” of this 
offer-demand dynamic followed particular rhythms that coordinate with the sequences 
of an “ethnic calendar” (Platt 1995; Harris 1982 and 1987).135 Limited by the 
climatological underpinnings of this calendar, long-distance travels for barter were 
always undertaken during the dry season, after the harvest, sometimes leaving already 
in late March, until late November.136 
In function of local consumption and socio-economic household reproduction, 
pastoralists annually left the altiplano to exchange their surplus production for what 
their direct environment could not produce and to obtain complementary income 
sources to secure a minimal margin of survival and to pay the indigenous head tax.137 
Subsistence means they found in the first place in the valleys and the coast with “fixed” 
barter contacts138 and secondary through the urban market place. Money was provided 
by cities, ports and mines in demand for their agricultural products, their labour and 
their transportation service. Second, these pastoralists also connected to principal 
industrial centres, cities and ports and hence the wider world through commercial ties. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
observed with commercial intermediaries who bring locally produced raw materials to the lower levels of the 
global market economy and, the other way around, brings the global market economy to the realm of the 
canton. 
135 Within the Andean agro-pastoral system, productive activities are repeated and the means of production 
thereto are renewed through self-supply, self-consumption or purchase (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 49), 
thereby displaying an annually recurring pattern. I propose a multi-layered calendar, structured as follows: an 
climatological-productive cycle (following the seasons) constitutes the first layer of this “ethnic calendar”, 
superposed by a ritual-political cycle (structured by ceremonies and cargos)  and an extraction-exchange 
cycle (following the organization of fairs, tax payment, and annual travels). 
136 According to oral testimonies and contemporary as well as recent observators, caravan mobility for grains, 
fruits and vegetables was highest around Easter and in the months of April to June and reaches its climax 
around San Juan (24th of June), when the end of the harvest is celebrated (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 187; 
West 1981, 164). During these months, between harvest and the next sowing,  the land nor the livestock 
needed much attention, so men and some of the children could leave their estancia for several months while 
women took care of the herds. 
137 The jilaqata of ayllu Pachacama, in the canton of Totora, stated in 1862 that his comunarios were absent 
because “they find themselves in the valleys because of the scarcity of provisions produced this year they have gone 
searching [the means] to support the necessities of their growing families as well as of the contribucion indigenal”. Own 
translation. AJC, 1862, 873, f. 3. 
138 Usually households established a stable reciprocity relation with a particular household or community 
which was “cemented” and annually reactivated with gifts and sometimes through compadrazgo bonds (West 
1981, 171). 
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Either on their own account or contracted by merchants, they traded and transported 
their own surplus products, such as wool, and obtained “exotic” products for personal 
use but more likely for further commercialization.139 A third form of participating in 
supra-local circuits was in providing one of the main means of transportation that 
connected these regional circuits, the llama, converting themselves into one of the 
pillars of the transport sector, the caravan driver.140 Fourth, rural households did not 
only set products and animals in movement, but also their own work force in search for 
additional income sources, not only as transporters but also through temporal or 
definitive labour migration in the mining or agricultural sector.  
What they transported were mainly altiplano treasures, with a particular role for 
salt141 and wool livestock (see also 7.1). Salt and wool livestock, and its derived products 
were in constant demand in both market and off market circuits, while metals and 
minerals, charcoal and skins were subject to specific conjunctures. In addition to typical 
altiplano products, they also transported products that had been obtained in the valleys 
of the Bolivian interior further westwards to commercial markets, principally the cities, 
but also in the mining districts, and foremost the saltpetre districts at the Pacific coast 
(this trade was of course not the exclusive terrain of the Carangas province).142  
On their way home, the caravans carried mainly cereals from the valleys in sufficient 
quantities for their personal consumption during the year. Corn had always been a key 
element in the Andean diet and was obtained raw for rituals or cooking, roasted 
(tostado) for direct consumption or as flour, specifically “white” flour, known as “harina 
primera” or “harina de Chile”, or to brew chicha, known as harina de muco. From colonial 
times on, wheat, and in addition cavi (dried oca) and barely, became important too. 
Another important valley product was coca, produced in the eastern valleys. In addition 
 
                                                     
139  Coca leaves played a particular role, transported towards the coast in quantities that “continue to be 
considerable, taking into account that there are two to three million Bolivians living in the saltpeter offices for whom this 
article is of primary necessity” as was commented in Tarapacá in 1882. AIT, vol.2, Informe del Subdelegado de La 
Noria al Jefe Político de Tarapacá respecto a medidas administrativas a adoptar para el buen orden administrativo, La 
Noria 19/1/1882, fol.121, cited in Castro 2004, chapter 4. 
140 Transporters either operated independendly but increasingly relied upon contracts established with white-
mestizo merchants. This will be briefly discussed in 4.2. 
141 Salt exploitation was particularly important in Sabya, near the Coipasa salt lake, as well as in Andamarca, 
which extracted this vital product from from Pampa Aullagas and Quitaquita, to then commercialize in the 
valleys (Lima 1921, 188-9). 
142 This transport of so-called productos nacionales diversified the range of products offered by these caravans, 
including salt, wool (alpaca, llama, sheep), meat, vicuña and chinchilla skins, wool livestock, cattle and mules, 
forage, charcoal, textiles and cloths, ropes, barley, potatoes, sulphur from the altiplano, and flour, chicha and 
tobacco, lime and coca from the eastern valleys. AIT, vol.2, Informe del Subdelegado de La Noria al Jefe Político de 
Tarapacá respecto a medidas administrativas a adoptar para el buen orden administrativo, La Noria 19/1/1882, fol.121, 
cited in Castro 2004, chapter 4, s.p. 
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they brought (dried) fruits (with a special importance of quince for being distributed 
when the tribute was collected), vegetables, wine, mainly from Codpa, herbs such as 
oregano, cheese, ají and alfalfa back to their home communities. 143  
 
Figure 22 Public stage depicting the agricultural potential of Camiña, Chile, which was one 
of the principal barter destinations of Carangas’ western communities (own 
picture, January 2012). 
While strategic resources were exported, even more was imported. The inflow of 
goods, in the first place storage commodities, next to overseas products, sugar and 
alcohol, clearly and continually exceeded the export trade. Also in this direction of the 
chain, transporters and traders of Carangas took up an active –illegal or not- role. 
Among the commercial products entering Carangas, alcohol played a dominant role, 
either as beer, wine or liquor. Logically, this was also the most smuggled import 
product. Since the 1940s its importation and consumption has only accelerated. 
Saltpetre equally entered Bolivia largely through smuggle, but passed principally 
through regions south of Carangas. Other key imported goods were flour, soap, rice, 
household goods and construction material, canned food (from the warehouses in the 
villages and saltpetre mines144), ironmongery and arms (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2009; 
Lima 1921).145  
 
                                                     
143 Based on interview with don Celestino, don Sabino, don Eduardo, don Agapito and other elderly 
comunarios of Turco, Turco, 25.3.2012. West 1981, 161; Rivière 1982, 291-2; Castro 2004, s.p.  
144 ITAR, vol. 824, Subdelegaciones, 1911, “Informe sobre contrabando”, Tarapacá 6.4.1911, f. 98-98v; vol. 17, 
Intendencia de Tarapacá 1917, “Reclamo al cónsul de Bolivia en Iquique por maltrato de comerciantes bolivianos 
indígenas”, Pica 11.3.1917, sin fol.; vol.17, Intendencia de Tarapacá 1917, “Oficio del subdelegado dando cuenta 
de la detención de comerciantes indígenas bolivianos”, Pica 5.3.1917, sin fol.; vol.17, Intendencia de Tarapacá 
1917, “Informe del prefecto interino sobre el ingreso de comerciantes bolivianos por Pica”, Iquique 12.3.1917, 
sin fol.   
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Thus, bringing surplus resources into circulation occurred on the junction of barter 
and commercial exchange. Barter was practiced at a more limited scale than commerce, 
within which one must distinguish between wholesale and retail trade. Still, 
considerable volumes of primary products, particularly salt and corn, were exchanged 
off the market in order to survive until the next harvest. In the context of booming 
markets and a vigorous demand for primary products in cities and mining centres, often 
literally located in the middle of a desert, the size of this caravan trade acquired even 
larger proportions. In 1928, as a customs officer of Iquique even stated that indigenous 
traders on their way home “fill more than ten times what they bring.”146 This statement is in 
line with the data provided by Bacarreza in 1910, which demonstrate that the level of 
products entering Carangas was higher than exportation because imported products, 
including bartered products, were usually further commercialized in the interior of 
Bolivia (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 386-7).  
Yet, it remains hard to calculate and compare the value of these exchange circuits 
because “no price series exist as yet for the Bolivian internal market during the nineteenth 
century, far less any series for those prices actually paid to different ethnic groups for their 
respective products” and non-monetary exchange remained an important but difficult to 
measure practice (Platt 1995, 285). As commented by Bacarreza, a large share of the 
exportation of Bolivian products via Carangas, especially of wool, did not enter the 
statistics as it was conducted “personally” by the indigenous population that lived on 
the border (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 386-7). There were no data on traffic across 
the Carangas border and even statistics for the Antofagasta-Oruro railroad line, which 
counted unequivocally for the lion’s share of all imported and exported goods in the 
department of Oruro, remained incomplete (Ascarrunz 1905, 25).147 However, some 
estimations have been made by contemporaries, hints are found in lawsuits or notarial 
documents and comparisons can be made (although with caution) with data from 
ethnographic field work in the late 20th century. Yet, these data produce contradicting 
results.148 According to don Agapito, barter was advantageous until the point where one 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
145 Also very insightful are the inventories of the shops or entire estates left by the merchant women doña 
Aguirre and Elisa Malavia. Respectively AJC, Civiles, 1906, no. 3, f. 12v-15v and 1907, no. 8; and Penales, 1908, no. 
8, f.4-7v and Civiles, 1910, no. 18. 
146 AITRI, vol.25, Solicitudes 1927, Petición para reponer empleado de Aduana en la Subdelegación de Tarapacá,  
Iquique 11/7/1928, sin fol. cited in Castro 2004, chapter 4. 
147 Regarding “regular” trade, the Prefect of Oruro had to admit in 1904 that “the tables and numbers about 
exportation and importation are deficient because the entail no secure and precise data or details on the importations that 
are made from Iquique, Pisagua, Arica and other ports of the Pacific via our extensive border with Chile; and which 
continue to compose a fair share.” Own translation, Ascarrunz 1905, 25. 
148 While West concluded that salaried jobs, agricultural migrant workers earning about 2500 pesos in only 50 
days, resulted much more profitable than barter, drovers obtaining only 600 pounds of corn, worth 1440 
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quintal of llama fibre which previously could be exchanged for 10 quintales of fruits and 
vegetables only equalled one quintal of foodstuff.149 Prior to the introduction of 
motorized vehicles, this was the point, according to this comunario, where barter was 
definitively replaced by monetary exchange, although they continued to barter at 
border fairs. 150 
Table 4 Weights and loads (Bolivia, 19th-20th century)  
1 libra  460 grams  
1 arroba @ 11,5 kg 25 libras 
1 quintal 
(hundredweight) 
qq 46 kg 4 arrobas 
1 llama load151  +/- 3 arroba   
1 mule load  1 quintal  
1 truck   7 tons 180 
llamas 
While the circulation of local surplus production was structured by regional 
specialization and “traditional” practices, the circulation of market products has 
incentivized by individual interests and the international market situation. However, 
despite the constructed division in exchange circuits, the level of overlap between local 
and transnational, between commercial and traditional (market and off-market), legal 
and illegal trade must be stressed. As well as the overlap between labour and trade 
circuits. This overlap creates a “complex exchange chain” (Rivière 1982, 300). Rivière 
refers with “complexity” particularly to the way in which individual households pooled 
market (monetary) and off-market (barter) forms of exchange. A successful pooling of 
these circuits was vital in achieving sustainable livelihoods and relied essentially on 
these households’ expertise in both the management of non-capitalist exchange 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
pesos, through 58 days of (harsh) working in 1977 (West 1981, 178), Molino stated that that such salaries (2500 
pesos) in agriculture were only obtained after 6 months of labour, equalling the value of the corn that could be 
obtained in one travel of only 3 months (Molino 2006, 116). Market conditions probably did not change that 
much between both calculations. 
149 Between barterers, the exchange rates were more or less stable and were always determined in mutual 
agreement based on measured units which are based on volume and not on weight (West 1981, 146-7 and 160). 
There was room for negotiation as well as fluctuations due to yearly due to climatological conditions. 
However, this flexibility and agreement has gradually been replaced by adopting other forms of measurement 
such as the hand-held scales which you see at every market stand nowadays. 
150 Interview with Agapito, Turco, 25.3.2012. 
151 A load, or carga, was a unit of mass, varying with locality and the commodity weighed, for instance for 
potatoes this was around 46 kg. For products such as coca, chili pepper, honey or wine, other measures were 
used (Ovando 1985, 51). 
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mechanisms as the responsiveness towards product price fluctuations on different 
markets.  
Rivière argues that the activation of overlapping circuits produced an extreme socio-
economic differentiation among these rural households that could never have occurred 
in a system where only traditional exchange exists (Rivière 1982, 312). This 
differentiation has been incentivized by historical processes that altered  the way in 
which different forms of access to and exchange of resources were combined. While the 
mobility and the exchange in itself continued to exist despite the diversification of the 
range of resources that was moved and exchanged in and particularly via Carangas, the 
maintenance of this “complex” exchange chain came under pressure. As will be and is 
discussed in several parts of this dissertation, the basic connections that provided 
Andean rural livelihoods’ access to a dense network in the valleys were amputated over 
the long term, starting under the early-colonial land reforms. Throughout colonial 
times, this access was further restricted by the coercive extraction of labour and 
agricultural surplus as well as the forced sale of commodities. Under republic rule, the 
reorganization of fiscal and border regimes and transport and infrastructural changes 
entailed important challenges to the continuation of longstanding indigenous exchange 
practices and networks. In short, livelihood construction in Carangas and its 
transformations cannot be understood regardless from processes of state integration 
and market expansion and the implied interference of local elites. This will be the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4  
The communities of Carangas under Bolivian 
liberalism: Land, mobility and local elites. 
 
Cambia lo superficial 
cambia también lo profundo 
cambia el modo de pensar 
cambia todo en este mundo 
Todo cambia – Mercedes Sosa1 
Introduction. The breakthrough of Bolivian liberalism. 
This chapter explores the institutions, actors and strategies that structured communal 
life on the Bolivian countryside in the late 19th century. The reconstruction of how 
highland communities were politically and economically entangled to broader scales of 
social power is linked to the progressive movement of several frontiers of incorporation 
into the countryside in the context of “the breakthrough of Bolivian liberalism”. The 
period of “Bolivian liberalism” does not necessarily point to the name of the then 
governing political party (the Liberals would only occupy the government after 1900), 
but to the regime’s liberal ideological orientation towards free trade and French 
Revolution ideals on property (Platt 1982, 1984).  
 
                                                     
1 What is superficial changes / what is profound changes / the way of thinking changes / everything in this world changes.  
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Rather than a “rupture,” the ascent of liberalism in the Andes should be understood 
within this longer time frame. As Irurozqui states, the rupture and antagonism of late 
19th liberalism tends to be overemphasized, thereby denying important continuities 
with preceding periods and the constructive input of indigenous communal entities 
apart from their resistance (Irurozqui 2005, 15). Its development figures in a much 
longer transition from colonial to republican rule that can be traced back to 
approximately 1780, the time of the great Andean indigenous rebellions, and culminated 
around 1880 (Langer 2004; see also Larson 1998). It must also be understood in a broader 
spatial frame, that of Latin America’s export age, roughly comprised by the 1870-1930 
period. 
This “breakthrough” period entailed a contradictory process of conflict and 
continuity,2 pointing to a fundamental development: the constellation of a state 
structure. It points to a state-in-formation pressured to strengthen its external 
legitimacy by opening up its resources to the world market and its internal legitimacy 
by integrating its population and their resources within a manageable framework. 
Departing from the belief that society can be scientific-technically planned, policies 
were designed to impose uniformity and to fix the outlines for property and power. 
While this is certainly a contested process, the observation of a more concerted political 
scene demonstrates that the Bolivian state infrastructure had accumulated a critical 
level of power to set a (capitalist) transition “in motion”, however not strong enough to 
define its final outcome. This transition came with standardized schemes designed to 
facilitate intervention, thereby altered the nature of laws, taxes, borders and 
representatives. As this transition had concrete repercussions on the allocation of 
access rights, the functioning of markets and the question of sovereignty, indigenous 
communities were forced into a renegotiation over their legal-fiscal bonds to the state, 
their access to supra-local exchange circuits, and the local representation of these 
political and economic structures in the region. As a result of this renegotiation, 
“liberal” impositions were pragmatically and forcefully distorted in function of local 
needs although often then co-opted/re-appropriated by local leaders. 
In the remainder of this introduction, a broad outline of the chronology of this 
transition will be given; the chronology of the emergence of Bolivian liberalism, starting 
 
                                                     
2 Despite the frequent turbulence, this period was in fact characterized by a remarkable stability, indicating a 
gradual political maturation (Klein 2011, 154). The oscilliations in the “liberal” discourse towards the 
indigenous population between “paternal patience” and “racist cries” indicates nervousness that a stems from 
the state’s eagerness to fully integrate in the “modern”  international state system (Platt 1982, 99). There is 
also an economic contradictory element in Bolivia  perseverance throughout the 19th and early 20th century 
in its “modern nation-state” project despite its enduring difficulties to overcome fiscal limits (Irurozqui 1999, 
721-2). 
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shortly after the middle of the 19th century. In the course of the following half century, 
strengthening market structures and monopolies, together with declining transport 
costs, created the conditions for the extension of resource frontiers, although on the 
Bolivian altiplano this was foremost a case of (the Potosí) frontier “deepening” (Bértola 
and Williamson 2006, 23). As Bolivian economic circuits were closer tied to the 
imperatives of the world market, the country’s “mercantilist” phase and the 
protectionist policies that had come with independence came to a close.3 In political 
terms, a transition phase followed and would break through by the end of the century, 
resting on a restructuring of a regional power axis (ejemonía) of Bolivia’s western 
departments (Barragán 2009, 79; see also Barragán 2002). 
Although the Bolivian treasury -burdened by high military expenditures and an 
easily evaded inconsistent fiscal system- had still not overcome the deficit that 
continued to thwart reformist ambitions since independence (Klein 2011, 119 and 122), 
booming silver, guano and nitrate production announced that the time had come to 
make an end to the balkanization “of the de facto customs union under colonial rule” (Bértola 
and Williamson 2006, 30; see also Cárdenas, Ocampo and Thorp 2000). The immediate 
trigger for this reorientation was the recovery of Bolivia’s extractive economy, based on 
silver,4 guano5 and nitrate,6 and favoured by international and regional market 
conditions and technological mining and transport innovations. The emergence of a 
pro-free trade class, based in the new silver mining and commercial elites of the 
Cochabamba and the La Paz areas and foreign investors, gradually pushed to win 
political terrain in order to set fiscally favourable conditions for the accumulation and 
 
                                                     
3 The newly independent Latin-American countries stuck to high tariffs, not at all to back off foreign capital 
but mainly because of (short-run) revenue needs, which explains the seemingly paradoxical adoption of an 
explicit free trade discourse (Topik , Marichal and Frank 2006, 5). In Bolivia, the dominance of mercantilist 
policies ended with the Belzú regime (1848-1855) (Klein 2011, 126-7). 
4 The silver economy revitalized first very slowly, until it started to boom in the 1850s. Although mining had 
been declining since the late 18th century, and -after a short recovery- ever stronger due to the wars of 
independence, silver coins and bars remained in place as the country’s major export commodity until well 
into the second half of the 19th century, even demonstrating a short flicker in mining production around 1838-
‘42 (Platt 1997; 2008). Still, Dalence  counted in 1846about 10000 abandoned mines in the country, two thirds of 
them (including those of Carangas) flooded silver mines (Klein 2009, 120).  
5 Coastal guano reserves were being exploited since the 1840s Mann 2011, 212-20). 
6 The saltpetre cycle started in the 1830s, boomed from the 1860s on to reach its climax in the first years of the 
20th century. Shortly after, the exploitation entered into decline due to the 1914 and the 1920 crises and the 
german introduction of artificial fertilizers; in 1930 came to a definitive end. The crisis of the saltpeter 
industry brought all countries closely linked to its production food scarcity and unemployment, with the 
Bolivian interior witnessing a massive influx of repatriated workers, while in Chile the Chuquicamata copper 
mine took the nitrate mines’ recruiting role over. Tejada 1921, 23; Fajardo 1931, 60; Smale 2010, 68-76; ITAR, 
vol. 916, Varios oficios, 1914, fs. 272-3, 275-6, 305, 341. 
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safeguarding of their capital (Klein 2011, 123-32).7 While constituting “the epitomization of 
antiliberalism” (Gotkowitz 2007, 19), it was Melgarejo (1864-1871) who decided to free the 
export of silver, undermining  the state’s minting monopoly in turn for entrepreneurial 
support.8  
A true resource rush was taking off, bringing the country’s internal structures as its 
external boundaries under strain. As generous Melgarejo was towards the country’s new 
economic elites and foreign capitalists, as offensive Bolivia’s most reviled dictator was 
towards indigenous communities and their land claims (wait and see in chapter 5). 
Regarding  national territorial claims, he signed a border treaty with Chile (1866) that 
expanded the latter’s sovereign control up to the 24th parallel, setting an important 
precedent to the eventual loss of strategic saltpetre possessions in Bolivia’s coastal lands 
(Klein 2011, 134 and 140-1).9 As with the Brazilian border adjustment of 1868, the 
territorial concessions made by the Melgarejo regime were all framed within a broader 
effort to eliminate the protectionist trade measures installed under previous 
governments (Klein 2011, 135).  
After Melgarejo’s overthrow and the short return to civilian rule (1870), his heavily 
contested confiscation program against communal property was put temporally on 
hold, yet his liberalization policy was expanded. In 1871, the circulation of the debased 
coins emitted since 1829 was ended, which converted silver from monetary device into a 
global commodity and, as the state gave up its monopoly over mineral production and 
price-fixing, “completed” Melgarejo’s monetary policy (Mitre 1982, 36-40). With the 
fiscal reform of 1872 revenue distribution was decentralized by the creation of 
departmental and municipal treasuries next to the national treasury, which only after 
1930 would obtain again a larger centralized control (Barragán 2009, 109 and 205). While 
silver production demonstrated an extraordinary increase, its price now being set by 
 
                                                     
7 Chapter 5 (5.1.2) discusses the inter-elite debate on monetary, fiscal and land reform that ensued in the 
1860s.  
8 In 1826, Sucre established various Minerals Purchasing Banks (Banco de Rescate) which had the monopoly 
over silver minting (Mitre 1982, 45-55). The pro-free trade stance of the capitalist class started to challenge 
these protectionist foundations of the state’s monopoly over mining production and price-fixing, which would 
remain in place until 1873 (Ovando 1985, 80; Mitre 1982, 43-5). The reason why the state stuck to that 
monopoly, regardless of the massive contraband it provoked, was its dependence from indigenous 
contributions, which until the middle of the century represented 40% of the total national income. By 
undermining the minting monopoly, Melgarejo undercut his own government’s control over silver production 
and price setting, but meanwhile earning the support of the powerful miners (Klein 2011, 137).  
9 Guano as well as nitrate exploitation heightened international tensions between Chile, Peru and Bolivia over 
their access to the Pacific coast. During the 1870s, Anglo-Chilean capitalist financial power based on guano and 
saltpeter attempted to push Chile into its sphere of influence while converting Bolivia into an intermediary 
country (with the dominant Bolivian classes as police agents controlling the indigenous peoples) in order to 
counter Peru's monopoly over the saltpeter industry and export (Ovando 1985, 289). 
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the market, and the take-off of the “railroad era” backed by English capital, foreign 
capital increasingly found its way to Bolivia’s rich mineral and other extractable 
deposits. As the consequent increase in national incomes from mining and rubber 
resources, together with the decentralization of indigenous tax collection, invalidated 
the government’s fiscal dependence upon the indigenous population and set the 
conditions for the 1874 Alienation Act that proclaimed the elimination of the 
community as a legal freeholder institute.10  
However, Bolivia’s national treasury collapsed in the late 1870s, creating a very 
volatile fiscal climate that further nurtured international tensions over saltpetre 
reserves at the coast. When the imposition of a new tax on nitrate exportation by 
Bolivia was seized by Chile as an unbearable provocation, the ongoing trilateral 
manoeuvring between Chile, Bolivia and Peru escalated in the War of the Pacific (Klein 
2011, 141-2). The conflict lasted for Bolivia from the occupation of Antofagasta (14 
February 1879) until the battle of Tacna (26 May 1880), while for Peru the conflict 
continued two more years. The conflict would permanently redraw international 
relations in the region, a trauma still haunting the country.11 But most importantly, the 
war gave a final push to an underway economic transition. This produced a sweeping 
political transformation, largely debated and defined by Bolivia’s new (and old) mining 
elites, endowed with a political commitment in order to secure their economic activities 
in a reduced national market. This manifested itself in the simultaneity of the country’s 
loss of its only access to the sea with the growing land base of the landlord class as the 
Alienation Act was brought into operation.  
In the turbulence following the war, a political party system emerged from the old 
caudillo structure’s ashes, based on the coexistence of the Conservative and the Liberal 
party. From 1880 until 1899, Conservatives controlled the government, initiating a 
period of civilian oligarchic rule. While the major point of discordance between both 
parties was their stance towards the Chilean question, with the conservative camp 
putting commercial and political interests before a confrontation, both shared in fact a 
liberal ideological orientation, indicating that their stance cannot simply be reduced to 
their namesakes elsewhere (Langer and Jackson 1990, 15-6).  
Growing regional economic discrepancies and party politics, in fact a hotchpotch of 
overlapping ideologies started to converge and challenged the balance of political 
power. Backed by the increasing dominance of tin mining over silver mining and the 
 
                                                     
10 Mining and rubber revenues increased from 4% to 31% between 1871 and 1880 (Grieshaber 1977, 291-3). 
11 These border changes still distort Chilean-Bolivian relations up to today. In 1975, Pinochet and Banzer 
reinstated diplomatic relations by signing the Agreement of Charaña, including the offering of a maritime exit 
which was however refused by Peru, leading to the break off of the restored relations in 1978. In 1997, the 
Chile-Bolivia Border Committee (DIFROL) was established. 
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parallel influx of foreign capital(ists), Liberal opposition was based in the north, 
particularly in La Paz, where thriving tin miners pushed for a modernization and 
federalization of the state structure.12 Elites who stuck to a unitary state around the 
Sucre capital were economically tied to the silver producing south, but saw their 
position eroding as silver was gradually taken over by tin. Thus the economic and 
political transition underway was backed by a shift in regional power dynamics among 
the altiplano and valley departments,13 which would contribute to the replacement of 
the dominant north-south axis (19th century) by an east-west dialectic (second half 20th 
century) (Barragán 2009, 79).  
The breakpoint in this conflictive transition is situated in the federal war of 1899, 
when the struggle between federalists or unitarist factions over the most appropriate 
administrative structure for the country was fought out. The Liberal party seized the 
debate to challenge the Conservative government and forged an alliance with the 
indigenous Aymara leadership, promising them the abolition of the community land 
sales.14 When the Aymara mobilization broke with the Liberal leadership, the war 
evolved into what became known as the “Great Rebellion” which was severely repressed 
by their former allies. Once in power, Bolivia’s first Liberal government quickly 
appeared to bring “an oligarchy even more recalcitrant than before” (Mendieta 2010, 316).  
Under Liberal rule, Bolivia experienced major border changes (Chile, Brazil), a boom 
in infrastructure and particularly railway construction, and increasing political turmoil. 
Different from the direct involvement of the silver elites under Conservative rule, the 
tin magnates of the 20th century showed less interest in intensive political participation 
and left Liberal rule to non-mining elites. However, apart from moving the seat of the 
country’s executive and legislative powers from Sucre to La Paz, little federalist change 
followed. Through the adoption of a changing discourse about the indigenous and rural 
mestizo population, the Liberals handily provided themselves with an excuse to 
abandon the initial purpose of the country’s decentralization and the ideological 
foundations of an anti-conservative revolution (Irurozqui 1994;Mendieta 2010, 316). 
Paradoxically, the Liberals “owed” their victory essentially to their pre-1899 
 
                                                     
12 The Liberal party had been formally formed in 1883 under guidance of Eliodoro Camacho. 
13 The departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba dominated the country, containing 
together over 80% of the country’s population. 
14 The Liberal-Aymara alliance had a long pre-history. Its constitution must be understood in the context of 
the 1874, 1880 and 1883 land legislation and took shape particularly after the 1888 elections (Irurozqui 2005, 
289-91). From the perspective of indigenous rebellion, 1899 stands out as one of the most “sensational” and 
widespread outbursts of communal insurrection in republican Bolivia. However, its origins and manifestation 
but must be assessed in terms of both confrontation and alliance, linking up to a much longer history of 
indigenous resistance (Condarco 2011 [1964]; Mendieta 2010; see also chapters 5 and 6).  
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commitment to indigenous demands to halt hacienda expansion and restore communal 
property, but “consumed” their victory after 1899 in the form of accelerated hacienda 
encroachment and criminalization of indigenous protest. The “ideological bankruptcy of 
Bolivian liberalism” exemplifies how liberalism and other imported European notions 
that were eagerly copied by Latin-American elite groups, whether liberal or not, were 
freely reinterpreted in function of local realities and pragmatic (short-term) goals 
(Langer and Jackson 1990, 26). It allowed the Liberals to remain in power until 1920, 
when a new elite-subaltern pact, between the seceded Republican Party with the 
proletarian class (Irurozqui 1994, 23). 
The turn of the 20th century brought changes that revealed the vulnerability of the 
maintained “monoculture” (Bértola and Williamson 2006, 34). While tin exports boomed 
until the Great Depression, allowing Bolivia to absorb one quarter of the total world tin 
production (Contreras 1990), every fluctuation on the world market had a direct impact 
on (particularly Oruro’s) regional mining economy and urbanization.15 Meanwhile, in 
the 1910s, the political landscape splintered and the urban working class started to 
organize into labour unions (Klein 2011, 163-4). Particularly from the 1920s on, 
increasing rural (indigenous) agitation added oil to the fire (Rivera 1987). Through legal 
action and violent confrontation, a new cycle of indigenous uprising was launched, 
attacking the old exploitative order and meanwhile pressuring for education and civil 
rights.  
By 1930, the rural landscape had seriously altered. While rural-urban proportions had 
undergone little change, the “free” commoners had lost their fairly stable (pre-1880) 
position to the increasing group of peons and landless peasants. Meanwhile, the Chaco 
war (1932-1935) decisively triggered the demands for indigenous emancipation, making 
indigenous inclusion as first-class citizens in return for their “service” to the Patria an 
irrefutable argument.16 Nurtured by a paternalistic indigenism current, the 
 
                                                     
15 Bolivia’s exposure to falling world market prices caused a decline in trade, including tin exports, and 
industrial inactivity in Oruro. By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, first observations of an 
upcoming crisis were made, although Oruro still counted with increasing revenues (Ascarrunz 1909, 3). which 
became more alarming in the following decades (Tejada 1921, 47; Fajardo 1931) and moreover affected the 
social stability of the country (Lemaitre 1916, 7). The Prefect commented that due to this economic and 
demographic downturn, “thousands of arms” were leaving the mining sector hence constrainging the fiscal 
incomes for the state, with the important exception of the contribucion territorial (Ascarrunz 1909, 67-70). Also 
reports from Tacna, an important trade pole in the wider Andean economic space, give testimony of declining 
commercial activities (AHVD, Fondo de la Intendencia de Tacna y Gobernación de Arica, vol. 17, f.81-82v, 12.4.1893).  
16 The Chaco war was fought out against Paraguay, initiated in a desperate attempt to tackle internal political 
turmoil to which later the argument of securing control over (supposed) oil reserves was added (Klein 2011, 
175). The loss of the war intensified the debate on state transformation/modernization and simultaneously 
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government’s harsh criminalization would gradually make way for a form of 
exculpation, searching for national unity (Gotkowitz 2007, 101-130). With the economic 
downturn following the Great Depression, also in the haciendas, and the general crisis 
after the Chaco disaster, the oligarchic order started fading and made way for populist 
projects of the 1930s and 1940s, including the 1945 Indigenous Congress and the pro-
indigenous decrees of the Villaroel regime (ibid, 164-232). This was the formative 
prelude towards the 1952 National Revolution. 
In the following three sections of this chapter, the structures upon which Bolivian 
liberalism acted and through which its effects reverberated in the countryside will be 
analysed by assessing how community-based land regulations entangled with state-
driven land legislation (4.1), how patterns of inter-community mobility and exchange 
entangle with capitalist commodity and labour markets (4.2), and how the local 
configuration of social power relations and ethnic boundaries entangled with cycles of 
elite formation (4.3). Each of these entanglements and their interdependence is marked 
by the particular locale of the story: a community-based society with ancestral claims 
on its territory occupying a borderland area within the confines of a state-in-formation. 
This chapter aims to situate these land rights-conditioning structures (the national land 
system, the organization of the market sphere, and the local representation of state and 
market actors) in relation to that specific locale and to the changing economic and 
political climate.  
4.1 No commons without tributo: Dissecting the State-
community pact.  
The formation, modification and defence of a margin for autonomous land 
administration as upheld in Carangas is embedded in a particular, asymmetric relation 
to a tributary state. That relation must be traced back to the aftermath of the Spanish 
conquest, and situated within the long history of the formation of an Andean/Bolivian 
land system. Throughout that trajectory, the modalities and subtleties of state-
community bonds came to determine the parameters for communal land control. When 
late 19th century governments revised those bonds and enacted a new land legislation 
that ignored the legal-fiscal principles underpinning the state-community relation, this 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
represented the indigenous population – for the first time – as a “participation-capable” and “nation-
contributing” factor, although as cannon fodder in the first place.  
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was answered by intense indigenous protest. Before going over to a more detailed 
discussion of 19th century reinterpretations of the reciprocal state-community pact and 
how this revision forced communities to renegotiate the terms of participation in the 
republican state (Part III), this section gives an overview of the formative components 
and mechanisms of that framework. Property titles, taxes and inspections were the 
elements that defined indigenous communities’ landowning, taxpaying and 
representing attributions and integrated them as “legible” units within a centralized 
land system. 
4.1.1 Título, tributo and Revisita: Adjudication, taxation, and registration. 
In chapter 2 we referred to the act of categorization as an essential differentiation 
mechanism for a state apparatus to “incorporate [a group] in the dominant socio-economic 
structure while maintaining its exclusion” (Rivière 1982, 6). This is exactly what happened 
with the original population of the Latin-American continent under Spanish 
colonization: their classification as “indios” went accompanied by the gradual 
imposition of a juridical-fiscal order that established the terms interaction between 
differently classified sectors of society and with the state powers, and the modalities to 
accede and administer resources. As Ovando states it, the classification of the 
indigenous population into several taxpaying groups was at the heart of Bolivia’s 19th 
century land question (Ovando 1985, 38).  
This differentiating process started after the first chaotic episode of conquest, when 
the indigenous population, whose interaction with broader society was mediated by 
communal affiliations and whose resource base was subject to communal regulations, 
was forced into a contractual relationship with the State, in which land titles, known as 
títulos de composición, served as the “contract”. The Spanish Crown granted (read: sold) 
these titles to indigenous corporative groups, including the right to communal land 
tenure without state interference state in the internal management of land use and 
property. These terms and modalities were squarely framed within an asymmetrical but 
vital relationship between the ayllus and Spanish Crown. The mutual reliance on this 
kind of contractual relationship has been coined by Tristan Platt as a reciprocity pact 
that originated in colonial land (and hence tax) policies (Platt 1982, 1984, 1987; see also 
Albornoz, cited by Langer 2009, 537). The pact was sealed by a fiscal obligation, the 
tributo or the indigenous head tax as well as the accomplishing of free services. In return 
for the communities’ fiscal contributions, the State granted and protected communal 
land rights. Keeping this pact in place implied the repeated execution of record-keeping 
operations, known as the Revisitas. After independence, this arrangement would 
continue to regulate the relations between the indigenous population and the “pact-
making” State (Barragán 2002).  
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At the same time, this tributary pact was “incorporated” at the heart of community 
organization. Access to community land and to the community hierarchy determined by 
one’s fiscal status as “contribuyente” (taxpayer) and the corresponding punctual 
payment of a head tax. Moreover, the corresponding responsibility of land distribution 
and tax collection converted community leaders into powerful intermediaries. In the 
eyes of the Indians, the maintenance of tributary ties became a guarantee for the 
viability of native land tenure systems (Langer 1989, 4). In several places of the Andean 
highlands, this internalization implied the extension of principles of reciprocity and 
redistribution, defined by Murra as the Andean ideals that supported Inca imperial 
coherence, into community-State relations (Platt 1982); a reciprocal bond that also 
regulated usufruct an authority relations among hacienda Indians (Grieshaber 1989). 
However, this virtual pact also resettled the conditions for community membership, 
which became a fiscal category, defined by the state and produced through Revisita 
operations. The 19th century classification of the population into accountable categories 
implied that anyone who registered as “indigenous taxpayer” and complied with the 
due obligations, gained legitimate access to community lands, which rural mestizos 
effectively did (see also Ovando 1985, 46). Fiscal status and ethnic or social status could 
perfectly contrast and converted “indigenous” in a flexibly manageable category, 
although ultimately sanctioned by one’s compliance with communal duties. 
In the late 19th century, communal land tenure security was seriously undermined by 
a newly enacted land policy and the corresponding deployment of fiscal instruments to 
“commodify” the communal ownership of land in Bolivia. Such frank and one-sided 
denial of the state-community pact triggered a region-wide ayllu reaction aiming at the 
restoration of the pact. The way in which this renegotiation materialized in Carangas, 
how the reform process was as a result getting “bogged down” in litigation and conflict 
and how the communities of Carangas escaped this privatization movement forms the 
storyline of Part III of this dissertation. The tributo and título functioned as key 
instruments and the Revisita as a key locus in this (re)negotiation of community-State 
relations. These underpinning elements of the state-community contractual relation 
played a central role in both short-term and long-term, individual and collective 
strategies adopted to resist, adapt to and overcome challenges to the allocation of 
communal resources and the political representation of communal interests. 
Registration in the taxpayers lists served to justify commoners’ land claims (their 
registered name or of their ancestor confirms their right to community lands), or the 
escape from that registration could serve to evade the implied tax duties. 
Título: The property deed 
The granting of property deeds would take off under viceroy Toledo who replaced the 
encomienda system by a composición policy. This titling operation started with the land 
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inspection by visitador Luis López, the bishop of Quito in the 1590s, but the communities 
of Carangas would obtain their property documents only with the next visita.17 Over the 
centuries, these titles have been repeatedly copied, a practice that intensified in the 
context of the liberal land reform process, when they were filed in the Property Rights 
registry books (Archive of Property Rights in Oruro, ADRO). There are traces of the visit 
of Francisco de Saavedra y Ulloa, who would have been commissioned to Carangas in 
1569-70.18 Yet, the oldest colonial titles refer to inspector José de la Vega Alvarado to 
whom the Carangas communities paid the sum of 1000 pesos fuertes (Pauwels 1983, 150).19 
Although he conducted his survey in the 1640s, it is interesting to note that most of the 
titles are antedated to 1543 and 1545 due to later manipulations in order to give more 
weight to the deeds (Pauwels 1983, 130 and 2006, 374). This visita was repeated in 1720-
1721, when Domingo Atocha y la Reynaga examined and confirmed the communities’ 
property entitlements.20 
Abercrombie gives a detailed description of the documents granted through those 
survey operations:  
“lists boundary markers, called (in colonial Perú as in sixteenth-century Castile) 
mojones, and describe the ritual circumambulation of the border by land judges 
and the hereditary native lords of Asanaqi, who stake their legal claim to territory 
through this act and subsequently take legal “possession” by yanking up plants 
and throwing stones and clods of earth. All such acts are duly recorded by the 
notary who accompanies the entourage, describing performative acts as well as 
the particular characteristics of each mojón. The land title resulting from this 
 
                                                     
17 On these first colonial visitas in Alto Peru (with particular emphasis on the Cochabamba region), see 
Gordillo 1987, 206. 
18 Colonial documents, recuperated in the early 20th century at the Property Rights office of Oruro make 
notion of visitador Saavedra, appointed under Toledo. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1924, no. 13. See 
also Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris 2006, 655; Presta 2005, 601.  
19 The most complete copy of the visita executed by José de la Vega Alvarado dated the property adjudication 
on 1543 and recorded purchases in the following order, first in Totora –indicated as capital of the province- on 
October 22nd, Choquecota on November 1st, Corque on November 15th, Huachacalla on November 25th, 
Huaillamarca on December 1st, Curahuara on December 15th, Turco on December 28th 1545 and Andamarca in 
the first day of the next year. The title enumerated the terrains and boundaries of the community, in every 
case stressing the inclusion of both puna and valley lands, and concluding the purchase with a ceremonial act 
on main square of the community, rolling on the ground, tearing herbs and throwing rocks and other signs of 
possession. AHJO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” fs. 1-16; 
ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1918, no. 6, f. 12. 
20 There is also a reference to 1563, when visitador Juan Bravo del Rivero would have arrived to Carangas, 
erroneously reporting this visita as commissioned by Atocha y la Reynaga (ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, 
Carangas, 1918, no. 11). Other references to the 1720 visita were found in 1918, no. 1 and 10; 1924, no. 15 and 
no. 23 and 1928, no. 28. 
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recorded ritual is meant for the archive, creating an “archival memory” by which 
a rote, word-for-word and act-for-act recollection of the territory and its 
possession can be later reconstituted. Such mojones and possession ceremonies 
derive from Castilian society, where, before the ready availability of paper and the 
rise of archival culture, these ritual acts were once a Castilian technique for 
engraving these legal transactions in the unwritten archive of social memory. At 
each boundary marker, the judge reads out a copy of the sequence thus far 
constituted in the presence of cross-border neighbors, who might be expected to 
protest. When they do no, general consent to the mojón’s position is recorded on 
the copy” (Abercrombie 1998, 9).21 
The described practices remained in operation in Bolivia until into the 20th century. 
The documents themselves and their copies continued to be of strategic value long after 
their composition in order to back communal land claims with evidence. The 
departmental registration books, where all land properties for each of its provinces are 
recorded, as well as the historical archive of the Court of Oruro include several copies of 
these purchased composición titles which were validated upon request of the 
communities and their attorneys. These documents often contain errors, although this 
did not nullify their function as property rights evidence.22  
However, while posterior serving as important instruments to assert communal 
demands, this first titling operation in fact fuelled the very processes underlying later 
struggles for the defence and recovery of collective rights. As the composición allowed 
Spanish(-descending) landowners to convert the occupation of the most interesting 
lands into legitimate titles, it produced a simultaneous enclosure movement of 
community lands (Platt 1975, 38, cited in Rivière 1982, 25). As a result, Carangas was 
gradually dismembered of its discontinuous territories in ecologically complementary 
regions that reached as far as the Pacific and the eastern valleys (see 3.1.2). Thus the 
regularization (formalization) of the colonial land tenure system provoked and legalized 
the expropriation of indigenous community lands and in that sense can be seen as a first 
land reform. Some communities managed to maintain control over their archipelago 
lands, but as late colonial documents testify, lands in the CBB and Sucre valleys were no 
 
                                                     
21 The same formulations are repeated in every document concerning the adjudication of land to communities 
(the entire ayllu) or individual comunarios (their sayaña).  
22 Those documents pretending to duplicate the oldest property deeds usually refer to 1543 or 1545 as the year 
of title purchase. However, this transaction took place approximately one century later. A concrete example is 
the copy of the colonial boundary marking between Sabaya and Huachacalla, referring to an improbable land 
inspection in 1504, commissioned by Francisco, “viceroy de Toledo,” under king “Carlos Felipe de Castillo” 
(1918, no. 9). Other copies refered to Domingo Atocha y la Reinosa and José de la Vega Alvarado as one single 
person (1924, no. 15) or antedated the visita as far as 1504 (1924, no. 24). ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas. 
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longer cultivated by their ‘own’ people (mitimaes pertaining to Carangas), but by Spanish 
renters (arrendatarios) who paid a certain amount of money to the communities.23 This 
renting practice was possibly a result of the demographic decline caused by the 
obligatory labour services and related high mortality rate among the indigenous 
population (Rivière 1982, 36-7).  
In the late 19th century, this “rented” control over distant lands was seized as an 
argument to absorb those lands as state property (see chapter 6). This privatization 
operation was part of the mentioned liberal land reform project that envisioned the 
replacement of all repartimiento lands by private titles. However, highland communities 
and their leaders knew to extort the vital concession that the possession of títulos de 
composición guaranteed a community’s exemption from land partition. This is where a 
title’s contractual role came into play. With the land reform of 1953 the communal 
ownership for those lands possessing colonial titles was consolidated with “undivided 
titles” (título proindiviso). Subsequently, the constitutional reforms of 1994 and 2009 
redefined this communal land status as “original community land” (Tierra Comunitarias 
de Origen or TCO) and “indigenous original peasant territory” (Territorio Indígena 
Originario Campesino or TIOC) respectively.24   
A title creates a link to the centralized jurisdictional and decision-making system in 
the sense that it gives comunarios access to court and forces them to uphold an active 
relationship with the executive and jurisdictional powers in order to secure this 
achievement. Land was thus a very most common reason for comunarios to come into 
contact with court. Litigation over land belonged to the order of the day. The sub-
Prefect of Carangas in 1921 understood the problem as follows: 
“of all the numerous cantons of Carangas, there is not one that not finds itself 
entangled in some or various monumental lawsuits with its neighbour” ... “the 
initial point [of those suits] is of extreme insignificance, it concerns undoubtedly 
not more than an overstepping of their respective lands, what could have been 
dispelled with care, easily, but it happened that this care never has been imposed 
by no administrative authority and even less judicially, in the sense of avoiding 
this ruinous litigation through an amicable and rational arrangement” (Lima 1921, 
111). 
An assessment of the almost endless series of land dispossession throughout the 
researched time frame reveals a recurring pattern. Most of these cases are conflicts over 
sayaña, community, cantonal or even inter-departmental boundaries that were violated 
 
                                                     
23 This was for instance the case in “la Chulla”, a terrain in hands of the community of Totora. ADRO, 
Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 47, fs. 334-377v. See also Rivière 1982, 36-7 and Pauwels 1983, 152. 
24 A more detailed assessment of the role of these post-1952 changes in Carangas is given in Cottyn (2012a). 
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through active or passive incursions.25 These were the provocations that took 
comunarios and their leaders to court, either through written or oral litigation. In case 
of collective claims, comunarios had to appoint an apoderado to denounce the 
dispossession and defend their land rights before court (see chapter 5). Also individual 
plaintiffs relied on apoderados, usually members of the mestizo village elite. An 
investigation followed, involving multiple actors who at times seized the conflict in 
function of their own interests and complicated its solution.26 When the land dispute 
had caused damage or casualties, a compensation was established. In protracted 
conflicts over land and boundaries, the verdict was to demarcate the territory.27 This 
could be done symbolically,28 but was most commonly done through a formal 
delineation (deslinde or amojonamiento).29 Deslindes were intended to harmonize 
neighbour relations over the long-term, yet sometimes they were to no avail as disputes 
escalated and converted into “an interminable war about lands.”30  
 
                                                     
25 Sometimes it concerned “passive” trespasses by letting their livestock enter the plots, others were more 
active, individually or in groups of 10 up to 50 or –exceptionally- even hundred(s). Invasions were often 
“covert” operations taking profit of the absence of the sayaña holders, but in the context of overt conflicts it 
came to violent encounters, occasionally with (fire) arms, while the sayañeros were working the land or 
during days of celebration. Sowed lands were left destroyed, harvestable fields uprooted or tilled, harvest or 
property on that plot stolen or plundered and livestock killed. Some examples are AJC, 1867, no. 1002; 1869, 
no. 1074, no. 1090 and no. 1108.  
26 The damage or the value of the lost/damaged properties had to be measured, described and estimated, 
which was executed by appointed experts (peritos), a function usually performed by the village elite. The 
plaintiffs, accused and witnesses were interviewed. In many cases, inter-comunario litigations escalated as 
both parties had to call in additional witnesses, their entire family and social network, which was not always 
conducive to a quick and peaceful solution of the conflict. An example is AJC, Civiles,  1914, no. 1. 
27 The peritos in a sense absorbed the role of the elderly, whose testimonies were originally the guideline for 
the execution of divisions and demarcations. An example is the 1786 land division between the ayllus of the 
Urinsaya part of Totora. ADRO, ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas 1924, no. 2. 
28 The inter-departmental dispute over the Coipasa hill (Tunupa) between Sabaya (Carangas province), Salinas 
de Garci-Mendoza (Paria province) and Tahua (Lípez province, Potosí department) was “closed” by the 
building of a chapel in the contested terrain to prevent further “advances” and dispossession by the 
comunarios of Sabaya. However, the latter continued insisting on a formal demarcation as the only legitimate 
ground for property rights. AJC, 1869, no. 1074. 
29 This juridical procedure usually implied a certain cost, hence all comunarios were expected to contribute 
with a small amount of money. See for instance AJC, 1874, no. 1332. This could also lead to abuses as in 1878, 
when the corregidor of Choquecota, Francisco Molina, seized the occasion of a petitioned delineation between 
two ayllus of his jurisdiction to charge each of them 15 pesos however without executing a division nor 
delineation. The corregidor, for his part, stated that it concerned a voluntary donation. AJC, 1878, no. 1596. 
30 This happened with the interdepartmental dispute between Huaillamarca and Pacajes. AJC, 1869, no. 1185; 
1874, no. 1335. 
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Tributo: The head tax  
To secure communal land rights, communities had to renew their contract relation with 
the state on a regular basis. This was organized through the installation of an extractive 
system that had two components, a head tax, known as the tributo, and labour service, 
known as the mita.31 The tributo indigenal was to be paid by the head of every household 
that belonged to an indigenous community. In formal terms, these tributarios comprised 
all men between 18 and 50 years old belonging to the community, although women and 
older or even younger man also figure in the tax registers. The mita was a corvée 
recruitment of mineworkers to work in Potosí.32 All adult males of the community had 
to fulfil this service, but few of these mitayos came back (Pauwels 1983, 123-5; Bakewell 
1985; Tandeter 1997). While the mita would eventually not survive the transition to 
independence, the head tax was maintained (though briefly abolished). The decree of 
July 7th 1838 defined the indigenous population as “the persons that pay the single head tax, 
denominated by the Spanish as tributo, their parents, wives and children.”33 On top of this 
half-yearly payment, commoners were to comply with several offices.34 
Among the indigenous population, a fiscal differentiation process ensued from inter-
rural migration dynamics. The colonial imposition of monetary and labour extractions 
triggered the exodus of numerous tributarios and mitayos attempting to escape their 
status. This generated a new, minor class of “rural poor”, classified as forasteros 
(foreigners) with an inferior socio-fiscal status, that is, weaker land rights but also lower 
tax duties (Cornblit in Flores Galindo 1977, 177; Stern 1995, 87) The stay-behinds were 
classified as originarios (originals),35 enjoying full communal land rights, but facing a 
dramatically increasing tax burden as their numbers were thinned out by epidemics and 
migration, which prompted even more people to migrate and offer their labour force to 
landlords or miners. As Cook summarizes Sánchez Albornoz’ pioneering analysis on the 
tributo in Alto Peru (Sanchez Albornoz 1978), “squeezed between the exactions of 
 
                                                     
31 The mita was not only paid in human labour, but also in animal labour. Particularly the comunarios of 
Carangas, representing a region famous for its llama wealth, were subject to a quota of llamas which they were 
obliged to carry with them to serve as beasts of burden in Potosí. In 1802 the quota was set on 5 llamas for 
each mitayo. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1924, no. 2.  
32 In one copy of the first visita, José de la Vega Alvarado explicitely grants the composición title to the mitayos 
in Potosí (of Carangas and Porco). ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1929, no. 55. 
33 Own translation. Ovando  1985, 46. 
34 In 1908, a jilaqata stated that for their land rights, they paid the territorial tax, and services to God and the 
State, including the delivery of 2 alferados, 2 mayordomos, 2 altareros, a postillón, an irasiri, a mitani for the priest, 
a semanero, a monamento and a paccihaque. AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 26. 
35 The originarios are the commoners registered during the first repartimientos and their patrilinear 
descendants.  
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corregidores, curacas, miners, hacendados, and parish priests, the best hope of the Indian was 
often flight” (Cook 1979, 727). However, this flight did not equal an absolute rupture with 
that home community. While forastero mobility demonstrates that the weight of the tax 
and mita obligations were out of proportion with the reward (which is the retaining of 
full ayllu membership and thus of full communal land rights), this originario “flight” was 
neither a desperate form of anti-colonial resistance nor a symptom of community 
disintegration and homogenization of the rural landscape. Rather, these escape tactics 
were a form of adaptation to altered access conditions to land and resources, their 
management and their circulation (Medinaceli 2006, 492; Saignes 1995). 
This differentiation process concerns a major transition in Andean rural power 
relations as it imposes a fundamental inequality upon the distribution of land rights. 
With the development of the hacienda system, which absorbed large part of these 
migrants, the colonial-republican tributo system came to include multiple tributario 
types, including the communitarian categories of the originarios, the forasteros or 
agregados (with or without land),36 and the Urus and the hacienda categories of 
yanaconas37 and forasteros (Grieshaber 1980, 267). The yanaconas, the Urus, the vagabonds 
and the indigenous population in most of the Atacama province enjoyed a special fiscal 
status, in case of the Urus because of their extreme poverty (Ovando 1985, 37). Black 
slaves as well as the indios changos living in the port of Cobija were exempt from 
tributary obligations (ibid). Yet in Carangas, the differentiation remained very weak, 
mainly concentrated between the Aymara originarios and Urus, and with a very low 
number of forasteros, which puts the region in a “marginal” to historical agrarian 
transformations since the (colonial) onset of these changes (Zulawski 1985, 161).  
Known as tributarios or contribuyentes, all indigenous rural dwellers were registered in 
the respective fiscal categories in a taxpayers list (padroncillo) kept by the responsible 
collectors, the corregidores and alcaldes in each village (Ovando Sanz 1985, 33). The 
 
                                                     
36 Among forasteros there were some differences as well, some still paying the tribute as originarios of their 
home community, others paying tribute in their new residence and others not paying anything. In the 
taxpayer lists, we find forasters “with” and “without” land. In the case that “newcomers” were accepted by 
the community, they integrated as originarios and occupyied the tierras de origen and were annoted in the 
taxpayers lists as “forasteros with lands”. When those newcomers were only allowed to cultivate the tierras 
sobrantes or lands in “excess” of the community they adopted the status of agregados and were registered as 
forasteros (or agregados) “without lands”, which and integrated in the community as part of a human 
resource pool to “tap” tax and service input from (however at a lower rate). On top of the tierras de origen and 
tierras sobrantes, there were the lands for collective (originario and agregado) use. Rivière 1982,  73 and Platt 
1982, 52-3.  
37 There was a difference between yanaconas of the Royal Crown or of the Republic and yanaconas de chacras, all 
corresponding to unfree labourers or peons, controlled either by the state or by private landlords 
respectively. 
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number of people on these lists and their differentiated status established the tax 
burden per community. This burden was to be contributed on half-yearly basis, in two 
“tercios” or semesters.38 The tercio de San Juan (St. John the Baptist) was collected in 
June; the tercio de Navidad (Christmas) in December. However, in order to deal with 
permanent revenue shortages provoked by excessive military and bureaucratic 
expenses, it was common to collect the tax with anticipation, which tended to provoke 
fierce resistance by the highland communities.39 As proof of their loyalty, contribuyentes 
received an official document, a ticket distributed by the tax collectors each time they 
paid the contribution, which could be used as evidence in the context of land disputes 
or sayaña adjudication.40  
 
Figure 23 Typewritten tax receipt, canton Totora, 1930.41 
 
                                                     
38 When a contribuyente is not able to pay the quota, he is ordered to compensate this deficiency by fulfilling 
services to the community, which in practice meant to the local authorities. For instance, in 1873 an originario 
had to serve the priest as mitani, which was actually a women’s task. AJC, 1874, no. 1332. 
39 Irurozqui writes that this practice was installed under José de Ballivián's government (1841-’47), turning the 
indigenous population into strong opponents of this president and his successors José Miguel de Velasco 
(1848) and Manuel Isidoro Belzu (1848-‘55) (Irurozqui 1999, 717). In one instance, tributarios protested because 
the anticipated collection of the contribution of “el tercio de San Juan” had left them with “ni un centavo”. AJC, 
1864, no. 964 and 968. 
40 AJC, 1860, no. 835; 1877, no. 1549; Civiles, 1908, no. 13.  
41 In the 20th century, the deposit of the cantonal collectors to the departmental treasury was registered and 
confirmed with typewritten receipts. Receipt of the payment of 972,55 bolivianos by the collecting alcalde of 
the Aransaya faction of the canton Totora for the contribución territorial of the second semester of 1930. APO, 
Libros de contabilidad, 1930, “Tesoro Departamental de Oruro”, loose papers, 13.08.1930. 
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The jilaqatas collected the total sum of tributo revenues of their ayllu and were 
responsible for its submission to the official accountable for depositing the money to 
the National Treasury.42 In case the established quota was not reached, the collector was 
responsible to add the missing money out of his own pocket.43 Of the entire collected 
tax, a certain percentage of the revenue was destined to the official collectors 
(governors, corregidores, jilaqatas, alcaldes, caciques etc.) and another, higher, 
percentage was lost through fraud, for instance by collecting too much tribute, without 
registering in the padroncillo, or from tax-exempt population groups (ibid,  47).44 
The individual fiscal obligation of rural producers reflected the strength of their land 
rights, ranging from full access to community lands to no rights, however without 
telling anything about the size or soil quality of the land the taxpayer acceded. Indeed, 
it reflected a person’s position within the community and not a person’s property or 
income. The allocation of a portion of land to a new contribuyente was a communitarian 
responsibility that was to be legitimated by the central state. The most common way to 
allocate land was when the usufructuary of a piece of land reached the age of 50 and 
replaced by either his son (classified as próximo) or an originario without land, or when a 
comunario without land or contribuyentes with a deficient land base or eager to extend it 
petitioned for land that lay fallow or unoccupied.  
In cases of land shortage, when there was no sayaña to pass from father to son, 
people searched for solutions and petitioned the adjudication of (supposedly) vacant 
 
                                                     
42 In colonial times, this tax collection, as well as the recruitment of mitayos, was a function of the kuraka 
(cacique). From 1855 on, the provincial responsibility of depositing the tributo was assigned to the Colector de 
la Contribución Indigenal (Ovando 1985, 70-1), although the local sources give witness of a wide range of 
denominations of that function. In the transition to the new cadastral system envisioned by the reform of 
1874, the office of cacique licitador was created, who deposited the collected tax in the departmental treasury 
(Rivière 1982, 105). 
43 In order to fulfill their duty as tributo collectors, the jilaqatas sometimes had to borrow money from others 
(relatives), for instance two comunarios from Turco borrowed each other money (up to 150 pesos) when one 
of both was appointed as jilaqata. AJC, Civiles, 1905, no. 2. 
44 When in 1916, the Prefectura decided to suppress the 1% premium for alcaldes cobradores (collectos at the 
village level), the concerned functionaries complained heavily against the loss of their compensation of “the 
personal work of those who with all honesty and compliance came from a long distance to pay their quotas in the 
Departmental Treasury;” a job in which no other functionary, neither the sub-prefects, intervened (Lemaitre 
1916, 56-7). According to the Prefect, this suppression undoubtedly complicates the collection of the tax 
because the rural collectors will not make the same surveying effort without receiving compensation nor pay 
their transportation costs out of one’s own pocket (ibid). In 1927, the Prefect demanded departmental 
exemption from the system of “licitación”, which was the appointment of individual head tax collectors, 
because it did not give satisfactory results and was heavily resisted by all communities of the department 
because of abuses, this system (Calderón 1927, 50-1). He proposed to stick to the 1874 and 1890 stipulations 
which indicate the sub-Prefects and corregidores as collectors, although in Carangas three indigenous persons 
with a 5% premium were assigned to the task (ibid). 
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land.45 Alternative ways to access the originario status and obtain sayaña lands was 
through marriage46 or through transfer of the sayaña of absentee relatives.47 The other 
way round, if there was land but no secure replacer, for instance when a contribuyente 
remained absent for a long time48 or when there were no children,49 “alternative” 
transfers were organized, with wives or minor sons taking over the status of 
contribuyente. Several manipulations to enter the register, such as minors or women 
registered as tributario, were noticed by the fiscal functionaries.50 Important for a 
notable process described further in this dissertation, this also included the creation of 
a group of “mestizos inscribed as indigenous originarios” or as forasteros (Ovando 1985, 
45). What happened was that, as tributary pressures rose over the 19th century, the 
definition of contribuyente gained flexibility, including various strategies to secure 
their land rights (Grieshaber 1980, 255).51 This “playing” with fiscal categories was not a 
new strategy but gained importance in response to growing demographic and/or fiscal 
pressures.  
There are several cases of comunarios petitioning the adjudication of a “vacant” 
sayaña because they were paying the originario tribute yet did not access (enough) land 
that enabled them to pay that tax. Sayaña adjudication was first requested to the state 
 
                                                     
45 In one case, an originario declared not to possess a sayaña because he did not know his natural father and 
petitions the adjudication of a “vacant” sayaña. In another case, a comunario of Totora who only acceded to 
the land of his brother petitioned the adjudication of a vacant sayaña now that his son is soon to be included 
in the padrón. Respectively AJC, 1871, no. 1196 and 1875, no. 1423. In 1832, a comunario in Totora accused of 
land theft protested that he  had three male taxpaying children to provide with land (ADRO, Propiedades 
Provincias, Carangas, 1924, no. 3). Not seldom, a comunario attempted to get a sayaña adjudicated by petitioning 
for a piece of available land that afterwards did not seem to be vacant at all, for instance: AJC, 1868, no. 1041; 
1870, no. 1158. 
46 Example of a marriage of non-contribuyentes with someone holding inheritance rights over sayañas are 
AJC, Civiles, 1909, no. 11. See also Ovando 1985, 34. 
47 AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 25. 
48 Rafael Condori was replaced by his son while he was living in the valleys; meanwhile his brother would have 
seized the opportunity to deprive him from his contribuyente status and his plot of land. AJC, Civiles,  1901, no. 
5. 
49 A couple of comunarios who remained childless, passed their contribuyente status to an adopted child, the 
son of his niece. AJC, Civiles, 1911, no. 1. Another case was when the mother of a contribuyente took over that 
status: AJC, Civiles, 1914, no. 32. 
50 AJC, 1867, f. 197. 
51 For instance, in the 1871 Revisita, a comunario of the ayllu Coro in the canton of Corque was able to pass 
from Uru to originario. Coro was predominantly inhabited by Urus and counted only with 7 originario 
taxpayers. ANB, Rv, no. 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, f. 46. In 1870, a 
domestic in service of a governmental functionary in the village of Corque (the servant could have been an 
(adopted) family member) was inscribed into the Revisita as originario, replacing a deceased taxpayer whose 
sayaña had since remained “headless”. AJC, 1870, no. 1150. 
 200 
authorities (the Sub-Prefect of the province) who had to legitimate the petition, to then 
be executed by the Corregidor after verification with the caciques and jilaqatas to 
prevent conflicts or forms of excessive accumulation. The adjudication of abandoned 
terrains in most cases provoked disputes as the terrain seldom resulted to be without 
usufructuary. In the years comprised by the case study of this research (1860-1930), 
adjudication petitions (including the creation of new contribuyentes) are frequent, yet 
over time, this diminished as demographic pressures aggravated land fragmentation 
and practical arrangements emerged to overcome the limit on the number of 
contribuyentes.52 In the 20th century, however, the mechanism to distribute land 
generated a fragmentation of plots as a result of demographic growth. If there was no 
land to partition and adjudicate, the próximo or petitioner became a contribuyente 
without lands or families sought other ways to make sure their children will have a 
piece of land by the time they become taxpayer. 
Petitions for sayaña adjudication seem to reflect the wording of a loyalty oath, first 
taken through sayaña petitioning and then renewed regularly through the tributo 
payment. In the eyes of the indigenous population, tribute payment was a matter of 
citizenship which gave them certain attributions (Irurozqui 1999, 713). Loyalty to the 
state was thus conditional as the tribute payment created expectations and gave them a 
strong lever to indigenous people in securing their land access. The interplay and 
constant strain on expectations and commitments is reflected in the procedures and 
formulations to ‘enter in’ and ‘confirm’ the contractual relation with the state or the 
occasions in which either party ‘abuses’ or ‘fools’ that contract. First of all, loyalty had 
to be openly declared when petitioning sayaña adjudication or other appeals to the state 
authorities.53 In every appeal to the state, petitioners underlined the precision and 
steadfastness of their contribution to the treasury,54 and of their service to the 
community, the Church and the State.55 The other way round, they stressed the vital 
exigency in that compliance with these loyalty demands was only possible when 
granted the solicited property, because it “provides in the necessities of life, to satisfy the 
 
                                                     
52 For the estancias in Sabaya studied by Rivière, there has not been any new sayaña ‘adjudication’ since the 
last agrarian census of 1950 (Rivière 1982, 269). From then on, other mechanisms such as the rotational 
payment of the contribution between the official contribuyente/sayañero (who owns the land 
title/adjudication document) and his relatives were relied on to foresee the growing number of comunarios 
with access to community land. 
53 This humbleness was often emphasized to the extreme, as by the jilaqata of ayllu Parco in Huaillamarca 
daring to submit a request to the Prefect “though it is too difficult to believe, that an imbecilic indio justifiably, dares 
to address the Supreme Government”. AJC, 1864, no. 960. 
54 One of many examples is AJC, 1876, no. 1482.  
55 AJC, Civiles, 1914, no. 32 and 33. 
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indigenous contribution,”56 and “fulfil the services and other obligations to which we as 
indigenous are bound.”57  
The state’s ability to levy the head tax determined its financial limits, the 
governmental “elbow room”. Although its taxation system also included other fiscal 
obligations towards the comunarios, including proportional taxes on production,58 the 
road tax or prestación vial (levied by the national and departmental treasury),59 the 
plazaje tax on ambulant sale (provincial treasury)60 and the sisa or tax on foodstuff 
(municipal treasuries).61 However, the indigenous head tax was the most indispensable 
source in creating that room. The fiscal role of the Carangas communities was crucial to 
the (particularly departmental) treasury, which at its turn determined those 
communities’ room for manoeuvre. While addressing the province commonly as a 
marginalized corner with little potential, the central state powers could not deny the 
fiscal potential and loyalty of its population. In that respect, Carangas gives credit to 
Ovando’s statement, that the richest provinces in terms of their fiscal contribution were 
at the same time the poorest in terms of their own economic development (Ovando 
1985, 134).  
In the first place, the indigenous head tax payment in itself was of vital importance to 
the state’s solvency. No other fiscal revenue could compete with the tributo’s 
 
                                                     
56 Andamarca. AJC, 1867, no. 1003. 
57 AJC, 1870, 1139. 
58 Apart from the head tax, indigenous community members – as did all non-indigenous in the country- also 
contributed with a share of their production in species, however not to the National Treasury, but to the 
Church. The diezmos (tithes) were the most “notorious” of these proportional taxes and corresponded to a 
tenth of one’s agricultural production, while the primicias were levied on the first harvest (about a fifth of the 
diezmo), the veintenas on wool livestock and the huasiveintena on smaller animals, together providing in 10% of 
the national budget (Ovando 1985, 51-2). In the 1860s-70s, the diezmos brought about 5740 pesos in the 
departmental treasury of Oruro of which about 2400 pesos were collected in the Carangas province, each 
community contributing with about 300 to 400 pesos, less than a tenth of what they paid as head tax 
(calculated on basis of rough data from the Archivo de la Prefectura de Oruro, APO, Libros de contabilidad, 1860, 
“Documentos duplicados”, document no. 79, and 1870, “Libro de cuentas”, f. 19). In 1910, Bacarreza recorded a 
yearly yield of the decimal tax on livestock of 5000 bolivianos in Carangas (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 
380). Although the tithe system (diezmos, primicias, veintenas and other ecclesiastic taxes) was eventually 
abolished in 1924, several complaints by indigenous comunarios give evidence of the continuing exaction of 
this contribution in the Carangas province (González Flores 1929, 32-3).  
59 In the transition to independence, the mita had disappeared, but the road tax (prestación vial) continued to 
subject the comunarios to an annual labour service, which in the first decades of the 20th century was 
gradually transformed into a monetary contribution for road maintenance. 
60 The plazaje fluctuated from 5 to maximum 26 bolivianos yearly per sale location, which were the cantons of 
the province (Bacarreza 1910, 380). 
61 The sisa included for instance the taks on flour, yielding 260 bolivianos yearly in the province (Bacarreza 
1910, 380). 
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indispensability to the National Treasury, at least until the 1860s (Sánchez Albornoz 
1978; Grieshaber 1977; Platt 1986; Abendroth 1991). In colonial times, mining and 
commerce revenues were more important to the Treasury than tribute incomes. Due to 
the independence wars, its impact on international trade and the downturn of the 
mining sector (flooded mines!), this changed after independence, when the tribute 
became the government’s prime income source, only to be altered from the late 1850s 
on (Klein 1993, 113). During this period, the vassalage entailed in the colonially 
inherited pact provided the State with a crucial legal basis for tax extraction. While all 
other revenues extracted from internal and external circuits were in decline, the 
growing rural population –and hence of taxpayers- was the tower of strength of the 
national Treasury (Klein 2011, 112). However, if by 1860 the tributo dwarfed any other 
income source, this dominance started to erode in the following years. Platt has argued 
that the pact continued, but at a sub-national level, hence indicating the major 
condition for communitarian structures to be respected (see Appendix 7).  
From 1872 on, a “financial decentralization” installed departmental and municipal 
treasuries in parallel to the national treasury, which made the national treasury 
increasingly reliant upon exportation revenues, announcing the shift from a tributo-
based to a mining-based central state budgeting (Barragán 2009, 105). In the first 
decades of the republic, tributo incomes made up 40% to 50 % of the entire state budget. 
From the middle of the 19th century up to 1880, its share gradually eroded as an effect of 
increasing mining revenues and fluctuated between 20% and 30% of all national incomes 
(see Appendix 7). Once the tax became a departmental income source in 1880, the 
contribución territorial came to play an important role in determining the departmental 
budget, until about the 1930s (Barragán 2009, 108; Barragán and Pérez 2007), while other 
income-making activities -particularly mining- served the national treasury.62 While the 
territorial contribution constituted the department’s “principal and most profitable 
income”, collected with regularity and at times even produced a surplus (Ascarrunz 1909, 
66), overall departmental revenues were stagnant since the 1880s because increasing 
trade and mining yields had become destined to municipal and national treasuries 
respectively.63 The contribución remained one of the most guaranteed departmental 
 
                                                     
62 According to data for the first 4 months of 1898, the head tax made up 79,5% of all departmental income 
sources, although this might be a distorted picture (Aramayu 1898, xxiii). In the 1910 to 1930 decades, 
contribución revenues counted for 32 up to 44% of all departmental incomes. Indicative is also the data on the 
collection of a “compensatory” payment in 1866, in the context of Melgarejo’s first land reform attempt (see 
chapter 6), which demonstrates that the entire departmental budget was dependent from head tax revenue 
(although  this was at that time still a national income source). 
63 The implication was that the departmental budget became increasingly reliant upon national injections, 
especially to cover police expenses (Sanjínes 1906, 19-20). Moreover, in the context of the early 20th century 
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incomes, but the departmental treasury built up a deficit, mainly due to inaccurate head 
tax collection, although this seems to be handled with by 1930.64 
As one of the three, and later four, provinces comprising only around 20% of the 
department’s entire population, Carangas accounted for 39% (1898) up to 42% (1920) in 
the constitution of those revenues, with an annual contribution fluctuating around 
36000 to 38000 bolivianos.65 This was the only revenue received by the departmental 
treasury from that province (Careaga in Ascarrunz 1909, 106), and its input underwent 
no change as long as the modification of its padrón remained forthcoming due to anti-
Revisita protest (Lemaitre 1916, 56). It is interesting to note the contrast between the 
province’s resistant reputation because of withholding the land inspection to update of 
the taxpayers lists and the respect it gained as a very docile province, being the most 
excellent of all in punctually and completely fulfilling their fiscal compliance 
(Ascarrunz 1918, 29 and 1919, 38-9). This contrast can only be understood in light of the 
stake the communities had in securing the continuation of the “old” state-community 
pact.  
Despite the radical land reform of the late 19th century and the substitution of the 
tributo by a contribución territorial, the head tax system underwent little change in those 
areas where communal land tenure persisted. Over time, the tax lost in importance and, 
as land property fragmented, so did the “contribuyente” status, particularly in the eyes 
of the government. The differentiation that existed before, between the originario, 
agregado and Uru quota and land rights, remained intact in Carangas (at least until 
1975), but the abolition of this distinction had become obsolete already before as most 
communities, as in Sabaya, exclusively counted with originarios (Rivière 1982, 254). 
About one century after the indigenous taxation was decentralized (1880), the tributo 
was officially abolished, although in Carangas the payment was adjusted to an internal 
“contract” with its collection serving as a community fund for collective realizations 
such as the building of schools, church renovation or road works.66 Thus, while the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
economic downturen, increased the departmental treasury’s came to rely even more strongly upon the 
indigenous communities (Ascarrunz 1909, 67-70). 
64 See following Prefectural reports: Ascarrunz 1918, anexo 2; Arce 1923, 44; Ibañez 1924, 27; Calderón 1927, 49-
50; Fajardo 1931, 80. 
65 There are however some problems and insecurities with these data as it is not always clear if the estimated 
revenue annoted in annual Prefect reports corresponds to the tax of one semester or a complete year. Often, 
an amount between 73000 and 75000 bolivianos is annoted, while in other years half of that amount, around 
36000 bolivianos. Taking Barragán’s note on the fact that contribución revenues made up about 60% of all 
departmental incomes (Barragán 2009, 108), and taking into account that budget calculations in prefectural  
reports often included (expected) incomes for one and a half years, it must be concluded that Carangas’ 
annual contribution based on the head tax fluctuated around 36000 to 38000 bs. See appendix 7. 
66 Rivière 1982, 106; Regalsky and Quisbert 2008, 178-9; and own field work notes. 
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status of contribuyente is blurring, the category of sayañero (still based on the payment of 
a community contribution and the participation in the fiesta-cargo system) continues to 
form the basis for group identity and access to land in Carangas.67 
Revisita: The land inspection 
In order to calculate the expected tax revenues for its Treasury, the colonial state had to 
gain an idea of the number of its “vassals”; taxation implies registration. Thereto, visits 
to all communities were to be organized and regularly repeated to count the proportion 
of contribuyentes in each community and set the according tax quota. The organization 
of the first Visita General in the Viceroyalty of Peru, in 1549, marks the moment that the 
Spanish Crown became more interested in curbing the power of the encomenderos in 
order to secure and enhance its royal revenues (Zagalsky 2009, s.p). Once implemented 
under Spanish colonial rule, these (repeated) land inspections, known as visitas and 
revisitas, would -after a short interval of frustrated attempts to implement Bolívar’s 
liberal decrees- remain operative throughout the 19th century until the government 
started in 1880 with the implementation of the disentailment reform. The most 
important change was that under republican rule, particularly by the Revisita 
regulations set by Andrés de Santa Cruz’s government in 1831, the organization of the 
land inspections was reoriented towards exclusively tributary objectives (Ovando 1985, 
32-3; Irurozqui 1999, 711).  
In the first place, the padrones allowed the administration to gain an idea of its 
expected revenues. In fact, the national (and later, departmental) treasury was 
extremely dependent upon the incomes of the indigenous head tax (see “Tributo” and 
Appendix 7). From the point of view of the indigenous population, registration in the 
padrón had clear advantages, most evidently the access to community lands, but also the 
exemption from military service as established by the circular of 28 June 1838 (Irurozqui 
1999, 712). But the land survey interventions did much more than register “dry” 
quantitative data on the indigenous population, their resources and fiscal potential. 
They were dramatic events driven by a political agenda to detect and eliminate 
disorders and impose territorial order, thereby renewing the fiscal and sovereign link 
between the communities and a (wannabe) omnipresent state (Zagalsky 2009; Gil and 
Salomon 1994, 8-10). They served to “fixate” local realities, which especially in the case 
of the Visita of La Palata can be taken quite literally, attempting to map and halt 
taxpayer migration (the forastero phenomenon), thereby converting the Visita 
documents into a key entry to patterns of indigenous mobility (Medinaceli 2006, 490; see 
also 4.1.2). Moreover, in the event of a land survey, state-community tensions found 
 
                                                     
67 Interview with Máximo Reinaga, head of the Jach’a Karangas Council, March 2012. 
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their most tangible public manifestation, enacted with an eye for drama. In view of its 
implicit (land rights) guarantees and (capital and labour) extractions, comunarios found 
themselves captured between acceptation (and even insistence) and rejection towards 
land survey interventions. The general distrust and frequent protest against Revisita 
intervention indicate how comunarios understood too well “the relation between 
information-gathering and external control, taxation and regulation” (Bolton 2007, 12). 
Because of these tensions, the surveys were often accomplished “lightly and without the 
calm and quietude that are indispensable to its success.”68 
In terms of formal modalities, Revisita commissions were formed by provincial 
governors, assisted by an apoderado fiscal (public representative) and a number of 
secretaries, who were instructed to collect detailed data on the amount, names, civil 
state, age, sex, and fiscal status of all indigenous people living in their jurisdiction 
(Ovando 1985, 32-3).69 This commission crossed the entire province, visiting each village 
where they executed the survey with collaboration of the local authorities, which 
usually took them up to two months.70 In November 1869, local authorities in 
Choquecota reported that on the first of October of that year all commissioners had 
started up the execution of the census and cadastre, “working from sunrise to sunset except 
in the moments of lunch and of dinner”.71 Between the field work and the eventual 
publication of the padrón could pass over half a year.72 These functionaries, often with 
one commissioner for each canton, were usually recruited among local mestizo villagers 
(sometimes even pastoralists), who often hardly disposed of the necessary requirements 
to execute the job, such as reading and writing skills, or simply did not fulfil their duty, 
which explains the frequency of illegal exactions and other abuses.73 Indeed, for these 
 
                                                     
68 Own translation. Apoderado Fiscal Antonio Monroy commenting in 1871 about the execution of the 
previous Revisita of 1867 in the Carangas province, although Monroy was accused by his successor in 1877 of 
the same carelessness. ABN, Rv, 1871, parte I, f.1v. and 1877, f.0. 
69 In line with art. 41 of the decree of 28 February 1831 and the Revisita regulation of 1836, the government 
appointed the governador and an apoderado fiscal to execute the Revisita, although several denominations were 
used to indicate the Revisita officers. Platt notes that in the 1837 Revisita , padrones were made up according 
to ayllu afiliation (receiving the data from the kuraka), but from 1843 on, the padrones were made up on basis 
of canton afiliation which conceals the fact that ayllu were spread over multiple (puna and valley) cantons 
(Platt 1982, 47). 
70 For instance, the survey of all cantons in order to elaborate the padrón of 1838 was carried out between 
April and June 1838. ABMO, no. 391, Padron general de contribuyentes de la provincia de Carangas, 1838. 
71 AJC, 1869, no. 1115, f. 3v. 
72 With regard to the execution of Carangas’ last Revisita, it took the land inspector from November 1877, 
when the survey “in the field” had been concluded, to May 1878 to finish the final Padrón. ABN, Rv, 1877, f.0. 
73 AJC, 1870, no. 1183, f.6v. A similar abuse had been noted during the execution of the Revisita in Choquecota. 
AJC, 1869, no. 1115, f. 3v. 
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functionaries their assignment was an opportunity for making extra revenue, 
something all levels of government were aware and repeatedly reminded of though 
indifferent to.74  
Roughly every five years, the field survey was repeated, announced by a Supreme 
Order that informed all taxpayers about the day they should appear with their entire 
family before the provincial governor. Priests were asked to dispose all data from the 
baptism, marriage, and funeral books (but these data are very incomplete) and the 
corregidores and alcaldes had to stand by with the padroncillos. The information collected 
through the Revisita was brought together in a padrón or matrícula, a taxpayers list that 
could take another half or almost entire year to elaborate.75 While the paroncillo was 
made up at the community level to facilitate the half-yearly tax collection by local 
authorities, the padrón covered an entire province and served the state administration 
in establishing the tributo quota (and during colonial times, the mita quota) for each 
ayllu. In 19th century Carangas, the padrones listed all ayllus, grouped per canton and 
vice-canton and ordered according to repartimiento, starting with the provincial capital 
of Corque. The population per ayllu was divided first of all into three fiscal categories. 
The originarios or “full” community members with land (Carangas did not count with 
“originarios without land”) paid 9 pesos 1 real a year and used to present themselves as 
“contribuyente de primera clase”.76 “Rootless” people77 or foreigners were “added” as 
agregados or forasteros, categorized as either “with land” or “without land” and paid 7 
pesos. The Uru population paid only 3 pesos because of “their low condition, and for not 
possessing repartimiento terrains, rather subject to two lakes.”78  
Each contribuyente was registered together with the other members of his (or her) 
family, all with name, family name and age, starting with the family of the cacique and 
the jilaqata. Together with the alcaldes ordinaries, the verger (sacristan), the precentor 
(cantor), the postilions79 or other comunarios fulfilling a community responsibility, they 
 
                                                     
74 ANB, Rv, 227. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1867, f.197-197v.; AJC, 1869, no. 1115, f. 3v.; AJC, 1870, 
no. 1183, f.6v-9v. 
75 While “field work” for the Padrón of 1852 was executed during that same year, the register was only 
finished by July 1853. The apoderado fiscal attributed this delay to the suspension of the operations as 
established by the supreme decree of 17 July 1852, the absenteeism of the Gobernador who stayed for over five 
months in the border and the exactitude with which the registration books had been elaborated. The Revisita 
of 1864 was executed in the course of February-March 1864, but the elaboration of the lists was not finished 
before January 1865. ABMO, no. 426, Libro de matricula de la provincia de Carangas, f.215-215v. ANB, Rv., 226. 
“Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864.  
76 AJC, 1871, no. 1196. 
77 ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, fs. 216.  
78 AJC, 1871, no. 1246. 
79 ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, f. 213v. 
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were not liable to tax.80 While holding office, they were included in the category of 
reserved (reservados), just as all contribuyentes that had reached the age of 50 and were 
permanently replaced by a new contribuyente to whom they passed their land rights and 
according tax duties. Absentee contribuyentes (ausentes) were equally exempted. Other 
categories registered in the padrón were the married women (casadas) and widows 
(viudas), the male sons (between 13 and 18 years old) who were next in line to become 
contribuyente (próximos), the non-married daughters older than 13 (solteras), and the 
kids under 13 (niños and niñas), none of them liable to tax payment.81 
In short, while responding essentially to fiscal incentives, the padrones tell us more 
than mere fiscal information and are a crucial entry to the rural dynamics of 19th 
century Bolivia. The fluctuations registered by the padrones depict (directly as well as 
indirectly) the evolution of the indigenous population and of one of the state’s most 
important fiscal source, the dynamics of family formation and demographic strategies, 
and the interaction between and differentiation of ethnic, social and fiscal categories, 
down to the most local level, as will be demonstrated in 4.1.2 (Ovando 1985, 134-44; 
Grieshaber 1980).  
An examination of republican Revisitas demonstrates a stability of the numerical and 
hence fiscal importance of the indigenous population at least until the latter quarter of 
the 19th century (1838-1877) (Barragán 2012, 23). Grieshaber’s work provides in a very 
detailed analysis of the padrones for all provinces subject to the Revisita (La Paz, Oruro, 
Potosí, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba departments) during that century.82 Throughout 
this period, there was an overall population decline, producing a drop of 17% among the 
indigenous population due to epidemics, drought and famine. However, this decline had 
a regionally differentiated effect on indigenous communities, which were surviving and 
even reviving in the altiplano departments, particularly in the Oruro department, while 
those in the Cochabamba valleys deteriorated (see table).  According to Grieshaber this 
outcome is determined primarily by ecological and demographical factors; not that 
much by their relation to the hacienda complex (Grieshaber 1980, 223).  
  
 
                                                     
80 Also service as postilion in the Tambo of Pongovillque exempted comunarios from tax payment (each year 
another canton delivers six postilions). 
81 According to Ovando, the matricula included these 9 colums, while the Padrón General only registered the 
tributarios, proximos and casadas, although there were many regional variations (Ovando 1985, 34). 
82 Note that Revisita data are not always trustworthy, particularly the numbers for the Chuquisaca 
department are nonreliable. 
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Table 5 Demographic evolution of Bolivia’s indigenous population and indigenous 
tributaries between 1838 and 1877. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Absolute and proportional demographic growth of indigenous population and 
indigenous tributarios per department between 1838 and 1877 (based on Appendix 
I in Grieshaber 1980, 263-5). 
  Chuquisaca Cochabamba La Paz Oruro Potosí BOLIVIA 
total 1838 
tributarios 1838 
19970 
5083 
47780 
11163 
247611 
63047 
65525 
14217 
109230 
30802 
490116 
124312 
trib-total proportion 25,5% 23,4% 25,5% 21,7% 28,2% 25,4% 
total 1877 
tributarios 1877 
15865 
5287 
29780 
6900 
188642 
74198 
74629 
20015 
97550 
36857 
406466 
143357 
trib-total proportion 33,3% 23,2% 39,3% 26,8% 37,8% 35,3% 
Total 1838-1877 
tributarios 1838-1877 
-4105 
+204 
-18000 
-4263 
-58969 
+11151 
+9104 
+5798 
-11680 
+6055 
-83650 
+19045 
% total 1838-1877 
% tributarios 1838-1877 
-20,6% 
+4,0% 
-37,7% 
-38,2% 
-23,8% 
+17,7% 
+13,9% 
+40,8% 
-10,7% 
19,7% 
-17,1% 
+15,3% 
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Table 7 Distribution of the indigenous population over the departments of Chuquisaca, 
Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro and Potosí in 1838, 1858 and 1877 (based on Appendix I 
in Grieshaber 1980, 263-5). 
 
 
Table 8 Changes in the distribution of the  indigenous population in the departments of 
Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro and Potosí in 1838, 1858 and 1877 (based 
on Appendix I in Grieshaber 1980, 263-5). 
 
 
4,1%
5,6%
3,9%
9,7%
8,3%
7,3%
50,5%
47,8%
46,4%
13,4%
16,3%
18,4%
22,3%
22,0%
24,0%
1838
1858
1877
Total indigenous population. 
Bolivia, 1838-1877.
Chuquisaca Cochabamba La Paz Oruro Potosí
19,2%
-20,6%
-25,8%
-37,7%
-18,0%
-23,8%
5,9%
13,9%
-14,4%
-10,7%
1838
1858
1877
Indigenous population per department in 1858 and 1877 in 
proportion to 1838
Chuquisaca Cochabamba La Paz Oruro Potosí
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The overall decline of the indigenous population, which concerned particularly the 
non-tributary population as women and children were most vulnerable to epidemics, 
produced a rise in the indigenous tax burden. Throughout the 19th century, the 
taxpaying population continued growing, however at differentiated rates, with a very 
strong increase in La Paz, whereas the Cochabamba department saw the number of its 
tributarios slightly declining (Klein 1993, 121-4). While the originario class recovered, 
partially due to the abolition of the mita, it was the forastero class that expanded most 
spectacularly. While forasteros are classically associated with haciendas, a larger and 
growing share of them lived in communities, where they even acceded to land, hence 
the category of forasteros with land (Barragán 2012, 23). In explaining this forastero 
increase, Klein suggests a conscious policy on part of the originarios to “close (sic) off 
access to their status in an attempt to keep themselves competitive and to increase their supply of 
cheap labor” in the face of growing market pressures (Klein 1993, 128-132). The result 
was an emergent gap between community tributarios (+24%, up to 107759 in 1877) and 
hacienda tributarios (-4%, up to 34110 in 1877) (Grieshaber 1980, 233-6). Particularly in 
regions with no or few haciendas, such as Carangas and the Potosí provinces of Lípez 
and Chichas, the communities managed to keep the share of tributarios to the overall 
indigenous population very low, partially thanks to a general population increase (ibid, 
254).  
As Grieshaber explains, the rising tax burden was in the interest of the treasury, yet 
not organized by the government. Paradoxically, the taxpayers increase seems to result 
from the land control strategies of the proper tributarios (and their replacers), who tried 
to uphold the number of tributarios (hence people with legitimate access to community 
land) in the face of mortality threats (ibid, 257). This ability to protect communitarian 
land rights and administrative structures was particularly manifest in altiplano pasture 
zones (ibid, 258), yet with the formal abolition of the community and land sale 
operations originario resilience was seriously undercut, instigating an originario out-
migration in search for labour (Klein 1993, 129-30). From the 1880s on, the trend of 
ayllus growing faster than haciendas was reversed. This shift came accompanied by a 
redefinition of the Revisita in itself.  
With the tax reform (implementation contribución territorial), the function of the 
Revisita changed form a mere administrative planning tool to an active reform tool. 
From 1868 on and even more from the 1880s on, a general Revisita was perceived and 
employed as a required nearly military intervention in function of the generalization of 
individual property, that is, to liquidate the community system and permit its 
usurpation (Ovando 1985, 297). However, due to state incapacity to implement the 
Revisita and counter the resistance it provoked, the creation of a homogeneous national 
culture based on direct loyalty without community intermediation remained in many 
altiplano provinces theory (see Part III).  
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4.1.2 The contribuyentes of Carangas 
The taxpayer’s lists or padrones made up during stand as an inevitable and probably the 
most detailed entrance to the evolution of the land question in the Andes. Because of 
the strategic value of this legal mechanism, for the state apparatus, for the communities 
themselves and for the researcher, the following will look into the origins and evolution 
of the Revisita, with a focus on the 19th century, and assess Revisita results for Carangas 
as a source into the region’s history.  
On basis of the padrones, Carangas’ demographic-fiscal story as well as its relation 
with the central state over the centuries can be reconstructed (Rivière 1982, chapter 2; 
see also Iño 2012 for Turco). That story was not written before the 1570s and would only 
be provided with more complete data about a century later. In the decades directly after 
Spanish arrival there was little impetus to gain a detailed overview of the local 
population and its resources. While a first general survey had been organized in 1549, 
Carangas was visited only in 1573-4 under the Toledo regime, when the province had 
already undergone its major post-conquest border changes (ibid, 63). The 28692 counted 
inhabitants, including a still quite large Uru population, corresponded in fiscal terms to 
6254 tributarios meaning that each tributario represented (a family of) about 5 persons 
(ibid). In the first century after conquest the proportion of taxpayers decreased 
radically due to the spread of epidemics, violent encounters and, most of all, the 
dramatic out-migration by contribuyentes who gave up the ties with their taxpaying 
and mita-providing home communities. Hence, the tax burden upon comunarios who 
survived and stayed in the community rose.  
Meanwhile, a floating mass remained out of the government’s reach. In order to 
incorporate these fugitives into a new fiscal category of forasteros, a next Revisita was 
commanded in 1683 by duke de la Palata, viceroy of Peru in 1681-89 (ibid, 66).83 This 
minority group lacked direct access to production assets in their new community and 
were hence dependent from the originario class, but were in return favoured by a lower 
fiscal burden (ibid, 88). The influx of this new fiscal segment as well as the post-
conquest population drop was a serious drain on Carangas’ human resources, evidenced 
in rising taxation pressures. With 2580 tributarios representing no more than 8382 
inhabitants, 1 out of 3 became subject to the payment of the indigenous head tax.84 
Meanwhile, the movement of a new fiscal class of forasteros brought a new dynamic into 
the stratification of community life. However, as climatological conditions impeded 
 
                                                     
83 General comments and bibliography on the Visita de La Palata, see Medinaceli 2010, 321-2. 
84 Revisita del Duque de la Palata, AGN, Buenos Aires, BA, sala 13, 18, 44, see also Wachtel 1978, 1154-1155 and 
Sanchez-Albornoz 1973, 30, cited in Rivière 1982, 65. 
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profitable agriculture in Carangas, the province could not compete with the pull factors 
of the attractive fertile valleys on forasteros. The immigration of this mobile labour force 
in Carangas remained limited to 13% in the period between Toledo’s and la Palata’s 
revisita;85 unable to camouflage the concurring real demographic decline of migrating or 
deceased originarios (-63%)86 as happened elsewhere (ibid, 68). Forasteros were mainly 
employed in the province’s rich mines,87 while 1137 originarios had left as ausentes, most 
of them working in long-connected places (mines, haciendas, valley communities) and 
hence easily tracked in order to ensure tribute payments (ibid, 73). If they managed to 
get off the radar (usually converted into forasteros elsewhere) for over 10 years, they 
lost their originario ascriptions (ibid, 77-81). 
After another century approximately, in the wake of the indigenous rebellion of 
1780-81, the revisita operation was executed for a third time (1785-7), but less detailed, 
and would from now on be repeated on a more regular basis. The pretention of the 
1785-87 census was to guarantee an egalitarian redistribution of lands among 
comunarios, restrain land usurpation and renew the taxpayer lists (Ovando 1985, 33). In 
Carangas, the Revisita gave evidence of 15414 inhabitants, while the reserve of 
taxpayers had only increased to the number of 2623, resulting in a proportion of only 1 
contribuyente to almost 6 persons (Rivière 1982, 90). Originarios represented 80,20%, 
which is largely explained by their strong (and in some places exclusive) reliance on 
pastoralism.88 Overviewing the colonial censuses, the high absenteeism among 
originarios is noteworthy and stems from the importance of long-distance trade, barter 
and transport or labour migration to haciendas or mines, either temporal or permanent. 
 
                                                     
85 Moreover, a third of them moved within the same province, although some arrived from remarkably far-
away regions such as Cochabamba, La Paz, the Titicaca area, Cuzco and even Santiago de Chile (Rivière 1982, 
71). Yanacona influx was simply non-existent. 
86 This decline was even stronger in the most western repartimiento of Coquiqota-Sabaya, which Rivière 
ascribes to environmental factors, that is, its strategic position on llama caravan routes and its mineral 
reserves. Moreover, Rivière notes that its close location to the mitimae valleys near the Pacific might have 
provided locals with a refuge zone free from fiscal obligations and abundant with arable lands (Rivière 1982, 
70). Also the mines within the province offered a fiscal refuge for part of the originario population. In Turco, 
for instance, half of the forasteros came from within the same repartimiento (AGI, revisita de la Palata cited in 
Rivière 1982, 70). 
87 The 1683 census counted 135 forasteros and only 46 originarios working in Carangas’ key mineral reserves 
located in the Ingenio de Concepcion de Guallatire, currently at the Chilean side of the border, and the mines 
of La Rivera, Carangas and Todos Santos, currently in the Mejillones province (Sanchez-Albornoz 1978, 152, 
cited in Rivière 1982, 70). 
88 In Carangas, comunarios would even have held differentiated ranks according to the size of their herd; they 
were classified into higher or lower fiscal categories “not because they possess lands but because they have a major 
portion of [camelid] livestock.”AGN, “Sobre la Revisita del Partido de Carangas (1786)” XIII, 18-5-5, cited by 
Santamaria 1977, 259, cited in Rivière 1982, 96. 
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The most notable void in the registers is the nonappearance of haciendas and hence 
hacienda workers, the yanaconas; together with its southern neighbour Lipez (Potosí 
department) Carangas stood out as the sole hacienda-free province of the entire 
country.89 Also forastero presence remained low, due to the abundance of land, the 
importance of livestock herding and the limited influx of new people (ibid, 97). In the 
last decades before independence, the province’s total population increased 
considerably, while its taxpaying share shrunk to only 17%, reflecting the effects of 
colonial mita and taxation extraction and the consequent absenteeism, and of the late 
colonial rebellion (ibid, 90-1).  
Over the following century, between 1787 and 1901, the main trend in the revisitas is 
opposite to the 18th century evolution, with a slowing down and destabilization of 
overall demographic growth in contrast to a solid increase in tributarios (ibid, 99). 
Between 1838 and 1877, the last executed Revisita, the proportion of taxpayers to the 
overall indigenous population in the province rose from 19,3% to 27,4%.  
Table 9 Total indigenous population and indigenous taxpayers in Carangas, 1838-1877 
(own elaboration on basis of Revisitas). 
 
The following assessment of the republican Revisitas will mainly focus on the second 
half of the 19th century. After the population had significantly risen in the 1787-1796 
 
                                                     
89 Regarding Carangas, it was declared that of the yanacona “specie” “there is not any indian in the entire 
[province] nor less haciendas to which they can be assigned”. ANB, 1762-1774, no. 1162, 289r., cited in Rivière 1982, 
70. 
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period, wide-spread and serious droughts produced an overall decline during 1796-1804 
to then increase again until approximately 1858 (ibid, 99). Particularly in the second half 
of the century, the population (as did the taxpayer share) fell back due to epidemics and 
labour migration (ibid, 99-101). In 1852, the Revisita commissioner pointed to  the 
mortality effects of the 1849 epidemic, as evidenced in the Church books and by local 
testimonies, and stressed “the constant absence of the Indios without livestock property 
because the larger part is sterile territory” to the Huantajaya mine, the Chacarilla mine or in 
Camiña, Peru.90 Although the 1858-1860 epidemics were probably much harsher, the 
following revisitas of 1860 and 1867 give the highest population numbers for Carangas in 
the 19th century. In 1864, the sub-Prefect of the province attributed the low taxpayers’ 
increase (2%, while the overall population had risen with 5%) to the abuses and defects 
of the previous Revisita.91 At the other hand, 75 new names were included into the 
register, equivalent to a yearly revenue increase of 474.4 pesos.92 By 1867, the increase of 
tributarios (over 7% in 3 years) was noticed as remarkable, given the proportional 
increase of reservados, the significant level of migration to the Peruvian coast, and the 
frequent death of tributarios because of alcohol abuse.93 
The next decade points again to a decline due to a pest epidemics and famine, 
although it started with an increase in taxpayer numbers.94 The 1871 padrón indicates 
several cases of contribuyentes switching to other categories, often from agregados to 
originarios,95 which means extra revenue, or abandoning their contribuyente status,96 or 
passing to other ayllus.97 Previous padrones do not include such explicit annotations, 
although this swapping of categories and ayllus was certainly not a new practice. It is 
however hard to assess whether this ‘switching game’ concerned an increased reliance 
upon a typical income strategy. The epidemic of 1872 had an exacerbating effect on the 
 
                                                     
90 ABMO, no. 426, Libro de Matricula de la provincia de Carangas, 1852, f.215-215v. 
91 ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, f. 212. 
92 This group included comunarios from age 8 up to 62 years old and all fiscal categories, most of them 
replacing deceased or retired contribuyentes. ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, fs. 
216-217v.  
93 ANB, Rv, 227. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1867, f.197. 
94 There were ninety four more contribuyentes counted, while 105 deceased contribuyentes had been replaced by 
new taxpayers (ANB, Rv, Carangas, 1871, parte I, f.1v). 
95 An example is ANB, Rv, 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, f. 29, ayllu Cala.  
96 In ayllu Collana of the canton Totora, Mariano Mamani, 19 years old, exits the list. ANB, Rv, 228 and 229. 
“Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871. 
97 In Huaillamarca, for instance, a contribuyente passes from ayllu Jacha Urinsaya to ayllu Jisca Urinsaya. ANB, 
Rv, 228 and 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, f. 73. 
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high absenteeism produced by (labour) migration.98 Still, in 1877 the Revisita 
commissioner was quite positive in observing that the “infinity” of deceased and ausente 
taxpayers and a number of 489 reservados had been replaced, thereby producing an 
increase of 364 contribuyentes, adding up to an annual tax income of 45183 pesos 7 
reales.99 However, the functionary detected irregularities between the totals of the 
provincial padrón and the cantonal padroncillos, possibly due to errors, rush and 
indifference of his predecessors, which had caused the Departmental Treasury a 
considerable loss of revenues over the last 6 years (42008 pesos 2 reales had been 
collected instead of 42220 pesos).100 
 
Table 10 Distribution of fiscal categories in Carangas, 1838-1877. 
 
In 1877, the last Revisita was executed in Carangas, closing the counts on an overall 
population increase of only 19,5% and a tributarios rise of 47% compared to the Revisita 
of 1838. Among the taxpayers, variations in originario, agregado or forastero and uru 
proportions remained remarkably stable throughout that period, even more when not 
 
                                                     
98 It was commented that “[t]he epidemics of the year 1872 had manifested itself in the cantons of Curahuara, Turco 
and Andamarca and decimated these villages, depriving the State from many tributaries” ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y 
Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877, front page. 
99 ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877. 
100 ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877. 
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including the 1838 Revisita which demonstrates strong disparities with the following 
censuses. Although the originarios never dipped under the 66% it lost a minor share to 
the forastero taxpayers that slightly increased until 1871, to decrease again with 1 
percent by the last Revisita. Meanwhile, the uru tributarios, while increasing in absolute 
numbers, never deviated from the 3%.  
However, this picture entails a lot of internal difference (see tables below), with half 
of the communities remaining or becoming almost entirely dominated by the originarios 
(85% up to 100% in Choquecota, Turco, Totora and Curahuara) whereas Andamarca and 
Corque counted with hardly 50% or even less of them. Regarding the latter two cantons, 
the other 50% was almost entirely represented by forasteros or agregados. Everywhere, 
except in Andamarca and Huaillamarca, the share of this fiscal category declined. In 
Turco, this decline was most striking, with a drop from 8,4% in 1852 (even 22% in 1838, 
but this is probably an exaggeration) to only 1,1% in 1877.101 In the cantons of 
Huachacalla, Huaillamarca, Choquecota and Totora, their proportional presence varied 
from 30%, 25%, 12% to 10% respectively. Curahuara never counted with even 5% of 
agregados or forasteros and their presence even completely disappeared by 1877102, nor 
did this canton ever include a single Uru family. By the start of the 19th century, the Uru 
population had been reduced to the cantons of Andamarca, Corque, Huachacalla and 
Turco. Over course of the century, their presence increased, including Urus converting 
into originarios.103 The increase is most remarkable in Huachacalla, after a transfer of Uru 
lands with Turco, which also explains the drop in the uru population of the latter 
canton (see 6.5). In the vice-canton of Orinoca (Andamarca), an “estancia Micayani” was 
registered, however not as ayllu and exclusively inhabited by agregados suggesting a 
“private” enclave in the province which however seems to have an ayllu roots and 
probably disappeared by the beginning of the 20th century.104 
Since the formal abolition of the indigenous tribute, proclaimed by the new land 
legislation of 1874 and implemented from 1880 on, no revisita has been undertaken in 
Carangas. The implication is that subsequent demographic and fiscal data are no longer 
 
                                                     
101 In the ayllu of Collana, for instance, all remaining agregados, 25 persons amongst which 5 tributarios, passed 
to the originario status. ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877. 
102 ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877. 
103 This can be observed in the ayllu of Coro (canton Corque), where in 1871 Inosencio Machaca, a 22 year old 
contribuyente, passed from Urus into the originario class. ANB, Rv, 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la 
Provincia de Carangas.” 1871. 
104 In the 1838 padrón, Micayani was still part of ayllu Collana. According to the Revisita of 1864, estancia 
Micayani was inhabited by 14 persons, all belonging to the agregados class, represented by 6 –amongst which 2 
absentee- contribuyentes. By 1910, the estancia was not mentioned in Bacarreza’s extensive report and had 
probably disintegrated. ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, fs. 187-187v. Bacarreza 
1910 in Pauwels 2006. 
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provided by province-encompassing padrones, but by national censuses, which are less 
focused on the land question. At the one hand, there is an impoverishment of data in 
that there is no further data on originario, agregado and uru differentiations nor are the 
given data reliable. The 1900 national census, in particular, provided incomplete and 
manipulated data. At the other hand, the census gave information on the non-
indigenous population and on other categorizations (rural-urban, professions) that were 
not included in the Revisitas. The next national census was not taken before 1950, 
counting 41534 inhabitants in the province, which is a rise of 45%, in line with the 
overall growth in Bolivia over the first half of the 20th century (Direccion General de 
Estadísticas y Censos 1951; Rivière 1982, 108). This increase can be broken down into 
local data on basis of local surveys called empadronamientos which were organized at the 
village level, probably executed in the context of the new tax system implemented after 
the 1874 land reform.105 However, I have not been able to trace these local surveys.  
Other entries into the information that was previously provided by the Revisitas are 
the sub-prefectural accounts included in the annual report of the Prefect to the Minister 
of the Interior and the monographs of Zenón Bacarreza (1910) and Eduardo Lima (1921). 
Their comments can be linked to trends observed in the Revisitas, pointing to processes 
that play a formative role in the questions at the centre of the following chapters. 
Where the Revisitas point to the dominance of the originarios in the province -in several 
places representing (almost) the entire indigenous population- non-Revisita documents 
indicate a dominance of the indigenous population as such, with the community of 
Sabaya counting even exclusively “local indigenous” people without a single mestizo 
inhabitant (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006). Moreover, the hegemony of the originario 
indigenous population even increased through processes of fiscal integration and ethnic 
assimilation.  
At the one hand, more and more Uru people attempted to erase the cultural 
distinctions with their Aymara neighbours. This was a logical strategy to counter the 
discrimination of their group, evidenced in the recurrent cases of dispossession. Their 
weak fiscal status and the label of “people of the water” –hence with no need for 
(community) land- made them very vulnerable to land invasions and demolitions by 
“indigenous people [who] see us in ultimate poverty and without the means to resist them”.106  
 
                                                     
105 In the first years of the 20th century, “empadronamientos” were elaborated in several cantons. According to 
an informant, they stopped paying the tributo with this operation and switched to the territorial tax (Rivière 
1982, 257-8). 
106 AJC, 1862, no. 868, f. 1. Particularly the Chipayas in the Huachacalla canton were exposed to repeated denial 
of their land rights. AJC, 1862, no. 868 and no. 884; 1864, no. 919, no. 927 and no. 942; 1867, no.997; 1868, no. 
1053; 1870, no. 1173; 1871, no. 1246; 1875, no. 1404, no. 1440 and no. 1476; 1880, no. 1631; 1888, no. 2084; 1897, 
no. 2369; Penales, 1913, no. 32.  
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At the other hand, a part of the mestizo population, which was already very scarce in 
the entire province, was incorporated into the taxpayers’ lists. Indeed, the originarios, 
agregados and forasteros of Carangas included so-called vecinos-contribuyentes. Vecinos, as 
will be explained further on in this chapter, were the non-indigenous villagers who 
represented the provincial elites. In many communities, these mestizos managed to get 
registered in the padrones and hence actively combined their citizen status with that of 
indigenous tributario. The regulation of 28 February 1831 stated with that “regarding the 
other casts, the padrones will be arranged by tradition, having recourse to their property status 
of not satisfying the contribution; except if they accede repartimiento community lands in which 
case they will be inscribed as originarios” (Ovando 1985, 37). Thus, the apparent 
contradiction of mestizos and white people enjoying usufruct rights over community 
lands and securing that position only by paying the indigenous head tax did not imply 
an ethnic or social conflict; in fact, everybody could be indigenous (Ministerio Protector 
de Indigenas 1837, in Ovando 1985, 46). Non-indigenous accepted the status of "indio" 
and the comunarios accepted their “integration” as long as they complied with all 
implied obligations. Yet, it was a remarkable trend that intertwined with processes of 
social change and that was noticed with concern by the national authorities. In 1889, for 
instance, the sub-prefect commented that there were cantons such as Huachacalla and 
Andamarca where all vecinos, even the corregidor, were tributarios and hence only 
interested in working their landed property, which prevents them from becoming 
appropriate “national” citizens (Atristaín in Aramayo 1898, Anexo, xvi). This overlap of 
non-indigenous elites obtaining an indigenous fiscal status constitutes an important 
phenomenon to understand Carangas’ land reform experience. 
Another remarkable evolution was the increase in the number of absentee 
contribuyentes throughout the 19th century. At the national level, the increase of 
contribuyentes that found themselves outside the community at the time of the census 
and were consequently registered as ausentes was particularly high in the Cochabamba 
department (from 6% to 24%), while in Oruro their number more than doubled from 
2,4% up to 5,5% (Grieshaber 1980, 259-60). In Carangas, the increase was less spectacular, 
first slightly from 4,6% to 5% (1838-1852), then dropping in the aftermath of the 
epidemics to 2,3% (1858), to finally augment up to 6,1% (1871, no data for 1877), but their 
share was already relatively high, reflecting the population’s mobile character. The 
revisita functionaries made abundant mention of barter travels and labour migration, 
which were essential complementary subsistence activities to counter the limits of the 
sterile altiplano lands.107 For instance, in 1871, it was commented that  
 
                                                     
107 ABMO, no. 426, “Libro de matricula de la provincia de Carangas”, f.215; ABN, Revisitas, Carangas, 1867 (also 
mentioned in Rivière 1982, 102); 1877, portada. 
  219 
“the special quality of the mentioned Province bordering Tarapacá and the Coast 
of Peru provokes that when less registered indigenous vive in absence embarking 
upon the Saltpetre plants or other places in search for work, with which motive 
they are included in the padrón as absentees.”108  
This absenteeism was in fact even higher as it was partly camouflaged by women and 
minors integrating in the padrón as contribuyentes, which was not a legalized but, in 
order to uphold tax revenues, a tolerated practice.  
As a way of conclusion, Grieshaber has rightfully stated that “[l]ands were not 
abandoned, but passed on to the rightful heir. Despite population decline, social discipline was 
maintained and the government legitimized the process. In essence, the increase in tributaries on 
the altiplano reflected the Indians’ ability to cope with epidemic disease and retain their 
communal organization” (Grieshaber 1980, 257, cited in Rivière 1982, 104). This adaptation 
to a changing context was not an exceptional measure but corresponds to a constant 
strategy which was however increasingly challenged with the onset of the country’s 
first land reform. 
4.2 No commons without mobility and exchange: Andean 
pastoralist market participation. 
Now having explored the legal-fiscal bonds that conditioned a communal system for 
land administration and tied it to a central state apparatus, this section zooms in on 
how the maintenance of that system entangled with a particular engagement with 
market structures. While the state-community pact put a strain on rural livelihood 
strategies, it also entailed important guarantees for the reliance of those strategies upon 
communal resource pools. At the other hand, the operation of that pact led to the 
amputation of the access to vital complementary resource pools in distant territories. As 
has been stressed before, the management of altiplano lands as commons instead of 
private estates and the access to different ecological lands are two essential 
preconditions for rural livelihood sustainability in an environment endowed with 
hardly cultivable lands. Thus, while at the one hand the strength of communal 
structures “at home” was to be defended in the face of state-building processes, it was 
key to safeguard inter-ecological mobility and exchange patterns in the face of an 
 
                                                     
108 ANB, Rv, 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, parte I, f. 1v. 
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expanding market sphere. The implications of the reorientation in Bolivia’s late 19th 
century economy for rural livelihoods in Carangas must thus be assessed in view of their 
access to complementary resources. 
4.2.1 A longer trajectory of peripheralization and indigenous 
responsiveness. 
As has been discussed in chapter 2 (2.2.3), a strong communal system does not 
contradict or impede strong market participation. On the contrary, the comunarios of 
Carangas were drawn into economic circuits that nurtured an emergent world-economy 
since early colonial market developments, yet not by unambiguously responding to  
labour commodification pressures. The insertion of pre-Hispanic exchange and mobility 
patterns, based on principles of ecological verticality, into this developing market 
sphere evidence a strategic adaptation that allowed (home) communities to preserve 
their distant land possessions despite the imposed outlines for (and logic of) spatial 
organization. With regard to Carangas, this skilfulness was most strongly manifested in 
the transport sector, based on their llama resource base and proficiency in inter-
ecological caravan mobility (Medinaceli 2006, 514). Caravan transport and trade 
activities converted the Carangas people and their llamas in vital world-economic 
connectors; no doubt the Spanish Crown would have given one of its kingdoms for a 
llama (caravan). 
However, the region would come to lose its colonial strategic position. Due to the 
technological inability to solve the flooding of the mines and the indigenous insurgency 
of 1781, most mines in the province were abandoned and the prominence of the mining 
district of Carangas, deprived from its Royal Treasury in 1803, eroded (Gavira 2011).109 
Meanwhile, the late colonial rise of a white- and mestizo-dominated commercial 
market, represented by the hacendados and non-indigenous merchants, and the 
substitution of the Pacific by the Atlantic (Buenos Aires) as the commercial gateway for 
overseas trade contributed to the gradual push of South-Central-Andean indigenous 
traders and transporters to the margins of the Andean economic space (Larson 1995, 25-
6). An increased level of surplus extraction and obstructing market intervention 
 
                                                     
109 Symptomatic for this protracted marginalization is the fact that the once so important mining district of 
Espíritu Santo de Carangas and the refineries of Totos Santos and La Rivera now constitute about the most 
marginalized remote corners of the region, distant from important transport and trade networks. In 1921, 
Lima reported that the village of Carangas had the outlook of a large town, yet found itself in almost complete 
decadence, with the signs of its colonial culmination -when it even counted for a while as the provincial 
capital- left in ruins (Lima 1921, 192).  
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(Tandeter 1991, 70-1 and 1995; Langer 2004)110 as well as the region’s shifting 
connectedness to interregional trade routes forced the pastoralists of Carangas to adjust 
their community-based peasant economy. Indigenous households came to rely more 
heavily on auto-controlled exchange relations and communal auto-consumption 
(Jacobsen 1993), although their share in (inter)regional trade probably remained 
relatively important and contributed to the recuperation and adaptation of the colonial 
internal market to the post-independence situation.  
However, (the indigenous element in) the adaptive potential of the early republican 
economy is overshadowed by the peripheralizing impact of the export boom upon the 
Andean economic space later that century (Bonilla 2007, 109; Langer 2004 and 2009). 
According to Platt, it was the adoption of an export-oriented political economy from the 
1870s on, nurtured by an intensive debate between pro-protectionists and pro-free 
traders, that has suffocated this potential, which he defines as “indigenous 
mercantilism” (2010, 53). Langer (2009) and Klein (1993, 166) rather define Andean 
peasants as free traders par excellence, who were in fact in favour of an open economy. 
The fact that quite a number of communities, particularly pastoralists, not only knew to 
survive but even to thrive throughout the first half-century of republican rule can 
indeed only be understood in light of their active importing and exporting, either 
legally or illegally, trade and transport activities, challenging the stereotypical idea of 
closed subsistence-based communities. 
Still, this pro-free argument does not invalidate Platt’s statement as under Bolivian 
liberalism the terms of participation for highland peasants would drastically change 
(Larson 2004, 226). The opening-up of the national economy to the world market went 
together with the advance of railroads, the boom in saltpetre and metal extraction, 
hacienda expansion and border tensions. This put a massive strain on the communal 
hold over resources, strangling the ayllu economy and effectively dismantling a great 
number of communities. Indeed, the deterioration of the ayllu economy was a key 
condition for pushing through the liberal land reform (Platt 1982, 35). New commercial 
monopolies pushed indigenous market participation into a secondary position or simply 
displaced from the restructuring Andean economic space (Langer 2009, 548). This 
 
                                                     
110 Symptomatic for the late colonial political climate was the repartimiento de mercancías, a mechanism for 
coercive trade that enabled corregidores to intervene in indigenous trade and consumption patterns. Whereas 
this practice had remained illegal but tolerated until 1750, it was officially allowed and generalized in the 
context of the Bourbon reforms of the second half of the 18th century and widespread corruption (Rivière 
1982, 85). The involuntary purchase of expensive products which were of no use to indigenous community 
peasants increased the compulsion for indigenous people to obtain monetary resources, while providing 
Spanish administrators with extra revenue and lowering the Crown’s bureaucratic expenses (Langer 2004). 
This reviled mechanism constituted a key motivator in the outburst of the Andean rebellion of 1780-81. 
 222 
progressive marginalization of indigenous groups and their “subaltern” labour forms 
from the market can be seen as an act of “symbolic and real violence” by the new Liberal 
elites,  in a tight alliance with international capital (Platt 1997, 55-6). The increasing 
taxation and non-reimbursed labour exploitation under the oligarchic regime added to 
the pressures that subjected commoners to the imperatives of the world market and 
state intervention. However, the fact that several ayllus “survived”, yet impoverished, 
indicates that the indigenous ability to respond to changing market conditions was not 
completely eliminated (Klein 1993, 120). This means that, in view of the increasing 
pressure of urban, mining and infrastructure demands for labour, land and food, the 
internal functioning of these communities must have changed. 
4.2.2 Andean forms of mobility and exchange as a hedge to 
marginalization. 
In the case of Carangas, its “survival” and the change adjustment of economic strategies 
has a great deal to do with the weak reverberation of urban, mining and infrastructure 
pressures. Still, booming markets in the broader region could never have thrived nor 
survived without the active participation of indigenous rural producers, caravan 
drovers and traders. The other way around, commodity markets foresaw in an 
additional income, a price for their wool or a salaried job as carriers. However, they did 
participate in a restricted ‘secondary’ position as access to these booming markets was 
“regulated” by the command of ‘primary’ actors (trading companies and their 
intermediaries) as well as by transport (dis)advantages, the abundance or lack of 
strategic resources and economic policy measures. At the other hand, the continuity in 
pre-existing inter-community barter relations provided the communities with a vital 
complementary livelihood source, making them less dependent upon commodity trade. 
In addition, the coercive factor of direct hacendado relations was absent in Carangas. As 
a result, the often anecdotal and usually little explicit details on trade activities in the 
province in reports by contemporaries, memoranda of association, inventories and 
litigations initiated by local trading companies in Carangas suggest a weaker link 
between local surplus production and the sketched commercial wool hierarchy. 
The lack of transport infrastructure and technological innovation produced the loss 
of the region’s strategic position as a trade passage and mining district, reducing the 
comunarios’ access to interregional economic circuits as well as the local presence of 
the state, but meanwhile enabling them to safeguard the complementary exchange 
strategies of the community economy. Their marginality to economic expansion made 
the comunarios of Carangas relatively more reliant upon their inter-ecological (trans-
national) off-market networks for the circulation of complementary resources and 
mitigated the implications of the region’s infrastructural disconnectedness from 
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markets. However, this reorientation implied an increasing segregation of the 
overlapping (market and off market) circuits in which indigenous transporters and 
traders participated.  
From the combination of the province’s protracted marginalization and Andes’ 
accelerated market integration the hypothesis can be formulated that the communities’ 
inter-ecological network, which was in essence a cross-border network, functioned as a 
“negotiated” hedge to shrinking margins of peasant survival. This hedge was to large 
extent facilitated by the state’s incapacity to control the border, yet this power vacuum 
implied that this hedge had to be “negotiated” with local commercial elites. This 
hypothesis forms the basis for a detailed analysis of how patterns of mobility and 
exchange changed under Bolivian liberalism. However, as my  extensive elaboration of 
these patterns evolved towards a second dissertation, I decided to limit this section to a 
wrap-up of the most important findings.111 
First of all, these findings need to be placed within a longer time frame that of 
Carangas’ protracted peripheralization. From a macro-economic perspective, Carangas 
shifted from a vital silver trade passageway to a rather marginal provider of the star 
players on the world market. Still, Carangas’ entry to the regional and world (including 
labour) markets was mainly an international one. From Carangas’ perspective, Tacna 
and Arica became the most important destinations and somewhat exclusive urban 
markets to be reckoned with.112 Oruro, La Paz and Iquique had alternative or stronger 
ties to each other and to other hinterlands. Thus, the province found itself squeezed 
between Arica’s strong links to La Paz and Pacajes and Tarapacá’s link to Bolivia’s 
southern departments and Argentina.  
Its stronghold was the international border, along which trade houses and small 
mining operations were strategically established, connected to warehouses in the most 
important villages to store the products arriving from the Pacific ports. Given Arica and 
Tacna’s preponderance, this chiefly concerns Carangas’ north-western border, while 
 
                                                     
111 However, large part of this reconstruction did find its way to this text, and was particularly important for 
sections 3.3, 4.2 and 7.1. The intention is to publish the findings of this economic analysis in separate 
publications.  
112 In colonial times, Arica was one of the most important Latin-American ports, the exit point for extracted 
silver and the entrance point for quicksilver and European commodities. After the war of the Spanish 
succession (1701-14), it even became the largest port of the South-American west coast (Dagnino 1909, 63). 
Also for Tacna, the silver route was crucial, already since the first exploitations under the colonial regime. 
Oruro, which at that time was developing fastly into a cosmopolitan city (Mendieta 2006), and secondary La 
Paz figured as the entrance gate to the markets of the Bolivian interior as well as Bolivia’s booming tin 
production. However, these cities are hardly mentioned in sources that give account of Carangas’ connection 
to regional markets. Even more remarkable is Potosí’s absence, which still was an obvious attraction pole in 
the 1860s, but then seems to have waned completely, at least for the Carangas region. 
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little references can be found relating to the Sabaya-Huachacalla area that connected 
with Tarapacá. Via these routes, raw material producers in the rural communities were 
connected to international trade houses and to the vagaries of the world market. In 
1910, Bacarreza counted 18 trading companies in Carangas which were all located close 
to the border crossing of Tambo Quemado (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 385). Also 
from other contemporary documents it appears that most -if not all- trading companies 
and depositories were established in localities close to the northern border of Carangas 
with the Arica province rather than in Corque or other villages close to the city of 
Oruro.113  
The importance and maintenance of this Pacific connection has of course a much 
longer, pre-Hispanic roots, but must also be related to the paradoxical effect of the 
introduction (or not) of technological innovations in the province. With the 
breakthrough of the transport revolution the factor of infrastructure and 
transportation only gained in importance, particularly the introduction of the railway 
(1889) lowered prices and fomented the commercialization of raw materials as well as 
the import of manufactured goods.114 The Andean’s physical unlocking reinforced the 
asymmetric balance of raw materials for manufactured goods. The consolidation of this 
shift was partially instigated by post-(Pacific)war geopolitical dynamics (Oporto 2007, 
159). However, for Carangas it mainly reinforced its disconnection, as the railroad 
 
                                                     
113 Main trading villages were Curahuara de Carangas, Turco and Sajama. But the tambos on interregional and 
transnational routes counted as preferable localities for the establishment of trading companies. Although 
smaller trading posts existed at other points of these routes as well, the border exerted a dominant attraction 
with establishments in Tambo-Quemado, Cosapa, Changamoco or Titiri. From these strategic points, the 
vecinos controlled and monopolized the incoming and outflowing trade of the province, their eyes clearly 
focused on the Pacific. AJC, 1864, no. 962, fs. 4-5v; 1871, no. 1208, no. 1224, fs. 17-8; 1874, no. 1367; 1878, no. 5; 
1890, no. 2160; 1892, no. 2191 and 1915, civiles, no. 45. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 40; 1923, 
no. 9 , 10, 11 and 16; 1924, no. 15; 1925, no. 3 and 4.  
114 Reports and statistic data from the first years of the 20th century on the increasing customs revenues from 
import and export taxes levied on Antofagasta-Oruro railroad transport give evidence of Oruro’s ascendance 
as a commercial growth pole, counting with a considerable number of important trade houses (Ascarrunz 
1905, 15; Mendieta 2006). Peru, accounting for almost the totality of alcohol importation, and increasingly 
Chile, were the main places from where imported goods entered the country via Oruro (Ascarrunz 1905, 25-30 
and Sanjínes 1905-6, 20). As for Chile, it was reported that the railroad connection, the territorial advance and 
the bilateral treaties had “our territory practically converted in a free market for products and manufactures of that 
country” while Bolivian exports to Chile remain extremely slight (Ascarrunz 1905, 26). Export reveneus derived 
mainly and increasingly from tin and rubber. Also silver, although demonstrating a decreasing export rate, as 
well as copper and silver coins were important exportation products. Main export destinations for the Oruro 
economy were England (56,5%) and Germany (35,8%), and to lesser degree Chile (7,6%) and France (0,02%) 
(ibid, 25-9).  
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network circumvented the province115 and as motorized innovations displaced the role 
of llama travels.116 With a deficient road network and disconnected from the railroad 
expansion, Carangas suffered clearly from a regional comparative disadvantage. Until 
the second half of the 20th century, the province of Carangas lacked a permanent road 
connection to any outside urban or industrial centre. Despite elite pressures, plans for 
regional (road) integration between the Tarapacá and Arica region failed to gain 
governmental support.117 
However, the effect of physical (UN)locking had a very double dynamic in Carangas. 
While lacking infrastructure immobilized the exploitation and expansion of potential 
resource frontiers, disconnection created extra freedom for (cross-border) mobility 
beyond governmental control and provided indigenous transporters, connoisseurs of all 
the “hidden” (and for modern transport impassable) roads with a comparative 
advantage. Somehow, a ‘vacuum’ for alternative routes and transport means was 
safeguarded, sustaining the maintenance of barter and caravan trade. But foremost 
smuggle and contraband counted as the most opted “complementary” activity, yet 
logically also the least visible. Previous to the “real” breakthrough of the province’s 
unlocking from the 1940s on, triggered by new modes of transport and progressively 
eroding the advantages of llama caravan trade, the “complex” combination of market 
and off-market exchange thus remained vigorous. The importance of the Pacific 
connection still lives on today, both in the region’s infamous smuggle reputation as in 
 
                                                     
115 A clear effect of the railroad’s introduction upon Carangas’ economic activities is noted in the declining 
circulation of silver across its roads. While the commodity continued to play part of its previously 
predominant role in the constitution of interregional trade routes throughout the 1860s and 1870s, there was 
less reported on the trade and transportation of silver and other metals and minerals through Carangas in 
later decades. A key factor, here, is the Oruro-Antofagasta line that entered in operation. 
116 Although llama caravans trade upheld a comparative advantage locally, the transport revolution gradually 
eroded the long-standing and strong foothold in the transport sector upon which these societies rested. Those 
who profited from this revolution, were the ones able to acquire new transport means, which required their 
disposal of a sufficiently large start capital, that is, a large enough herd and the ability to increase their herd. 
Herd expansion enabled llameros to multiply their barter and trade profits. From the 1940s on, these profits 
allowed successful llameros to purchase motorized vehicles, which multiplied their incomes. However, they 
remained dependent from their access to transitable roads (West 1981; Rivière 1982, chapter 6). 
117 The role of regions within the national economy was determined in function of its contribution to those 
revenues, which increasingly came from mining (and export), providing the eastern part of the Oruro 
department with a privileged treatment while the department’s western part was ignored. As a result, most 
regional industrial elites supported the railroad connection via Uyuni to Antofagasta and were indifferent 
towards a modern Iquique-Oruro highway connection despite regional lobbying at both sides of the border 
(González 2011a, 80-1). ANB, MI, 1885, tomo 225, no. 44, Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro. See also the map in 
the geographical appendix no. 1, indicating the proposed routes for the regional integration of Tarapacá 
(1864-1937) and note the clear ignorance towards Carangas’ southwestern connection to the Andean 
headlands via Colchane (Castro 2004, chapter 4, s.p.). 
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the memories and evocations of the nearness of the ocean and its economic function 
(see figures).  
     
Figure 6 Left: fresco in the church of Sabaya depicting a bustling port with a railroad and 
(Andean) mountains in the background (own picture, Sabaya, March 2012). 
Figure 7 Right: mural in Sajama depicting a llama at the shores of the Pacific (own picture, 
Sajama, October 2008).  
However, the picture was not that rosy for community. The access to complementary 
products and income sources was increasingly complicated. This has to do with spatial 
reorganizations and the role of economic intermediaries. As is being discussed in other 
parts of this dissertation (3.1.2 and 6.2), the communities of Carangas were being 
deprived from their direct control over valley lands as their rented estates were 
confiscated, the end of a long enclosure process. Meanwhile, Carangas was being 
remodelled into a borderland. This had concrete repercussions on its economic 
activities, as the international border, with Peru and later Chile, was located at the 
intersection of market and off-market as well as legal and illegal circuits, converting all 
economic actors in the region, from small wool producers to big traders and border 
patrols into accomplices of contraband.  
Related to the (attempted) expansion of land, labour and trade markets, 
governmental attention was increasingly drawn to the international border, 
particularly after the War of the Pacific and the subsequent 1904 border treaty with 
Chile. The influence of both the new and distrusted neighbour and the large-scale 
smuggle resulted uncontrollable (González 1929, 31; Castro 2011). Not only was the 
border attributed with the function of income source (through taxation), but also of 
legitimacy source (national integration). However, central state efforts at implementing 
the border as a barrier were counteracted by local responses converting the border into 
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permeable membrane.118 This is, in short, the “border paradox” at work in Carangas, 
facilitated by Carangas’ close relationship with the adjacent areas that stretched until 
the Pacific and the absence of roads or railways or any proper state infrastructure. This 
paradox was not only the locus of contestation between locals and central state powers, 
but also of an asymmetric reconfiguration of local power relations. The power vacuum 
left by the state on its borders provided cross-border economic players with an 
advantage, but this resulted in hierarchic constellation with trade houses, through their 
local agents, blocking market access for llameros, reducing them to raw material 
producers and contracted transporters, excluding them as traders. 
Time to take a look at Carangas’ merchant class. The success of their trade companies 
in Carangas relied on the exploitation of three regional strategic factors: the (pre-
)colonial inherited routes that connected the Bolivian interior with the Pacific, the 
region’s resources (the soil’s rich mineral reserves and the favourable habitat for wool 
livestock), and the international border. Their activities sustained  an asymmetric 
labour division that was instigated by the boom in saltpetre and tin extraction and the 
export of raw material in general. The role of Carangas’ communities in that division 
was mainly that of transporter, with the international wool market, the import trade of 
overseas products and high salt demand on the Chilean side structuring market mobility 
in the region, rather than the mining sector itself.  
Elaborating further on the force of the wool market, a commodity chain can be 
detected that connects livestock producing comunarios to white-mestizo merchants in 
Carangas’ economic circuits. During the wool cycle which ran roughly from 1880 to 
1930, local wool producers of Carangas became more tightly connected to a regional 
hierarchic trade structure, dominated by British trade houses.119 Today the llameros of 
Carangas -still exporting and trading wool- recall the times “when wool still had a good 
price”.120 The province counted as one of the country’s principal wool industry regions 
and became an important raw material provider of the developing world wool market.121 
In line with Deborah Caro’s case study on the border community of Ulla Ulla, situated 
 
                                                     
118 This was nothing unique, but corresponded with the general state of Bolivia’s borders at the time (see also 
Démelas 1992). 
119 From 1835 on, the cycle slowly primed with the introduction of an industrial loom appropriate for alpaca 
fibre and the subsequent establishment of European wool firms in Arequipa (Caro 1994, 29; Orlove 1977). Once 
this import-export link between the Central Andean wool market and Great Britain’s hegemony was created, 
the increasing demand from foreign and Peruvian export houses expanded and stratified this circuit, shaping 
a specific global commodity chain. 
120 Interview with don Celestino, don Sabino, don Eduardo, don Agapito and other elderly comunarios of 
Turco, Turco, 25.3.2012. 
121 Other important wool producing districts were, Lípez (which was divided into North and South Lípez in 
1917), Pacajes, Ingavi, Camacho, Muñecas and Caupolicán (Lima 1921, 49). See also chapter 7. 
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north from La Paz, the way in which Aymara herding communities were incorporated 
into the wool-exporting complex can be reconstructed (see Appendix 9).122 At the lower 
gears of this chain, the local household provided in the wool, mostly purchased “alive”. 
Once the wool was extracted, pastoralists continued to participate in this commodity 
chain as (contracted) caravan drovers (arrieros) or as depositors,123 who connected to a 
network of petty purchasers. The latter brought the wool to wholesale agents who 
represented the international trade houses in wool-producing zones and from there 
supplied urban-based firms and merchants, usually trading with Great Britain.  
This kind of octopus-commercial network that reached into remote corners of the 
province equally absorbed other locally produced commodities such as salt, pelts or 
charcoal. Parallel to wool livestock, these products circulated in market and off market 
circuits and their commercialization, transport and the smuggle was closely linked to 
the saltpetre industry, which constituted thé structuring factor behind booming 
markets across the border.124 Meanwhile, their “free” exploitation became increasingly 
contained by changing land (privatization) legislation, processes of proletarization and 
the proliferation of truck transport (see 7.1). Through these processes, pastoralists were 
increasingly pushed out of the market circuit by intermediary merchants. 
Notarial documents on the establishment of trading companies and lawsuits where 
commercial interests or concluded contracts were defended give an image of the people 
that made up the province’s merchant class, the companies they managed and the 
relations they developed with local households. In 1900, 286 “merchants”, partly 
foreigners, were registered in the province (Blanco, 2006 [1904]: LXXXII). This was a 
heterogeneous group in terms of gender,125 ethnicity, class and nationality.126 Elite 
 
                                                     
122 Based on Caro 1985  and 1994, 23-41.  
123 The obtained goods of ambulant traders dealing with other business affairs were guarded in storehouses 
before transporting everything to their employer. AJC, Civiles, 1902, no. 1; Penales, 1903, no. 14; Civiles, 1906, no. 
3, f. 12v-15v.  
124 The labour and consumables provisioning hinterland of Tarapacá’s oficinas salitreras (saltpetre plants) 
reached until Cochabamba. Its cycle ran more or less in line with other booming sectors. ITAR, vol. 25, 
Solicitudes, 1927, “Oficio informando petición de agricultor de Coscaya para comerciar en las oficinas 
salitreras”, Iquique 1.3.1928, f. 147-147v. Lima 1921, 49; Castro 2004. 
125 Commerce in Carangas was all but a men’s world. Both indigenous shopkeepers as woman from the 
vecindario actively participated in Carangas’ commercial business. About the indigenous trade women very 
little is known except for sporadic traces (AJC, 1871, no. 1208). The women with direct contact to the bigger 
trade houses are more visible, particularly when they left a will or their shops were inventorized after their 
death. Eloisa Renfel managed a trade house in Changamoco and contracted transporters from other 
communities of the province (AJC, 1891, no. 2163). Other examples are Virginia Romana ran a trade business in 
Curahuara de Carangas and was an active money lenders (AJC, Civiles, 1901, no. 8) or Angélica Aguirre, a single 
trad e woman residing in Toledo with ties to members of the Carangas vecindario (AJC, Civiles, 1906, no. 3, f. 
12v-15v and 1907, no. 8), and Elisa Malavia, representative of the international trade house Casa Harrison y 
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formation and capital accumulation was no exclusive mestizo phenomenon but 
developed within communities as households able to differentiate their activities saw 
their incomes disproportionately increasing. Only those comunarios provided with start 
capital, that is, livestock property that was large enough to employ part of the herd in 
highland-valley transportation, could acquire a sufficient level of accumulation to 
participate in rural, urban and mining markets and in large-scale contraband activities, 
hence further increasing their economic power. Thereto, they competed and 
cooperated with other merchants, often establishing joint businesses. The most 
powerful merchants and trade partnerships established in Carangas were those that 
knew to combine several activities, with the most common option of combining retail or 
wholesale commerce –export of wool, import of alcohol and the internal provision of 
charcoal- with mining operations.127 The transportation of their products was generally 
outsourced by contracting llameros as arrieros.128  
While these economic intermediaries clearly represented the richest segment of the 
province’s population, still they occupied a marginal position within the interregional 
and transnational market sphere. The strongest entrepreneurs that were fully 
integrated in the broader scene exploited the province from a distance (as did big 
hacendados with their estates). By contrast, the merchants with a stronger foot in the 
village economy compensated their marginal position by consolidating their local 
power base with extra incomes derived from smuggle activities, the execution of 
governmental positions, including customs offices, and the opportunistic exploitation of 
these political positions. For the construction and maintenance of their client network 
these middlemen (often “middle women”) were highly reliant on the careful 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Bötiger in Oruro (AJC, Penales, 1908, no. 8, f.4-7v and Civiles, 1910, no. 18), who both left an impressive 
inventory of merchandise and accumulated fortune. 
126 Next to provincial trade agent, there were urban merchants from Oruro or other nearby Bolivian, Peruvian 
or Chilean cities active on carangueño soil, next to foreigners from several European countries or the U.S. 
127 An example is the tin smeltery in Changamoco exploited jointly between the foreign merchants Lyons, 
Jefferson and Ortega and vecinos of the village of Turco (AJC, 1871, no. 1208). Another case is the trade 
company “López e Iraola de Tambo-Quemado” which aimed at “encompassing the purchase of alpaca wools and the 
exploitation of a sulphur vein in the Caporata hill” (AJC, 1892, no. 2191). The commercial partners, both powerful 
vecinos (and for some time corregidor) in respectively Turco and Curahuara, already collaborated since the 
1860s but in 1892 expanded their business with the purchase of the trade company of Tambo Quemado.  
128 Within these contracted relationships, the arriero –indigenous llama herders- did the transport, his boss or 
contractor was responsible for the cargo costs. Usually arriero contracts are untraceable because they were 
made orally, except in some lucky occasions. Some examples are AJC, 1871, no. 1224, f. 4-7; 1875, no. 1425; 
1886, no. 1906; 1891, no. 2163; 1895, no. 2286; Penales, 1906, no. 25, f.2. ART, Serie Corte de Apelaciones. Sub serie 
Causas Civiles. Legajo I, Cuaderno no. 27, 24.11.1880. In rare cases we find contracts made up among 
comunarios which could afterwards be used as proof for outstanding debts. AJC, 1871, no. 1224, f. 7; Civiles, 
1913, no. 2. 
 230 
manipulation of kinship and residence ties in order to secure their access to local 
natural resources and labour. Even though purchasers and sellers might create fictive 
kinship ties, comunario-merchant interaction was usually based on mutual distrust 
rather than reciprocity.129 The implications of the ambiguity in local merchant’s 
accumulation tactics should be further assessed and brings us to the “vecinos” of 
Carangas, in the next section of this chapter. 
Not despite, but exactly because of their close ties to the comunarios and their 
resources, the vecinos contributed –even as marginal players on the world market- to 
the displacement of highland-valley reciprocity within what constituted a complex 
system in which barter and commercial exchange co-existed. The way in which 
commercialization gradually pushed rural households as secondary players into a 
homogeneous system has been coined by Temple as economicidio. This refers to the 
undermining of a people’s ability to simultaneously create reciprocity relations and 
enter the market by changing the terms of interaction (Temple 1989, 2003). The 
imposed segregation between “traditional” and “modern” exchange went hand in hand 
with processes of stratification and monopolization, reflected in the consolidation of the 
vecinos class.  
Still, the pastoralist households of Carangas remained rather marginal to the effects 
of that process, as they employed their “alternative” forms of mobility and exchange as 
a hedge to counter the market disadvantage of their disconnectedness. This is where we 
detect an “anti-commodity” side, yet the case of Andean transporters demonstrates that 
this side was far from “anti” but searched for complementarity. This dimension is 
essential to grasp how in the same way that some “spaces” of the market are not 
accessible for pastoralists, some “pastoralist” spaces are not (made) “accessible” for the 
market, reflecting one aspect of the unequal impact of market expansion (see also 
Mayer 1999). However, this hedge has been neutralized in the second half of the 20th 
century, when infrastructure innovations broke through. As the previously bartered 
products started to “come to them”, moreover via much faster transport means, barter 
exchange rates decreases, leaving caravan trade to the poorest pastoralists (West 1981; 
Rivière 1982, 292-7).  
 
                                                     
129 Because Andean economies operate according to an inter-ecological logic of circulation, in which products 
circulate “primarily within the group, transported by the producers or consumers themselves,” the “typical indigenous 
traders of the central and southern Andes were and are not intermediaries” (Harris 1995, 305). Interesting is Harris’ 
quotation of Bertonio, who in his Aymara dictionary of 1612 defines the “Indian style of trader” as “he who travels 
to other areas to acquire food,” in opposition to “our sort of trader” (Bertonio 1985 [1612], cited in Harris 1995, 305). 
Vocabulario de la lengua aymara La Paz). 
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4.3 No commons without inroads: local elite intermediation.  
Both the ayllus’ legal-fiscal bonds to the state as their trade links to the broader 
economic space conditioned the margin for communal land control. Hence, the late 19th 
century changes in those connections forced them to renegotiate the terms of 
participation and autonomy within expanding state and market spheres. In this 
renegotiation, the vecinos (residents) surface as unavoidable yet ambivalent 
intermediaries, having consolidated their position as rural mestizo elite at the nexus 
between the ayllus and the state and between the ayllus and the market. Paradoxically, 
the strategies they developed to claim that position implied their gradual absorption 
into the community sphere, destabilizing the false image of two opposite (community-
“outside”) worlds. Indeed, “there are not two, but three participants in the process of 
exploitation” (Wallerstein 2004, 293).  
As will be further discussed in Part III, the strategies deployed on part of the 
commoners to fight the new land legislation, the outcome of their resistance and the 
reconfigurations in state-community relations cannot be understood regardless of the 
role played by the rural mestizos (Platt 1987, 283; Irurozqui 1993; Mendieta 2006 and 
2010). Though originally inaccessible for the vecinos (for not pertaining to the 
community), the lands of the ayllu came to play  a particular role in the way these elites 
sought to strengthen their local exploitation base. Given the observation that 
“community lands remained in hands of the community” in Carangas, this 
encroachment is hardly visible and (therefore) highly interesting. Even though it 
concerns a very small group, their broker role attributed them a two-faced streak, 
which deserves closer attention.130 In order to fathom the ambiguity of vecino 
intervention in Carangas’ land rights trajectory, this section will look into the origins 
and composition of these provincial elites and the margin they controlled to organize 
and optimize their livelihoods in Carangas. This will demonstrate the subtle vecino 
interferences in communal networks and will challenge the image of a uniform and 
closed hegemonic elite group. 
4.3.1 Who are the vecinos? 
First of all, what does “vecino” exactly denote? The meaning and the use of the term has 
been very different according to time and place across the Spanish speaking world. In 
 
                                                     
130 This was also the topic of an earlier paper (Cottyn 2012b). 
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colonial Hispano-America, vecino was imported from 16th century Spain as a strict legal 
category of citizen to then shift into a more less formal title that alluded to one’s public 
image and belonging to a particular community (Herzog 2003, 43-4). Ciudadanía 
(citizenship) was a status exclusively attributed to the fully vested (Spanish) town 
citizens who enjoyed the greatest degree of privilege (Abercrombie 1998, 46).  
However, by the late colonial decades, the effects of an increasing differentiation 
process between commoners and their leaders, created an overlap between the 
indigenous elites and mestizo strata which hence could integrate into the “indio” strata 
and the accompanying communal authority system (Platt 1982, 29). Meanwhile, as a 
result of late colonial measures, the category of vecino was extended to a larger number 
of people. These measures were nurtured by growing aspirations to strengthen the 
administration’s local presence on the countryside and, in view of the indigenous 
rebellion of 1780-’81, to undermine the power of the caciques. Thereto, the Spanish 
citizens forged an alliance with the mestizo population, against the ayllu (Platt 1982, 15-
8). Concretely, the cacique was replaced by the corregidor as head of the province, 
reducing the cacique’s area of operations to the most local level, where he had to share 
his attributions with the alcaldes, Spanish officers dispatched to execute this newly 
created judicial function. This was a major change compared to the colonially imposed 
principle that the pueblos de indios were prohibited terrain for non-indigenous people, 
except for the priest.  
From the late 18th century on, thus, the rural villages became the scenery of new 
white and mestizo residents who integrated in the vecino class (Abercrombie 1998, 304-
5). Conditional to their position, these newcomers had to negotiate their integration 
with the old cacique class, instigating a process of elite renovation. This forced the 
caciques to renegotiate their local power base, seeking to keep a balance between the 
defence of the people they represented and the safeguarding of their own authority in 
face of the newcomers’ arrogations (Pauwels 1983, 178-83). Thus, as the vecino class 
expanded, a sort of ethnogenesis process developed in which the caciques at times 
exposed themselves deliberately to the Spanish world and its privileges, producing a 
growing gap between the indigenous commoners and a mixt rural elite (ibid, 184). In its 
strict sense, the qualification of vecino only corresponded to those members of the elite 
who executed a state or Church office, but it was also used more broadly to refer to all 
mestizo and white inhabitants of a rural village. Also its “neutral” meaning of 
“resident,” regardless of one’s status within that residence, continued to be used. In this 
dissertation, however, the use of vecino applies to the broad status category of the rural 
elite.  
Who, then, where the vecinos of Carangas? Why and from where did they arrive to 
this region? The presence of these local elites must be linked to the economic trajectory 
of the province, and more particularly its mining history (Gavira 2011). The first 
permanent white and mestizo presence in Carangas, yet (apart from the priests) outside 
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the pueblos de indios,131 can be traced back to the early 17th century, when 
entrepreneurs settled in the mining district of Espíritu Santo de Carangas (Gavira 2010, 
79). In the wake of the late colonial decline of the Potosí silver economy, most of them 
left the province as most mines were abandoned because of technological deficiencies 
and indigenous insurrections (Pauwels 2006, 332, 342 and 361). However, several 
families decided to stay and settled in the villages, continuing to exploit the region’s 
mineral resources and the proximity of the ports of the Pacific and moreover attracted 
by the administrative job creation. Examples of “outsiders” seeking permanent 
anchoring in the province during that time are the Juan Crysóstomo López, Felix Blanco 
and Narciso Arias, “pioneers” of vecino families that would come to dominate public life 
in Turco.132 Dominant indigenous families that descended from the pre-Hispanic kuraka 
families, such as the Mamavillca, Chuquichambi and Layme, integrated into the vecino 
class.133  
The central state authorities applauded the settling of mestizos in the villages as the 
advent of a rural avant-garde. These intermediaries were attributed with the 
responsibility of stability, the column that would facilitate and permit the necessary 
level of local extraction and assimilation for the central state to optimize its 
institutional power.134 Initially, they were also welcomed by the community members, 
convinced that their reading and writing capacities would bring progress to the 
countryside (Pauwels 1983, 179, 204). However, this enthusiasm would soon dampen in 
view of the gradual absorption by these new residents of all political and commercial 
power in the province.  
 
                                                     
131 In the 1720s, harms commited by vecinos to the indigenous population of the village of Huaillamarca were 
reported to the court of Corque. The complaint concerned among others the usurpation of land. It was stated 
that “in the villages of the Indians there live no Spaniards, negroes, mestizos or mulatoes,” despite the fact that the 
Spaniards might have bought lands there. It was added that Spanish intervention in the reducciones was 
prohibited and caused troubles. AJC, 1721-2, no. 6, f. 1, cited in Pauwels 1983, 212. 
132 The Spaniard Juan Crysóstomo established in Espíritu Santo de Carangas in the last decades of the 18th 
century until he moved with his son José Eugenio to the village of Choquecota to eventually settle down in 
Turco where he tried to gain control over the community lands. Due to their dominant presence in Turco, the 
López family was later remembered as the first vecinos arriving to Turco, yet also the Blanco and Arias settled 
in Turco around that time. AJC, Legajo 1 (1679-1796), 1787-1835, no. 144; Legajo 2 (1792-1809), 1798, no. 44 and 
1808; Legajo 6 (1831-1832), 1832, no. 17, cited in Pauwels 1983, 212. The trajectory of the López has been 
assessed with more detail, in large part on basis of the work of Gilberto Pauwels (1983) and will reappear, 
illustrating the experience of Carangas’ vecinos throughout this section and particularly in 7.3.2. 
133 Some of the most common family names still found in the 19th century Revisitas are Mamani, Villca, 
Choque, Chambi, Layme. 
134 This can be linked to theories about mestizaje as central nation-forming principle in 20th century Latin-
America. Lorandi 2005; Telles and Garcia 2013. 
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4.3.2 Political and economic consolidation  
The 19th century vecindario of Carangas was constituted by the non-indigenous families 
who had settled in the rural villages for a couple of generations and had intermingled 
with the ex-cacique families, and was further expanded by newly arriving Bolivian 
citizens and foreigners. Concentrated in the urban centre of the community while 
commoners occupied dispersed dwellings, the vecinos organized themselves in a 
separate world, distinguishing themselves from the community in religion, clothing, 
food and drinking preferences (Pauwels 1983, 225-36). The walls around that world were 
kept up through endogamous marriages, although this apparent closed community was 
crisscrossed by illegitimate relations with non-vecinos. Each village of the province was 
dominated by a small number of principal families whose names the people of Carangas 
still recall today.135 Although these vecinos hardly represented 4% of the population of 
the province in 1910 (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 365), their presence redraws to a 
certain extent the autonomous position of the Carangas communities. In fact, the 
vecindario has been proposed as a kind of “multipersonal” hacendado (Platt 1982, 16; 
Irurozqui 1999, 717, footnote 26).  
Their presence and strength varied according to local conditions. Corque was 
logically perceived as the centre of vecinos power, for constituting the capital of the 
province. According to the census of 1900, Corque was indeed the “whitest” place of the 
province (Blanco 2006 [1904], LXX). However, Bacarreza (1910, cited in Pauwels 2006, 
365) –who’s counting seems more reliable- signals a major concentration of white-
mestizo in Sajama, Carangas, Totora, Chuquichambi, Curahuara, Turco, Cosapa, and the 
village of Carangas.136 Bacarreza contended that the only villages in the province with 
the “required social conditions” for such function were Curahuara and Turco, where a 
couple of merchant families from other departments and from Peru resided (Bacarreza 
1910 in Pauwels 2006, 362). Rather than trade, Totora’s elites based their power on the 
fertility of the soil, converting the village into what, among all places in Carangas, 
probably counted as the hacienda-like regime.137  
 
                                                     
135 Also Eduardo Lima, in writing his report on the province in 1921, could easily point to the principal families 
of each canton (Lima 1921, 194). 
136 In contrast, Rivière sustains that Sabaya was free of any mestizo or other non-indigenous group exploiting 
the community lands (Rivière 1982, 222), although power relations in the village were of course not free from 
real inter-comunario differentiation. 
137 In 1921 a strong vecindario next to a “sad” indigenous population was reported, evoking the image of a sort 
of big estate (Lima 1921, 190). According to documents of 1700, recopilated in 1924, Spanish presence had been 
strong in this disctrict, particularly in Tatasapana, burdening the ayllus of Totora with frequent intrusions 
into their community lands and driving commoners away to other villages or the valleys. ADRO, Propiedades 
Provincias, Carangas, 1924, no. 6. 
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The monopolistic position of the vecinos was based on a tactical combination of their 
political and their economic power. This combination allowed for their exponential 
accumulation trajectory and consolidation as inescapable mediators. This trajectory was 
“initiated” by the incomes of their administrative job and/or their commercial 
activities. The (exponential) accumulation of these inputs, then, was based on an 
increased access to exploitable local resources which they obtained by means of subtle 
dependence relations with the commoners and more brutal inroads on their livelihood 
assets.   
In comparison to commoners who could also rely on their access to community land, 
finding additional income sources was a vital condition for the settlement of the 
vecinos. Under republican rule, the central state reinforced their residence and local 
power by attributing them the exclusive responsibility of representing the state’s 
interests, as well as those of the Church, at the provincial and village level (Pauwels 
1983, 42 and 218-20). Thus, the vecino families divided all state and religious offices 
among their own members, clearing the way for a monopolistic political, juridical, 
educational and ecclesiastic control over community life.138 While peopling the most 
local levels of the state administration and its jurisdiction, they also claimed the 
function of community attorney to defend local demands before that same state. This 
double stance before the community provided them with legal and extra-legal accesses 
to community and household resources and surplus labour. Most information we have 
on these tactics is from accusations of authority abuse by the local population, fellow 
(rival) vecinos, and governmental commissioners inspecting the province. 
In the first place, the village elite depended heavily on the free labour force of the 
commoners. The independent republican rule, the colonial mita regime was no longer 
maintained, but corvée continued to be extracted at the local level through the fiesta-
cargo system which was extended with multiple personal obligations (which would 
persist until even after the National Revolution of 1952, despite their suppression under 
the Villaroel government at the Indigenous Congress of 1945).139 Postilions, mayordomos 
and other auxiliary cargos assisted the vecinos in the execution of their public offices 
while domestic workers, herders and handymen simplified their private activities. Apart 
from their free labour, this also required material contributions such as fire wood, food 
 
                                                     
138 In Turco, for instance, the position of corregidor was from 1860 to 1892 in hands of Juan López and four of 
his sons without interruption. During the same episode, his sons also occupied several times the office of judge 
and of all official functions registered since independence until 1860, half of the terms of office were fulfilled 
by members of the López family (Pauwels 1983, 702-8). 
139 The extensive complaints expressed by the originarios of Huachacalla against Nicolás Rafael in 1810 gives 
an idea of the comprehensiveness and weight of this extractive system. ACES, “Razón de los derechos 
obencionales y fiestas que se celebran en cada año en la iglesia parroquial de Juachacalla.” 1810. 
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and money. The exaggerated reliance upon this unpaid labour continually defied the 
limit between tolerated duties and unacceptable exactions. This resulted in an 
increasing number of complaints about outright vecino abuses such as by “Velasco who in 
ill-fated times came to settle in the village of Totora and who has become obsessed with living 
from the sweath of the unhappy Indian, falsely accusing them, with the calculated purpose of 
extracting his money and livestock in order not to live without troubles.”140  
However, in taking the vecinos’ illegitimate exactions and usurpations to court, the 
comunarios were confronted with another apparatus which the local vecindario had put 
to its service. In fact, the juridical framework had been imposed at their service by 
central state powers. Eduardo Lima observed in 1921 how the way in which the judicial 
power was organized at the cantonal level (the jueces parroquiales), by the ad honorem 
employment of incompetent villagers, mostly illiterate (and therefore needing an 
assistant who also needed remuneration), fomented corruption (Lima 1921, 104-5). 
Demanding their indigenous “clients” to pay them with livestock, labour and money, 
these local judges converted their function into a direct revenue source, “a sort of 
complement to their material interests.”141  
Not only from within, but also as “clients”, the vecinos knew to manipulate the 
juridical instruments created by that apparatus. “In the position of strongest and of white 
origin,” vecinos either unjustly accused “ignorant Indians” or misleadingly claimed to 
act as their representatives before court, in order to seize their possessions. One vecino 
was accused of “at the one hand, continuously making arrangements with the indigenous class, 
figuring himself as attorney and also as authority, receiving money or livestock, in order to make 
the opposing party loose the case: in the second place, he intervenes in livestock property whose 
owner died, and collects money or other species without informing his superiors.”142 This latter 
strategy of claiming property as vacant, regardless of the concerned goods or livestock 
effectively had a rightful owner or not.143 A very “popular” way to gain closer access to 
others’ property was to act as executor (albacea), a privileged position often fraudulently 
obtained and equally exploited.144 By adopting the juridical figure of community 
 
                                                     
140 Own translation. AJC, Penales, 1912, no. 23. Also the López were subject to similar complaints, with Gregorio 
López being accused in 1893 of stealing 64 llamas, he argued that he was merely following orders of his 
superiors (amongst whom his brother). AJC, 1893, no. 2257. 
141 “It is with very rare exception, that citizens of scarce skills to efficiently execute these offices, which converts them into 
a secure medium for unworthy speculation, of which the Indian becomes the victim, who in any reclamation he formulates 
before these authorities, is sucked up in an exaggerated and despicable way.” Own translation. Lima 1921, 104. 
142 AJC, Penales, 1905, no. 17. 
143 Referring back to the López family, Juan de la Cruz was accused by his brothers-in-law of having 
appropriated his wife’s property after her death. AJC, 1886, no. 1920 and 1888, no. 2031.  
144 The corregidor of Choquecota, Francisco Molina, was in 1878 accused of having himself made appointed as 
albacea trough fraud. AJC, 1878, no. 1596. Moving again to the López, Juan de la Cruz and his brothers Gregorio 
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attorney (apoderado), vecinos tended to even further let their socio-economic position 
even further depend on the community sphere.  
Not only did the vecinos manipulate their lucrative broker role in the extension of 
the state’s administrative and juridical tentacles into the countryside, but knew to make 
a living from a parallel middlemen position in the communities’ connection to broader 
economic spheres. As the number of political offices and their remuneration was 
limited, their engagement in trade and extractive activities was a necessary 
complement in their accumulation trajectory or sometimes their full-time occupation.145  
By taking advantage of the province’s mineral reserves and of the simultaneity of a high 
cross-border mobility with a precarious state capacity to control and tax this mobility, 
the vecinos constituted part and parcel of “a new layer of commercial intermediaries” 
(Larson 2004, 223). They consolidated their economic power base by establishing or 
representing trade houses in border settlements, halting posts or in the villages, by 
exploiting small mines, or by occupying an office in customs and other governmental 
functions.  
These are the people managing the trade companies that connected Carangas to the 
world market (4.2.). However, within the province’s heterogeneous merchant class, a 
differentiation can be made between a white group closer attached to the urban and 
world market and generally with foreign roots,146 and a mestizo group closer attached to 
the village life and integrated in the provincial vecindario. Gregorio López is a good 
example of how the vecinos actively contributed to the connection of the province to 
transnational commercial circuits through the establishment of companies and trade 
partnerships.147 Guillermo Pfeng, merchant with German roots and vecino in Curahuara 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and Guillermo managed to be named “albacea” of several comunarios in Turco and accordingly claiming part 
of their inheritance. AJC, 1861, no. 847, fs. 9-11; 1870, no. 1176 and 1871, no. 1201 and no. 1224, fs. 14-17; 1879, 
no. 1611, f. 3v; 1886, no. 1919, fs. 1-5.  
145 A clear example of a vecino who built his fortunes on basis of his economic activies is don Eufrasio Ortega, 
son of miner and azoguero Manuel Santiago Ortega and Marta Trujillo, married to doña Braulia López. His will 
is the best indication of the kind of activities he developed (his inheritance include shops, houses and 
“typical” vecino livestock such as donkeys, horses, cows, sheep and only a little bit of llamas, pointin to trade 
activites, but also sayaña rights which point to cultivation, probably for forage). It also indicates the multi-
sitedness of these activities (in Turco, Todos Santos, La Rivera, Carangas, Corque) and with whom he entered 
into trade (debts pending from other vecinos). AJC, Civiles, 1904, no. 3. 
146 An illustration of the settlement and activities of the former group is the trade company in Changamoco 
that was run by Tomas Lyons, a U.S. merchant, Juan Jefferson, a British merchant based at Arica, and Juan 
Ortega, a Spanish merchant appointed as chair of the company. Their business consisted of the exploitation of 
a warehouse for all sorts of merchandise and of a mining plant for the smelting of tin. AJC, 1871, no. 1208. 
147 Gregorio López did not directly depend upon any international trade house but performed quite similar 
activities to the “foreign” merchant element in the province. One of his enterprises was the “trading company 
López and Iraola of Tambo-Quemado” which he had bought with another merchant in 1892 to trade alpaca 
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de Carangas, was an in-between case, holding a foot in both the “international” as the 
vecino world.148  
Throughout their “accumulation trajectory,” vecinos put their political authority at 
the service of their economic strength, and the other way around, preferably by 
occupying strategic administrative and trade positions at the same time. This mutual 
reinforcement of political and economic interests was sustained by a complex of 
accumulation tactics.149 But for many vecinos, social community networks, formed 
around the fiesta-cargo system but also through compadrazgo bonds, also were 
incorporated into their “field of activity,” hence giving them access to a key instrument 
in the acquisition and distribution of material and symbolical credit among the 
members of the community. Their insertion into social networks of the communities 
went hand in hand with an increased level of exploitation from (and hence resistance 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
wool and extract sulphur nearby Turco. He also established a trade company with José Maria Loayza, a miner 
from Corocoro, and otehr powerful vecinos of Carangas, including his father Juan de la Cruz and Maximino 
Zubieta, to import and export liquor, wool and livestock between Oruro and the Pacific. Moreover, he 
exploited the trade house “López and brothers” in Titiri, close to the international border. AJC, 1865, no. 962, 
fs. 4-5v; 1873, nº 1224, f. 17 and 1892, no. 2191.  
148 Although Guillermo was based at the city of Oruro, the marriage between Guillermina Pfeng –probably his 
sister- and the corregidor of Curahuara, Gregorio Iraola, may be an indication of the local rooting of Pfeng. 
AJC, 1877, no. 1534. Guillermo Pfeng was a very active merchant, yet this brought him at times in conflict with 
other commercial enterprises of the region. While controlling several warehouses on and nearby Carangas’ 
northwestern border crossing in Tambo-Quemado and frequently crossing the southwestern border check 
point in Pichagas with overseas importation products, he also headed a mining company in Yarvicolla, Turco, 
and represented Blondel i Compañía, a major trade house of Oruro with its principal basis in Tacna, South Peru. 
AJC, 1869, no. 1083 and no. 1124; 1871, no. 1194; 1873, no. 1248, fs. 19-22v. APO, Libros de contabilidad, 1880, 
“Libro de aduanas”. AJHO, 178-2, 1870, no. 50. 
149 Again gratefully recurring to the fascinating case of the López family, this complex entailed the 
combination of licit incomes from their political and juridical offices, their commercial activities and their 
agro-livestock properties (mainly livestock and forage cultivation in function of their trade activities) with 
sale transactions and matrimonial strategies, as well as with illicit revenues derived from juridical 
manipulations, fraud and usurpations, often “under pretext” of their official range of duties. This allowed Juan 
López to amass a patrimony that included at his death in 1883 several houses, sold and inherited, and terrains 
in Turco, furniture, gold and silver objects, and an animal stock of 400 sheep, 200 donkeys, 40 llamas with their 
young, 10 cows and 20 horses. Moreover, his marriage with his first wife had brought in additional assets, 
which were then increased under joint household management. The total value of his patrimony was 
estimated at a couple of thousand pesos, but part of that sum was squandered in loans and charity works. In 
1887, his illigetimate son Juan de la Cruz leaving “substantial properties”, valued at 11000 to 20000 pesos and 
comprising the property of the trade post and mining enterprise at Titiri, result of an even greater 
accumulation than realized by his father. Large part of his possessions, including houses, farms, livestock, 
money and gold objects, were obtained matrilineally. Critical to add, both Juan and his son enjoyed hereditary 
usufruct rights over sayaña land (an apparent incongruity in vecino wills that will be explored below). AJC, 
1883, no. 1713; 1894, no. 2281; 1886, no. 1920; 1887, no. 1992 and 1888, no. 2031. See also Pauwels 1983, 212-27; 
Cottyn 2012b. 
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by) the local population and with a further “alienation” from (and hence opposition by) 
the national elites. However, it also implied their relative impoverishment in pure 
material terms, stemming from their deliberate participation in community 
dynamics.150 Another inbuilt constraint of vecino accumulation strategies was the fact 
that their dominance over village life and the region’s economic assets generated inter-
elite competition.151 There was indeed a remarkably high number of inter-vecino 
disputes, going from rather innocent defamations to cases where “almost the entire 
vecindario of Llanquera is involved in the crime of several murders.”152 
4.3.3 The “reversion” of the vecinos. 
The vecino monopolization of the link between the community and the government 
endowed them with a double-edged mission. As agents of nationalization, civilization 
and evangelization they represented the central state and church powers, while 
simultaneously acting as the local representatives of the community’s interests before 
the legislative and executive powers. The combination of their broker role yet marginal 
to the ‘national scene’ with their quest for a maximal profit rate converted them into 
exploiters while meanwhile being exploited (Zibechi 2012, 196).  
However, both poles of this doubleness were ambiguous in itself. Towards the 
government, they simultaneously acted as defenders of central state (and treasury) 
interests and as abusers of those interests, through daily corruption and smuggle. 
Towards the community, their exploitation went hand in hand with a certain form of 
interdependence, in order to secure an access as unrestricted as possible to the region’s 
economic resources. The strategies deployed by vecinos to pragmatically intrude in 
communitarian social networks went as far as taking up a formal indigenous identity by 
registering in the commoners’ taxpayers lists. For the sake of their consolidation, 
provincial merchants created political and social/kinship relations and shared their 
 
                                                     
150 As will be further illustrated in later chapter, the López family made intensive “use” of the community 
sphere (even as commoners themselves), but as participation in these networks required considerable 
investments of time and capital, in return for a higher social status within the community, the renowned Juan 
López, just as many rich carangueños, ended his life relatively impoverished. AJC, 1883, no. 1713. 
151 The fact that sharing such a small world provided with limited resources unavoidably created conflicts is 
colourfully illustrated in the criminal record of “the famous indigenous” Gregorio López –as he was called by a 
fellow vecino who accused him of having subtracted property from commoners. During the 1880s, Gregorio 
was incessantly sued for slander, offences,  mistreatment and injuries against other vecinos, including a 
murder attempt against his own brother Guillermo because of a due loan. AJC, 1877, no. 1542; 1883, no.1741 
and no.1744; 1885, no. 1860, no. 1874; 1886, no. 1952 and no. 1896. 
152 AJC, Penales, 1905, no. 2. 
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complicity in smuggle practices with pastoralists, thereby pushing the vecinos further 
into the “world” of the comunarios. The result was their anchoring in the community, 
not only as formal representatives but in several cases also as proper indigenous 
comunarios, which at its turn had important implications for its relation with the state 
and the national elites. The “anchoring” of the vecinos and the implications this had for 
the potential safeguarding of a margin for communal land control begs for further 
inquiry in order to properly understand the ambiguous vecinos intervention in the 
unrolling of the land reform process in Carangas. 
The clue to this ambiguity must be searched in the double identity adopted by a 
considerable part of the vecinos. By combining different documentation on individual 
vecinos, it can be revealed how several villagers knew to complement their non-
indigenous privileges with the advantages of communal land access. A very 
obvious/striking case is the already mentioned Gregorio López. As will be more 
reconstructed with more details in chapter 7.3.2, he descended from Spanish lineage 
which only a couple of generations before integrated in the vecindario of Carangas. His 
commercial and political activities, indicated above, show that he clearly upheld his 
vecinos status, but at the same time he was registered in the padrón of ayllu Collana, in 
Turco and his name repeatedly appears in petitions for sayaña adjudication, justified by 
his originario status. Gregorio’s case shows how vecinos consciously adopted 
mechanisms to flexibly move between two –supposedly mutually excluding- worlds in 
function of the opportunities that arose.153  
Apart from fascinating individual cases, statistical sources also point to this overlap. 
In 1910, Bacarreza noted that while the vecinos population had been incessantly 
growing over the last century, the number of mestizos in the province had started to 
reduce. According to his calculations, they still counted for about one third of the 
province’s population in 1835, to only represent 1,55% by 1910 (Bacarreza 1910, in 
Pauwels 2006, 343). In the shorter interval between the national census of 1900 and 
Bacarreza’s survey there is a considerable reduction in mestizo-white presence (from 
13% to 2%) in contrast to an absolute increase of the indigenous population, from 15696 
to 26779 (Blanco 2006 [1904], LXVI-LXXXV; Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 365-6; 
Pauwels 1983, 232-5).  
Table 11 The proportion in indigenous and mestizo-white presence in Carangas, 1835-1910. 
 
                                                     
153 His case is further scrutinized in relation to the entire López family in 7.3.2 and forms the central storyline 
of a previous article (Cottyn 2012b).  
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Although the reliability of the numbers presented in the 1900 census and by 
Bacarreza’s report is disputable (a high vecinos population allowed a village to claim a 
‘higher’ economic and cultural status), this graph clearly points to a shifting balance in 
ethnic relations. Because of the statistical manipulations, it is difficult to make 
waterproof statements about this alteration, but comments by contemporaries were all 
unanimous in stressing low white-mestizo presence.154 However, different categories 
were at play, which make it difficult to establish the exact number of vecinos. At the 
other hand an analysis of these different forms of categorization exactly point to the 
emerging overlap of which the case of Gregorio López testifies. Vecinos were 
categorized in racial-ethnic terms as white-mestizo, representing 418 (1,55%) in 
habitants in 1910 (Bacarreza 1910 cited in Pauwels 2006, 350-403). In fiscal terms, the 
vecinos were considered as “urban without land” (contrary to the sayañeros who were 
“rural with land”), of which only 317 were counted (1,17%) in 1910. In contrast, 
Bacarreza counted 983 “civilians” (3,61%), inhabitants with electoral rights.155 When 
 
                                                     
154 The sub-prefect of Carangas commented in 1898 that among his subjects “everybody is indigenous, only 1% of 
mestizo race and 0.5% of Spanish race.”This argument was used to explain the impossibility of collecting fines in 
his province (Own translation. Aramayu 1898, Anexo, xii-xiii). In the national census 1900, in contrast, white-
mestizo presence tended to be overemphasized, indicating a number of 2416, which was almost entirely a 
concentrated in Corque (2006 [1904], LXVI-LXXXV). In 1910 one year later, Bacarreza (under-)reported no 
more than 418 whites and mestizos (Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 365-6). 
155 One year before, 1138 people with civil rights were counted (Ascarrunz 1909, 103). In 1927, only 765 
“civilians” were counted in the province (Calderón 1927, 11), but two years later official lists registered 1081 
civilians (Gonzalez Flores, 34). 
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indigenous 67% 83% 98%
mestizo-white 33% 13% 2%
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putting these numbers together, an overlap surfaces, indicating that a relatively large 
share of the minor elite population was, despite of belonging to a non-indigenous ethnic 
group, identified as indigenous and/or having access to community lands while at the 
same time  enjoying civil rights.  
Table 12 Population division of the Carangas province according to land access and 
ethnicity, 1910 (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006). 
 
What we observe is a more complex phenomenon that resulted to be quite 
widespread among the vecinos. In view of the strong communal hold over the land, 
vecinos developed other strategies to get a grip on the land. For that purpose, they were 
prepared to “humble” themselves and adopt the status of indigenous contribuyente, 
including its fiscal obligations. This implied a confusing and intensifying interaction 
with and within the community that generated a new class of “vecinos-originarios” 
(Mendieta 2006, 778), which I will define more broadly as “vecino-comunarios”. Over 
time, these so-called “vecino-comunarios” who obtained a foot in both “worlds” became 
deeper entrenchment in communal affairs.  
This phenomenon corresponds to a slow, subtle absorption process that defies clear-
cut dichotomist interpretations of Bolivia’s rural society. Contemporary national elites, 
however, interpreted the simultaneous adoption of different ethnic and social statuses 
by the people entrusted with the “nationalization” of the province as an assimilation 
process that went in the “opposite” direction of how Bolivia’s future rural classes were 
envisioned. In 1910, Bacarreza commented that 
98,46% 
0,37% 
1,17% 
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“the mestizo race which, during colonialism was numerous, has considerably 
decreased since the depopulation of the mines of Carangas, and tends to disappear 
because of the emigrations and the consequent process of reversion to the 
primitive race; phenomenon which is observed almost daily in the marriages.”156 
The comments by contemporaries about this reversion refer to an intermediary 
phase in a longer process of integration. In that sense, the vecino-comunarios give 
testimony of an evolution that started superficially but gradually gave way to a more 
fundamental ethnic absorption process. In fact, we find the vecino-comunarios on the 
turning point where the consolidation of their elite position culminated in their 
incorporation into the local community. In search for additional revenue sources, 
several vecinos attempted at complementing their urban and mineral landholdings with 
agrarian lands,157 which were in communal hands, and effectively gained control over 
most cultivable terrain by the late 19th century (Pauwels 1983, 216 and 222-4). In effect, 
the maintenance of their power position came to involve manoeuvres to gain access to 
non-alienable property, which involved an “alternative” encroachment of community 
lands. However, effective occupation of community land was impossible despite the 
registration as contribuyente and the consent of the community given the prevalence of 
comunarios over vecinos and their concerns regarding this additional demographic 
pressure on the land (Mendieta 2006, 776-7). Hence, this land usurpation went hand in 
hand with a process of “contribuyentization” and a pragmatic extension of vecino 
networks into the community sphere. By acquiring a double identity, they 
simultaneously enjoyed all the privileges provided by their vecino status as the access to 
community land provided by their sayañero status.158 
This subtle process of land appropriation by (initially) non-community sectors is a 
known yet understudied phenomenon that entails a clue to the specific land rights 
trajectory of community areas such as Carangas. The implied forging of social and fiscal 
bonds to the state and the community as contribuyentes conferred the vecinos a stake 
in preventing the state from intervening in the regulation of community land and hence 
 
                                                     
156 Own translation, emphasis is mine. Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 364. 
157 Vecinos were active in the land market in urban plots, which counted as private property, as well as in 
mining concessions, as has been discussed above (7.1). 
158 This double identity can be detected by linking different archival sources such as wills, inventories, sayaña 
adjudications and the padrones. In the case of Antonino Morales, the inventory of his possessions and his 
share in copper mining point to his wealth and vecino status, but at the same time he was registered as 
contribuyente “of several ayllus” and had passed as alférez. AJC, Civiles, 1916, no. 13, 14 and 28. As the López 
family will demonstrate further on, the names of government officers and mestizo merchants can also be 
traced back in the Revisita records. Also wills can give an indication as with Eufrasio Ortega, a rich vecino 
from the vice-canton of Carangas whose will included a sayaña. AJC, Civiles, 1904, no. 3. 
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avoid the sale of their (usurped) lands through auction. While at the one hand 
“compensating” Carangas’ “freedom” from an established hacendado class, the 
particular usurpation strategies of the vecino class nurtured their gradual erosion and 
mitigated the ‘rupture’ of the 1952 National Revolution and the 1953 anti-hacienda 
uprising. This particular dimension of Carangas’ experience of the land reform will 
receive more attention in 7.3.2. 
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To conclude Part II 
This second part of the dissertation has assessed the incorporation of Carangas and of 
its constituting communities and households as a rural sub-zone of a regional 
production system which has been defined as the Central-Andean social agro-pastoralist 
system. More specifically, it has assessed how the integration of this production system 
within broader frameworks and processes for governance and exchange increasingly 
subjected those households and communities to pressures to assimilate to homogeneous 
frameworks for access management and decision-making. This reconstruction has 
allowed me to specify central factors in the formation and transformation of 
production, exchange and regulation in Carangas. These specified factors will enable me 
to scrutinize the impact of changing land legislation for the comunarios of Carangas.  
In ecological terms, 19th century Carangas presented excellent conditions for llama-
based pastoralism, which continues to constitute the “pillar” of rural livelihood 
construction, while offering limited strategic resources with potential to rouse land 
purchase and other extractive incentives on part of private landlords. In demographic-
ethnic terms, the region was predominantly “indigenous” which goes together with a 
particular fiscal and legal status and left governmental representation over the region 
to a very small mestizo-white elite group. The region’s ‘exclusion’ from the ongoing 
transport revolution and the pastoralists’ alternative accesses to circuits for resources 
and labour hindered commercial and industrial entrepreneurs in channelling its 
extractable resources to the world market, whose forces are a third factor. While lack of 
communication and institutional infrastructure also undercut the state’s institutional 
power and its grip on the region, it constrained the comunarios’ fiscal potential to 
colonially inherited asymmetrical relation and was in return forced to commit itself to 
the protection of their collective land rights. While conditioned by that fiscal relation, 
communal agency tapped into long-standing structures and mechanisms for communal 
regulation, which were secured by a negotiated margin for autonomy, which was 
however locally interfered by the ambiguous intermediation of a minor yet powerful 
elite group. 
 

  247 
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Introduction to Part III.  
A fluctuating law with a differentiated reach. 
Rather than a quick and clear-cut division surgery, Bolivia’s first land reform law 
launched a long, conflictive and fluctuating legislation and implementation process. In 
the words of Barragán, exvinculación cannot be reduced to a single act or coherent policy 
line but presents a long process that has a formal and an operative dimension (Barragán 
2012, 25). While its formal dimension is reflected in the way ideological debates were 
“translated to the paper” in the form of decrees, its operative dimension is reflected in 
how these decrees were “translated on the ground”. Most interestingly, Barragán 
demonstrates how this first dimension, which is most strongly transmitted through the 
sources at our disposal, is oriented towards the destruction and replacement of the old 
(colonial) order, while its second, less obvious dimension ironically reflects a continuity 
of the old order through the “flooring” of the envisioned new (liberal) order (Barragán 
2012).  
The success of this “flooring” can only be understood in the light of prevailing 
economic incentives and constraints that overruled the law’s ideological justifications, 
inter-elite struggle, and of the communal defence of collective land rights. “On the 
paper”, the translation of the aggressive discourse in which communitarian land 
administration equalled colonialism and land privatization progress into laws and taxes 
was hampered and modified due to the State’s fiscal bonds and indigenous pressures. 
“On the ground”, its implementation was hindered by the State’s bureaucratic 
incapacity, its reach checked by (often violent) communal resistance and its results 
coloured by regional variations in the power relations that structured the countryside.  
The bottom line of the reform was that indigenous and dominant groups entered a 
single land market, falsely assuming that they were equal partners. The reality –and the 
irony- was that the reform provided the landlord class with a favourable legal tool, 
materializing in a massive expansion of the hacienda between 1880 and 1930, rather 
than a strong smallholder class (Klein 1993). This is particularly true for the broader La 
Paz region, where enclosure manifested itself in its most dramatic way as well as in the 
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Cochabamba valleys, which depicts however a stronger “peasant road”. Both regions 
have generally attracted most attention in the research on Bolivia’s liberal reforms in 
relation to the country’s rural population, which explains why the idea of the hacienda’s 
omnipresence on the pre-revolutionary Bolivian countryside is so strong. The dominant 
line of inquiry that backs this idea is the question to what extent the liberal land reform 
measures enabled the hacienda complex to offset the share of indigenous communities 
and to what extent the latter managed to endure as Bolivia was increasingly caught in in 
the world market’s net. 
My approach to Bolivia’s land question, however, goes beyond the dual community-
hacienda question and the exaggerated emphasis on the (peri-urban) La Paz region and 
the Cochabamba region, seeking to revalue the differentiated experiences of less visible 
areas and players.460 From altiplano herding communities over valley sharecroppers to 
Amazonian groups, there were different implementation trajectories with different 
economic incentives at play, resulting in a very “uneven” transformation of rural 
Bolivia (Irurozqui 1999, 708-9; Jackson 1997).  
“Clearly we cannot reduce local and regional variations of indigenous-state 
relations to one seamless “Andean experience of liberalism” – whether it be 
construed as massive ayllu divestiture and “ethnocide” under liberalism, 
resurgent ethnic movements of communal defense, or peasant family strategies of 
land acquisition” (Larson 2004, 226).  
A notable instance of “unevenness” has crystalized in the vast highland zones that 
played no direct role in the 1880-1930 enclosure movement, apparently located beyond 
the reach of the exvinculación law. Carangas and its southern neighbour Lípez, which 
covered the west of the Potosí department, appear together as the sole hacienda-free 
provinces of the country’s established departments (excluding the eastern lowlands) 
during the pre-revolutionary republican period (Rivière 1982, 99). Here, the aspired 
transition got bogged down in endless delay. Remarkably, the particular experience 
seems to constitute unexploited terrain; a void that should not be excused by the 
absence of hacienda dynamics nor by the difficult source situation.461 
 
                                                     
460 An example of exaggerated emphasis on La Paz region is Choque’s statement that Jesús de Machaca was the 
only marka surviving out of the hacienda system in the pre-1953 period (Choque Canqui 2008). 
461 Even though the department is the scenery of the quite dramatic experience in the community of Peñas 
(see 5.3), there is little literature that directly and exhaustively addresses the effects of the 1874 law in the 
Oruro. However, important publications with regard to this period and region (or related regions) include 
Rivière 1982; Platt 1982; Pauwels 1983; Ayllu Sartäñani 1992 and 1994; Sanjínes 2005; Urioste, Barragán and 
Colque 2007; Mendieta 2010.  
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Exclusively entailing altiplano lands, concrete steps towards the exvinculación of 
community lands never materialized within these provinces, but did dismember it from 
the distant valley lands rented by a number of communities, for becoming classified as 
“residual,” excess land. As a consequence, these provinces presented from the “outside” 
a picture of insulated communities, cut off from their ecologically complementary land 
property and hence from the incomes its rent produced. This constraint on the 
communities’ land base diversity reinforced their disconnectedness from the wider 
(agricultural) world. In the “home communities”, practically all land remained under 
ayllu control, apart from mining concessions and the private plots in the rural towns, 
and the contribuyente population remained exempt from cadastral registration and 
taxation. This observation that no community lands were divided or sold further 
strengthens the idea of an enclave, an isolated island. Yet, the image derived from an 
“inside,” close assessment of what happened at the very local level is much more 
dynamic and interconnected (though not “in the eye of the storm”) situation.  
Questions and hypotheses 
Recurring to the guiding questions of the case study, this third part of the dissertation 
seeks to gain insight into how exvinculación was kept at bay in Carangas and which 
repercussions this particular experience had on the organization of rural life on the 
longer term.  
In line with the proposed dissection of frontier processes into different dynamic 
phases, the first question includes following sub-questions:  
In search for the incorporation purpose behind the land reform, this enquiry starts 
with assessing the objective of the law and its scope. What were the ideas driving 
legislators? How did they envision and plan the implementation of the law and what 
tools were developed thereto? Did the proclaimed stipulations alter over time? It then 
assesses the local impact of that incorporative drive and the “reach” of the law’s impact. 
How was the law ‘brought’ to the region/people? Which implications did the law have 
on the existing relation between the central state and its subjects? Which effect did the 
law install upon that relation? What were the obstacles in implementing the law? 
The impact of the law must be related to the responsiveness of local actors to the 
objective of the law and the pressures it effectively exerted in order to assess how the 
law was negotiated. How was the law received? What were the arguments/motives for 
protest or acceptance? When (in which context) was decided to go over to the 
offensive? How did legal action take shape? Why/When did protest erupt in violent 
uprising and when did spontaneous action evolve into more organized strategies? What 
were the tools, the leaders and the targets of this responsiveness? What were the 
demands and what were the successes of opponents to the law?  
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The fourth aspect of this incorporation “trajectory”, then, concerns its so-called 
“feedback” effect, that is, very broadly, how new dynamics were “inserted” into the land 
reform process that “deviated” its course.  
My assessment of these questions is nurtured by a set of hypotheses that beg to be 
“tested”. With regard to the purpose of the law, Barragán’s suggestion of a fluctuating 
law is key. With this fluctuation she points to the oscillations in its implementation, but 
also to the deviation of its content, converting the abolishing law into a titling and 
taxing law (Barragán 2012, 26). This points already to a feedback loop in the land reform 
process that altered its ambition. Regarding the reach of the law, Boone’s argument 
must be taken into account, maintaining that the state sometimes makes a deliberate 
decision to not incorporate particular territories or their people (Boone 2003). In that 
respect, the case of Carangas seems to support the statement that property rights 
regimes emerge and are consolidated where they there are strategic resources to be 
controlled (Cole and Ostrom 2012, see Clay and Wright, and McDowell). Another factor 
that may have influenced such state decision is the state’s fiscal bonds to the people 
upon which the new legislation was imposed, where Platt’s emphasis on the key role of 
the state-community pact comes into play.  
In relation to the responsiveness inscribed in incorporation processes, and despite 
powerful external factors that kept Carangas marginal to the land reform process, I 
maintain the hypothesis that the communities of Carangas were not simply 
“overlooked” but actively “fought” themselves out of the “scope” of the law. Historical 
research on communal resistance against exvinculación has emphasized the role of  
formal land titles as a crucial tool to “halt” the law (Larson 2004, 53-4). This was a 
strategy that essentially implied the intermediation of indigenous leaders, but also 
indigenous alliances with non-indigenous elites, which –as Mendieta criticizes- have 
mainly been evaluated in rather dichotomous terms (Mendieta 2010). The role of these 
titles and these leaders and their relation to “external” representatives remains 
hitherto very vague for Carangas and begs for a serious examination.  
Fourth, there is the feedback effect. On basis of his case study in Chayanta, which 
despite different geographical and economic conditions depicts a quite similar situation 
as Carangas, Platt argues that the relocation of the head tax collection to the 
departmental apparatus implied that in regions where the tributo system persisted 
notwithstanding the exvinculación law, the virtual pact between the state and these 
taxpaying communities was “renovated” at the sub-national level (Platt 1982, 134-5). 
This implied that communities knew to limit the infringement of the mediating role of 
their indigenous leaders as of their fiscal position. However, Platt also points to the 
effect of the central state’s withdrawal from the law (as an effect of Barragán’s 
argument) moved its “abolishing” purpose into the hands of the local elites (Platt 1982, 
145-7). His findings urge for a closer analysis of the intertwined relations between 
comunarios, local elite groups and central state institutions.   
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A key entry into this tangle of questions and hypotheses is the land inspection that 
was imposed as the conditional step towards the implementation of land reform, the 
Revisita General. My assessment of the land reform’s repercussions upon the historical 
trajectory of the communities of Carangas departs from a “close-reading” of the 
implementation of this fiscal-legal operation, or rather, of its “perpetual imminence”. 
This intervention constituted an instance of “real and symbolic violence” enacted by 
the agents of Bolivian liberalism and provides in a rich entry into more complex 
processes of (re)negotiation as its enactment came with fiscal changes, legal strategies, 
conflict and violence, political representation and socio-ethnic categorization.  
The extensive set of questions and hypothesis related to my first guiding question 
already hints at possible answers on the second question, which interrogates the effect 
of the local dynamics unchained by the advance (or retreat) of the reform process on 
long-term social changes such as peasant differentiation, stress and marginalization. 
The same question must be posed regarding reconfiguration of ethnic boundaries. 
Pauwels (1983) description of the phenomenon of the vecino-comunarios, local non-
indigenous elites who however obtained access to community lands, forms the starting 
point of a further examination of social and ethnic reconfigurations, but also of the 
triangular relation between state powers, comunarios and village elites. The question of 
how the land reform process related to a particular social-ethnic group must also be 
asked regarding a much more omitted from the historiography, the Uru population. 
While in the early 19th century still inhabiting various districts of the province, Uru 
presence was by the early 20th  century reduced to a single tiny village. How did the 
process of land reform relate to their marginalization?  
Structure of Part III  
Chapter 5 gives an outline of national developments that preceded the land reform, 
describing the first but failed land reform attempts under the first presidents of the 
independent republic (5.1.1), focusing on the inter-elite debate driving the 
conceptualization of the law (5.1.2), discussing the confiscation decree of 1866 (5.1.3) 
and pointing to the measures taken after his defeat (5.1.4). The second section dissects 
the take-off of the 1874 Alienation Act (Ley de Exvinculación), stipulating its content and 
objective (5.2.1) and the tools designed to implement the law (5.2.2). It then assesses the 
reach and impact of the law (5.2.3) and the communal response to the law (5.2.4). It 
closes with the eruption of mounting indigenous protest and the ascent of new elite 
forces in the 1899 federal war (5.3).  
Chapter 6 takes the unrolled development to the level of the Carangas province, 
starting with the how the communities dealt with president Melgerajo’s land reform 
decrees (6.1). It then discusses how the last rented valley lands under direct control of 
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several communities of Carangas were confiscated in the course of the land reform 
process (6.2). Then, the focus is put on the repeated efforts to implement the Revisita 
and how these pressures fostered the spread of rebellion and internal violence in the 
1870s-1890s (6.3). It then scrutinizes how this instigated the emergence of a modest 
apoderados generales movement in Carangas (6.4) and how this mobilization erupted in 
the 1899 rebellion (6.5).  
Chapter 7 departs from the post-1899 context and looks into the subsequent 
evolution and implications of the initiated land reform process in Carangas until around 
1930. It first assesses the (im)mobility of strategic resource frontiers in the province 
(7.1). Then, it moves on to the local dynamics provoked by the imminence of the 
Revisita, reflected in inter-ayllu conflict (7.2.1) as well as in the deployment of a 
threefold resistance strategy under indigenous leadership (7.2.2). A third section 
addresses the ambiguity of vecinos intervention in communal land management and 
the anti-Revisita protest (7.3) and closes with a discussion of the changing national 
discourse regarding vecinos and indigenous peasants in early 20th century Bolivia (7.4). 
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Chapter 5  
Exvincular: delinking the community from land and 
power. 
Melgarejo  
Bolivia muere en sus paredes 
como una flor enrarecida: 
se encaraman en sus monturas 
los generales derrotados 
y rompen cielos a pistolazos. 
Máscara de Melgarejo, 
bestia borracha, espumarajo 
de minerales traicionados, 
barba de infamia, barba horrenda 
sobre los montes rencorosos, 
barba arrastrada en el delirio, 
barba cargada de coágulos, 
barba hallada en las pesadillas 
de la gangrena, barba errante 
galopada por los potreros, 
amancebada en los salones, 
mientras el indio y su carga cruzan 
la última sábana de oxígeno 
trotando por los corredores 
desangrados de la pobreza. 
Pablo Neruda462 
 
                                                     
462 Pablo Neruda 2005, 192. English version: “Bolivia dies within its walls / like a rare flower: / defeated generals ride 
high in their saddles / and blast the skies with pistol shots. / Mask of Melgarejo, / besotted beast, filthy scum / of betrayed 
minerals, / beard of infamy, horrendous beard / above the embittered mountains / beard dragged in delirium, / beard 
filled with bloodclots, / beard discovered in gangrenous / nightmares, roving beard / galloping in the pastures, / 
cohabiting in the parlors, / while the Indian and his burden traverse / the last sheet of oxygen, / trotting through the bled 
/ corridors of poverty.” Neruda 2011, 157-8. 
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Adopted as the formal name for Bolivia’s first land reform proclaimed in 1874, 
exvinculación alludes to a liberation effect which the law pretended to create. Its 
objective was to free the country from its dual landownership by replacing communal 
property rights by individual and alienable land titles. This would release collectively 
held lands to the free market and liberate the indigenous population from the 
discrimination imposed by the differentiated head tax system and non-remunerated 
labour exactions (Klein 1993, 115-7). The term is a small variation on desvincular, which 
can be literally translated as de-linking or liberating from a connection. Desvinculación 
relates to, but does not equal, desamortización, which is the most common term used in 
19th century Latin America to denominate the legislation enacted to privatize, divide 
and commodify land. Both terms refer to the legal operation of disentailment, the 
elimination of restrictions to the free circulation of land by freeing property, 
particularly corporative held rural properties (both ecclesiastic as profane), from 
entail.463 In the case of exvinculación, this liberalization was “legally” translated into an 
operation to make all lands occupied by the “class of originarios, forasteros, agregados 
or whatever other denomination” alienable.464  
This kind of legal confiscation processes took off in Mexico with a first batch of 
reform laws proclaimed in the 1850s,465 but its roots correspond to a much longer 
history that must be traced back to Spanish Bourbon despotism. Out of the late 18th 
century dialogue between liberal and conservative notions on the economic function of 
property, a changing perception on land distilled (Barragán 2012; Irurozqui 1999; Langer 
and Jackson 1990). The impact of this changing notion was that the importance and 
methods of measuring the value of land changed, allowing for its commodification. This 
road towards productivity and agrarian development required a strong land tenure 
security for agricultural producers which was believed to be unattainable under the 
conditions of communal tenure. Thus, for the sake of the free movement of goods and 
capital, the undivided and inalienable character of collective land rights was to be 
eliminated through disentailment, while the subsoil was made state property.  
In fact, the implementation of this altered notion implied devaluation as qualitatively 
appraised features, hard to disentangle and pigeon-hole into an “legible” matrix, were 
omitted from the calculation. In Bolivia, this reassessment had far-reaching implications 
for the position of indigenous communities, the ayllus. Not only did it undermine the 
functioning of communal land systems by removing its underpinning principles of 
 
                                                     
463 Whereas desamortizar replaces the former landowners by the state, which sells these lands as national 
goods to individuals, desvincular leaves the land in possession of the owners and their first-borns as free goods 
(Barragán 2012, 25). 
464 “Ley de 5 de octubre de 1874.” Sección 1a, Article 1.  
465 The most important of these measures was the Ley lerdo of June 25th 1856 (de la Torre Rangel 2013, 81). 
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inalienability or non-transferability, but it implied “deep cultural incursions into the most 
intimate corners of communal life” (Larson 2004, 226). The loss of the community’s 
legitimacy as landowning, taxpaying and representative institution triggered a 
renegotiation of state-community relations.466 The “feedback” effect of this 
renegotiation was that anti-community aggressions unleashed a range of grassroots 
resistance, rebellion, consciousness and memory mechanisms, converting the Bolivian 
liberalism paradoxically into the moment when the community simultaneously 
confronted its strongest attack and received a major stimulus to its political agency 
(Gotkowitz 2007, 18; Barragán 2012, 25). Accounting for the vigour of communal 
pressures in the Bolivian context, the “surplus” value of land, which was more strongly 
eradicated in the European context, has hence continued (although distorted) to play a 
part in the altering national land legislation in Bolivia.  
In short, the law under study must be approached as a long process rather than 
“single act”, taking into account the antecedents to the legislation project as well as the 
multifaceted agency of the indigenous population that actively contributed to the twists 
and turns in that project. In order to situate the repercussions for and contributions by 
the communities of Carangas as this process developed, the present chapter assesses the 
antecedents to the enactment of the exvinculación law, discusses its purpose and 
stipulations, its methods of implementation and its short-term outcome at the national 
level, up to the point where communal protest and inter-elite struggle merged in the 
federal war of 1899.  
5.1 Antecedents to the exvinculación process. 
Although a substantial shift in Bolivia’s land policy towards community lands would not 
occur before the 1860s, the origins of that shift must be traced back to late 18th century 
ideas. In order to foster the circulation of goods and capital, to raise fiscal revenues and 
to eliminate rooted hierarchies, it was asserted that property was to be “mobilized” 
 
                                                     
466 Legislators insisted on the pact’s discriminatory postulation as it imposed a differential tax that was 
defined by caste instead of income, provided originarios with a privileged status and impeded the assimilation 
of indigenous commoners as Bolivian citizens. The communities themselves, however, defended another form 
of citizenship, based on collective instead of individual rights, and insisted on their particular “indigenous” 
relationship to the state and its fiscal underpinning (Rivière 1982, 107; Platt 1982). Their argument was that 
privatization would neutralize the  incentive (the defence of collective rights) to pay the head tax and hence 
deprive the treasury from indispensable revenue. 
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through partition or amortization (see Campomanes 1765 and Jovellanos 1794, cited in 
Barragán 2012, 17-20). Ensuing debates, triggered by new ideas on civilization and 
nation-building, gave shape to a different concept of land property and the formulation 
of “dead hands” (mortmain), which gained major entrance under influence of the 
French Revolution (Rose 1984; Jones 1991). However, the roots of these concepts and the 
tools to implement them, such as the cadastre, thus precede the French Revolution (De 
Reu s.d., 1-5; Touzery 2002 and 2007), nor are they strictly European. Once circulating, 
the eventual materialization of new ideas on property and their application to 
collectively held land lingered for a long time. Throughout the first decades of Bolivian 
independence, intensive inter-elite debates developed around the issue of land, hinting 
at a slow crystallization of liberal “peasantization” plans and their translation into a 
body of laws. 
5.1.1 First disentailment attempts. 
Concrete disentailment measures were first taken under Spanish Bourbon rule in Nueva 
España (largely coinciding with what is now México).467 Subsequently, the property 
debate was brought up at the Cortes de Cádiz, which came to function as the main 
forum for the diffusion of liberal ideas.468 In this Andalusian port, the besieged anti-
Napoleon Spanish government held its first national assembly (1810-1814) and produced 
a constitution (1812) that would serve as a liberal blueprint for the soon independent 
Latin American states. Here, Spanish-American relations were intensively discussed and 
the foundations for future land tenure reorganizations in the entire Spanish American 
region were formed (Rodríguez 2005). An important privatization tendency was 
inscribed into these foundations, including the proposal of substituting the indigenous 
head tax by a general, single and direct tax. While the cadastral system found its 
entrance, changes to the colonial Leyes de Indias eventually proved taboo and the 
Spanish king Fernando VII decided in 1815 to simply rename the tributo as contribución 
(Irurozqui 1999, 709; Sanchez Albornoz 1978, 189-90). In turn for their contribution, the 
indigenous population was granted citizenship, yet receiving a “special treatment” 
 
                                                     
467 Under the incentive of bankruptcy, legal disentailment measures were for the first time enacted by Spain’s 
Illustrated ministers of the Bourbon regime in the viceroyalty of New Spain (Langer and Jackson 1990, 11). 
Here, a Royal Decree was enacted in 1804 as part of the Bourbon reforms, ordering the expropriation of real 
estate of ecclesiastic corporations. As this measure directly and indirectly affected about all productive 
sectors, major protest was bound to follow. See also García Ugarte 2005.  
468 Barragán suggests the possibility that the materialization of new notions on land property into concrete 
policy lines regarding indigenous communal tenure first originated in Mexico, to than, via Cádiz, be 
generalized in the continent through Bolívar’s decrees (Barragán 2012, 22). 
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because of their attributed minority of age. Presented as a violation of the right on 
property and stimuli for capital accumulation, the mita also figured in these discussions, 
and was eventually abolished (Calderón Vega 2010, 142-3, cited by Barragán 2012, 21). 
Once gained independence, the first effective disentailment initiatives taken by 
Latin-American governments principally targeted Church lands. This confiscatory 
operation was denominated as desamortización (Bodinier, Congost, and Luna 2009). 
Regarding Bolivia, Langer and Jackson are among the few researchers explicitly 
addressing the understudied issue of Church land expropriation (Langer and Jackson 
1990). They indicate that the confiscation of Church lands was executed largely during 
the first decades after independence and particularly affected the properties of regular 
male orders. In contrast to what happened in various other Latin-American countries, 
particularly in Mexico, the young Bolivian state was relatively effective in neutralizing 
future conflicts over Church land, at least until the Liberal Party took power at the turn 
of the 20th century.469  
Disentailment ideas also entailed important consequences for the indigenous 
population, particularly regarding their role as economic actors and fiscal subjects. 
However, while privatization plans for Church or community lands equally stemmed 
from liberal ideology, the materialization of these plans differed significantly in design, 
implementation and outcome for either form of property (ibid, 9). In contrast to Church 
properties, the indigenous community had a much firmer footing in the Bolivian 
countryside. As in the wider Andean area, the application of new ideas on why and how 
to address the land issue in these corporative landholding institutions was postponed 
until the second half of that century, Bolivia being the last to join (Larson 2004). This 
second phase of disentailment was to take a much more conflictive and protracted 
course.  
Already in the first years of Bolivia’s republican history, several steps were taken to 
develop a concrete policy towards community lands, but their implementation resulted 
unsuccessful. In July 1825, Bolívar, the libertador who became the first president of the 
country that was named after him, expanded “his” Peruvian decrees to Bolivia in order 
to convert the usufruct rights of indigenous commoners into a full title to community 
lands, hence establishing these lands as private property (Aylwin 2002, 31).470 The 
 
                                                     
469 The authors contend that this relative success can be attributed to president Sucre’s limited affinity to the 
country he was ruling and the weak position of the decimated anti-liberal elites and clerics after the wars of 
independence (Langer and Jackson 1990, 10-6). 
470 The decrees of Trujillo (8 April 1824) and  Cuzco (4 July 1825), issued by Bolívar, abolished the cacicazgo but 
without these indigenous chiefs losing their title of “citizens worthy of consideration” and their lands, 
prohibited personal and un-contracted services by the indigenous, and ordered a distribution of community 
lands in favour of the landless (Irurozqui 1999, 709; Barragán 2012, 22).  
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decrees aimed to integrate community-bound producers as nation-bound smallholder 
peasants, which required the “solution” of the question of land rights security. They 
specified that lands originally obtained through repartimiento remained inalienable until 
1850, while the remaining lands which were not occupied under a previously granted 
legitimate title (through auction, composición or adjudication) were confined to 
“possession at will” (posesión precaria), which means that they fell under the ultimate 
landownership of the State (Irurozqui 1999, 709-10). Determined to install a new and 
more egalitarian fiscal system, Bolívar also foresaw the replacement of the indigenous 
tributo by a general tax (however without clarifying the implications for tributarios’ 
landownership), but the survey operation to implement the reform was never executed 
(ibid). 
Breaking with the colonial agrarian policy resulted unrealistic due to a number of 
factors such as the resistance of conservative elites, urban elites and indigenous elites, 
the bureaucratic incapacity to implement the reform, and the irrelevance of insisting on 
an anti-Spanish reform (as Bolivia was already independent) (Ovando 1985, 24-27). The 
key obstacle, however, is to be found in the Treasury’s dependence upon indigenous 
tribute revenues and hence the indispensability of differentiated fiscal categories 
(Assies 2009, 296). The reciprocity pact -although permanently marked by troubled 
relations with the State and elite groups- proved irreplaceable. The aspired tributo 
abolition would bring indigenous contribuyentes and the mestizo-white population on 
equal terms, hence the measure was received with protest by all sectors, each for their 
own reasons (Lofstrom 1983, 333-55).  
As the protest of different social sectors merged, Bolívar’s land policy was taken 
down after only seven months. With the law of 20 September 1826, his successor, 
president Sucre, suspended Bolívar’s decrees and reclassified communal land tenure 
again as precarious (usufruct) possession (Ovando 1985, 27-8). This implied the 
restoration of the indigenous tributo, which followed in July 1827, confirming the 
intrinsic fiscal character of the indigenous community and reinforcing the National 
Treasury's dependence on indigenous tax payments (Irurozqui 1999, 711). According to 
Ovando, this legislative reform was in fact a public credit operation to secure the 
government’s solvency, but which meanwhile took a first step towards the occupation 
of community lands (Ovando 1985, 31). Still, it concerned a weak reorientation of the old 
tributary structures installed by the colonial agrarian policy, rather than what Antezana 
describes as an amplification and correction of Bolívar’s “ultraliberal” policy (Antezana 
2006, 66-7). 
The measures taken under president Andrés de Santa Cruz (1829-1839) in 1831 
installed a status-quo in Bolivia’s land policy that lay the basis for the land sales policy 
that found entrance from the 1860s on (Platt 1987, 293). The status-quo resulted from 
the difficulties to balance the large ambitions of the regime with the constraints 
provoked by international tensions and widespread indigenous protest and created 
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some breathing room for communal landholding groups. The imposed measures 
included the recognition of the community as a collective landowning entity capable of 
initiating juridical procedures, however via indirect attorney (apoderado) 
representation.471 In 1838, escalating military expenses due to a Chilean-Peruvian-
Bolivian confrontation472 pressured the government to prohibit the purchase of 
community lands in order to secure the inflow of indigenous head tax revenues 
(Irurozqui 1999, 714). To even increase the number of indigenous tributaries, the 
tributary class was opened up to mestizos, elderly, women and children and lands were 
distributed among the landless (ibid). Overall, the measures taken  under Santa Cruz, 
particularly the restoration of the tributo, had an appeasing effect on the countryside 
and the country as a whole (Ovando 1985, 50). 
To the degree that the debate over the revision of land property rights evolved 
towards a broader and hardier debate about the country’s economic prospects, the 
maintenance of that status quo would make way for the abolition of communal tenure 
systems (Langer and Jackson 1990, 10). In the 1840s, a discourse emerged that pushed 
for a redefinition of community lands ownership no longer as indigenous but proper to 
the state (Irurozqui 1999, 715). This ideological shift, fomented by liberal and landlord-
promulgated ideas to abolish the indigenous tributo, became first clear under president 
Ballivián (1841-1847). With the circular of 14 December 1842, the state let community 
lands out on long lease to the indigenous tributaries, who saw their status reduced to 
leasehold tenants (ibid).473 This is known as the emphyteusis regime (enfiteusis) which 
subjects community lands to the eminent domain of the state, with the latter -as 
exclusive landowner- lending usufruct rights over cultivation lands in return for taxes 
(Ovando 1985, 55). As land property became the exclusive terrain of the state, the state 
itself and its legal instruments were appropriated by elite groups anxious to ensure 
their power base –and hence their land base.474    
 
                                                     
471 The law of 28 September 1831 declared the indigenous taxpayers individual owners of those land which 
they had occupied “pacifically” for at least 10 years (Irurozqui 1999, 711). Recognized as individual 
proprietors, contribuyentes could petition their demands individually, but as stated by the Supreme Order of 7 
February 1834, corporate interests were to be defended by apoderados as courts were not to accept collective 
claims by indigenous communities (ibid). 
472 In 1836, Santa Cruz brought Bolivia together with the fleeting states of North and South Peru under a single 
confederation, although the return to the colonial Peruvian viceroyalty was short-lived as the war with Chile, 
Argentina and disloyal Peruvians resulted in its dissolution in 1839 (Rojas and Berdichesky 2009). 
473 The circular declared that “the lands possessed by the originarios are property of the State, and [the originarios] 
should be considered but as a kind of enfiteutas [leaseholders] who pay a certain amount to the direct landlord for its 
usufruct.” Own translation. Antezana 1993, 56. 
474 Although the Bolivian state seemed yet not sufficiently strong to operationalize Ballivián’s policy, 
provincial authorities effectively profited from the enacted measures. The head (Gobernador) of each province, 
 
 262 
Ballivián’s presidency provided the later land reform with a crucial antecedent, 
paving the way for the process that was to be called exvinculación (Platt 1987, 293). 
However, direct attacks to indigenous land property were temporarily pushed into the 
background under his successors; land right security for indigenous community 
members seemed to improve (Irurozqui 1999, 717). The return to more equilibrated 
State-community interactions is reflected in the supreme order of 27 August 1858 which 
guaranteed communal land properties and respected the land adjudications held by 
indigenous tributaries (ibid, 719).475 Not only the formulation of the agrarian question in 
José Maria Dalence’s standard statistical work Bosquejo Estadístico de Bolivia (1851) 
manifests the general acceptance of the “enfiteutis regime” (Ovando 1985, 69), but also 
commoners themselves seem to have been familiar with their emphyteutic status.476  
An attempt to go beyond this “emphyteutic regime” in 1861 by ordering the 
elaboration of cadastres of all properties was aborted by landlord resistance out of 
indignation to be treated as indigenous taxpayers subjected to a Revisita (ibid, 77-9).477 In 
1863, a proposal by the Achá government to divide community lands into individual 
plots failed before finding general acceptation and one year later the exemption of 
measurement and estimation operations for lands in indigenous hands was confirmed 
(ibid, 121; Irurozqui 1999, 725). Despite this exemption, the seeds for the end of the 
preserved equilibrium (imposed by Santa Cruz) were being planted. Growing urban food 
demands helped to shape a new climate that allowed for the treasury’s “liberation” from 
its head tax dependence. This would open the road for an economic reorganization and 
the physical unlocking of the countryside, announcing a new cycle in the expansion of 
large estates that would fully develop from the 1880s on. This announcement was 
underpinned by a reinforcement of anti-corporatist ideas on land and property. The 
urban elites, who now had generated funds for rural investment and demonstrated a 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
for instance, was entitled with the allocation of vacant lands and the resolution of land grabbing and border 
disputes at the community level and in 1843, a new Revisita was announced in order to gain an idea of the 
amount of –now state-owned- “residual lands” that could be sold to private landowners (Ovando1985, 54-60). 
475 Emphyteutic lease and the declaration of indigenous lands (in particular, wastelands which had to rest) as 
“vacant” (tierras residuals) is a general practice enacted in (post-)colonial regimes, for instance observable in 
North-American reserves and Portuguese India (AGTER and ILC 2009, 9-10; Serrão and Santos 2013).  
476 In a dispute over the property of a sayaña in 1861, for instance, a plaintiff brought in the argument that the 
land rights of all contribuyentes concern access rights to terrains of the state, in order to charge the accused 
intruder of incursion of state possessions. AJC, 1861, no. 856, f. 2v. 
477 Local sources also give testimony of how comunarios’ precarious land ownership was locally understood and 
employed. In a lawsuit over the disputed rights over a sayaña, one of the parties brings in the argument of all 
sayañas belonging to the property of the State property and hence accuses his opponent of intruding “state 
possessions”. AJC, 1861, no. 856. 
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growing interest in commercial agriculture, were hence provided with the ideological 
foundations for the effective seizure of community lands.  
5.1.2 Disagreeing elites: money, property, and taxes in a transforming 
economy. 
In the 1860s, a transition that would undermine the virtual state-community pact was 
prepared. Dominant voices pushing for the consolidation of land seizure operations and 
imperatives of the reactivating mining economy shaped a favourable climate for the 
deployment of a capitalist sector and the development of convenient ideological 
underpinnings. In parallel with a discussion over the country’s financial foundations 
and constraints, an intense debate ensued among old and new landlord factions on the 
fate of indigenous communal land tenure. The political turmoil and economic 
reformism of this decade announced the time of Bolivia’s liberal reforms in which 
monetary and fiscal reorganizations closely entangled with the designing of a 
confiscation operation, to be first implemented by president Melgarejo in 1866.  
Addressing first the monetary debate, Bolivia’s double monetary policy lay at the 
core of the problem (Platt 2008 and 2010; Mitre 1981). It was not so much the 
simultaneous coinage of a weak coin for internal circulation and a strong one 
functioning as a commodity for external trade that formed the problem (this was a 
common practice in several countries), but the fact that both Bolivian coins, each with 
their intrinsic value, were open to trade circuits that left the country. The perverse 
effect of this parallel circuit of monetary circulation, in which the debased coin 
increasingly played a leading part, was that it allowed foreign commercial interests to 
prevail over national interests (Platt 2010, 49; Jacobsen 1993, 160). Money manipulation 
burdened Bolivia with a stagnating economy and undermined its international trade 
position. Contemporaries such as Benedicto Medinaceli, one of the leading voices in the 
debate, contended that the reduced monetary standard of the weak coin since Santa 
Cruz had encouraged external markets to withdraw the coin from internal circulation 
and produced a relative price-rise in imported consumption goods rather than to 
foment Bolivia’s national market (Medinaceli 1863, 3; see also Santivañez 1862 and 
Vargas 1863). As the debate developed, the transition from an octal monetary system to 
a metric decimal system gained ground.478 In 1863, a bill of the Achá government 
proposed the replacement of the strong peso by the silver boliviano of 100 centavos, which 
 
                                                     
478 After a failed monetary reform in 1830, president Belzú had proposed a financial reform in 1849 that would 
reduce the weight and size of coins, but left the octal monetary system intact (Medinaceli 1863, 4-7). 
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was eventually implemented as the national monetary unit under the Melgarejo regime 
in 1869, but remained based on the silver standard until 1895.479  
Together with a monetary reform, the need for a fiscal reform was planted. Until at 
least the 1860s, the task of filling the Treasury was in the first place accomplished by the 
indigenous head tax, covering 36% of the national budget. This explains why the State 
remained all that time supportive to the communities' territorial claims rather than 
displaying an aggressive attack towards them (Rodríguez 1991 and Langer 1991, cited in 
Irurozqui 1999, 715). However, there was an increasing need for additional fiscal 
revenues as the number of indigenous tributaries had been in decline since the 
reinstitution of the tributo system in 1827 (Grieshaber 1980; Irurozqui 1999, 714). This 
need became even more pressing by the late 1850s, when the epidemics of 1855 and the 
consequent loss of numerous taxpayers as well as the weak Bolivian currency brought 
the government’s financial state of affairs into a general economic crisis (Ovando 1985, 
73-4; Irurozqui 1999, 719). The state’s deteriorating solvency and the marginalization of 
large sectors of the rural society that were left without monetary means of circulation 
encouraged a revision of Bolivia’s colonially inherited fiscal framework.480 Meanwhile, 
booming silver, guano and nitrate production produced a shift the constellation of the 
national budget in which the mining sector increasingly figured as a secure income 
source, while the relative importance of the head tax declined. In 1872, a fiscal reform 
eventually allocated the head tax incomes to the departmental treasuries, yielding the 
fiscal potential of the indigenous population to the sub-national level.  
The newly implemented monetary and fiscal policy entailed important consequences 
for the indigenous population and the security of their land rights. To the degree that 
the mining boom opened new revenue sources, the argument that indigenous tributarios 
needed sufficient and ecologically diverse land in order to pay the head tax lost ground. 
This argument supported the political ascendance of the new elite group of capitalist 
entrepreneurs and produced a divergence in Bolivia’s land debate from its initial course. 
While the previous decades were dominated by questions over the indigenous 
population’s landowner status, which had given emergence to the emphyteusis thesis 
with the indigenous commoners as the State’s land leasers, the questions now focused 
on the societal model to organize the rural indigenous population (Irurozqui 1999, 719-
720). The proposed answers to these questions reflected political ideas on how to ensure 
the country's future as a morally “civilized” and economically “prosperous” nation. 
 
                                                     
479 “Ley de 29 de junio de 1863” and “Ley de 26 de noviembre de 1895.” Sucre, 1895. Klein 2011, 136; see also 
Rojas 1977 [1916]. 
480 Until into the 1850s, the maintained fiscal policy continued to reflect its colonial character, for instance in 
Bustillo’s ultraconservative, unsuccessful tributo reform of 1850 that pushed for fiscal exemption of landless 
community members, or in the practice of provincial and anticipated tributo collection (Ovando 1985, 69-72). 
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Around these ideas, an intense inter-elite debate crystalized that would set the stage for 
the eventual formulation of a land reform act one decade later.  
The proposals that were formulated, circulated and discussed by the dominant 
(mainly economist) voices that partook in the debate concerned the conversion of 
indigenous land tenure. Among the different destinations for community lands was 
their sale to private landlords (which required their temporary conversion into 
individual property as had been advanced by the Trujillo decree of 1824), their division 
into marketable plots with individual ownership, or their incorporation as directly 
marketable state property.481 These options evolved towards an antagonism between 
two models, pushing for the conversion of indigenous commoners into either tenants or 
smallholders. The tenant proposal suggested a labour strategy, speculating that the 
incorporation of indigenous tributaries in the body of hacienda workers would 
assimilate community-bound Indians with national interests, while the smallholder 
stance advocated a juridical and cultural strategy through the individualization of 
collective land property (ibid, 721). The former strategy corresponds to the classic 
option of the landlords, while the latter to the capitalist option of the land buyers. 
Geographically, the former stance was most strongly supported by “old” style 
landowners, established in the north of the country, while the latter was maintained by 
a new emerging landowner class emerging based in the southern departments of the 
country (Langer and Jackson 1990, 20-1).  
The regional divergence among elite groups can be related to the different ways in 
which the peasantries of the respective departments were organized and linked to the 
market sphere. In the southern departments, peasants were less tied to communal 
organization patterns. In Cochabamba, they actively participated in the dynamic grain 
market and in the Potosí and Sucre departments there economic activities were 
strongly tied to the regional (booming) mining and urban economy. In the La Paz area, 
by contrast, the rural products that entered the market arrived from freeholding 
Aymara corporations which dominated the northern part of the altiplano as well as the 
central Oruro region which is generally omitted from this discussion. Elite groups with a 
land base in the former region displayed a rather pro-smallholder stance, while those 
 
                                                     
481 An outline of the ideas that nurtured the two phases (1861 and 1863) of the debate is given in Antezana 
2006, 130-9; Irurozqui 1999, 720; Langer 1991, 64-69; Ovando 1985, 81-121; Peralta and Irurozqui 1992 and 
Rodríguez 1991, 186. Among the most influential pamphlets figure those of Melchor Urquidi, Bases para la 
reforma de la hacienda y de la contabilidad pública de Bolivia, Cochabamba, 1861, Jorge Mallo, Aplicación económica 
cambiando el sistema rentístico de la república conforme a las costumbres modernas. Sucre, 1861, Miguel María de 
Aguirre, Apuntes Financiales para Bolivia, Cochabamba, 1863, and José Vicente Dorado, Proyectos de repartición de 
tierras y venta de ellas entre los indígenas. Sucre, 1864.  
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holding lands (or eager to appropriate lands) in the peri-urban La Paz area envisioned a 
hacienda expansion, fuelled by ex-commoner peonage (ibid). 
The ongoing debate was driven by the search for the most efficient method to make 
the community disappear as a corporate unit. What both strategies had in common was 
their agreement over the abolition of the communities and the state's ownership over 
residual lands as the appropriate solution for the country’s economic challenges 
(Irurozqui 1999; Ovando 1985, 120). The remaining question was: what would happen 
with the indigenous population? As several legal measures were suggested to address 
this question, the ongoing regionally divided inter-elite dialogue was kept alive.  
5.1.3 Melgarejo: The 1866 decree. 
By the mid-1860s, Bolivia’s capitalist classes found patronage in general Mariano 
Melgarejo who provided them with the “most adequate” regime (1864-1871) to optimize 
and legalize their economic interests. Still counting as the country’s most polemical 
president so far (Arguedas 1929; Iriarte 1986; Neruda 2011, 157-8; Jacobs 2012), 
Melgarejo seized the economic boom to allow his decadence and political 
thoughtlessness full reign, consequently burdening his government with urgent 
financial problems and the country with debilitated territorial borders (Klein 2011, 132-
7). Most importantly, his government re-launched early-republican liberal plans to 
privatize community lands, materializing in the first serious attack on the free 
communities in Bolivia’s independent history. After a 1863 decree to distribute 
individual plots and sell “residual” lands had been cancelled (Irurozqui 1999, 274-5), the 
search for more appropriate profitable options pushed the Melgarejo government, 
facing a treasury that was to be filled, to promulgate in 1866 a land reform decree that 
favoured the “classic” landlord strategy to open up the communities’ land base.  
The (in)famous decree of 20 March 1866 is emblematic for the triumph of economic 
liberalization, confirming the political ascent of the country’s silver-exporting 
capitalists, yet was still driven by feudal-like motives. Indeed, if Melgarejo’s regime can 
be acknowledged as the breakthrough of liberal policies, his anti-corporative decree 
endorsed the “classic” landlord proposal rather than the capitalist, smallholder model 
(Langer and Jackson 1991, 20-1). Still, this radical but short-lived prologue to the 
disentailment act of 1874 would play a decisive role in the subsequent evolution of the 
community land debate through which the capitalist strategy eventually would gain 
official acceptance. In fact, the eventual putting into practice of longstanding liberal 
ideas on land had more to do with financial incentives than with ideological arguments; 
as had been the case with Santa Cruz and Ballivián (ibid, 28). As the regime’s military 
expenses were skyrocketing, the country’s increasing internal public debt limited the 
policy options for Melgarejo and his legislators to an extreme (ibid, 21). Meanwhile, the 
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government was receiving more from mining investments and export than from the 
indigenous tax (Klein 1993, 113-5). It was in the first place the government’s pressing 
revenue shortage and its relief from tributo dependence that determined Melgarejo’s 
land policy, regardless of all pro-hacienda and pro-smallholder arguments.  
By declaring the state as exclusive proprietor of all lands, Ballivián’s emphyteusis 
regime was taken one step further. According to the policy line pursued by Melgarejo’s 
functionaries, lands had to be consolidated by unifying the usufruct rights with the 
direct rights over land. By combining both rights, there came an end to the leasehold 
status (enfiteusis) of communal tributaries. In order to organize this titling operation, the 
state attributed itself the exclusive competence to grant usufruct and full property 
rights and moreover created an extra revenue source by demanding a monetary 
recompense for each title to be consolidated (Ovando 1985, 122-3). The indigenous 
population were to claim their land titles and pay a fee of 25 to 100 pesos for their 
consolidation within the established term of 60 days. If no payment was made within 60 
days, their lands became accessible to individual buyers through public auction 
(Irurozqui 1999, 725). If no buyers were interested in the community lands, the 
commoners could continue to occupy their lands as renters, implying rental taxation to 
the new owner of those lands, the state. Thus, the only way for tributarios to protect 
their community lands was to pay for property rights which they in fact always had 
possessed! The many indigenous communities to which this arrangement constituted an 
insurmountable capital barrier saw their community lands subjected to blunt purchase 
and sale transactions (ibid; Ovando 1985, 169). In other words, the legal measures 
concerned an ironic consolidation operation designed as an intermediary step towards 
the creation of a free market for consolidated lands. 
In 1868, the classic landholding class managed to employ its majority in the Asamblea 
Constituyente to confirm the Melgarejo decree with the law of 28 September, stating in 
its first article that “the lands possessed by the indigenous race and known until now under the 
name of Community lands, are declared property of the State.”482 The law gave practical details 
on the execution of the confiscation program. It ordered the deployment of Juntas 
revisitadoras (survey committees) commissioned with the demarcation of community 
lands, the elaboration of (a sort of cadastral) land maps and estimation of purchase or 
rent prices, and the revision of the sale contracts originating in the 1866 decree.483 
 
                                                     
482 “Ley de 28 de Septiembre de 1868.” Article 1. See also Irurozqui 1999, 725; Ovando 1985, 145-67. 
483 Inspection commissions were formed in the capital of each department, including a juridical and an 
ecclesiastic functionary and the solicitors of the district court. The attributions of these commissions are to 
examine all community land sale and consolidation documents that have been verified between March 1866 
and the promulgation of the 1868 law and to approve the legal and annul the erroneous contracts. “Ley de 28 
de Septiembre de 1868.” Article 20 and 21. 
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Commoners who had effectively consolidated their land rights according to the 1866 
decree would be declared proprietors with usufruct and direct rights over their lands, 
while land sales made on basis of the 1866 decree were legalized.484 Included in the law 
was a compensation arrangement which was of particular interest to the Carangas 
communities, as will be discussed in chapter 6.  
Melgarejo’s modifications to Bolivia’s land legislation were underpinned by a fiscal 
reform. Initially, the indigenous contribución remained in place but, as property moved 
to the state, the fiscal implication was that the head tax was to be converted from a 
contribution for land property into a rent for land tenure (Klein 1993, 115). In 1868, 
measures were taken to replace the tributo system by a tax system that reflected an 
individual, direct and statistical orientation.485 This switch required the execution of a 
general Revisita, which in many regions nevertheless was a long time coming –or was 
never to come. As a result, a dual collection system emerged in which the tributo (at that 
time still the state’s most lucrative rent) and other obligations continued to be exacted 
in Revisita-free areas, while the new territorial tax started to be collected where the 
Revisita had been organized (Irurozqui 1999, 731; Ovando 1985, 153-6). As a growing 
group of communities managed to prevent the sale of their lands, thereby consolidating 
themselves as landowners with “full” fiscal responsibilities, the state sought for an 
alternative way to free itself from any compensatory respect towards communitarian 
property rights and declared, later in 1868, these communities exempt from paying a 
contributions and other services that had previously guaranteed these rights (Ovando 
1985, 157).  
Although the measures taken by his government were of short duration, this episode 
fundamentally altered not just the outlook of agrarian legislation but also the country’s 
(rural) society as a whole (Irurozqui 1999, 708; Salazar de la Torre 2013). Melgarejo’s 
brutal confiscation policy has ever since been remembered in usually strong evocations 
of sadism, tyranny, tragedy and resistance. However, the immediate effect of his 
agrarian policy is disputable as the main ambitions of the decree remained frustrated 
even before the whole operation was being restored. The target of creating extra 
income was only partially fulfilled; the public auction operation yielded much lower 
 
                                                     
484 “Ley de 28 de Septiembre de 1868.”Article 26 and Article 18.  
485 A resolution of October 1868 imposed a land tax of 0,3% for rural properties and 0,1% for urban properties, 
and a personal tax, according to which all men between 21 to 25 years paid 2 bolivianos annually. Originarios 
continued to enjoy an exceptional fiscal status of 4 bolivianos annually and exemption from “process costs” 
for official procedures. Taxes on production, such as diezmos, primicias or veintenas were abolished, yet their 
replacement by a cadastral system was not pushed through before the 20th century. Irurozqui 1999, 725; 
Sanchez Albornoz 1978, 208; Ovando 1985, 154. 
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revenues than expected.486 The target of community land conversion was tempered by a 
superficial transformation and hacienda expansion and undercut by strong regional 
differences as well as violent counteractions on part of the indigenous communities 
(Ovando 1985, 169). The La Paz area received the heftiest “auction blows” and hence the 
heftiest counter-reactions.487 The Cochabamba area witnessed a fragmentation of its 
land structure, however rather produced by internal fragmentation of large estates than 
through legal dispossession (Rodríguez, Jackson 1990 and Rivera Pizarro 1992, cited in 
Irurozqui 1999, 726). 
In some –generally understudied- areas, the enacted measures seemed to have had 
no impact or resulted at least little effective. The department of Oruro, where only three 
communities had been subjected to public auction, clearly belongs to that last category 
(Ruiz and Irurozqui 2000, 88; Sanchez Albornoz 1978, 209). The indigenous fiscal and 
insurrectionary counterweight of the department’s rural districts is key to understand 
the limited reach of the decree. As the case of the Carangas province will demonstrate in 
the next chapter, communities managed to block off the impact of the measures. 
However, the fact that this went at the cost of communal mobilization and a fiscal 
arrangement demonstrates that the new legislation did unchain important local 
dynamics in the province.  
5.1.4 The 1871 debate. 
1866 would result still too early for a “capitalist transition” of the Bolivian rural 
landscape. Premature market conditions and financial constraints of the institutions 
appointed to implement the land legislation prevented Melgarejo’s decree to work as it 
was intended to. Moreover, the radicalness of the reform sparked widespread 
 
                                                     
486 In 1870, the Ministry of Finance stated that the lands of 325 communities had been sold by auction, yielding 
867000 bolivianos, in contrast to an estimated revenue of 1205370 bolivianos (Ruiz and Irurozqui 2000, 88; 
Sanchez Albornoz 1978, 209). There are indirect indications of a high level of illegal land sales, manipulated 
land surveys, contested adjudications and other arbitrary operations that partially served to solve public debts 
(Irurozqui 1999, 725-6; Ovando 1985, 158). Interesting to note is that many of the lands sales in this episode 
corresponded to soldiers, government employees and favourites, in addition to well-off indigenous purchasers 
who saw their chance to expand their land base beyond communitarian constraints (Langer 1991, 72, cited in 
Irurozqui 1999, 726). This latter group may correspond to mestizo villagers who had integrated in the 
community of contribuyentes. 
487 Several haciendas in the La Paz area formed, which had been formed with purchased lands, were invaded 
by its previous indigenous occupiers, often violently and far beyond the capacity or will of state authorities to 
stop them (Langer y Jackson 1990, 22). 
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resistance.488 Meanwhile, pamphlets of white elitist hand started circulating, opposing 
the confiscatory operation. The particularly violent indigenous protest from the 
attacked communities in combination with strong opposition by large elite factions of 
private landowners demonstrate that his plans came ahead of time (Klein 2009, 137). 
The economic transformations conditional to the reform had still not attained enough 
strength to convince a part of the national elites large enough to force a more 
substantial enclosure operation through. This inter-elite discrepancy allowed for a 
merger of “old” elite and indigenous interest. Their shared resentment towards 
Melgarejo’s dictatorship and against the new economic elites burst into a revolution in 
November 1870, led by Agustín Morales and Casimiro Corral (Mendieta 2010; Irurozqui 
2001). With the dictator’s defeat, his decree perished as well. However, also this 
achievement would soon appear to be an illusion. 
The anti-Melgarejo victory and the temporary and exceptional return of a civilian 
government under president Morales was based on an alliance between the established 
landowner class and indigenous communities, mainly Aymaras from the La Paz 
department (Ovando 1985, 168). This seemed an illogical construction given the fact that 
the political project of the established landowner class came to rest on the population 
group whose power they actually feared the most. However, from a broader time 
perspective such elite-community alliances were not that exceptional and this 
particular coalition created an important precedent to the 1899 revolution as will be 
discussed below.  
Exemption or not, the comunarios of Carangas did actively participate in the 
revolution. Although a lack of data on the department’s participation in the revolution 
has been notified (Mendieta 2008, 388), evidence has been found in the correspondence 
between the Prefect of Oruro to his superiors, informing “about the indigenous who took 
part in the revolution and whose intervention must cease, with the splendid triumph obtained the 
15th of the current [month, January], over the vandalism of Melgarejo and his devastating 
troops.”489 That month, a contingent with coronels of Melgarejo’s army, arriving from 
Tacna, had been taken by surprise in Curahuara de Carangas. In February, different 
public acts followed in all villages of the Carangas province during which the vecindario 
proclaimed their honour to president Morales.490 Melgarejo himself made it across the 
border, escaping via Chile to Lima, where he was eventually murdered in November 
1871 (Terán 1980).  
 
                                                     
488 Klein states that the reaction from the peasants upon the proclamation of the decree was slow, eventually 
leading to major revolts in 1869 and 1870 in Tliquina, Guaycho and Ancoraymes (Klein 1993, 116). 
489 ANB, MI, 1871, tomo 195, no 96. Provincias, Letter 4 January 1871. 
490 ANB, MI, 1871, tomo 194, no 81. Oruro dept, Letters 28 January 1871 and 27 February 1871. 
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The law of 31 July 1871 declared the land sales executed under the Melgarejo 
government invalid, stating that  
“the indigenous commoners are proprietors of the original and community 
terrains, by this virtue all sales, adjudications and expropriations of any class that 
may have been applied to these lands under the reign of don Mariano Melgarejo 
remain annulled as infringements on the right to property”.491  
Thus, indigenous tributaries recuperated their previous land rights as well as their 
fiscal and other obligations. However, this apparent pro-community policy was mainly 
built upon pragmatic promises. Melgarejo’s adversaries realized that the promise of 
ayllu recuperation was the only way to mobilize indigenous support in their attempt at 
overthrowing the regime (Langer and Jackson 1990, 22). As a consequence, this 
restoration would be as short-lived as the decrees it aborted. In fact, landlord-
community relations were quite soon brought back to the order of the day.492 Moreover, 
the 1871 restoration included an indemnification procedure for land buyers whose land 
acquisitions were cancelled by the anti-Melgarejo regulations. This indemnification 
would be financed with big European loans which the Bolivian State secured with the 
projected revenues from silver export and particularly guano exploitation in the 
Bolivian littoral, which through the Chilean occupation would become beyond its reach 
(Ovando 1985, 262).  
Despite the violent dethronement of Melgarejo, the liberal transition that had been 
set in motion under his government was extended rather than reversed. The following 
years would bring an intermezzo during which the agrarian question and the related 
civilization question were brought back on the political agenda. During the 
Constitutional Convention of 1871, the revived inter-elite debate reached another 
culmination moment, nurtured by a number of simultaneously published pamphlets 
(Ovando 1985, 175-206; Irurozqui 1999, 727-9).493 Opinions differed regarding the 
(in)alienability of community lands, the (im)productivity of those lands and the 
 
                                                     
491 Own translation. “Ley de 31 de Julio de 1871.” Article 1. 
492 In the La Paz region, where auctions had produced the highest number of land sales and hence the uprising 
had been strongest, many community lands were successfully restored, whereas more southwards weaker or 
absent mobilization favoured the pro-Melgarejo elite factions. Ovando 1985, 170; Klein 1988, 45-63; Langer 
1991, 70-75; Langer and Jackson 1990, 9-32 and Grieshaber 1991, 113-143, cited in Irurozqui 1999, 279 and ibid, 
271-2; Barragán 2012, 25.  
493 The debate started with the simultaneous publication of the leaflet of Santiváñez and Zambrana and was 
first steered from Cochabamba to then move to La Paz. Amongst the most important pamphlets, included in 
the Colección René Moreno of the National Library of Bolivia (BNB), are José María Santiváñez "Reivindicacion 
de los terrenos de comunidad"; Zambrana "Dos palabras sobre la venta de tierras realengas a la Nacion, a la 
Soberana Asamblea y al Supremo Gobierno"; Bernardino Sanjinés; Avelino Aramayo Apuntes sobre el Congreso de 
1870. Sucre, Tipografía del Progreso, 1871. 
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(in)justice of all obligations tied to those lands and its products, but all agreed on the 
necessary disappearance of the community in order to create a free land market. As in 
previous decades, the question was not so much on which goal to achieve but on how to 
achieve it. This question relates essentially to the question of labour (Langer and 
Jackson 1990, 20-1). The debate brought up once more was what would substitute the 
community: the hacienda or the smallholder farm.  
According to one current, propagated in the north of the country and particularly by 
José Vicente Dorado, ensuring indigenous commoners’ contribution to the country’s 
economic progress required their “protection” from the market by absorbing them as 
peons (colonos) in the hacienda system (Dorado 1864). He considered their conversion 
into capitalist producers impossible. These arguments envisioned a paternalist strategy, 
supported by the established landlord camp, and had prevailed all that time, even under 
Melgarejo. An assimilation strategy, backed by dominant elite groups in the southern 
departments of Cochabamba, Potosí and Sucre, challenged this stance. They upheld that 
the way towards economic progress was in converting indigenous commoners into 
capitalist farmers by abolishing the tributo and granting property rights, which implied 
the division of community lands in order to incentivize their participation in the 
market. Despite this antagonism, Ovando states that in the aftermath of Melgarejo the 
classic landowner class started to embrace the new elites’ capitalist arguments, while 
the latter in fact supported the old elites’ feudal logic (Ovando 1985, 222-3). After all, the 
shared fear of both groups for an indigenous revolt was bigger than the shared hostility 
between anti-Melgarejo elites and indigenous communities towards land sale 
operations. As the debate evolved and elite interests merged, pro-usurpation arguments 
gained ground. 
With the new constitution of October 1871, the inter-elite dispute came to a 
conclusion. The small steps taken in the following years all reflect a convergence of old 
and new elite interests in acquiring indigenous lands. Whilst the land sale operations 
under Melgarejo were being annulled, disentailment plans were clearly trickling 
through, advocating for Bolivia’s liberation from colonial anachronisms such as the 
community, but also of the hacienda. A truce over land disputes among indigenous as 
well as between non-indigenous and indigenous land occupiers was enforced in order to 
gain time to formulate a coherent policy for the break-up of community lands that 
would make commoners “real proprietors” of their lands (ibid, 263-7). In 1872, several 
desvinculación measures were taken to “unlock” property in mortmain (Barragán 2012, 
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25; Irurozqui 1999, 727).494 With the fiscal reform of that same year, the collection of the 
indigenous tributo became a departmental attribution (Sánchez Albornoz 1978). Now the 
state-community “contract” was neutralized at the national level and the inter-elite 
struggle abated, the conditions were set for a powerful elite-indigenous conflict. 
5.2 The take-off of the exvinculación process (1874-1899). 
5.2.1 The Exvinculación Act of 1874. 
Only a couple of years after the annulation of community land sales in 1871, a new law 
announced one of the most tumultuous episodes in Bolivia’s republican history. Under 
the second Frías government (1874–‘76), regional interest groups came to an agreement 
over the appropriate solution for the country’s land question. Among the multiple law 
projects that had been circulating, the bill of the Chuquisaqueños, who represented the 
capitalist stance in the land debate, won general acceptance. It was only when this 
emerging entrepreneurial class had accumulated enough capital to incentivize 
investments in rural lands that their land reform proposals could work out. Still, the 
smallholder-tenant debate which in the preceding decade(s) had set the stage for the 
eventual land reform project would continue to revive as the exvinculación process 
developed, particularly in the context of critical legislatorial debates as again during the 
1880 National Convention. 
The act was promulgated on 5 October 1874 with the name of Ley de Exvinculación (the 
Alienation Law). Hoping to avoid violent reactions by the indigenous masses, the law 
replaced the Melgarejo decree with a gradual, more cautiously formulated reform. The 
difference between both rules was that this time only the “vacant” community lands 
became state property, while the rest of the land, both collectively and individual, 
remained with the contribuyentes, although in the form of absolute, individual and 
alienable property (Klein 1993, 116). With their proposal, the landowners’ faction of the 
southern departments staked on a capitalist transformation of the rural producers 
which would automatically ensue from the individualization of their control over the 
land (Ovando 1985, 120; Langer and Jackson 1990, 20-1; Irurozqui 1999). In that sense, 
 
                                                     
494 The 1871-‘72 regulations also determined the access to salt reserves, either in their liquid or solid form. 
These stipulations were later confirmed by the 1879 law and brought concrete changes and conflicts in 
Carangas regarding the exploitation of these strategic resources, which will be discussed in chapter 7.  
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the law was promoted as a tool to foment a process of “peasantization.” This would 
come at the cost of the community’s tenure, fiscal and representative attributions. The 
intermediary communal link between individual producers and the centralized state 
apparatus and the market had to be cut, implying a negation of the reciprocal state-
community pact. 
According to the specifications of the law, every family was to be made private owner 
of the terrain it exclusively worked. Thereto, collective property titles were to be 
replaced by new individual titles that corresponded each to a sayaña that was effectively 
cultivated (Ovando 1985, 277-9). Contribuyentes would thus become the rightful 
proprietor of the sayaña they occupied. This also applied to non-indigenous villagers 
who had been registered as contribuyente in case they had enjoyed access to community 
lands for at least fifteen years, otherwise they had to buy lands from the state (ibid). If 
an inter-indigenous conflict existed over the terrain in question, the juridical procedure 
had to be closed. If it concerned an interethnic dispute (between indigenous and non-
indigenous occupiers), then the procedure continued. Either way, a resolution could 
only be found in the adjudication of individual titles, there was no corporative option 
(ibid, 279). 
As in other Andean countries, the government developed a particular interest in so-
called tierras sobrantes or “excessive lands” which came to play a central role in the 
enactments of community subdivision plans. This applied to collectively used lands, 
lands that lay fallow, were kept as reserve by the community, or were located in distant 
archipelagos as well as the lands usurped by non-indigenous proprietors. The 1874 law 
classified these residual lands as “vacant” and declared them property of the state. The 
official argument was that these commonly held or usurped lands exceeded the minimal 
amount of land conditional to the subsistence of the people who lived from that land 
(Langer and Jackson 1990, 24). In the eyes of the state, these residual lands represented 
first of all wastelands that were to be brought into the productive cycle and secondly 
represented a welcome revenue source for the national treasury as they were easily 
marketable through auction operations (Larson 2004, 216). 
As collective claims on community land were no longer accepted, the community was 
stripped of its corporative means of representation (Irurozqui 1999, 731-2). It became 
forbidden to “take the name of community or ayllu, nor take charge of them before any 
authority.”495 The implication was that communities were forced to rely on attorneys, 
 
                                                     
495 It was article 7 of the 1874 law that made the figure of the apoderado necessary: “Once the property titles have 
been granted, the law no longer recognizes communities. No individual or gathering of individuals can take the name of 
community or ayllu, nor take charge of them before any authority. The indigenous will negotiate themselves or by means 
of an apoderado in all their enterprises, considered legally of age, or they will be represented, as minors of age, according 
to the civil requirements of each case.” Own translation. “Ley de 5 de Octubre de 1874.”. Ovando 1985, 279. 
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called apoderados, while their autonomy in terms of land control was invaded by the 
deployment of land inspection commissions. This seriously undermined the role of 
community leaders as mediating actors in the connections of indigenous peasants to the 
juridical system, political authorities and the land market, which was to the advantage 
of opportunistic local elites. At the other hand, these restrictions gave rise to what is 
known as the apoderado movement (see below, 5.2.3). The National Convention of 1938 
would legally restore the community’s formal abolition, but it was only with the 
National Revolution that this legal recovery would be reinforced with a broader package 
of emancipatory measures.  
The fiscal implication was that the head tax lost much of its leverage in the 
contractual relation between the communities and the central state. The contribuyentes’ 
monetary and labour contributions did no longer guarantee the protection of their 
collective land claims. Moreover, from a liberal point of view, the differential tax status 
as well as the compulsory personal services represented discriminatory colonial legacies 
from which they were to be liberated. Therefore, the disentailment operation required a 
simultaneous transition to a cadastral system based on a universal property tax (a rental 
tax defined by the size of each privatized plot). As an intermediate step towards this 
new fiscal regime, a “territorial contribution” was instituted, which –since the head tax 
had ceased to exist at the national level due to the 1872 fiscal reform- was allocated to 
the departmental treasury by the newly created office of  caciques licitadores, who 
adopted the previous task of the jilaqatas (Rivière 1982, 105). However, the 
implementation of this decentralized collection would only follow after the 
modification of the law in 1880 (see below).  
5.2.2 Delinking instruments: La Revisita General of 1881. 
Even with a reform law formally proclaimed, the welcoming prospect of indigenous 
taxes and the “specter of a caste war” delayed the implementation of the country’s new 
land policy (Langer and Jackson 1990, 20). In a first moment, the law of 1874 achieved its 
objective only in some regions, particularly the Tarija and Cochabamba departments 
(Rodríguez 1991, 135, cited in Irurozqui 1999, 732; Ovando 1985, 286-8). It would take a 
military interference before the government would go over to a generalized application 
of the reform. The War of the Pacific shaped decisive economic incentives and was 
seized by the country’s national elites to push their ultimate land reform plans through. 
Pressured by the urgent need for extra income source, the new Assembly of 1880 finally 
proceeded to measures to put the law into practice (Irurozqui 1999, 732; Barragán 2012, 
25-6). Moreover, the Chilean occupation of Bolivia’s coastal lands in early 1879 had 
deprived the government from the money that was foreseen to compensate in 1871 
annulled land sales. This motivated indemnification petitioners to seek compensation 
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through land reform interventions that would allow them to usurp community lands, 
which according to Ovando explains the elite’s inclination towards domestic power 
interests rather than to back off Chile's aggression (Ovando 1985, 290 and 306).   
The context of the ongoing War of the Pacific sparked once more the lively debate 
over the destination of the indigenous population. From a liberal-republican stance, 
only “independent peasants, linked to the market, producer and consumer” could contribute to 
a civil modern nation-state (despite the general fear that “independent” might equal 
“beyond the state’s reach”) (Irurozqui 1999, 733). In June of that year, Ladislao Cabrera, 
one of the country’s war heroes, stated that  
“the lands belonging to the originarios constituted a considerable part of the 
territory of the Republic. To place their possessions in circulation, place them in 
hands of intelligent and capitalist proprietors, was the attempt of the 1874 
legislation; and if that ley was put into practice, a considerable increase in public 
goods and agricultural receipts would be achieved.”496  
Despite the general fear that indigenous smallholders might appropriate their 
independence –unprotected by a paternal hacendado- to move beyond the State’s reach, 
this was the road that was eventually indicated by the National Convention of 1880 and 
adopted by the government of president Campero (1880-‘84). On the 1st of October 
followed the law that ratified the disentailment act of 1874, annulling the measures 
taken by the previous Daza government (1876-‘79) which had restored the land sales 
prohibition and the anti-Melgarejo policy of 1871 (Ley de 1 de octubre de 1880; Irurozqui 
1999, 732). 
Regarding the parallel fiscal reform instituted in 1874, the 1880 law created a 
property tax that substituted the ‘old’ tributo and tithe system. From now on, an 
impuesto predial rústico and impuesto predial urbano (respectively a rural and an urban 
property tax) was charged, corresponding to about 8% of the annual return (in profits or 
in rents) of respectively rural and urban real property. However, ayllus that did not 
possess themselves privatized lands (such as the estates some of them rented) were 
exempt from the new tax (Klein 1993, 135-6). In the latter case, they paid from now on a 
“territorial contribution” (Irurozqui 1999, 735-6; Ovando 1985, 293-300 and 322), which 
was a change of names rather than a substantial alteration of the commoners’ fiscal ties 
to the state. Indeed, in several departments as in Oruro, this substitution of the 
indigenous tributo did not alter the importance of the tax revenue for its treasury 
 
                                                     
496 Own translation. Cabrera, Ladislao. “Memoria presentada a la Convención Nacional de 1880 por el 
Secretario de Estado Ladislao Cabrero”, La Paz, 7 de junio de 1880, 18-9; cited in Irurozqui 1999, 735. 
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(Sanchez-Albornoz 1978, Bonifaz 1953, Flores Moncayo 1953 and Gorvera 1926, cited in 
Rivière 1982, 106).  
Regardless of its name, the fiscal burden of the tax increased as both the “transitory” 
and new tax were collected in decimally ordered bolivianos, implying an increase of 25% 
in comparison with the peso currency that corresponds to an octal system.497 However, 
as this caused major protest, the government decided in 1882 to switch back to the 
collection in pesos, declaring the contribuyentes exempt from personal taxes and military 
conscription (Platt 1982, 78). In 1886, under pressures of non-abating indigenous 
insurrection, it was decreed that the contribución would continue to be collected in pesos 
as long as the procedure to switch to the new fiscal system (the Revisita) was “in 
progress” (ibid, 79). In 1911, the territorial contribution was once more modified 
(footnote 81 in Irurozqui 1999, 735-6) and while other modifications would follow, 
would remain in place until into the second half of the 20th centuries in the “free” ayllus 
(see 4.1.1). 
The conversion to a property tax required new fiscal tools and practices, designed on 
basis of a cadastre (defined by James Scott as “a geometric representation of the borders or 
frontiers between parcels of land”) that would allow the state to trace the connection 
between landowners and their property (Richards 2009, 57). As the Prefect of Oruro 
would later explain, this reform implied three operations which he estimated to be 
executed simultaneously in the course of one or two years (González 1929, 211-2). In 
preparation, a meticulous census was to be elaborated in order to replace the old 
padrones. This census would deliver details regarding the subdivision, extension and 
usufructuaries of the sayañas, in order to define how ayllu lands could be divided. The 
following step was then their effective privatization, the exvinculación, allotting each 
“ex-comunario” an individual plot that eventually could be incorporated into the 
cadastre. Shortly after the law of October 1880, guidelines for the execution of this 
survey operation, baptized as the Revisita General (general land inspection), were 
defined, in line with the stipulations of the 1874 law.498 Different from the previous 
regular Revisitas, the exact confines of the terrain of each proprietor in the surveyed 
territorial units had to be established (Platt 1982, 74). However, the lack of technical and 
financial government support to execute this operation as well as distrust and fierce 
opposition to such intervention would convert the Revisita in a protracted and in some 
 
                                                     
497 The collection of the tax in the new currency of boliviano, which corresponded to the strong coin (10 
reales) instead of the weak peso (8 reales or 80 centavos of 1 boliviano) in which the tax was previously 
collected. As the nominal quota of the tax did not alter, its relative burden increased (Platt 1982, 76; Irurozqui 
1993, 14). 
498 The organization of the Revisita was regulated by article 11 of the 1874 law. The following description of 
the Revisita regulations is based on Ovando 1985, 279-300; Klein 1993, 135-6 and Irurozqui 1999, 735. 
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regions never concluded or even started, assessment operation. In 1883, the 
communities who held a colonial land title would even be formally exempted from the 
Revisita operations (see below). 
At the departmental level, mesas Revisitadoras (survey committees) were formed and 
dispatched of to all provinces to inspect the terrain, grant property titles and define the 
corresponding tax quota in each canton. These committees consisted of a revisitador, the 
sub-Prefect, a secretary, a land surveyor, all recruited among the provincial population, 
and the priest from the village from where they operated. Upon their arrival, the sub-
prefect of the province ordered the attendance of the jilaqatas of all ayllus, together with 
the indigenous people they represented, in order to arrange the payment of the land 
titles resting on the tierras de origen (communal lands).499 They subjected the terrain to a 
measurement, distribution and valuation operation by walking and demarcating the 
territorial limits of the community lands. The regulation of the 1st of December 1880 
ordered that, within a term of only one year, community land had to be divided as 
individual property among the owners who held undivided (proindiviso) rights to the 
land, which went accompanied by the exaction of elevated consolidation payments. 
Beneficiaries –the comunarios who received an individual title- were to pay 5 to 10 
bolivianos. Their entitlement to a sayaña had to be consolidated with a legal property 
document that bore the name of that sayaña. When division resulted impossible, these 
lands had to be purchased with the proceeds from the sale distributed among the 
owners. Lands that lacked a property titles would be transferred to the State and 
subjected to sale or renting. In that sense, the Revisitas gave continuity to the land sales 
operation initiated under Melgarejo.  
The Revisita board was also the main instrument to prepare the elaboration of a 
cadastre to which all non-communal land property, either of smallholders or 
hacendados, were subjected. The commission was in charge of making up the taxpayer 
list of those people liable to the new tax and to fix the quota of the new tax system.500 In 
order to implement the announced property tax, information on the ownership, 
 
                                                     
499 See for instance the description of the arrival of the Revisitador in Corque in the Gazeta judicial. CDLT, 
Gazeta judicial, 1895-1896, no. 5, 12-3. Oruro, 18 June 1896. 
500 The taxpayers and corresponding quota were recorded in three books, one where individual titleholders 
were registered, in substitution of the Padrón de Contribuyentes, another where “residual lands” (now state-
owned) were inventoried and a third one where “separated” lands from the communities, such as halting 
posts, parishes and villages were listed. Previously landless beneficiaries who now had to pay annually 2 
bolivianos in addition to the new tax were registered in an additional book. Because of their indigence, Urus 
and Afro-descendants were exempt from taxation. Peasants who became incorporated as colonos on a hacienda 
were freed from all personal services to political, military and religious functionaries but now paid those 
services to the hacendado. However, for other peasants this service obligation remained in place, although no 
tax was to be paid during service. 
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production and value of all estates had to be united in a systematic register, a task that 
was completed by 1882, at least for some regions comprising profitable cultivation land, 
such as the coca (and coffee) producing Yunga valleys (Klein 1993, 135-6).  
However, the implementation of the cadastre as a national tax system remained too 
great an ambition for the Bolivian state. The law of 25 November 1887 was a new 
attempt to replace the tithe system by the impuesto predial, but was eventually again 
postponed until 1894, when a new tax on annual production was implemented, yet only 
in the department of Tarija (Platt 1982, 90). The law of 20 January 1900 even restored the 
diezmos (tithes) and primicias (first fruits) were restored in the provinces, followed by a 
transition period in which an “intermediary” tax was levied before definitively 
switching to the cadastre.501 Still, a huge part of the countryside fell outside the scope of 
the cadastral measures. In regions where land remained out of private hands, ayllu 
contribuyentes continued paying the head tax, until receipt of their land title. In the 
Oruro department, most rural lands corresponded to such regions and were hence 
omitted from the cadastral books, but also the department’s privately held estates 
remained un(der)recorded. In the cadastral registers of the National Archive of Bolivia, 
the Oruro department appears with empty pages.502 Even the pre-cadastral procedures 
of the Revisita did not get off the ground in many districts and particularly those of 
Carangas. The question which will be addressed in chapters 6 and 7 is not just why this 
did not happen, but also which tangible and more concealed implications this had for 
further developments in the province. 
5.2.3 The regionally differentiated reach of the law. 
When the implementation of the law eventually took off, in the 1880s, Bolivia witnessed 
an unprecedented land tenure intervention which indigenous resistance could no 
longer retard. The result was a sweeping dispossession process that indelibly marked 
life in the highlands and valleys for the next centuries to come (Ovando 1985, 300-6; 
Klein 1991, 52). Land intrusions, either through purchase or fraud, would continue into 
the middle of the 20th century and subsequently “transferred” to the eastern lowlands 
of the country. Numerous “free” communities were converted into “captive” 
communities within the boundaries of a hacienda or into dismembered islands in a sea 
of individual farmers (Rivera Cusicanqui and THOA 1992, 45). With their land, these 
communities lost their labour force as well. Between 1880 and 1930, indigenous 
 
                                                     
501 In Norte Potosi, the cadastre was created in 1903-1910 (Platt 1982, 117). 
502 ANB, Serie Padrones y Catastros, 1773-1902. Departamento Oruro. 
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communities saw their land and labour basis shrinking from half to nearly a third of the 
lands and of the country’s rural population (Klein 2009, 147).  
Grieshaber has demonstrated that, at least until 1877, communities maintained and 
even expanded their control over indigenous land and labour, comprising over half the 
Bolivian indigenous labour force in each department, while haciendas lost indigenous 
labour force (Grieshaber 1980, 236). Since Bolivia became independent, rural society was 
marked by a distribution of land control in a more or less balanced way between 
corporative entities -the Church and the indigenous communities- and private estates –
the hacienda- next to a smaller portion of smallholders. The rural indigenous 
population corresponded to three categories, those living in communities, those living 
in the haciendas and a minority of “independent” indigenous villagers (ibid, 225). The 
first group was the largest, representing 70% (1838) to 75% (1877) of all indigenous 
taxpayers, while the second group hacienda tributaries counted for 29% (1838) to 24% 
(1877) and the last group hardly represented less than 2% (ibid, table 4 and 5). However, 
after 1877, the “controlled” balance between haciendas and communities, installed 
under colonial regime, was broken.  
Whereas in 1846 still over 63 percent of Bolivia’s indigenous population lived in free-
holding communities, that figure was by the end of the century reduced to 27 percent 
(Thiesenhusen 1995, 53). On a longer term, the number of free-holding communities 
declined from 11000 in 1847 to only 3779 by 1950 (Lavaud 1991, 173). Meanwhile, the 
number of haciendas increased from about 300 to 4000 during the last four decades of 
the nineteenth century (Cárdenas 1988, 510).  
Still, this was far from a uniform experience, but a process marked by a strong 
regional differentiation. In the Southern departments of Cochabamba, Potosí and Sucre, 
there were in fact few communities left at the start of the reform’s implementation. 
Together with strong resistance and lacking purchase incentives, this resulted in a quite 
low rate of community land conversion (Langer and Jackson 1990, 23). Particularly in 
the Cochabamba area, there was a remarkably high level of land fragmentation, but this 
was in part produced by internal fragmentation of large estates rather than through 
dispossession (Irurozqui 1999, 726). Here emerged a large group of middle to rich 
peasants who saw their accumulation potential deadlocked by communitarian 
constraints and opted for a “smallholder road” out of their commoner’s life, 
“squeezing” the landlord class from below (Larson 1998, 313). According to Rodríguez, 
the effect of the exvinculación process in the Cochabamba area helped to “unchain 
accumulated craving for and tendencies towards a universally desired peasantization” 
(Rodríguez 1991, 192-9, cited in Irurozqui 1999, 730). 
In the La Paz department, by contrast, the subdivision and transfer of community 
lands produced acceleration in the expansion of the hacienda system rather than a 
proliferation of individual farmers. Particularly the region of the Titicaca Lake, the city 
of La Paz and the western valleys witnessed the heftiest wave of land sales. What 
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happened here was that the exvinculación replaced the protection which comunarios had 
enjoyed in the national state-community pact by the dynamics of the (land) market, 
where they were played off individually against the private interests of a much more 
powerful landlord class. As an effect, this “release” of comunarios on the market fed the 
growing class of colonos or hacienda tenants instead of reinforcing the emergence of a 
smallholder class as the 1874 had pretended to achieve (Irurozqui 1999, 732; Ovando 
1985, 278). The result was that the department saw its communal land base decreasing 
from 879 to 281 ayllus (an annual rate of -1,2%) and the number of haciendas increased 
from 1625 to 8507 (an annual growth of 1,8 %) in the 1846-1941 period; a process 
concentrated in the highland area and in the 1880-1920 decades.503 Most of the time this 
conversion happened through “stepwise” community land sales: first peasants would 
sell one of their sayañas, often at very low prices, which curbed their access to the 
market and hence to complementary income sources, which then forced them to 
gradually sell their other sayañas as well (Klein 1993, 157). 
An important factor in this hacienda expansion was the developing communication 
infrastructure which incited estates that formerly had remained disconnected from 
domestic and export food markets to search for commercially exploitable lands. 
Booming railway construction, tin mining and speculation markets caused a rise in land 
prices, as well as in fraud and coercion, creating a very active land market in the La Paz 
area (Langer and Jackson 1990, 23). As usurped estates were used as collateral to obtain 
bank loans, this hacienda expansion was also related to the expansion of the banking 
system (Klein 1993, 155-6). As Klein explains, the low risk of land investments and the 
rise in food prices in the La Paz area made that “the incentive to reduce the initial cost factor 
even further by using government troops to seize lands from "rebellious" Indians was an 
irresistible temptation that led to a massive assault on Indian land ownership” (ibid, 118). This 
expanding landlord class conveniently relied upon social Darwinism to justify this land 
grab (Langer and Jackson 1990, 24). At the other hand, it was exactly where enclosure 
was most dramatically experienced that resistance and the development of a grassroots 
movement was strongest, reflected in the “impressive (…) amount of land these now “illegal” 
communities still retained into the modern period” (Klein 1993, 162). The departments’ 
communities that díd survive hacienda encroachment would take up a predominant 
political role. 
Further south on the altiplano, several areas remained out of the scope of the 
hacienda system. Here, the new land legislation did serve local elites to expand their 
resource base (Ayllu Sartañani 1992, 85). However, the factors of distance, soil fertility 
 
                                                     
503 “The change in the number of ayllus and haciendas in the department of La Paz, 1846 and 1941.” Klein 1993, 
119, based on Demélas 1980, 163. 
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and demography tempered the risk for indigenous communities of becoming “captive” 
to enclosure pressures was low. Given the lack of infrastructure innovations kept 
several areas disconnected from urban market (demands), the lack of cultivation lands 
impeded the sprouting of economic incentives and the preponderance of a community-
bound indigenous population, such pressures were less strongly felt and hence more 
easily/successfully countered. Recurrent indigenous insurgence, reinforced by a local 
mestizo-indigenous anti-Revisita alliance, enabled communities in regions such as 
Chayanta, northern Potosí, as well as Carangas to keep the exvinculación of their lands at 
bay (Platt 1987). 
To complete the diversity of late 19th century rural Bolivia, the focus must be moved 
further eastwards to the Amazon basin and the Chaco pampa. These lowlands were 
treated as terra nullius, in function of the deployment of an extractive economy based 
on forest resources exploitation such as quinine and rubber in the north and an 
expanding colonization frontier fuelled by cattle farming in the south of the country 
(Assies 2009, 297). Rather than haciendas oriented towards commercial agriculture, this 
region saw the emergence of rubber estates in the Beni and cattle farms in the Chaco. 
The dispersed indigenous population of these areas had the choice of either their 
incorporation through debt peonage or their retreat into marginal regions (Assies 2009, 
297; Gamarra 2007; Guiteras 2011; Servicio Alemán de Cooperación Social Técnica – DED 
2008, 6). 
Still, despite this diversity, the renewed efforts at privatization presented themselves 
in the first place in terms of conflict, equally for enclosed as for free communities, and 
only secondly as (an attempted) liberal transformation (Langer and Jackson 1997, 171-
92). The overall outcome was the conversion of the Bolivian countryside into a 
differentiated conflictive arena that would nurture the development of inventive 
communal responses. 
5.2.4 The law and the communities: Loopholes and rebellion. 
Against the background of a varied rural landscape, freeholding communities in all 
regions –whether surviving or dismantled- witnessed an erosion of their social safety 
net. At the same time, this increased vulnerability incited a strong and coordinated 
reaction which, considering the reduced margin for communal action, was quite 
successful in defending key indigenous demands and developing decisive representative 
skills. This reaction points to the factors of state incapacity and indigenous agency. The 
reform and the specifications of its execution challenged the government far beyond its 
bureaucratic capacities. While the ambitions of the state were undercut by its own 
weakness, its limited reach was further stressed and “exploited” by indigenous lobbying 
and confrontation manoeuvres. Thereto, they relied to great extent upon the mobilizing 
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potential of communal structures, inter-community coordination, and an indigenous -
not so surprising yet ambiguous- alliance with rural elites. This multifaceted 
manoeuvring materialized in “legal loopholes through which indigenous communities could 
evade or contest the new tax and land policies” (Larson 2004, 220). 
The drastic policy was taken as an unacceptable provocation by the indigenous 
communities who saw their key margin for autonomy being dismantled. However, 
indigenous resistance and disobedience did not correspond to a “simple” opposition 
reaction, but entailed various forms and strategies of collective representation. In 
response to the limits and gaps created by the developing land legislation, this 
multifaceted indigenous agency converted the reform process into a complex interplay 
of  state, community, and intermediary actors. In function of possible allies, available 
tools and intolerable offenses, indigenous groups consciously deployed a broad 
repertoire of negotiation tactics. Through intimidations as well as collaboration, they 
continuously lobbied for and “extorted” concrete concessions. Not only did this keep 
taxes uncollected and land sales unexecuted “on the ground,” but it even led to the 
inscription of legal changes and exemptions “on the paper.” Communal lobbying and 
mobilization was thus an important factor in delaying the implementation of the 
division of communal lands and the elaboration of a cadastre. Even more, by imposing 
obstructions to and creating “escape options,” the original objectives of the legislation 
were refuted and enervated. Thus, by detecting, creating and forcing “loopholes” into 
the legislation, indigenous agency not only slowed down but fundamentally altered the 
course and the intended effect of the reform process (Barragán 2012). 
To the extent that the foundations for corporative representation were undermined, 
indigenous groups found themselves in a “juridical limbo”. Legal actions attempting to 
break out of this limbo only nurtured the general conviction that the indigenous 
population was to be kept as isolated as possible from the national public scenery, quite 
in contrast to the law’s promotion as a tool to open up citizenship. Paradoxically, these 
are precisely the actions that stress the indigenous capacity and openness to active 
participation rather than their stubborn resistance to anything “modern” or “western” 
(Irurozqui 1999, 239-40). As the community went “underground,” the indigenous 
population became increasingly reliant upon alternative spokespersons to access 
anything close to civil rights. Stimulated by the puzzling range of liberal acts, as well as 
by the continuous inter- and intra-community land clashes and lawsuits, a grassroots 
movement of particularly Aymara leaders emerged (Larson 2004, 227). In its first phase, 
this movement was in known as the apoderados generales (Ticona 2003; Mendieta 2006, 
762-3). Fully developing in the 1880s, its first realization can actually be traced back to 
the 1871 alliance with Morales, which was a formative experience for the later Liberal-
Indian alliance. In a second phase, from the 1899 rupture running up to the National 
Revolution of 1952, indigenous leadership was coordinated at the national level by the 
movement of so-called caciques apoderados (see chapter 7).  
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While inciting rebellions, this grassroots movement was also very active in court. 
Thereto, they tapped into the accumulated experience with legal language and 
mechanisms by community leaders over the preceding decades and centuries. In 
building up their argument and designing their legal strategies, the (envisioned) official 
legal framework was submitted to a customary juridical reading which resulted in a 
new, communitarian-based language that allowed these negotiators to enter in dialogue 
with the principal agents of the fiscal-legal reform implementation.504 Through bottom-
up pressures and regionally coordinated reactions, these apoderados managed to make 
use of detected “gaps” in the legislation process. Barragán and Soliz lucidly define these 
lacuna as “the times of justice” in which community leaders appear as active negotiators 
in the process of closing the distance between the law (the paper) and its 
implementation (the field).505  
As an outcome of that dialogue, a margin for pluralism was created in the national 
legislation that allowed for the continuation of communal land tenure. However, this 
achievement was not a one-sided victory as the negotiators’ strategy to enter the 
domain of European law codes required a certain degree of accommodation to the 
premises of that domain (see also Hall and Fenelon 2009, 10). For instance, in order to 
access the country’s juridical infrastructure where the colonial land titles of their 
communities were registered, they often relied upon mestizo lawyers and 
representatives who they appointed to recover, copy and authenticate these colonial 
documents, which had become the vital basis of their communal land claims (see the 
1883 law below). This collaboration thus helped them strengthening their legal 
“armament” but meanwhile had a noxious effect upon communal representation 
structures and their secure hold on colonial documents (Rivera 1991, 607).  
The stipulation that collective claims could no longer be defended as community, the 
role of formal representatives became crucial. The function of apoderado was in principle 
an indigenous attribution, but as communitarian land claims were on the rise, 
comunarios, either individually or collectively, assigned the defence of  their land rights 
to literate mestizos and white residents of the rural districts. Thus, while the created 
power vacuum opened possibilities for the extension of a network of community 
leaders, it also allowed opportunist non-indigenous actors to interfere in land 
 
                                                     
504 For a fascinating insight “from within” on the construction of a movement and how it cultivated an own 
“communal literacy” to read, interpret and respond to an imposed “language of contention”: Condori and 
Ticona 1992; Choque and Mamani 2003; Choque 2005; Choque and Quispe 2010; Ticona 2011; Cúneo y Gascó 
2014. 
505 Their argument is based on particularly one juridical file (Archivo de La Paz) that comprises documents 
that can be traced back to the composiciones procedure in the colonial era to the Chaco War (Barragán and 
Soliz 2011). 
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arbitration (Irurozqui 1999, 717, footnote 26). Village authorities, hacendados, local 
economic potentates or lawyers consequently entered in an ambiguous indigenous-
mestizo alliance, which gave them greater legitimation for “paternalist” extraction of 
the comunarios they pretended to defend but drifted them apart from the national 
elites. The elites that governed them at either the national or local level did not form a 
homogeneous block; an advantage which the indigenous leaders were conscious of. In 
fact, the personal interests of these mestizos often very intimately matched with those 
of the communities, particularly in the case of the vecino-comunarios who had obtained 
formal access to the community lands and were hence induced to enter in an anti-
Revisita coalition. 
Out of this dynamic dialogue between state institutions, community representatives 
and elite groups with diverse land rights interests, the newly implemented juridical 
system became interspersed by several -either deliberately or unintentionally created- 
fissures that provided communities with a margin for communal land property. Already 
in 1880, the Revisita operation was temporally postponed due to the clashes it provoked 
and bureaucratic limitations. One year later, a resolution defined that, when the Revisita 
commissioners encountered too much resistance against individual land titles, the land 
had to be allocated with collective proindiviso (undivided) property titles (Bonifaz 1953, 
315, cited in Barragán 2012, 26). Upon request of comunarios of the Paria province, the 
country’s legislative body acknowledged that the 1874 law had not taken the leverage of 
the composición titles and the related tributo payments into consideration and adopted 
on 21 October 1882 a resolution that exempted communities in possession of these 
colonial land titles from the Revisita operation (Bonifaz 1953, 335 cited in Barragán 2012, 
26). The resolution was probably adopted without realizing that its stipulations applied 
to numerous ayllus of at least five departments which disposed of colonial composición 
titles and hence imposed serious limits upon the reach of the 1881 Revisita 
proclamation (Rivera 1991, 605). 
When the resolution was promulgated on 23 November 1883 as the proindiviso law, a 
vital loophole for communal survival was created.  
“the community lands [terrenos de orígen] consolidated in the colonial period 
through composición certificates granted by the land inspectors, are property of 
their owners, remaining consequently excluded from the Revisita settled by the 
laws of October 5th 1874 and October 1st 1880,”506  
This declaration unlocked extra room of manoeuvre to assert indivisible land claims. 
Members of an indigenous community were given the option to freely choose or come 
 
                                                     
506 Own translation. Ley de 23 de noviembre de 1883. 
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to a consensus on whether they preferred either undivided or subdivided possession of 
the land before proceeding to the exvinculación operation (Bonifaz 1953, 386 and 395, 
cited in Barragán 2012, 26). 
By exempting all communities able to prove the legitimacy of their communal 
properties from undergoing the Revisita intervention and instead recognizing their 
collective property rights, the land reform project received a major blow. It also had a 
decisive impact on the strategies adopted by the communities to defend their land 
claims. The importance attributed to validated colonial property titles unleashed a rush 
on the juridical archives (Rivera 1991, 606). Meanwhile, persistent indigenous demands 
and uprisings pressured the state to continue to accept their contributions as a 
guarantee that neither the state nor private proprietors would absorb the community’s 
landowning attributions by respectively selling consolidated land titles or purchasing 
community land (Platt 1982, 79-100; Grieshaber 1991, 117-9; Klein 1991, 52). Particularly 
in the La Paz region, where anti-corporative pressures were strongest felt, communal 
leaders launched “innumerable judicial actions that demonstrate the indigenous resistance to 
prevent that their contributions to the State would imply that the latter again assumes its 
tutelary function and defends them against individual buyers” (Irurozqui 1999, 736).507 In this 
region, comunarios remained most compelled to purchase their individual plots, despite 
the extortion of the proindiviso law of 1883 (Klein 1993).  
Thus, as communal manoeuvring crystalized in achievements that somehow 
alleviated their vulnerability, indigenous pressures, particularly by Aymara highland 
communities, would not cease (Larson 2004, 220-1). As a result of their continued 
counteractions, the Revisita operation was suspended once more between 1884 and 1886. 
By the late 1880s, it became clear that a lacking bureaucratic-military supervision over 
the titling, assessment and sale procedure impeded the execution of the Revisita process 
and the idea to postpone the substitution of the tributo system until the primary 
objectives of a land subdivision and land market had been realized won ground 
(Irurozqui 1999, 737). Meanwhile, however, the violent reactions provoked by the 
initiated reform process had grown out of hand and merged with economic and political 
pressures for elite renovation. 
 
 
                                                     
507 These actions resulted successful to some extent as these communities managed to enforce a reduction in 
monetary extraction (see the suspension of the switch to bolivianos in the tax collection). Still, sale operations 
continued to affect particularly the lands around the Titicaca lake, in the western intermountain valleys and 
connected to La Paz’ urban market (ibid). 
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5.3 From a convenient alliance to a dangerous pact: The Great 
Rebellion of 1899. 
By the end of the century, the combination of a thriving mining export economy, new 
land legislation and the political consolidation of new power groups had put a serious 
strain on communal land rights security. Offended by the aggression of the ongoing land 
grab, the bondage of the hacienda labour regime, and the excesses of vecino intervention 
in the villages, belligerency among highland –particularly Aymara- communities was 
gradually forced up. During the last decades of the 19th century, Liberals started to see 
options in the rising indigenous hostility to form a strategic anti-governmental front 
(Larson 2004, 229-31; Mendieta 2010; Condarco 2011 [1964]). In their determination to 
bring the conservative government down, they placed their bet on an expansion of 
existing clientelist ties to the indigenous population with a broader Liberal-Indian 
coalition. Their overture towards the indigenous leadership was guaranteed by the 
advocacy of community land restitution. Yet, what seemed to both a convenient deal –
Liberal support against the exvinculación in turn for massive indigenous mobilization- 
would eventually result a dangerous pact. And moreover a very complex pact, when 
observing the local dynamics through which vecinos and comunarios tended to be 
gradually driven into each other’s arms (as will be further discussed in the following 
chapters). 
In 1896, a partnership was sealed between the Liberal Party leader, Colonel José 
Manuel Pando, and the influential Aymara leader Pablo Zárate “el temible” Willka 
“against the scandalously official candidacy of sir Alonso”, the president and leader of the 
Conservatives.508 The alliance was grounded on pre-existing networks of community 
leaders, which were strongest in La Paz and Oruro. Whereas the Liberals built their 
claims on and prospects for the future of Bolivia in very similar terms as the political 
party they attacked (or the other way round: the conservatives had in fact started up 
the liberal reform program), the indigenous leaders built on strong and long-standing 
traditions in territorial and political self-rule. While it is clear that none of both parties 
saw this as a natural alliance, historians differ on the degree to which indigenous 
participation in the revolution gives evidence of their autonomy or rather their 
subjugation to Liberal manipulations and internal struggles. Scholars such as Platt 
resolutely reject analyses that attribute indigenous mobilization to top-down 
 
                                                     
508 These are the words of José Valerio Aldunate, a resident of Oruro who later acted as agent for several 
miners and big traders in the province, and played a leading role in the revolution. ADRO, Propiedades 
Provincias, Carangas, 1903, no. 4, 1907, no. 6 and 1910, no. 12. Portal 1896, 13. 
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manipulation (1987, 281 and 314). There is a debate over the autonomy of indigenous 
action. While Condarco emphasizes Willka’s leading role as military caudillo (2011 
[1964]), Rivera and the THOA adopt a bottom-up view to the cross-regional network of 
community leaders (1991). Mendieta’s work is an attempt to formulate a middle course 
in these debates (Mendieta 2010). 
Liberals and “Indians” departed from a differing orientation, but their projects were 
both internally heterogeneous. The Liberal party went to war against a political and 
narrowly identified enemy, the opposite party, in order to take over the government. 
The mobilization of Zárate Willka as commander-in-chief of the indigenous insurgents 
targeted Bolivia’s oligarchic social order and its ethical underpinnings as a whole. 
According to Condarco, the majority of Bolivia’s peasant population supported the 
revolution not simply out of liberal or anti-conservative affinities, but to back the 
federalist (anti-centralist) cause as a way to secure increased self-determination 
(Condarco 2011 [1964], 409-10). Moreover, Condarco explains that in the context of the 
war ideological motivations and interpretations of “liberalism” and “federalism” in 
relation to the socio-economic and political organization of the communities conflicted, 
not only between the national elites and the indigenous population but also among the 
latter (ibid, 408). The indigenous interpretations of their role in this joint struggle and 
the final purpose their mobilization varied among the insurgents themselves. In view of 
the bloody excesses that occurred in Oruro’s provinces in “the shadows of the war” (see 
6.5), particularly the communities of Carangas and Paria seemed to understand the 
political conflict in more extreme interethnic terms, backed by a project of an 
“exclusive” indigenous nation under Zárate Willka’s presidency (Pauwels 1983, 244; 
Condarco 2011 [1964], 260). 
The coalition entered in full operation through the revolution of La Paz of December 
1898, which was the start of the Federal War of 1899 that lasted until the decisive battle 
on in April (Condarco 2011 [1964]). However, in the course of the war, an indigenous 
“schism” emerged as the community of Umala (Aroma province, La Paz) denied Zárate’s 
leadership, upon which Pando recruited the community in his plans to bring Zárate and 
his ‘liberation plans’ down. Despite Pando’s discourse on the role envisioned for 
indigenous troops in the conflict, the dependence of the Liberal army upon indigenous 
support went further than that of cannon fodder, but served to intimidate and harass 
Alonso’s army with their demographic majority, their swing -and even some fire arms 
(ibid, 332). Pando counted on about 6000 men from Caracollo, led by Zárate, and some 
10000 men from Carangas and Umala, split from Zárate. The deciding battle was fought 
at Crucero de Paria on the 10th of April 1899 with Willkas’ troops functioning as 
vanguard, covering (and thus facilitating the surprise attack by) Pando and the Umala 
troop (ibid, 344).  
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Figure 24 The gathering of indigenous troops in Oruro, 1899 (adaptation of Condarco 2011 
[1964], 467) 
Meanwhile, however, as revolutionary troops had been advancing, the Liberal staff 
became increasingly worried about independent acts and excesses on behalf of 
indigenous groups (ibid, 307-8). The massacre of a liberal battalion in Mohoza, north 
from Carangas in the province of Pacajes (La Paz), in the last days of February, sparked 
the fear for a “war of races” (ibid, 262-72; Mendieta 2010, 193-238). On 28 March, Zárate 
Willka remitted a proclamation in an attempt to clarify his position as the revolution 
developed, insisting on the mutual respect between the white, vecino and indigenous 
population “because we are of the same blood and children of Bolivia” (Condarco 2011 [1964], 
313).  
In the aftermath of the revolutionaries’ victory against the “alonsistas”, the instant 
indigenous “consumption” of the Liberal promises regarding their tierras de origen by 
invading and plundering the hacienda estates poured oil on the fire (ibid, 378). The 
installation of an independent indigenous government in Peñas, west from Carangas in 
the Paria province, in April caused a turning point in the coalition as it left an indelible 
mark of Zárate Willka’s ideological agenda, although no proof exists on his formal 
instructions regarding the proclamation of this autonomous indigenous state (ibid, 363-
80; Mendieta 2010, 193-238). With Zárate Willka turned away from Pando, rumours 
spread that he and his troops were to attack the cities of La Paz and Oruro. As the terror 
for an imminent interethnic war inflamed, all indigenous leaders were imprisoned 
(Mendieta 2010, 191). 1899 thus constituted a temporal culmination point in a longer 
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history of inter-ethnic alliances and conflicts and a breaking point in a medium-term 
political transition process that would accelerate the initiated land reform process, yet 
without bringing that process to its conclusion, on the contrary. 
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Chapter 6  
Exvinculación in Carangas: Land reform dynamics 
“on the ground”.  
 
Nos quieren quitar la tierra para que no tenga suelo 
nuestro paso. Nos quieren quitar la historia para que en 
el olvido se muera nuestra palabra. 
Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos1 
At the level of the Oruro department, communal manoeuvring kept the intervention of 
Revisita functionaries in their intra-community land use and property arrangements to 
large extent at bay. In fiscal terms, this implied the persistence of the old tax system, 
based on the 1831 legislation, and its collection mode. Even though several communities 
joined the ranks of the colono class, the exvinculación law would not find entrance before 
entering the 20th century (Aramayo 1898, 27). A superficial change from the tributo 
indígena to the contribución territorial was implemented and the private estates 
surrounding the city of Oruro in the Cercado province were registered in the rural 
cadastre, but the law would never find generalized implementation in the department. 
Hence, the allocation of property and power to the relatively well-surviving communal 
entities of the department, including all communities of the Carangas province, 
continued to be regulated by the logic of state-community reciprocity. Key to this 
“survival” was how communities brought the factors of taxation and representation 
into play as they (re)negotiated their position within the restructuring political and 
 
                                                     
1 Fragment from the “Cuarta declaración de la selva Lacandona,” 1st of January 1996. Subcomandante Marcos 
et al. 2011, chapter 15. In English: “They want to take the land so that our feet have nothing to stand on. They want to 
take our history so that we and our word will be forgotten and die.” in “Fourth Declaration of the Lacondon Jungle 
(excerpt)” Subcomandante Marcos et al. 2011, 80. 
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economic outlines of the country. These negotiations went together with the forging of 
inter-community and inter-class/ethnic bonds and/or their breakdown into juridical 
and violent clashes. 
The question that guides the present chapter is why and how Revisita intervention 
was prevented from taking off in the province. As concrete protest against “the state” 
was principally directed against the Revisita, for constituting the conditional step 
towards the implementation of exvinculación, enquiries into this regulatory mechanism 
serve as a quite well documented entry into the local dynamics provoked by the land 
reform. The dispatch of revisitadores commissions to the province was not uncommon to 
the communities nor was the distrust and (violent) antagonist reactions towards these 
fiscal interventions a novelty. However, this time this state intervention was no longer 
justified by a renovation of state-community reciprocal relations, but by a project to 
exactly eliminate that particular relation. Instead of confirming the contribuyentes’ 
access to communal lands, it intended to divide them from those lands. Strategies to 
boycott the Revisita plans included both attacked the reform process “on the paper”, 
through legal action, as well as “on the ground”, through organized rebellion, through 
everyday violence and widespread, coordinated insurgence; all equally stirring the 
existing fear for an indigenous uprising.  
In the following, different responses by Carangas’ communities and local state 
representatives to the announcement, entrance and undermining of the Revisita 
operation will be discussed along a chronological overview, starting with the “prologue” 
to the eventual land reform. Immediately after the proclamation of the 1874 law, the 
announcements of a Revisita were answered by fierce protest which would culminate in 
the rupture of the 1899 Great Rebellion. However, a reconstruction of the way in which 
the Revisita intervention was blocked yields a more complex picture than mere 
dichotomous/superficial reactions. When linking Revisita-related documentation to the 
larger pool of simultaneously produced archive material, we gain access to less visible 
processes that give insight into the functioning and reorganization of fiscal bonds, the 
deployment of multiple “lines of attack,” and the interests and intervention of 
intermediaries. The nearly countless number of lawsuits on land dispossession and 
consequent demarcation procedures archived in the provincial court in Corque 
demonstrate that the mounting tensions over the imminent Revisita went hand in hand 
with an overall increase in land inroads and local disputes. In chapter 7, this chronology 
will be extended into the 20th century. 
  293 
6.1 Carangas, Melgarejo and the compensativo.  
With regard to the effect of Melgarejo’s decree in Carangas, “it was said that the 
communities of the region were so powerful that they could consolidate their lands with regard to 
the exigencies of the tyrant” (Mendieta 2008, 388). Already the very same year of its 
proclamation, the new legislation provoked reactions and mobilization in the province. 
The first reactions regarded lobby work on the terms and weight of a compensation the 
communities eventually all agreed upon to pay in return for their exemption from the 
decree. When the department nonetheless went over to the organization of the Revisita, 
in line with the decree, rebellious reactions followed. As no community lands in the 
Carangas province were being sold through auction nor being consolidated as 
prescribed by the 1866 decree, it seems as the communities managed to “neutralize” the 
confiscation threat already before Melgarejo’s defeat and the subsequent annulation of 
his decree. Yet this achievement implied a financial transaction to the departmental 
treasury, which was settled through lobby work and rebellious manoeuvres coordinated 
between the leaders of several communities and vecino allies.   
As Eric Langer comments, “We do not have much information on the effects of these laws in 
the region around Oruro; it appears they had the greatest effects further north, around La Paz. 
There are hints, however, that the Oruro communities purchased their own lands, thus depriving 
them of the capital that they had used for commerce” (Langer 2009, 547). He refers to 
Grieshaber, who first hinted at a payment, however without document proof of such 
arrangement (Grieshaber 1977, 199). During my archival research at the National 
Archive of Bolivia in Sucre, I found evidence of this “purchase” in a conversation 
between the Prefect of the Oruro Department and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In a 
prefectural report of 1867, the head of the department stated that in most communities 
of the Oruro department, including the entire entire Carangas province, a compensativo 
or “compensation” of 4 to 5 pesos was being collected from all contribuyentes, retired 
taxpayers (reservados) and widows with access to community lands.2 This contribution 
was levied “in virtue of the special grace granted by the Supreme Government in order that these 
Indians remain exempt from the effects of the decree”.3 In return for an amount slightly lower 
than the annual head tax burden, the valuation of community lands, which was ordered 
by Melgarejo’s decree as a preparatory measure to the confiscation of the land, would 
not be applied. In the Paria province, a differentiated quota was established for districts 
 
                                                     
2 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 2 April 1867. 
3 Own translation. ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 2 April 1867. 
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inhabited by “overly poor Indians” and communities possessing mainly grazing lands.4 In 
those communities, only 4 pesos per person would be exacted, while elsewhere the 
payment was five or six pesos, depending on the quality and quantity of the land.5 
The compensativo arrangement is explicitly adopted and described in the law of 28 
September 1868. The concerning section states that  
“the contracts verified (sic) by the Executive with the name of compensables 
[persons qualified for compensation], do not bring in anything else but the rent of 
the lands for five years, leaving of course the indigenous compensators from this 
date on exempt from the payment of the territorial contribution and other 
obligations.”6 
This purchase did however not free the comunarios from the State’s ultimate 
possession over all community lands, so that the compensated lands were to be 
repurchased or otherwise subjected to public auction after a term of five years (Klein 
2011, 136). However, this does not say anything about the exemption of a Revisita 
operation or about the establishing of the payable “rent”. There is indeed very little 
known about the application of the compensativo; I even did not find it explicitly 
mentioned by name nor regarding its application in a specific district in any of the 
consulted historiographical works on Bolivia’s 19th century land legislation. In the 
following, I attempt to gain a more detailed picture of the coming about and the 
implications this remarkable arrangement on basis of the case of Carangas. I rely on the 
information provided in the Prefect’s correspondence to the Ministry and on the traces 
of this arrangement found in judicial documents filed at the provincial court of Corque. 
For the earliest references to a financial deal in return for legal exemption between 
the government and the communities of Carangas we must go back to spring 1866 
(around October).7 That year, the corregidor of the canton of Turco, Juan López, 
informed the Intendente of the province that the caciques of Andamarca and 
Huachacalla had requested the caciques of Turco to disobey a circular that contained 
governmental dispositions about the land rights of the community of Orinoca.8 The 
 
                                                     
4 This exception was endorsed under governmental permission by the Supreme Authorizations of 8 and 17 
May 1867. A lower quota was levied in the communities of the cantons of Poopó (except for the Peñas 
community), Challacollo, Toledo, Pampa Aullagas, Salinas (de Garci-Mendoza), (Santiago de) Quillacas and 
Culta. Landless indians did not pay any compensation. ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 17 May 
1867 and 13 May 1867). 
5 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 23 May 1867). 
6 Own translation. “Ley de 28 de septiembre de 1868.” Article 25.  
7 AJC, 1866, no. 985. 
8 AJC, 1866, no. 985, f.1-2v. 
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latter would have been conceded the entitlement of the terrains it possessed to which 
the adjacent community of Andamarca had reacted by claiming the same rights. It is not 
clear why the community would have obtained this exemption, although the fact that 
the canton of Orinoca –as exception in the province- comprised the estancia Micayani, 
which was no ayllu but a form of private estate, might play a role.9 At the other hand, 
the insistence on the annulment of the compensativo exaction is not mentioned in the 
accounting information of the Prefect that same year.10 
Local authorities contended that the protesting community leaders incorrectly 
interpreted the measure as an offence instead of appreciating the intended valuation of 
the province’s terrains.11 They saw in Andamarca’s request an implicit warning for an 
indigenous revolt and went over to an investigation of the detected insubordination. 
They started with questioning Antonio Zubieta, merchant and corregidor of Andamarca, 
about the tentative of ‘his’ caciques to start up a revolt. According to Zubieta, the 
community leaders were petitioning a lower compensation quota in order not to pay 4 
or 5 pesos, and had thereto prepared a more favourable bill.12 The inter-communal 
manoeuvring thus addressed the payment of the compensativo. Interestingly, Zubieta 
himself had been asked by the cacique of Andamarca to transcribe the bill, which they 
had received from Orinoca, in order to pass a copy to the community leaders of 
Huachacalla.13 In October of 1866, the corregidor and a delegation of commoners had 
travelled to Corque and afterwards to the salt lake of Quitaquita to meet with 
community leaders. In the following months, Andamarca formulated objections against 
the exaction of an obligatory tax of 4 or 5 pesos from each contribuyente, because it was 
an “unknown measure” which moreover had been abolished in other places, implicitly 
referring to Orinoca.  
Despite communitarian protest, the department went over to the collection of the 
compensation in the Carangas province, executed by the commissioned land surveyor 
Antonio Vargas on basis of the data from the padrones. Between October 1866 and March 
1867, Vargas collected 17333 pesos 5 reales, which is slightly less than the 19446 pesos 
4½ reales the province contributed on half-yearly basis in the form of the indigenous 
 
                                                     
9 According to the Revisita of 1864, estancia Micayani was inhabited by 14 persons, all belonging to the 
agregados class, represented by 6 –amongst which 2 absentee- contribuyentes. ANB, Rv, 226 and 227. “Matricula 
de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, fs. 187-187v. 
10 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 2 April 1867. 
11 AJC, 1866, no. 985, f. 21v. 
12 AJC, 1866, no. 985, f.13v-14. 
13 AJC, 1866, no. 985, f.15v-16v. 
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head tax.14 Unfortunately, the record of his recovery commission does not mention the 
location (canton, ayllu, estancia) of every collection (see table in Appendix 10). By that 
time, compensation incomes were still expected from the Paria province. Yet, even at 
this intermediary stage, the compensativo collection had already produced more than the 
purchase of community lands in the entire department, which by March 1867 had only 
yielded 15663 pesos 6 reales.15  
From the point of view of the department, the compensativo provided in a quite 
profitable yet once-only revenue source. The Prefect stated that these incomes 
corresponded to a new fiscal branch that was created out of necessity because the 
departmental treasury had not disposed of a single peso to pay its public services since 
October 1866.16 The collected sum of 17333 pesos 3 reales had been used to cover all the 
expenses of the Prefectura since October 1866 until the end of March 1867, including 
salaries, military equipment, military and police service, loans, road construction, 
transport costs, accommodation, etc.17 Since the moment the departmental 
administration had finished the indigenous tax revenues. the departmental treasury 
relied upon private loans to relieve, at least temporally, itself from bankruptcy.18 As this 
money was not just a welcoming bonus but a vital survival measure for the Prefectura 
that was entirely consumed by the departmental treasury, the compensativo rather 
seems to correspond to an opportunistic measure that sprouted from departmental 
needs that later on was authorized by “special grace” of the central government and 
still later incorporated into a proper law. In fact, by the time governmental sanctions 
followed regarding the compensation, the departmental treasury had already effectively 
received and largely expended the compensation from the Carangas province.  
Returning to Langer, while the compensativo proved indispensable to the department, 
how damaging was it to the Carangas comunarios? While the tributo already imposed a 
considerable burden upon the comunarios, that year they paid about 45% to 70% of their 
annual tax duty extra. While on the long-term, the Carangas communities managed to 
preserve their community lands from confiscation, they got little in return in the short 
 
                                                     
14 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro; ANB, Rv, no. 227. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.”, 
1867, f.195. 
15 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 28 May 1867. 
16 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 28 May 1867. 
17 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 28 May 1867, 2nd attached letter. 
18 In a letter that same year, the representative of the trade house of Blondel (one of the most powerful trade 
houses of Oruro with its principal basis in Tacna), describes how his company repeatedly was approached by 
the Prefect to “rescue” his treasury with loans, in turn for which Blondel requested opportunistic 
compensations (such as the right to extract silver etc). ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 28 
May 1867. 
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run, because once having paid the compensativo the Revisita arrived anyways. The 
compensativo was indeed much more important to the State, who cashed an 
advantageous fiscal deal, than that is was a motivation for the communities of Carangas, 
which cashed a false promise of legal exemption.  
Notwithstanding the assurances of the compensation deal, a Revisita commission was 
sent to the province in 1869 as commanded by the law of 1868. Not surprisingly, the 
news on the survey commission was far from cordially received as it inflamed feelings of 
insecurity. In Tacahua, in the community of Llanquera,19 the intervention of the Revisita 
officials “to sell the terrains and then organize the partition of the children of the commoners” 
was taken as an intolerable provocation.20 Denouncing that “on account of the census they 
tried to seize and separate them from their children,” the comunarios went over to a violent 
rebellion.21 In their judgement, the commission was determined to divide their children 
and livestock. Although this understanding of the Revisita operation does not 
correspond with the letter of the law or the plans of the government, the fact that this 
connotation was made, indicates how deep the anti-Revisita distrust was rooted in the 
communities. This contention was not merely motive to an ad hoc physical 
confrontation, but provoked a more sustained resistance that went together with 
gatherings, preparations and the diffusion of letters among community representatives.  
Once informed about the organization of the census, the Tacahua comunarios 
prepared their reaction through long nightly meetings until “the chicha we were drinking 
was finished.”22 By the day the corregidor had summoned all comunarios to present them 
in his house to execute the census they had decided to oppose the census and cadastre 
operation in accordance with the Toledo comunarios.23 To support their claim and their 
planned murder on the corregidor and the commissioners, they reproduced documents, 
 
                                                     
19 It concerns the comunarios of ayllu Sullca-Tunca in Tacahua, which since 1961 figures as an annex 
(appendix) to the canton of Bella Vista, which today is an independent canton from Llanquera in the province 
of Nor Carangas (“Ley de 28 Noviembre 1961”). Within the native territorial organization of Jach’a Carangas, 
Bella Vista has the status of marka, comprising only one ayllu, which is the ayllu in question of Sullcatunca 
(COAJ-K 2001, 24).  
20 Own translation. AJC, 1869, no. 1100, f. 14v. 
21 Own translation. AJC, 1869, no. 1100, f. 5.  
22 The juridical file ends with stating that the Tacahua insurgents acted in a state of drunkenness. The contrast 
between the initial presentation of the Tacahua comunarios as rebellious peasants eager to “cut the throat” of 
government officials who are eventually reduced to drunken and subsequently arrested agitators incapable of 
halting the Revisita operation undermines the apparent/original impression of a coordinated uprising. 
Portraying rebelling comunarios or villagers as drunkards is a recurring pattern (in similar lawsuits), and 
seems -in most cases- rather a tactic by the denouncing party to delegitimize the accused party. AJC, 1869, no. 
1100, f. 17 and f. 54v. 
23 AJC, 1869, no. 1100, fs. 16 and 11v. 
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received from Toledo, that contained “the laws that encouraged them to cut the throats of the 
(…) authorities to avoid the distribution which they had to make of their children.”24 In order to 
finance their communal actions, a capitation was levied among the comunarios, 
although some stated this common practice was not realized because there was no 
leader of the uprising.25 In the aftermath of the rebellion, several insurgents had been 
imprisoned as a preventive measure in order to facilitate the proceedings of the 
Revisita.26 
In other districts of the province, the Revisita operation would not pass unnoticed 
either, although no major revolt materialized. In the canton of Choquecota, the 
revisitador was being accused of illegally extracting one to two reales from each 
contribuyente in ayllu Jilanaca, which preoccupied the authorities as “such attitude gave 
the indiada cause to confirm the false rumours diffused by demagogues to set up a revolt in the 
entire Republic.”27 In Turco, the alcalde parroquial commissioned with the census and 
cadastre operation in his canton, was also accused of illegally collecting one to four 
reales. Similar to the Choquecota case, he was blamed of sweeping up the community in 
the political turmoil the country was currently living, thereby “embarrassing the honour 
of the government in an infamous way.”28  
While the Revisita may not have brought about the implementation of Melgarejo’s 
envisioned transformation of Carangas communal land base, it did contribute to a 
heightening of internal judicial struggles over land. In the aftermath of the execution of 
the Revisita, a remarkable high number of “voluntary delineations” demands and/or 
executions ensued at the intercommunity level. Such operations often provoked or 
were interpreted as inter-ayllu usurpations and therefore often extended the dispute 
rather than ending it.29 These legal interventions and their conflictivity hint at the 
growing sensitivity for existing inequalities between ayllus, estancias and families 
regarding their access to land. In the canton of Huachacalla, for instance, boundary 
delineation in 1870 between one ayllu and its considerably smaller neighbour impelled 
the smallest of both parties to defy the examining magistrate of the province in an 
 
                                                     
24 Own translation. AJC, 1869, no. 1100, f. 4v-5, fs. 9-9v and f. 54v. 
25 AJC, 1869, no. 1100, fs. 5 and 39. 
26 According to the detainees’ declarations their imprisonment occurred without the right to defense or prior 
judgment which “in the 19th century would be a scandal and an extraordinary phenomenon”. Own translation. AJC, 
1869, no. 1100, f.25. 
27 Own translation. AJC, 1869, no. 1115, f. 3. 
28 Own translation. AJC, 1870, no. 1183, f.1. 
29 In the notary inventory of 1870, for example, there is an abundance of archived civil files on terrains, as well 
as plot delineations, legal protection of property. See also AJC, Legajos 22 (1869-69), 23 (1869-70) and 24 (1870-
72). 
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attempt to curb further strengthening of the other, larger ayllu.30 The inter-ayllu 
inequality that was motive to the delineation between ayllus Coro and Puma in the 
Corque canton did not so much correspond to a difference in population size but to 
fiscal discrepancy between the Uru and originario class that secured the latter of a 
much stronger land rights status.31 
Although the dispersed information gives an incomplete picture of the organization 
and success of the resistance, it is clear that the arrival of a Revisita commission in 1869 
could not be prevented, not by paying the compensativo or through rebellion. What is 
nonetheless important to notice is how the anti-decree and anti-Revisita initiatives on 
part of the comunarios were consciously framed within a legal strategy. Their resistance 
was not an ad hoc battle, but involved the circulation of letters, nightly meetings, 
travels, etc. This way of entering in dialogue with the state and its agents had its price, 
in terms of “lobby investments” and financial-legal commitments. A more ambiguous 
concession the comunarios were making in order to keep new land regulations at bay 
was their alliance with certain vecinos. The preparation and coordination of their 
protest, both in 1866 as in 1869, was a matter of collaboration between comunarios, 
their leaders and powerful members of the vecindario. While those vecinos involved in 
charge of the Revisita execution and other state interventions were accused of abuse, 
others were approached for support and several of them would actively support the 
communal cause, although without neutralizing the risk of their intermediation.  
Despite the negative effects of the compensation payment, the distrusted Revisita 
operation, the mounting inter-community land disputes and rebellion, the communities 
of Carangas would remain confiscation-proof on the longer term. The compensation 
payment may not have played a major factor –or rather a misleading factor- in this 
achievement, but its obtainment and the “communal manoeuvring” it provoked already 
hints at future developments. The strategies that were later adopted in the face of the 
liberal reorganization Bolivia’s land system would recur to this payment as an argument 
to hold off the execution of the Revisita and division of their community lands and link 
up to what was seen as a joint vecino-comunario disobedience of the new land 
regulations. 
 
                                                     
30 It concerns the ayllus Capi and Camacha, the latter being more than doubled in population by the former. 
AJC, 1870, no. 1157 and 1870, no. 1174. See also ANB, Rv, 228 and 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la 
Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, 167v. 
31 Both ayllus counted with a more or less equal number of inhabitants, but those of the former belonged for 
about 90% to the Uru class while the latter was about 75% originario. AJC, 1871, no. 1263. See also ANB, Rv, 228 
and 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, f. 46. 
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6.2 Inter-ecological amputation. 
While the communities of Carangas managed to commute the threat of community land 
confiscation into a fiscal contribution, a simultaneous attack was launched towards 
those communities still possessing ecologically complementary lands in other provinces 
and departments. Masked by the achievement of community land exemption, the 
altiplano communities underwent serious threats regarding their discontinuous 
territorial control. The distant lands located in the western (now Peruvian/Chilean) 
valleys had already been lost under the colonial repartimiento policy. This inter-
ecological rupture was reinforced by the imposition of national borders in the 19th 
century. The lands possessed towards the east, generally in hands of Carangas’ eastern 
communities, underwent a similar squeeze, particularly in the context of the late 
colonial (pre-)independence rebellions and wars which interrupted the communication 
between the altiplano and the valleys (Pauwels 1983, 152). By the late 19th century, 
however, a couple of communities still rented estates to private leaseholders. In the 
context of Melgarejo’s new land legislation, these estates were targeted as a potential 
income source and hence became subject to confiscation threats which gradually 
amputated the province from its last grain of complementary land property. In 1867, the 
Prefect of Oruro made the following argument: 
“there are several Communities in this Department which by donation or similar 
arrangement, have estates in property which, unable to hold these themselves, 
lease them to individuals, from which they take petty advantage and perhaps 
many times none, because V.G. [Your Governor] knows well how easy it is to 
outwit the interests of the indigenous class, for their ignorance and lack of 
protection.”32  
While it was assumed that there were many of these cases, the Prefectura had no 
complete information on the exact number and names of the estates. The Prefect 
proposed the purchase of these estates through public auction and the transfer of its 
revenues to the public treasury as a means to resolve the renters’ abuse and fraud 
against the communities as well as to alleviate the treasury from its recurrent problems. 
In turn, the indigenous head tax burden would be lowered as a way of compensating the 
loss of the rent the communities concerned currently received under the assumption 
that a lower tax was more beneficial to them than rent revenues. He added that there 
was a real risk of revolt given the fact that comunarios were often “incapable” to 
 
                                                     
32 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 13 April 1867. 
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understand the benefit of this arrangement, which they possibly had to be made 
understood by force. Indeed, in the following decades, communal altiplano control over 
more fertile ecological zones was effectively lost. The declaration of these lands as 
“vacant” resulted in an enclosure at the supra-provincial level, reinforcing Carangas’ 
land-locked situation.  
One of the cases mentioned by the Prefect in 1867 was the community of Choquecota, 
which held the “Hacienda Caranguillas” in property in the canton of Pocpo, situated in 
the Yamparaez province near the city of Sucre (Chuquisaca department). 33 By 1871, 
when liberal land reforms were “on their way” to reorganize the Bolivian land system, 
the estate was still rented.34 That year, a contract was signed between Choquecota and 
Carlos Saavedra, a carpenter “of Hispano-american quality” who resided in the city of 
Sucre, for three years during which the former would receive an annual rent of 160 
pesos. In 1873, this case reappeared in the notary books kept in the court of Corque.35 In 
April, the lease contract of the hacienda in Pocpo was verified by the Corregidor, 
caciques and jilaqatas of the canton of Choquicota, with permission of the sub-prefect, 
in favour of Carlos Saavedra. The contract was settled on 200 pesos per year for a term 
of five forced years and two voluntary years, starting the 1st of July, and with an advance 
for one year received, and Saavedra was instructed to actively preserve and assure the 
integrity of the terrain against introductions and usurpations by neighbours. It was only 
in 1883 that the estate was formally declared “vacant”.36 In order to prevent the estate 
from being lost, the community appointed Marcelino Vazquez as their non-indigenous 
representative to defend their rights in the further procurement and administration of 
the estate. From the following silence in the sources, as no further mention is made to 
the Caranguillas estate, it becomes clear that the hacienda was eventually lost, however 
without disposing over any details.  
Also in the Pocpo canton, the comunarios of Orinoca and of ayllu Collana of 
Andamarca presented in the late 19th century their claims on lands in the valley of 
Santiago de Quitarge, where they had been cultivating corn, potatoes and cereals since 
colonial times.37 In 1898, they regained the formal possession over these lands, 
demanding the abandonment of the valley by local population groups of neighbouring 
 
                                                     
33 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 13 April 1867. 
34 AJC, 1871, no. 1199 (notary register), fs. 1-3. 
35 AJC, 1873, no. 1284, fs. 4v-5v. 
36 AJC, 1883, no. 1710. 
37 The comunarios of Andamarca and Orinoca had thereto paid 500 pesos fuertes as well as their regular labour 
service in the Potosí mines to the Spanish Crown. They shared these lands with the Quillacas. ADRO, 
Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 35, fs.167r-183r. Rivière 1982, 39; Medinaceli 2010, 99. 
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provinces.38 As in the case of the Caranguillas estate, there is no further information on 
the destination of these lands. 
Another community with claims over valley lands was Totora, which held a hacienda 
called “La Chulla”, situated in Quillacollo, in the Valle Grande of Cochabamba, in 
common with the comunarios of Quillacas (of the Paria province in the same 
department).39  In the early 1920s, the community initiated a legal campaign, visiting all 
urban centres to recuperate their property by means of provincial representatives, but 
their protest would avail them nothing.40 The same community also possessed an estate 
named Pisaqueri in the canton of Paria of the Cercado province, situated northeast from 
the city of Oruro. In 1906, the estate was sold and Belisario Ampuero, famous vecino of 
the province, was appointed to represent the interests of the comunarios in the 
accomplishment of the purchase.41  
The community of Corque also seemed to possess a private estate, denominated 
“Tuero”, but it remains unclear where the estate was located.42 The estate was rented to 
José Miguel Mostajo according to a personal arrangement without any inheritance 
rights, which his heirs in 1913 denied and were hence accused of land usurpation.43 
There is no further reference to what happened with the estate.  
From a court case of 1871, it appears that the comunarios of Carangas –although no 
further specification is given- owned terrains in the ravine of Tabo oco in the vice-
canton of Urmiri, situated north-east from Pazña in the eastern part of the Oruro 
department. That year, the sub-Prefect of Carangas acted as judicial depositor to lease 
 
                                                     
38 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 35, f. 178. 
39 Together with other communities of Carangas, Totora had obtained legal ownership over these lands in the 
late 16th century in return for a contribution in money and mita labour, but nearly lost those rights in the late 
18th century due to accusations of participation in the 1780 rebellion. The rebellious events of 1780-1 had 
impeded them to visit the hacienda and recollect its products, but the community leaders managed to obtain 
legal guarantees to travel to their valley possessions, successfully claimed that the priests of Quillacollo had 
neglected the estate’s maintenance and regained the lands. Subsequently, these lands were rented to 
Spaniards. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 47, fs. 334-377v. See also Archivo Municipal de 
Cochabamba (AMC), Expedientes Coloniales de Cochabamba (ECC), vol.25, “Causa ejecutiva seguida por Diego 
de Verga protector de los naturales en nombre de los indios caciques carangas, quillacas, uruquillas que 
residen en Colcapirhua, contra los indios de Capinota por las tierras de Chulla”, cited in Medinaceli 2010, 308; 
Rivière 1982,  30-5; Pauwels 1983, 152 and 163. 
40 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 47, fs. 376-377v. 
41 AJC, Civiles, 1906, no. 2, f. 8-9v. 
42 There is a place called Tuero Tuero in the Potosí department, situated south from the city of Sucre on the 
border with the Chuquisaca department. 
43 AJC, Civiles, 1913, no. 3. 
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those lands to don Matías Reinaga at a rent of 20 pesos for a term as long as the juridical 
procedure of replevin for the concerning terrains would take.44 
The late 19th century “completion” of the amputation process initiated with the early 
colonial land reforms demonstrates how the liberal reforms in fact reproduced the logic 
of the composición policy. Under that policy, based on the purchase of land property 
titles to the Crown, only a fraction of the altiplano ayllus had been able to secure their 
direct control over complementary archipelago lands, however in a “rented” form. Now, 
this renting principle was seized by the republican regime (arguing that the renting of 
lands evidenced their “residual,” excess character) to bring this seclusion to a 
conclusion. This further exacerbated the discrepancy between a territorial logic open to 
flexible discontinuity in function of ecological complementarity and a territorial logic 
promoting fixed delineations of homogeneous terrains, inciting a process of ethnic and 
territorial fragmentation (Saignes 1991 and Abercrombie 1991, cited by Ruz , Díaz and 
Fuentes 2011, 24). Still, this amputation did not correspond to an abrupt elimination of 
interregional links, but would take several decades to eventually crystalize. Meanwhile, 
as the province was being blocked-in, internal strains on communal land access 
deteriorated, yet without materializing in their effective enclosure. 
6.3 The Revisita came knocking at the door...  
Before Melgarejo proclaimed his decree, the execution of the Revisita seemed to 
provoke little (explicit) protest.45 Since their colonial creation, these land survey 
commissions had been confronted with significant distrust on part of the community 
population, but their work was nonetheless viewed as an acceptable intervention that 
guaranteed the maintenance of the established order. In the context of the liberal 
reforms, however, the Revisita became perceived as an intolerable provocation. This 
time, the field operation did not concern a mere registration of plots and contribuyentes, 
but constituted the first step towards the subdivision of corporative lands in order to 
grant indigenous commoners “full” property rights and impose a new tax. The 1866 
decree started to fuel the common anti-Revisita suspicion and provoked serious 
 
                                                     
44 This could suggest that these lands had been confiscated under Melgarjo, and now, under Morales, were 
again “liberated”. AJC, 1871, no. 1199, f. 4. 
45 See for instance ABMO, no. 426, Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas, 1852, f. 215 and 
ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, f.212. 
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frictions. After 1874 (even though the implementation of the newly adopted law would 
take until the next decade), tensions escalated and would convert the Revisita in the 
bone of contention between the community and State representatives. But also inter- 
and intra-community relations were affected by deteriorating communal access and 
property security, resulting in an upsurge of local land disputes. Moreover, the 
announcement of the new land policy came shortly after the pest epidemics of 1872 in 
which a high number of contribuyentes lost their life.46 
During the 1870s, the department still managed to implement provincial land 
inspections conform the ‘old style’. However, the prospect of a land division operation 
motivated comunarios to take precautions to secure their land rights, aware that  
“very soon the repartition of the community terrains must take place, strictly 
subjected to the law of October 29th of last year [5th of October, 1874], which bans 
any question, in order to assert my right before the committee.”47  
In the Uru ‘enclave’ Chipaya, the alcalde cobrador (head tax collector) petitioned in 
1876 judicial intervention in order to stop his people from quarrelling amongst 
themselves about land issues and “save the good harmony until the formalization of the land 
division.”48 Anxiety, reflected in comunario reliance upon formal juridical procedures 
and turbulence regarding land rights, was growing. Still, the 1877 Revisita was executed 
without major problems in the Carangas communities, but would never be repeated 
afterward.  
The situation particularly inflamed once the government started with translating the 
law from the paper to the field in the 1880s. While Carangas remained peripheral to the 
enacted enclosure operation and the accompanying hacienda expansion, the imminent 
arrival of a commission consigned not merely to inspect but to alter local land 
structures caused major nervousness. Warnings by local functionaries about an 
upcoming revolt increased. Opposition was not so much directed against encroaching 
landlords, but targeted the territorial intrusion by the Revisita commissions. As in other 
rural zones, particularly controlled by Aymara communities, here too, nightly meetings 
to coordinate their resistance, open threats to the Revisita commissions and a “massive 
paper campaign” provoked a rising panic in the countryside (Larson 2004, 220-1).  
 
                                                     
46 ABNB, Revisitas, Carangas 1877, portada/f.0. See also chapter 4.1.2. 
47 Own translation. AJC, 1875, no. 1421. This is an example of a comunario of ayllu Sullca Salle, in the canton of 
Turco, who in 1875 reclaimed the documents saved in the provincial court that confirmed his antecedents and 
legal ownership over his sayaña. Similar petitions were also made by entire ayllus, such as Llanquera and 
Sullca-Tunca, both pertaining to Huaillamarca, which registered the demarcation of their boundaries as 
inspected in 1848 in 1876. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1928, no. 11. 
48 AJC, 1876, no. 1476. 
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In October 1884, soldiers had to contain a revolt in opposition to the 1874 law in the 
village of Corque. Leaders of several ayllus had marched to Sucre with representative 
power and money obtained from their comunarios in order to petition the suspension of 
the Revisita. Moreover, the insurgents would have openly incited all comunarios to 
disobey the orders of the Revisita de tierras and rumours circulated about plans to 
destroy the Revisita books.49 That same year, a departmental commissioner was 
confronted with an insurrection by some 60 to 100 men and women in Totora. He had 
been appointed by the Prefectura of the department to execute the delimitation, 
measurement and adjudication of peat bogs (probably bofedales which were excellent 
grazing land) which the comunarios considered community land for which they paid 
taxes to Felipe Teare.50 Armed with slings and stones, they violently opposed what they 
interpreted as an attempt to “steal” their possessions. The commissioner indicated Luis 
Lujan and Marcelino Vásquez, two powerful residents of the province, as “defenders” of 
the indigenous insurgents of ayllu Sapana, adding a fierce critique towards “the moral 
laxity and the corruption of some bad vecinos of this capital [Corque] who exploit the rusticity 
and innocence of the indigenous caste.”51 Mendieta and Condarco link this revolt to the 
attacks that led to the murder on the vecino José Guarachi in 1884 as reported by the 
revisitadores of the region, although Condarco mistakenly identifies this as the revolt in 
which revisitador Delfín Arce was murdered in Corque, which occurred 10 years later 
(Condarco 1982, 48, cited in Mendieta 2008, 388-9).  
In December 1885, the Prefect of Oruro was informed about rebelling communities in 
the Paria province and a larger indigenous uprising was said to be expected soon.52 
Although Carangas was not mentioned in this warning, things were not much calmer 
there. The province witnessed open attacks by the local population to the sub-prefect, 
José Manuel Delgado,53 and two attempted murders, 54 although little details are given on 
the executors and their motives. In 1887, land dispute erupted between two ayllus of 
 
                                                     
49 AJC, 1884, no 1805. 
50 A legal testimony registered in 1922 indicates that the community lands were effectively returned to Totora. 
Five years later, the comunarios of Totora registered their community land boundaries with Curahuara and 
Huachacalla as granted during the visita under Francisco de Toledo and in 1712. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, 
Carangas, 1922, no. 13 and 1928, no. 9). 
51 AJC, 1884, no. 1814, f. 1. 
52 ANB, MI, 1885, tomo 225, no. 44. Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro, 30 December 1885. 
53 AJC 1885, no. 1911. 
54 AJC 1885, no. 1879 and no. 1909. 
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Turco and an adjacent ayllu of the Choquecota canton in which the Turco comunarios 
invaded the lands of Choquecota.55  
After the revolts of 1884, it took several years before land surveyors attempted to 
revisit the province. By 1893, Mesas Revisitadoras had been formed for each province of 
the Oruro department, apart from some vacant secondary offices.56 Because this news 
heightened indigenous hostility to an alarming degree, the sub-prefect, Eliodoro Mier, 
demanded military reinforcement. After his first request of June 1893 had remained 
unanswered, a second request was launched in the days preceding the patron saint’s 
celebrations, which -as does any festivity- goes accompanied by a drinking binge lasting 
for days where the least provocation can inflame the populace. He commented on the 
constant disobedience by anti-governmental elements, warned for the indigenous ánd 
mestizo hostility towards the announced Visita de tierras and reported that the caciques 
and jilaqatas were preparing an appeal of opposition in Corque to present before the 
Prefectura.57As the Prefect of Oruro reported to the Ministry that same year, a swift 
accomplishment of the Revisita seemed unrealistic and armed reinforcement was 
necessary in order to “prevent the case that the operation of the revisitas would originate in 
many places, and especially in the province of Carangas, disorders and indigenous uprising.”58 
The next inspector embarking upon the province to conduct the land survey would 
not survive his mission. During the first days of May 1894, revisitador Delfín Arce had 
arrived at the provincial capital. Shortly after, a major indigenous uprising arose that 
ended with the brutal murder of the commissioner and his son Ricardo.59 The sub-
prefect of Carangas, Luis Lujan, who was afterwards suspected of having instigated the 
rebellion, attributed the insurrection to an order that compelled the comunarios to 
contribute 10 bolivianos each in return for the land titles that had been surveyed in 
Corque in 1885 by the same Dr. Arce.60 Due to the revisitador’s insistence on their 
 
                                                     
55 Guillermo López, member of the “famous” vecino family in Turco (see chapter 4.3) was appointed as the 
apoderado of the comunarios of Turco. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1923, no. 12. 
56 ANB, MI, 1893, tomo 272, no. 79. Oruro dept., 19 June 1893, f.12-13. 
57 Indicative for the agitation that could be expected, the sub-prefect adds that during last Corpus Christi 
celebrations (Good Friday), the alcaldes had been “cruelly” victimized, “without any other motive then to be 
alcaldes.” ANB, MI, 1893, tomo 272, no. 79. Oruro dept, 6 June 1893. 
58 ANB, MI, 1893, tomo 272, no. 79. Oruro dept., 19 June 1893, fs. 11-2. See also Mendieta 2008, 389. 
59 The judicial investigation that followed their assassination reconstructed the development of the 
insurrection in detail, which can be checked out in the Legal Gazette. CDLT, Gazeta judicial, 1895-1896, no. 5, 
12-20. Oruro, 18 June 1896. 
60 Afterwards, Luis Lujan was not only sued by Arce’s wife for not having prevented the murder, but also by 
the cacique of Corque regarding several murdered indigenous comunarios. Eventually, Lujan was released as 
the appeal by Arce’s wife was revoked and the lawsuit for which cacique had collected about 500 pesos among 
all commoners of Corque was not started up, with the cacique being accused of appropriating the acquired 
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obedience to a “measure considered by the comunarios as an odious exaction,” he became 
the target of comunario protest.61  
The direct provocation of the revolt was the imprisonment of the jilaqata of one of 
Corque’s principal ayllus for having expressed his aversion against the insinuated 
payment. When a group of about 300 indigenous comunarios managed to liberate him, 
they clashed with soldiers based in Corque leaving five deceased comunarios. In a 
reaction, the insurgents encircled the village overnight, made watch fires in the 
immediate hills and blew their pututus (horns). Meanwhile, their number grew to more 
or less 1000. Despite the authorities’ requests to retreat and cede their purposes and 
mediation by commissions of notable villagers, the insurgents attacked the village, 
armed with stones, slings and guns, and set the government building on fire. As Arce 
understood his precarious situation, he tried to escape the besieged village together 
with his son, but they were chased until the outer limits of the community where they 
were overtaken, tortured and murdered by  “the multitude of cannibals, thirsty for blood,” 
as the clerk recorded in the Judicial Gazette.62 
Only in late 1895, steps were taken to restore the public order in Carangas.63 As the 
population was being pacified, the Prefect of Oruro drew again attention to the 
indispensability for the province of implementing the Revisita. In contrast to the 
Cercado and Paria provinces where the Mesas Revisitadores had been started up without –
according to the Prefect- encountering indigenous resistance, the process was still 
paralyzed in Carangas since the Juez Revisitador’s resignation in November 1894.64 The 
following years, the departmental authorities observed with fright how rebellion spread 
over the broader highland region, particularly in the La Paz department (Klein 1993, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
funds to his own benefit. AJC, 1895, no. 2302; ANB, MI, 1895-1896, tomo 286, no. 53. Prefectura y comand. Gral. de 
Oruro, 25 October 1895; CDLT, Gazeta judicial, 1895-1896, no. 5, 12-20. See also Mendieta 2008, 389. 
61 ANB, MI, 1895-1896, tomo 286, no. 53. Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro, f.2v-3 
62 The dossier continued, in the words of the clerk: the murderers crowded with savage roars and in the 
middle of an infernal screaming, hit the victims with sticks, axes and picks. Their cruelty was such that the 
physical drinking of the blood of these martyrs did not suffice and they continued beating the cadavers while 
giving them the most unjust and rude functions, they exposed them naked to tease and mockery and 
eventually they decapitated them. Afterwards, six comunarios were identified as participating authors of 
these crimes and sentenced to death although some could draw lots for an alternative punishment because of 
mitigating circumstances (lack of education, friendship with the insurgents, cooperate with the investigation 
and having no criminal record). The jilaqatas of the ayllus to which the principal “promoters” of the revolt and 
other witnesses confessed that the insurrection was premeditated. Some of them were accused of siege and 
fire of the government building and imprisoned. Two accused vecinos, Marcelino Vazquez and Isaac Luna, 
were absolved. CDLT, Gazeta Judicial, 1895-1896, no. 5, 13-4.  
63 ANB, MI, 1895-1896, tomo 286, no. 53, Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro, 15 Octubre 1895. CDLT, Gazeta 
Judicial, 1895-1896, no. 5, 13-4. 
64 ANB, MI, 1895-1896, tomo 286, no. 53. Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro, July 1895, f.12. 
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117). In Oruro as well, rumours about a general indigenous uprising swelled to an 
alarming degree and in 1896 the Prefect requested armed reinforcement for both Paria 
and Carangas in order to bring a halt to inter-community invasions and indigenous 
counter-pressures that thwarted the Revisita (Portal 1896, 3). One year later, the head of 
the Department informed that the execution of the Revisita still remained uncompleted 
in each of its provinces due to indigenous distrust and resistance, deficient armed 
support and corruption.65  Moreover, the revisitadores assigned in 1896 to the Carangas 
province suspected vecino interference in this resistance, commenting that a local 
government authority would have arranged an agreement with his indigenous subjects 
to obstruct their assignment.66 That same year, 11 inhabitants of Huachacalla would 
have attempted to kill 4 vecinos.67 
In order to force and foster the continuation of the Revisita and hence to get rid of 
the old tributary system, the Prefect pleaded for a reconciliation of the new financial 
system with  
“the ignorance and natural distrust of the native who generally is victim of 
injustices committed by the functionaries who do not enjoy a salary and search 
the remuneration of their work in the rights assigned to the operations they are 
charged with”.68  
In July of 1897, the indigenous population of Carangas would have refused to deliver 
personal services as a means of resisting the Revisita operations, to which the state 
authorities reacted with a form of quite absurd- blackmail, threatening to start up the 
Revisita if they did not pay their due services.69 
As the department was unable to formulate a sound response towards continuous 
communal anti-Revisita manoeuvring, the solvency problems of the departmental 
treasury increased by the day. The declining tax revenues caused growing uneasiness 
with the departmental administration. As the Prefect warned in 1897, head tax incomes 
had decreased to a critical level in spite of the growing population liable to the tributo 
because taxpayers lists had not been updated in 23 years.70 As long as no tax quota 
adjustment was being made, registered tributarios continued dying or moving out 
 
                                                     
65 ANB, MI, 1897, tomo 297, no. 75. Informe Prefecto, fs. 16v-17. 
66 APO, 1896-1898, libro 62, cited by Mendieta 2008, 389.  
67 AJC, Penales, 1903, no. 7. 
68 Own translation. ANB, MI, 1897, tomo 297, no. 75. Informe Prefecto, fs. 16v-17. 
69 APO, 1896-1898, libro 62, cited in Mendieta 2008, 389. 
70 The Prefect refers to the 1874 law, overlooking the execution of the Revisita of 1877. ANB, MI, 1897, tomo 
297, no. 75. Informe Prefecto, fs. 17. 
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without being replaced by the new generation of taxpayers.71 In 1898, the Prefect 
lamented that, while other departments were making extra revenues, Oruro was still 
tied to the old, “defective and illegal” indigenous head tax with, moreover, a large part of 
the due taxpayers remaining off the radar (Aramayu 1898, 25-6; see also Mendieta 2008, 
389). According to his estimates, in comparison to the last padrón, at least one fourth of 
the registered inhabitants would have died whereas their total would have doubled. 
Although a Revisitador had been assigned to Carangas and had received an anticipation 
on his remuneration of 600 bolivianos, he had not initiated his job (Aramayu 1898, 26). 
Given that the Revisita remained pending, the Prefect suggested the organization of an 
alternative indigenous census to include new taxpayers and take unregistered 
community land usufructuaries in Carangas, Paria and el Cercado out of illegitimacy, but 
his proposal remained without avail (ibid, 27).  
Regardless of Revisita démarches, internal frictions over land were meanwhile 
remarkably increasing. From the late 1870s on, the provincial court registered a 
mounting number of inter- and intra-community conflicts relating to theft and 
(disputed) denouncements of “vacant property” (unclaimed inheritance or ownerless 
goods, particularly livestock), violations of communal property (either in individually or 
collectively held terrains) as well as abundant accusations of authority abuses, most of 
them labelled as despojo or dispossession.72 Although these countless instances of sayaña 
intrusions often had no direct connection to the new land legislation, the taking to 
court of these inter-community struggles is a sign of heightening tensions over land 
rights security due to increasing pressures upon resources. These pressures were also –
though limited- provoked by the tension between mining concessions with communal 
property.73 
While most of these cases concern minor incursions, usually rather swiftly dealt with, 
some evolved into protracted, violent and expanding confrontations involving tens and 
even hundreds of armed comunarios, at times assisted by local vecinos. A concrete 
example is the rivalry over land boundaries between ayllus of Totora and Huaillamarca 
which led to a series of violent and widening clashes, (temporally) culminating in 1898 
 
                                                     
71 ANB, MI, 1897,tomo 297, no. 75. Informe Prefecto, fs. 17-8. 
72 AJC, Legajos 29 to 39, covering the years 1877 up to 1891. 
73 An interesting case is the conflict in the mining district of Carangas, where Manuel Santiago Ortega, a 
mestizo miner and quicksilver trader (azoguero) residing in La Rivera, was accused of land intrusion under the 
pretext of disposing of a legal mining concession. The comunarios of the neighbouring community of Todos 
Santos appointed Manuel Sempertegui as their apoderado to defend their terrenos de repartimiento against this 
usurpation. It was stated that mining concessions do not include pasture and cultivation rights. AJC, 1873, no. 
1293. In Andamarca, the miner Bernardo Rodríguez was accused of -amongst other things- having sold lands 
belonging to the community, but he argued that he was only exploring potential mining sites and offering 
mines for sale in Andamarca. AJC, 1876, no. 1478. 
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with Huaillamarca’s attack on Totora, where they “did not leave one stone on another” 
(ibid, 4).74 Throughout the 1890 decade, the recurrence of such violent outbreaks only 
increased. Serious and long battles were fought out between ayllus,75 but also at the 
inter-cantonal and –provincial level.76 Often, these clashes were embedded in longer, 
fierce inter-ayllu conflict over lands and boundaries.77 The closing of such conflicts 
implied the execution of formal land inspections,78 a procedure that was progressively 
applied throughout the following decades and would stimulate even more comunarios 
and their representatives to frequent the juridical institutions as the procedure 
required the presentation of all relating property documents (see chapter 7). 
In 1893, the sub-Prefect indicated inter-communal land intrusions, across provincial 
and departmental boundaries, as a primary incentive that urged and justified Revisita 
intervention, lamenting that  
“the indigenous mass [is] inclined against the revisita, despite having clarified 
that it is the mode to obtain the replacement of the deceased and absent 
taxpayers and of those who have lost their lands because their neighbours from 
Pacajes, Joya and Toledo have violently taken them.”79  
The continuous violence motivated his successor’s recommendation in 1898 to 
“demarcate the lands of the contiguous cantons; cause and origin of frequent turmoil and crimes” 
(own translation, Atristaín in Aramayu 1898, Anexo, xv). He was still quite confident in 
 
                                                     
74 The ayllus of Totora had a long history of internal land conflict which re-erupted in the 1870s. In 1881, this 
belligerency spilled over to other communities as a result of a land boundary conflict between the comunarios 
of ayllu Lupi (Totora) and those of ayllu Jisca-Urinsaya of the Huaillamarca canton. The dispute grew into a 
major confrontation involving about 500 people, according to some testimonies, with comunarios from 
Llanquera, San Miguel, Chuquichambi, Corque and Curahuara de Pacajes actively supporting Huaillamarca. 
Five years later, another violent invasion followed, in which houses were destroyed and hundreds of animals 
stolen, good for very dense lawsuit files. AJC, 1875, no. 1437, 1440 and 1457; 1881, no. 1659, no. 1667 and 1670; 
1886, no. 1901, no. 1912, no. 1930 and no. 1950; 1887, no. 1964 and no. 1974. 
75 Inter-communitarian strife and battle erupted in Sabaya as well as in Llanquera, each time violent invasions 
involving over 50 armed comunarios. AJC, 1898, respectively no. 2384 and no. 2407. Among the ayllus of Totora 
the quarrels and violence over land were even more stern and would continue to preoccupy authorities into 
the 20th century. AJC, 1893, no. 2224, no. 2225 and no. 2226; 1895, no. 2303. 
76 In 1890, a four days fight took place between the cantons of Turco and Choquecota, including the 
participation of hundreds of armed comunarios as well as vecinos. In 1893, a similar incident occurred 
between Toledo, of the Paria province, and Llanquera. AJC, 1890, no. 2144; 1893, no. 2218.  
77 Such was the case with the violent inter-ayllu invasions in Huachacalla, between ayllus Tuaña and Collana, 
in January 1896. AJC, 1896, no. 2324 and 1907, penal, no. 6. See 6.5.1 on further developments. 
78 This happened for instance in 1892 between ayllus Mitma and Tunca in Huaillamarca to settle a dispute over 
boundary markers. AJC, 1892, no. 2209.  
79 Own translation. ANB, MI, 1893, tomo 272, no. 79, Oruro dept., 6 June 1893.  
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the eventual support of the indigenous population, assuring his superiors of his special 
efforts during cantonal visits to “make the comunarios understand the profits and prosperities 
the Revisita would bring them” so that “once educated” they will be willing to undergo the 
Revisita (own translation, ibid, xi). However, the envisioned direct role to be played by 
the Revisita in such delineation and ‘fixing’ plans, and the advancing of such plans at all, 
failed to materialize. Meanwhile, however, the imminence of an external assessment 
motivated several sayañeros and ayllus to dive into the juridical archives in order to find 
legal evidence of their property rights. 
6.4 The launching of a “paper war”. 
The reform-minded and export-oriented climate converted secure land property in a 
sought after and hence disputed asset. With the Revisita unabatedly knocking at the 
door, contribuyentes were roused to regulate their sayaña tenure. In order to block off 
intrusions by contesting neighbours or imminent inspections and demarcations, 
contribuyentes petitioned the registration of the adjudication of their sayaña or other 
documents that would proof their ownership.80 Still, apart from individual interests, 
ayllus and markas in search for collective land rights security started to reclaim 
documents that would proof their legitimate titles. At the office of Property Rights, 
installed in the departmental court of Oruro, representatives of these communities 
requested the enrolment of validated testimonies in the registers.81 
As a result of the obtained guarantees for indigenous communities as confirmed by 
the 1883 proindiviso law, old documents concerning land inspections, demarcations and 
land litigation verdicts, but foremost the colonial composición titles, became vital sources 
of land right security. This rush on the archives mobilized an army of attorneys 
traveling up and down the departmental and national courts to reclaim their legitimate 
 
                                                     
80 In view of a petitioned land division between litigating parties, a comunario of ayllu Mitma requested the 
registration of the 16th century purchase of repartimiento lands made to the Spanish Crown by the cacique of 
that time, of whom the applicant claimed to be great-grandchild. Similar individual requests were made in 
that decade by contribuyentes of Huaillamarca and Coipasa, seeking to guarantee the tenure of their sayaña. 
AJC, 1898, no. 2379. AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” 
fs. 47-8. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 45, fs. 323-4v. 
81 The records of this office, kept in the Archivo de los Derechos Reales (ADRO), comprise registrations colonial 
composición titles, the adjudication of sayaña lands obtained through transfer, will or legal sentence, the 
demarcation and concession of land as sentenced through land dispute litigation. The original documents that 
were registered derived from the Supreme Court in Sucre or from the provincial court in Corque. 
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titles and a battery of clerks transcribing and copying colonial documents, thereby 
raking over old land disputes. This emerging “paper war” is the background of the 
development of (however modest) movement of apoderados generales in Carangas. 
The petitions made by attorneys in name of a particular ayllu or several ones, or even 
the entire province attempted to recuperate their composición titles. In an appeal to the 
provincial Revisitador in 1897, a head tax collector from Corque stated that the 
communities of Carangas no longer possessed the originals of these colonial 
documents.82 Since they had presented their land titles to the former, ill-fated 
Revisitador Delfín Arce and sub-Prefect Luis Lujan in 1894, they would have fallen into 
the hands of the Revisita committee. The collector’s appeal forms part of an extensive 
file archived at the Supreme Departmental Court of Oruro containing a sequence of 
community requests throughout the 1890s.83 In dialogue with the records of the register 
books of Property Rights at the same court, this sequence reflects the chronological 
development of a provincial apoderado generales, which for Carangas remains a hitherto 
unidentified movement.84  
The chronology starts in 1891, three years before the revisitador accused of having 
deprived them from the original composición documents arrived to the province. That 
year, the cacique of Huachacalla, Andres Nicolas Rafael, petitioned the registration of 
the inspection and composición documents administered by Revisitador Domingo Atocha y 
La Reinaga in the early 18th century (see 4.1.1) in order to proof the property rights of 
his community “since time immemorial and the conquest of the Kingdom that was founded.”85 
In 1894, Mariano Laime, resident in the province, requested the legalization of the 
composición documents for the communities of the province, as obtained through 
purchase from royal representative and land surveyor José de la Vega Alvarado, before 
the Supreme Court in Sucre.86 In the following two years, Turco87 and Huachacalla88 
 
                                                     
82 AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” f. 20. 
83 All requests comprised in this file were petitioned before the Supreme National Court in Sucre between 1894 
and 1898. 
84 As with the juridical file (AJHO), the register books (ADRO) in fact contain indirect marks of the concerned 
requests. The requests found in the former source concern copies of appeals originally presented  before the 
Supreme National Court or departmental authorities while the requests in the latter case were found in 
registration requests of the 1910s and 1920s. Possibly, the archive of the Supreme Court of Justice, kept in the 
National Archive of Bolivia, contains documents which would further complete this chronology, but 
unfortunately this has remained beyond the scope of this research. 
85 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1918, no. 1. 
86 AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” fs. 1-16. 
87 The documents were requested in 1895. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1929, no. 13. 
88 The documents were requested in 1896. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1929, no. 20. 
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registered the same documents granted under Toledo. The comunarios of Choquecota 
requested in 1897 the archiving of an extensive file over the division of adjacent lands 
between Choquecota and Turco which had fought out fierce struggles over these 
boundaries in the late 18th and early 19th century.89 The same year, a representative of 
ayllu Mitma, Luis Rocha, demanded the registration of all documents relating to the 
inter-ayllu struggle in Huaillamarca, going back to the late 18th century.90 Meanwhile, 
the jilaqatas of Quitaquita and Ayocota (canton Corque), represented by Francisco 
Parrado, requested the accreditation of the 16th century composición documents, adding 
that: 
 “in order to organize the Revisita of community lands in the province, it is 
necessary to state that in the dictatorial administration of Melgarejo the 
obligation to consolidate the property of our territories of which we are and were 
owners and lords since colonial times was imposed upon us, because of the right 
of first occupation as aborigines as of the onerous title of the composición with 
the Spanish Crown, which our ancestors obtained through oblation of thousand 
pesos in each canton.”91 
Moreover, they linked the composición to the compensativo they had paid thirty years 
earlier and demanded the certification of the amount of money they had deposited for 
the sake of the consolidation of their lands to the fiscal commissioner Antonio Vargas. 
Their appeal was responded and the same year, the departmental treasury 
administrator formally confirmed the payment of 15663 pesos 6 reales, reduced to 12531 
bolivianos, however not by the requesting ayllus but by the province as a whole, as a 
form of compensation in order to remain exempt from the 1866 legislation.92  
Subsequently appears the letter by the mentioned head tax collector from Corque 
addressed to the Revisitador of Carangas in which he petitions for Revisita exemption in 
view of the certified compensativo payment, the composición titles and the numerous legal 
 
                                                     
89 Originally, both communities formed a single administrative district. In early colonial times, they fell under 
the same doctrina, which was a Spanish-imposed administrative unit for recently converted Indians, before the 
establishment of parishes (Diccionario de la lengua española, 2001). In later colonial times, however, a violent 
dispute developed between a powerful turqueño and three ayllus of Choquecota over the rights over a 
particular estancia. In the first decades after independence, both communities continued quarrelling over the 
legitimate basis of colonial composición documents for a formal demarcation and the legacy of mutual land 
intrusions. AJHO, 202-1, 1897, no. SR, “Causa por venta de terrenos en Chaquicota”. 
90 This registration includes copies of documents from 1779, 1787, 1830 and 1844. This conflict has been 
mentioned before (6.3). ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1924, no. 14. 
91 AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” f. 18. 
92 AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” fs. 18v-19. 
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guarantees (particularly the 1882 resolution, see 5.2.3) that recognize this exception.93 
He warns that if no appropriate resolution will be declared, similar conflicts as during 
previous Revisita interventions, provoked by the denial of justified community 
demands, can be expected. At the other hand, the collector stresses that the Revisita is 
not unwanted per se; in some cases even quite the contrary. In view of the extensive 
land seizure by neighbouring communities, the northern cantons of the province are 
eager to have their lands inspected in the hope to recover their properties. In December 
1897, the Prefect of the Oruro department, Andres Aramayo, responded to the 
collector’s request by announcing the return of a Revisitador to verify the legitimacy of 
the presented land titles and their conformity with the stipulations of the 1882 
resolution  so as to decide whether the lands in question are subject the Revisita or 
not.94  
In his following prefectural report, the Prefect informed the Ministry of the Interior 
to have appointed Froilán Rivero as Revisitador but he had nevertheless not started and 
neither would start his assignment (Aramayo 1898, 26). In a reaction, a group of 
apoderados generales of several communities of the province appeared in May 1898 before 
the departmental judicial authorities.95 The commission included following 
representatives: Hilario Cáseres of the community of Corque, Melchor Marca of Totora 
and Curahuara, Juan Nicolas of Huachacalla, cacique Manuel Manuelo of Huaillamarca, 
cacique Juan Tangari of Andamarca, and cacique Tomas Colque of Choquecota.96 In 
anticipation to the pending Revisita, they conferred special representative power to don 
Juan Lascano, thereby repealing the power previously attributed to José Maria Laime, to 
defend their rights and interests relative to their claims upon Revisita exemption.97 
Their newly appointed apoderado general was consigned to “present writings, test, revoke, 
appeal” before the Supreme Government, and if necessary before the Congress, until 
achieving a final and favourable resolution regardless of the required number of legal 
 
                                                     
93 AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” fs. 20-20v. 
94 AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” f. 21. 
95 AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” f. 74. 
96 The first three substituted the caciques of their respective communities. No reference is made to the 
communities of Curahuara and Turco. Mendieta’s identification of Manuel Alanoca, Pedro Alderete y Melchor 
Marca as the apoderados of Carangas (Mendieta 2008, 388) links up to this list, at least when it comes to 
Melchor Marca. I have not been able to trace solid evidence in the local archives on the person of Alderete and 
Alanoca or their link with the 1899 rebellion. 
97 Laime is possibly related –or perhaps even is intended to relate to- Mariano Laime, who in 1894 had 
requested the land titles of all communities.  
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actions.98 Here, we see that the apoderados were not mobilizing to strengthen the 
communities’ land claims through mechanisms inscribed in the imposed land legislation 
(and its “loopholes”), but also to address the legislative body in order to topple that 
legislation. 
Counting as his first action as apoderado general, Lascano petitioned still in 1898 the 
formalization of the documents of the land inspection in the province of 1545.99 In the 
same period (1895-1899) the validating and archiving of these composición documents 
had been individually requested by several communities.100 The difference with Lascano 
was that he acted as single attorney appointed by all communities to solicit and obtain 
the formal declaration of the exemption of their community lands from the Revisita. 
Their claim was justified by their possession of their lands as legitimate owners, by the 
composición and sale transaction with the Spanish Crown and its repeated confirmation 
with the colonial land inspectors, and moreover by the purchase verified under the 
administration of Melgarejo.101 Lascano refers to a long range of laws and resolutions, 
including the laws of 31 July 1871 which cancelled the land sales executed under 
Melgarejo and the proindiviso law of 23 November 1883 and amending resolutions to 
the exvinculación laws of 5 (sic) October 1874 and 1 October 1880, demanding that all 
communities of the Carangas province would be included in these regulations.102 
Subsequently it is stated that both the land tenure and the taxpayer status of the 
“aboriginals” of Carangas are currently being undermined, as the preservation of their 
land rights is perturbed by summary trials, while their fiscal rights are negated by the 
 
                                                     
98 Because the comunarios do not possess any writing skills, the testimony is undersigned by two vecinos, 
Joaquin Daza and Socrates Arteaga. AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. 
Pueblo de Totora.” f. 74v. 
99 These documents are included in the registration documents of the purchase of a mining concession in 
Negrillos effectuated in 1922. The next year, he petitioned a testimony of the composición operation in 
Andamarca as executed by Atocha’s predecessor José de la Vega Alvarado. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, 
Carangas, 1922, no. 45, fs. 304-332v. and 1918, no. 6, see also no. 12 and 1929, no. 47. 
100 Cáseres and Marca, for instance, as representatives of Corque, Totora and Curahuara (in the May 1898 
commission) petitioned a certified copy of the composición titles their ancestors had obtained from José de la 
Vega Alvarado. In 1899, the composición documents granted by José de la Vega Alvarado were petitioned by the  
community of Turco. AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” 
f. 21v-46v and 49-50v. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1929, no. 28.  
101 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, partida 45, fs. 325v-326. 
102 The apoderado mentions the supreme resolutions of 21 (sic) October 1882, 15 and 22 February, 10 and 13 
April and 5 and 18 June 1883, the 1874 and 1880 laws, as well as the supreme decree of 24 December 1874 and 1 
December 1880 and the supreme resolution of 13 October 1894. See also chapter 5 on the 1871, 1874 and 1880 
laws. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, partida 45, fs. 326v-327. 
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jurisdiction of the Revisitador.103 This urges for preparatory actions in anticipation to 
the execution of the Revisita.  
The file closes with the observation of Esteban Vargas, also in the position of general 
attorney of the eight cantons, that the Revisita is against the law and despises the land 
titles of the communities, which can be taken as an act of defiance to the government. 
Explicitly addressing the president, he rhetorically asks whether “the communities of the 
province of Carangas will be subjected to the Revisita operations? Not at all because they are 
protected by the law.”104  
A vecino-comunario alliance. 
The anti-Revisita support of Vargas and Lascano, both powerful non-indigenous 
residents of the province, hints at the operating of a vecino-comunario coalition that 
transcended supposedly cemented social and ethnic divisions. Over the last years, such 
alliance formations were repeatedly alluded to by government representatives at the 
provincial and departmental level. In the annual report of 1898, these allegations were 
clearly expressed, asserting that Delfín Arce had not been able to bring the Revisita to a 
good end due to such vecino-community collaborations (Atristaín, in Aramayu 1898, xi). 
By that time, swelling rural unrest was becoming more visible as community pressures 
upon the government crystalized into a formal nation-wide political alliance with the 
Liberal party (see 5.3). Also in Carangas, the movement of apoderados generales had 
become more identifiable to the degree that representatives and their actions were 
recorded by the juridical authorities (see Appendix 11).105 
Now, who exactly were these apoderados? More precisely, what was the basis of the 
power, the legitimacy and the motivation they acted upon? Most of the mentioned 
representatives belonged to powerful families, such as the Vargas in Corque106 or were 
influential –yet therefore also contested- individuals, such as Juan de la Cruz Arias107 and 
 
                                                     
103 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, partida 45, fs. 327v. 
104 Statement made in 1898. Subsequently, Vargas cites the literal stipulations of the law of 23 November 1883. 
ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, partida 45, fs. 328-329. 
105 The list gives all identified names of people who took up the function of “apoderado” between 1870 and 
1930 in Carangas to defend comunarios or defend their plaintiffs in relation to land rights. However, it is not 
always possible to define whether the cases in which the apoderados appeared corresponded to communal or 
inter-individual issues. 
106 AJC, Penales, 1900, no. 3. 
107 As magistrate for Mines, Juan de la Cruz Arias supervised the registration of mining concessions, while as 
public notary in Carangas he regulated the transfer of real estate in the province and even came to represent 
 
  317 
Luis Lujan.108 The case of Lascano offers a good demonstration of the ambiguity of these 
representatives. Juan Lascano was a white merchant, citizen registered in the city of 
Oruro,109 who had acquired a very powerful position in the province thanks to the 
lucrative exploitation of public offices and commercial relations. In the mid-1870s, he 
was corregidor in the provincial capital Corque.110 In the same period, he acted as 
auctioneer of the taxes on alcohol consumption in the province, which gave him 
influence over regional merchants and trade houses and local indigenous 
transporters.111 In 1874, a comunaria in Corque accused her corregidor of having 
violently dispossessed her of her sayaña, asserting that –as “everybody knows”- Lascano 
never possessed a piece of sowing field.112 In her words, he would have sarcastically 
explained that he simply  
“felt like [seizing her land] and had a hunger for avarices; and for the same reason 
no one could make him interrupt and retrocede of his works and enterprises; 
besides that he did not esteem the laws, because the time had come to eat his 
fill.”113  
When relating this brief insight into Lascano’s position in the province to his role of 
community attorney it becomes clear that he had strong political and economic power 
base, his legitimacy was contested and he had a motive to halt the Revisita.114 Regarding 
the first point, his influence explains why community leaders would approach him with 
their requests. Second, his knowledge of and respect for the law, upon which he 
pretended to act as apoderado (see his references to several decrees), was undermined by 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the entire province as Sub-Prefect. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1903, no. 1-6, 1906, no. 1. APO, Libros 
de contabilidad, 1860, “Libro de tomas de razón”, s.f. and 1880, “Libro de diario”, f. 400.  
108 Luis Lujan was Judge in Carangas in the 1880s and executed the office of sub-Prefect around 1893-’95, but 
was severely accused of having incited an indigenous rebellion as well as held responsible for attacks on the 
comunarios in Corque. APO, Libros de contabilidad, 1881, “Libro de Diario”, f. 403. AJC, 1895, no. 2302. See also 
the Delfín Arce case (6.3). 
109 AJC, 1875, no. 1420. 
110 AJC, 1874, no. 1355. 
111 In 1874, he had placed a bid on that function through a deal with the municipal auctioneer of Carangas over 
the collection of alcohol taxes. A conflict emerged with Rey, Días and Company, an alcohol-importing trade 
house in Tambo Quemado, which would one year later “purchase” the exemption from those taxes. He also 
sub-leased the collection of the alcohol tax to local collectors. AJC, 1875, no. 1224, fs. 22-3, no. 1367 and no. 
1420. 
112 AJC, 1874, no. 1355. 
113 Own translation. AJC, 1874, no. 1355. 
114 A similar case is that of Manuel Sempértegui, a much sought-after apoderado and powerful vecino with 
sayaña claims. AJC, 1864, no. 950. 
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latent hostility towards his person. This distrust makes clear that his influence was 
acquired through dubious practices. Most importantly, this disputed legitimacy 
stemmed from the simultaneity of relying upon a vecino status as non-indigenous state 
representative while claiming a contribuyente status as indigenous sayañero. However, 
his claims on that sayaña are not backed by legitimate access rights to community lands, 
which explains why the execution of a land inspection was not in his interest. In chapter 
7, we will further inquire this overlap of interests. 
Together with the opportunistic manipulation of inter-community struggles over 
land and boundaries and of indigenous efforts to represent and assert their communal 
rights before the central authorities, insecure vecino occupation of community land 
constitutes the clue to vecino involvement in Carangas’ land issue. The case of Lascano 
gives a first insight into this embroilment but the motives and tactics behind anti-
Revisita vecino manoeuvres and its profound implications on communal life requires a 
more elaborate analysis. What was the foundation of a shared vecino-comunario 
interest in halting the exvinculación process? Comunarios’ appeals to the residents of 
the province with ties to the country’s political and juridical institutions to defend their 
individual or communitarian land interests were in the first place based on the 
legitimacy they derived from their political and economic power base. The role of 
community attorney before the government or lawyer of litigating communities 
allowed them to opportunistically enlarge this power base through divide and rule 
tactics of quarrelling ayllus, thereby tightening their grip on the comunarios’ mobilizing 
force. But there was also a more intrinsic factor at play that explains committed vecino 
backing of indigenous efforts to stop the Revisita. As several vecinos had obtained 
access to community land through a range of –authorized and corrupt- tactics, the 
defence of communal land rights became the struggle for their own land interests. 
In the first place, the new land legislation triggered inter-communitarian incursions 
in Carangas, rather than the emergence or growth of a land usurping hacendado class. 
The approaching of a general Revisita only intensified this internal land-related 
disputes and the comunarios’ recurrence to the official juridical system. Literate 
villagers with a minimal knowledge of that system knew to take advantage of the 
demand for lawyers and defenders and were increasingly suspected of manipulating 
inter-community struggles. Especially local authorities, and even the revisitadores 
themselves, were accused of “countless exactions and abuses” to maximize the 
profitability of their public offices at the expense of the “ignorant” indigenous 
population.115 An extra drive behind this embroilment were the clashes among the 
vecinos themselves. Competing political and economic interests ensued in recurrent 
 
                                                     
115 ANB, MI, 1897, tomo 297, no. 75. Informe Prefecto, fs. 16v-7. See also Aramayu 1898. 
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inter-personal and family feuds that further fuelled the conflict and violence in the 
province. Luis Lujan, for instance, was quite a contested figure who lived at odds with 
Meliton Delgado,116 including in the context of community struggle in which both acted 
as representatives of opponent parties,117 while he found a ‘partner in crime’ in vecino  
Marcelino Vazquez.118 As will be demonstrated, the latent conflict among vecino families 
re-emerged with even more strength in the aftermath of the 1899 events, while 
criticism by government agents towards this counteracting role of the provincial 
vecindario bolstered. 
However, the counteracting role by non-indigenous rural elites went further than 
exploiting the insecurity and distress of the comunarios but was partially based on 
exactly the same cause of insecurity; the fear for state intervention in communal land 
distribution. In the course of the 19th century, several vecinos had gained access to one 
or more sayañas, yet not always in a legitimate way. In response to the usurpation of 
community land by unregistered inhabitants, which according to the Prefect of Oruro, 
Andrés Aramayu, was a wide-spread practice in all three provinces, Prefect launched in 
1898 the proposal of implementing an alternative census (Aramayu 1898, 27). This 
proposal was presented as a provisional measure to increase departmental revenues as 
new contribuyentes would be included into the registers, thereby rectifying the 
unlawfulness that reigned in the department’s rural districts. The sub-Prefect, 
Fructuoso Atristaín, explained that there were vecinos who occupied sayañas without 
being registered as contribuyentes, in order to maintain that situation, misinformed the 
indigenous population with the purpose of reinforcing anti-Revisita protest (Atristaín, in 
Aramayu 1898, Anexo,  xi). He stated that there were cantons where all vecinos, even 
the corregidor, belong to the “tributario” class and hence only interested in working 
their landed property (ibid, xvi).  
These vecinos-converted-into-tributarios, to whom I will further refer as “vecino-
comunarios”, were a thorn in the flesh of the government and its land commodification 
plans. According to Atristaín, who particularly referred to Corque and probably alluded 
to Lascano and Vargas, it was due to this category of individuals to whom the Revisita is 
inconvenient that Delfín Arce had not been able to bring the Revisita to a good end 
 
                                                     
116 Lujan was married to Petrona Delgado, but this family tie did not hold both vecinos from their continuous 
quarrels. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1894, no. 2, f. 2. AJC, 1886, no. 1882 and no. 1930 and 1889, no. 
2112. 
117 In the violent conflict between Totora and Huaillamarca in 1886, Lujan defended the former community, 
while Delgado represented the latter. AJC, 1886, no. 1901, no. 1912, no. 1930 and no. 1950; 1887, no. 1964 and 
no. 1974. 
118 In 1886, they were accused of having attacked the sub-Prefect of Carangas. Lujan had been earlier linked to 
a murder attempt against the sub-Prefect of Carangas. AJC, 1886, no. 1913 and no. 1879 respectively. 
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(ibid). Thus, while the execution of Revisita was obstructed by indigenous resistance, 
that obstruction –and all the disorder it caused- was more and more blamed on the 
vecino-apoderados and the vecinos-comunarios. Moreover, the sub-prefect warned that 
this assimilation prevented the incorporation of the provincial vecindario as 
“Nacionales” (ibid, xvi). He particularly stressed the situation in the cantons of 
Huachacalla and Andamarca, where indeed “formal” mestizo and white presence was 
low.119 Even the capital Corque -the most “national” place of the province- only counted 
with 60 members of the Guardia Nacional and hardly half of them were reported to 
attend the Sunday gatherings of the guard because all of them are on leave for 
travelling as commerce was their foremost activity. To foment the enthusiasm among 
this minority group, the sub-prefect suggests the appointment of an examining 
magistrate of the guard to train all local guards in the cantons.  
What happened was that, gradually, the indigenous and mestizo inhabitants of the 
Bolivian countryside were driven into each other’s arms. This became particularly 
visible in the 1890s, before bursting into a bloody civil war (Platt 1987, 311). According 
to Platt, the overruling of class solidarity by the creation of ethnic bonds suggests that 
lacking state support forced mestizos into a position where negotiation and conciliation 
with the ayllus was inevitable (ibid, 306). They became involved in their struggle for 
secure community land rights, and offered legal and physical support to their claims. In 
return, the comunarios were inclined to adopt a more tolerant stance towards their land 
occupancy of community lands. However, vecino abuses and consequent crippled 
livelihood prospects remained a major motivator of discontent. The central state got 
increasingly irritated by what was defined as an “illegal usurpation” by vecino-
comunarios and the “crookedness” of vecino-apoderados. More and more, the vecinos 
were indicated as the culprits of rural unrest and indigenous defiance instead of the 
vanguards of national integration. Meanwhile, the passive victimhood attributed to 
indigenous existence was replaced by a frightening image of barbaric savageness. As 
becomes clear in the official discourse adopted after the 1899 events, the government’s 
preoccupation over the incorporation of its rural subjects was dramatically stirred, 
provoking a growing discrepancy between the national and provincial elites and a 
reorientation in state-community relations. 
 
                                                     
119 According to the national census of 1900, Huachacalla and Andamarca had indeed the lowest presence of 
non-indigenous inhabitants, both proportionally as in absolute numbers, of all cantons (Blanco 2006 [1904], 
LXVI-LXXXV).  
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6.5 Carangas during the Federal War. 
In the context of the pact sealed between the Liberal Party and Zárate Willka, an 
indigenous army was formed. The mobilized peasants joined the Liberals in battle and 
swore allegiance to both Pando and the indigenous general staff led by Zárate Willka 
(Condarco 2011 [1964], 296). The integration of the troops from Carangas into Zárate 
Willka’s broader indigenous army was possibly consigned to Manuel Mita Willka, 
assisted by Cruz Mamani (although Condarco states that this is the name adopted by the 
press of La Paz when referring to the former, namely the “second Willka”120), while the 
Cochabamba and Paria regions were commanded by Feliciano Willka, or the third Willka 
(ibid, 256). From beginning February 1899 on, the populations surrounding the city of 
Oruro started to harass the governmental army (ibid, 236). That month, indigenous 
troops also began to mobilize in Carangas with the primary task of interrupting the 
international communication, specifically towards the Pacific (ibid, 247-8). While the 
people from Pazña demolished the railways in order to disconnect and distract the 
constitutional troops, the people from Paria and Carangas were preparing the siege of 
the city of Oruro from the cardinal points.121 In March, the indigenous revolutionaries of 
Carangas crossed the Desaguadero river and headed in increasing number to Alonso’s 
headquarters (ibid, 278). 
Meanwhile, however, it became clear that indigenous participation in the conflict 
was not undivided. In Huachacalla, particularly, the comunarios of the ayllus of Capi and 
Tuaña sided with the “Alonsos” while the ayllus of Collana and Camacha supported the 
revolution.122 When they started struggling, the latter ayllus acquired the support of a 
group of over 300 “rebels” from Turco, who, headed by Ramón Willca and Santiago 
García, invaded Capi and Tuaña on the 22nd of February. Once the turqueños had 
returned to their community that same day, the attacked ayllus declared themselves 
alonsistas, provoking a second attack. This time, the Tuaña and Capi inhabitants were 
brought to surrender and were forced to engage themselves on oath to the revolution.123   
 
                                                     
120 The proclamation of Caracollo, circulated in 1899 by Zárate (letter dated on 28.3.1899), is signed by Manuel 
Mita Villca as “El 2° General” (Condarco 2011 [1964], 313). 
121 “Gumercindo N. To Juan Manuel Virreira, Oruro, February 11th 1899.” Letter published in El Comercio, 
March 2nd 1899, 3, cited in Condarco 2011 [1964], 237.  
122 The ayllus of Huachacalla had a longer history of inter-communitarian struggle. AJC, 1861, no. 848 and 849; 
1870, no. 1157 and 1174; 1896, no. 2324. See also AJC, Civiles, 1902, no. 4; 1903, no. 2, fs. 1v-3; Penales, 1907, no. 6. 
123 AJC, Penales, 1903, no. 3. See also Pauwels 1983, 244-5; Mendieta 2008, 389-390. 
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Figure 25 Mobilized indigenous community and its leader (adaptation from Condarco 2011 
[1964], 451).124 
On the 17th of March 1899, the province’s indigenous population met in Corque and 
declared their support for Pando and Willka by swearing a federal oath before the 
corregidor of the provincial capital Corque (ibid, 280). Now that they had explicitly 
adhered to the liberal cause, the comunarios of Corque and Huachacalla started to 
appoint their corregidores through direct vote (ibid, 410). According to Condarco, this 
was perfectly in line with the indigenous interpretation of federalization plans, which, 
from their point of view, implied the freedom to choose their own Corregidor instead of 
having him appointed by the central authorities (ibid). However, a communication of 26 
March from Manuel Nina to Pando casted doubt on Carangas’ loyalty to the Liberals 
(ibid, 408). Three days later, a letter by the military commander of Llanquera, Miguel 
Zorilla, informed that the indigenous “army” of Carangas had turned their position 
against the liberals (ibid). Whether this warning was correct or not and was received by 
Pando or not, the latter assured during the last days of March that “with regard to those of 
 
                                                     
124 The indigenous leader in the middle could be Manuel Mita Willka, one of Zárate’s auxiliaries, who would 
have been consigned with the military command over the comunarios of Carangas. 
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Carangas, You will see in the documents that I send by mail, that these, in agreement with the los 
vecindarios [local residents], have proclaimed a neatly federal revolution.”125 
Pando’s plans to attack Oruro crystalized in late March, early April. His telegraphic 
correspondence with the Council to coordinate the attack on Oruro gives insight into 
the role attributed by the liberal forces to the Carangas communities, which were 
grouped with the seceded Umala troops, as a form of indigenous counterweight. The 
first of April, Pando wrote that  
“The 8th [of April] they will encircle Oruro, the Indians of Umala and Carangas, in a 
considerable number: which I judge pass over ten thousand, apart from those 
from Caracollo. -/ These Indian armies will permit me to hide the movements of 
the federal army, over the terrain of Oruro, -without permitting Alonso to know 
where we are located.”126  
Thus, the mobilized indigenous masses and the vecindario of Carangas were to come 
into action the 8th of April. The Carangas troops assumingly participated in the deciding 
battle of the 10th of April, although little or no reference is traceable.127  
In the shadows of the Great Rebellion. 
In the shadow of the war, there were several incidents in which local interethnic but 
also inter-indigenous hostility collapsed. In 1904, a plaintiff questioned about the above 
mentioned Turco-Huachacalla conflict stated that  
“the Indians of almost the entire Republic, with the famous Pablo Zarate Villca as 
their racial leader, also started a rebellion against the legitimate government of sir 
Alonso, ignorant of his authority and consequently supporting the revolution of 
La Paz, although in an exaggerated way. Nobody denies that in all places where 
the Indians participated, they have committed the most atrocious offenses in the 
 
                                                     
125 Fragment of a telegraphic session between Pando and the Junta, La Paz-Sicasica, s.p., probably 31 March 
1899, cited in Condarco 2011 [1964], 331. 
126 Telegraphic session, between Pando and the Junta, La Paz-Sicasica, s.p., 1 April 1899, cited in Condarco 2011 
[1964], 332. 
127 At least it is known that Manuel Mita Willka was there (Condarco 2011 [1964], 344), although it is not clear 
if he (still) executed the leadership over Carangas. According to Condaro, given their adopted antagonism and 
the different interpretations of “federal” between the Liberal and the indigenous revolutionaries, Pando’s 
confidence in their unanimous collaboration was quite too optimistic (ibid, 332). In effect, Pando could only 
truly count with the forces of Umala, maximum a couple of thousands of rather loosely united indigenous 
people. See also communication between Montes and Pando, Oruro, 18 April 1899 in Téllez 1924, 94, cited in 
ibid, 333-4. 
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criminal History of Bolivia, as the slaughters in Mohoza, Ayoayo, Peñas, Carangas, 
etc. The villages which have distinguished themselves most by acts of true 
savageness in the province to which we unfortunately belong are Totora, 
Curahuara, Choquicota, Turco and part of  Huachacalla.”128  
In a reaction to the materialization of such charges, the “rebellious” Indians literally 
set the Court in Corque on fire in 1908.129 As a result of the fire, a lot of information on 
the indigenous participation in the revolution in Carangas has probably been lost,  
including “the mentioned dossier about the fire occurred in the Juzgado de Instrucción the night 
of 13 September of the year [1908] has totally disappeared.”130 Despite lacking sources, the 
strong reverberation of the “Great Rebellion” in the province is unquestionable. In 1921, 
the then sub-prefect of Carangas, Eduardo Lima, commented that “the sad events in the 
revolution of 1898 have not been wiped out from memory. Likewise, some parcialidades of the 
canton of Corque share in this horrific racial degeneration” (Lima 1921, 8). He also referred to 
Choquecota, where “the bloody memory of the horrific crimes that its inhabitants committed in 
its surroundings in the last revolution of 98” still vibrate (ibid, 190-1).131 
Accusations brought to the provincial Court in the aftermath of the Great Rebellion 
asserted that the “Indians” of Carangas used the situation to avenge their oppression by 
the vecino class (Pauwels 1983, 244-5). In several villages, mestizo residents became the 
target of murder and plunder during the months of February and March. A merchant in 
Totora, Nicasio Perez, was robbed by comunarios of ayllu Lupi.132 In Corque, several 
vecinos would not survive the plunder. In the aftermath of the federal war, Pantaleón 
Arias blamed comunarios of ayllu Jilanaca of the vice-canton of Chuquichambi of having 
seized the triumph of the liberal revolution as a mere pretext to murder Tiburcio Rejel 
and his brother Laurencio.133 According to the insurgents, the ill-fated vecinos would 
have opposed the revolutionary flag and aggressed the indigenous revolutionaries, but 
Arias countered that the only purpose that drove the insurgents was to exterminate 
“the white race”.134 Around the same days, a vecino of Corque, Idelfonso Vargas, would 
 
                                                     
128 Own translation. AJC, Penales, 1904, juicios penales, no. 11, f.1v-2.  
129 In 1909, the sub-prefect of Carangas commented that the Court was moved to the property of César 
Vásquez since the building had burnt down (Careaga in Ascarrunz 1909, 104). 
130 AJC, Civiles, 1909, no. 17. 
131 This rebellious fact seems to have a strong historical precedent, as Lima recalls the demolition of the 
former village of Choquicota on order of the viceroy of Peru after the comunarios had massacred the Spanish 
residing in the village (Choquicota was rebuild in 1774 with the name of “ciudad de Cáceres”).  
132 February 1899. AJC, Penales, 1906, no. 28, f. 1. 
133 The murder occurred in mid-March 1899. AJC, 1900, no. 2434. 
134 AJC, 1900, no. 2434. 
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have been murdered and plundered by comunarios from Chuquichambi as well.135 
Another Vargas of Corque, or maybe his son, was later accused of having instigated the 
uprising among the comunarios, which he refuted for having been sacked him during 
the rebellion and since then lives in enmity with the province’s indigenous 
population.136  
However, the Federal War and the ensuing Great Rebellion was far from a clear-cut 
non-indigenous vs. indigenous affair but was interrupted by aggressions among the 
indigenous population. Condarco gives the example of the extermination of a 
comunario family by fellow comunarios.137 The above mentioned clash between a group 
of “Alonsos” and “Pandos” in Huachacalla with interference by rebels from Turco even 
more clearly indicates that indigenous insurgence was not free of contradictions and at 
times collapsed into inter-indigenous violence. In the context of that conflict, Toribio 
Flores, merchant from Huachacalla and leader of the insurgents in Turco, publically 
assassinated Pedro Flores, a “disobedient” comunario from Huachacalla, in April 1899.138  
Once the “alonsistas” had been brought to surrender and the order of the day 
restored, a settlement followed between the communities to compensate the damage 
caused by the Turco revolutionaries. In the first years of the following century, both 
communities reached an agreement over Turco’s compensation to Huachacalla, the 
former represented by Juan de Dios Cruz Quispe, Jorge G. de Alvaro and Andres 
Portillo139 and the latter by caciques Manuel Mamani and Manuel Zubieta.140 Turco was 
liable to a transaction of 2000 bolivianos (the value of 500 hundredweights of uprooted 
sweet potatoes) within a term of one and a half year and mortgaged with their lands, 
 
                                                     
135 AJC, Penales, 1900, juicios penales, no. 3, fs. 1-2. 
136 AJC, Penales, 1906, juicios penales, no. 33. 
137 In Zorilla’s mentioned letter to colonel Pando, the assassination of the Warachi family of Ancocala in the 
canton of Llanquera in late March is reported (Condarco 2011 [1964], 408). However, in a file of the provincial 
court which apparently concerns the same case (referring to Guarachi, a common indigenous name, also 
written as Huarachi), confusion rises over Warachi’s death, with the plaintiff stating he was burned alive and 
his children killed in 1905, while the accused state he was shot in 1893, “long time before the last revolution.” AJC, 
Penales, 1912, no. 23. 
138 In the years preceding and following the revolution, Toribio and his brothers would also have assaulted 
and threatened several inhabitants and merchants in Turco and surroundings, although this was denied by 
the accused. AJC, Penales, 1904, no. 11. See also “Protocolización de obrados a favor de los comunarios de 
Huachacalla” on 15 July 1904. AJC, Civiles, 1904, no. 1.  
139 Mentioned in ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1906, no. 4 and 1910, no. 2. 
140 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1903, no. 7, fs. 7v-8. 
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goods and livestock and a 4% monthly increase in case of overdue payment.141 
Meanwhile, the conflict had further developed and had come to centre upon the small 
turqueño enclave within Huachacalla territory.142 It concerned the lands inhabited by 
the Chillagua, a seriously reduced ‘remnant’ of Turco’s Uru population, commonly 
referred to by their mocking name of “Capillos” (Pauwels 1999, 76).  
According to the agreement between the litigating caciques, eventually confirmed in 
1904, Turco paid 1080 bolivianos (the value of a herd of 108 llamas) and ceded the 
legitimate ownership over the anexo of Santa Barbara de Capillas, to Huachacalla.143 As 
this transaction announced the eventual disappearance of this vulnerable Uru group 
(Pauwels 1999), it demonstrates that the merger of land disputes, local elite factions and 
national political disorder converted inter-community fights such as the Huachacalla-
Turco clash into substantial changeovers with a critical and long-term impact on land 
rights security and ethnic configurations.  
 
 
                                                     
141 The compensation was not completed before 1903. The document that registers the transaction in 1903 
include 2000 bolivianos for the damaged potato fields and the restitution of silverwork that belonged to 
Huachacalla. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1903, no. 7, fs. 7v-8 and 1906, no. 4. 
142 The Capillo had earlier pertained to the jurisdiction of Choquecota. Pauwels 1999, 72. AJC, Penales, 1903, no. 
3, f. 13. 
143 The concession was set on the 1st of January but would eventually take place on 6 June 1904. This implied 
that from now on, the Huachacalla comunarios had to pay the half-yearly contribution to the caciques of 
Turco in order to maintain those lands. Huachacalla incorporated the territory of the Chillagua as the anexo of 
Rosapata, yet its inhabitants, the Capillo, moved to Yarvichambi, on the border between both litigating 
communities. The ayllus Tuaña y Capi divided the obtained lands among each other in 1908 and a formal 
property adjudication followed in September 1910. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1910, no. 2; 1911, no. 
1 and no. 3. Pauwels 1999, 77. See also Pauwels 1983, 245.  
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Chapter 7  
From delinking to unlocking, 1899-1953. 
Para que nos nombrarán 
nos negamos el nombre 
para que nos mirarán 
nos tapamos el rostro 
apostamos el presente 
para tener futuro 
y para vivir… morimos 
(Subcomandante Marcos) 
Mural in the village Turco.  
Own picture, 2008.1  
 
                                                     
1 “In order to be mentioned / we refuse our name / in order to be seen / we cover our faces / we gamble the present / in 
order to have future / and to live… we die.” Own translation. Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, leader of the 
Zapatista National Liberation Army. Wall painting by the Casa de la niñez y juventud libres y creativos sin fronteras. 
Escuela de Futbol TURCO (House of the free and creative children and youngsters without borders. Football 
school TURCO). 
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Intro. Ayllus, vecinos and the state, and the intensified quest 
for land in early 20th century Bolivia. 
The indigenous participation in the conflict that had brought the Liberals to power 
deeply influenced the (negative) perception by other sectors of society of the 
indigenous population, but also of the mestizos that locally governed them. Particularly 
after the local excesses of interethnic violence, the portrayal of indigenous poor passive 
victims converted into that of savage murderers, while mestizos lost their legitimacy as 
rural heralds of modernity. This change of discourse served the Liberals to revise their 
initial promises, arguing that a federalization of the country was unviable due to 
indigenous “savageness” and local mestizo exploitation of “ignorant Indians”. The 
“Liberal betrayal” was most obvious regarding the question of land. In contrast to their 
commitment to protect the “free” communities, the expropriation policy against 
corporative entities as initiated under previous conservative administrations was 
protracted and even accelerated.2 Once the Liberals had eliminated Zárate Willka and 
disarmed the indigenous insurgents, they revoked the ban on land sales (Klein 1993, 
117), thereby putting residual community lands (tierras sobrantes) to service of local 
land-accumulating elites (Langer and Jackson 1990,25).  
By the 1920s, the richest lands on the altiplano were in hacienda hands, while the 
surviving free comunarios had been pushed into marginal lands (Klein 1993, 135). Up to 
1952 and 1953, when the National Revolution and subsequent Agrarian Reform 
universalized suffrage and expanded rural schooling, the tenacity of Bolivia’s 
indigenous/land question continued to constrain indigenous access to citizenship to a 
fixed set of requisites imposed since 1839, the trinity of tributo, property and literacy.3 
While indigenous mobilization increasingly pushed for substantial changes on these 
three points, the indigenous taxation, now based on the contribución territorial, remained 
in place, collectively held lands were attacked and access to schooling hardly got ahead. 
It must however be noted that several communities managed to keep their lands free 
from reform interventions until after 1953, accounting for a diversified dynamic in the 
progression and counteraction of the protracted land reform process. In relatively 
 
                                                     
2 The new Liberal government also changed its position towards the Church, proclaiming a true secular state. 
This went accompanied by a new attack on ecclesiastic properties, which particularly targeted the Franciscan 
missions in the eastern lowlands, although much less pronounced than in other Latin-American states at that 
time (Langer and Jackson 1990, 17-9). At the village level, this laicization was reflected in struggles, 
particularly between the vecinos and the priests. See for instance AJC, Penales, 1913, no. 12 and 15.  
3 The government of Santa Cruz (1829-1839) suspended Bolívar’s decrees, thereby prohibiting restoring the 
role of the indigenous tributo. Irurozqui 1999, 738-40. 
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“free” regions, insurrectionary arguments and objectives were differently formulated, 
defending the tributo against reformist attempts to introduce a new fiscal regime. Where 
communities were strongest, departmental treasuries remaining to large degree 
dependent upon the old tributo collection (footnote 81 in Irurozqui 1999, 735-6). 
The context of this aggressive stance towards collective control over land was 
Bolivia’s ever more intimate and hence vulnerable subjection to the imperatives of the 
world market, stirring the rush on resources. Not only land, but all the exploitable 
resources it comprised, including salt, livestock, and minerals, were identified as 
resource frontiers to be made accessible. In the first section of this chapter, it will be 
assessed how attempts to mobilize such frontiers in the Carangas territory were little 
successful. However, as particularly the “immovability” of the exvinculación process in 
the province demonstrates, this perceived immobility in fact implied a lot of movement 
and counteraction. However, the ways in which these frontiers were kept immobile is 
only scarcely and indirectly visible in the traces left of the comunarios’ interaction with 
the juridical system.  
The fact that the Revisita operation and cadastre elaboration remained unfinished 
hints at the revival of collective mobilization, despite the decapitation of the pre-1899 
indigenous movement. In the first decades of the 20th century, the movement of 
caciques-apoderados launched a new cycle of rebellion that anticipated the end of the old 
order. One of their principal objectives was the recovery of usurped community lands in 
correspondence to their colonial composición titles. However, the imminent threat of the 
reformist process and the general increase of insecurity gave rise to internal land 
conflicts and litigation, which at their turn counteracted the government’s Revisita 
plans. Thus, the communal rush on the archives dissected in the second section of this 
chapter was both a matter of securing “individualistic” interests in view of a growing 
inter-comunario rivalry as of collective action to secure communal interests against 
non-communal competitors, symptomizing a heightened alertness towards both inter-
family, inter-community and indigenous-vecino inequality. The starker aggressions 
against comunarios’ land base triggered a threefold resistance strategy, brought into 
practice through the caciques apoderados movement and erupting into the indigenous 
rebellions of the 1920s which, similar to the 1899 effect led to a reorientation in state-
community relations. 
The third section looks into the trajectories of vecino “conversion” in search for clues 
to why and how vecinos had a shared interest in indigenous efforts to halt the Revisita. 
This shared interest and the consequent ambiguous position of the vecinos in Carangas 
strengthened the state in its conviction that the vecinos were the “sting” to be taken 
out. Thus, their power had to be circumvented, which implied an increasing state 
penetration on the countryside, seeking to “reconcile” its relation with the indigenous 
population.  
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The 1899 events had provoked a growing discrepancy between the national and 
provincial elites that, nurtured by the emerging indigenista movement, would gradually 
shift towards an integration discourse. With the adoption of a more inclusive stance, 
accusations for indigenous belligerency came to rest with the exaggerated exploitation 
by provincial elites (Mendieta 2010, 315). This reorientation in state-community 
relations aimed at the neutralization of the Indian question, which would eventually, 
with the National Revolution of 1952, lead to the “peasantization” of the rural 
indigenous population. Simultaneously, indigenous demands gradually oriented 
towards education as a precondition for a (legal) fight with equal arms as well as a tool 
in the renewal and expansion of a nation-wide network of indigenous leadership 
(Mendieta 2010, 287-9). The last section of this chapter will assess this gradual shift until 
around 1930, at the eve of the Chaco war that would give a decisive push to Bolivia’s 
(rural) mobilizing potential to bring the country’s oligarchic land structure down.  
7.1 Resource frontiers in Carangas. 
At the entrance of the 20th century, entrepreneurial appetite for land was far from being 
satisfied. In the context of vigorous extractive industries, a booming export and the 
related development of vital railway connections, there was a growing demand for 
resources, including communal lands, and hence rising land prices. Archival evidence 
demonstrates that the pursuit for, speculations over and hence the contentiousness of 
the access to resources intensified in Carangas as well. As the Prefect of Oruro expressed 
before his superiors in 1916: 
“The agricultural, livestock and mining wealth of these Provinces [Carangas, 
Abaroa and Lípez] must call (...) our attention, to ensure that this wealth results in 
the national interest, instigating private profit”4  
Five years later, sub-Prefect Lima -not averse of some exaggeration- described the 
province as a “virgin terrain” for the country’s aspired industrialization.  
“this province continues in a rosy and preponderant situation; the fabulous 
treasuries guarded by the interior of its mountains and its altiplano, they only 
wait to be moved and uncovered by the vigorous effort of man. Carangas is 
 
                                                     
4 Own translation. Lemaitre 1916, 59. 
  331 
without doubt an ample terrain most prepared for industry, whose importance 
until today has not received due appreciation.”5 
If only national or foreign capitals would find an entrance to this weakly integrated 
area, core processes of capitalist production could do their job and industrialization 
would probably follow (Lima 1921, 54). As “motors of progress” to foment this 
industrialization, the sub-prefect pointed to wool livestock breeding and its derivatives, 
but also hunting, mainly of the chinchilla and vicuña was seen as an integral part of “the 
industrial phases of Carangas” (ibid, 51). Also salt and charcoal had some potential to 
convert Carangas into a strategic operating base for provincial merchants and 
industrialists. Although most of the land itself, controlled by the communities, was kept 
outside the land market, the restriction of the “free” exploitation of resource frontiers 
offering exportable products implied augmented pressures on community land. In 1927, 
increasing property attacks, usually by hacendados, corregidores and alcaldes, were 
reported in the entire department, but while in all provinces the balance between 
community and hacienda land control was toppled by these aggressions to the 
advantage of the latter, not a single private estate was counted in Carangas community 
(Calderón 1927, 15-6).6   
7.1.1 Immobile frontiers? 
The quest for the expansion of commodity frontiers had an impact on the margins for 
local livelihood construction as it increased the susceptibility of communal property 
rights to a renewed attack by private landowners and governmental intervention. 
Gradually, the access to strategic resources was contained by changing land 
(privatization) legislation, processes of proletarization and the proliferation of truck 
transport.7 Meanwhile, coercion, loans and other financial pressing tactics, false 
attorneys and declarations of non-revisitado lands as “wasteland” pushed the level of 
usurpation and agitation in the highland communities to an unprecedented degree 
(Rivera 1991, 604). However, while such anti-communal aggressions succeeded in 
 
                                                     
5 Own translation. Lima 1921, 63. 
6 The Cercado province counted with 5 ayllus and 102 estates, the Poopó province with 22 ayllus and 75 
estates, the Avaroa province with 58 ayllus and 72 estates, and the Carangas province with 90 ayllus and no 
estates. 
7 Although there are few clear indications, labour migration and proletarization became more important 
factors in the control of rural households over their land. An example is a comunario employed as colono on a 
hacienda outside the province transferred his sayaña in San Miguel to his brother-in-law. AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 
25. 
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creating a very active land market in the La Paz department, where two thirds of 
hacienda land changed owner in a term of only ten years (Klein 1993, 143), 
commodifying pressures did not develop that straightforward in Carangas.  
While the government was advised by provincial commissioners about appropriate, 
pro-privatization measures to optimize and regulate the exploitation of these reserves, 
the state sought to increase its control over and benefit from these developing sectors 
by subjecting the detected resource frontiers to a tax regime. As the indicated sectors all 
related to cross-border trade, this did not only imply the elaboration of a fiscal 
apparatus but also the imposition of an effective border control. In the following, the 
resource frontiers detected in Carangas and their development are briefly assessed. 
Salt 
Regarding salt, Bacarreza wrote in 1910 that the  
“indigenous communities (sic) in charge of the exploitation of these salt flats, 
during the months of April and May, transport large bulks of this article of 
primary necessity, to the valleys of Cochabamba (…) its commercial exchange is 
appreciated in a considerable sum.”8  
Until that year, any community could extract salt in return for a tax paid to the 
community that occupied (the shores of) the exploited salt lake with its benefits 
destined to the coffers of the community.9 As it was later explained by the comunarios,  
“since colonial times the exploitation of this substance has been open to 
autochthonous indigenous exploitation, as a free industry, handed over to 
common or own use, according to the customs and traditions, while the State has 
appropriated itself [since 1871-1872] of formations of the mentioned substance 
only when appearing in veins and located in wasteland or unexploited terrains of 
the public or private domain.”10  
In 1917, a new law proclaimed that  
 
                                                     
8 Own translation. Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 356. 
9 This was the community at the marka level (parallel to the canton). One of these communities was Sabaya. 
Rivière refers for instance to a document of 1817 ordering all villages to pay one real, which was later 
increased to two, for ten carguilla of salt (one carguilla weighs 46 kilos) in order to reconstruct the church of 
Sabaya (Rivière 1982, 307).  
10 Own translation. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1916, no. 8, fs. 12-12v. 
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“the salt flats in current exploitation cannot be adjudicated and will continue to 
be exploited according to the customs and traditions of each locality, while the 
law continues to recognize the established rights.”11  
Nevertheless, the salt lakes in Carangas were subdivided and ceded (in the condition 
of aynoqa) to the estancias located along the salt lake (in Villa Vitalina, Cumujo and 
Coipasa) and hence the access to salt became monopolized. This would only increase the 
existing polemic over salt resources.12 In 1915, a salt concession was made to three 
urban residents of Oruro. Facundo Rojas, apoderado of ayllu Cumujo, protested that the 
land legislation of 1871-‘72 had stated that salt was only marketable in its solid form, 
hence the state could not adjudicate its deposits (its original substance is liquid) as 
private mineral concessions.13 He linked his argument specifically to the new land 
legislation, claiming that this adjudication contradicted the protection that legislation 
pretended to give:  
“the different community land laws have come to protect the indigenous class in 
the exercise of the right to property of its lands, being it evident and known that 
the indigenous tributaries of the Departments of La Paz, Oruro and Potosí live of 
the exploitation of the salt flats located within the limits of their properties, that 
the adjudication of this substance in those conditions deprives the indicated 
indigenous race of the necessary means to its subsistence, dispossessing it from a 
right acquired since time immemorial.”14 
Motivated by demographic pressures, the case was closed by allocating exclusive 
exploitation rights over a specific sector of the lake to each estancia. Whereas 
surrounding communities previously came to extract the salt needed for their barter 
exchanges, they now had to purchase it. For the estancias attributed with salt 
concessions, the exploitation of salt became more and more absorbed by competition 
and struggle, particularly against estancia Coipasa which received the most central part 
of the salt lake where salt was sufficiently dense to extract and commercialize in blocks, 
 
                                                     
11 Own translation. “Ley de 22 de noviembre de 1917.” Art. 1. 
12 Disputes between Sabaya, particularly Cumujo, with neighbouring departments and with Peru over the 
Coipasa flat and similar inter-ayllu litigation in Andamarca (Turuna, Guanapa, Collana and Parcomarca) over 
salt extraction in Rosapata (the Tayo-cota salt lake) had been nurturing the controversy over the tenure status 
of salt flats. AJC 1862, no.892; 1868, no. 1040b and 1869, no. 1057. 
13 He refers more specifically to the laws of 25 June 1871 and 8 December 1872. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, 
Carangas, 1916, no. 8 and no. 9, fs. 10-14, and 1958, f. 267 r., no. 4. See also Rivière 1982, 308-9.  
14 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1916, no. 8, fs. 12-12v.  
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which was the best quality. 15 The concentration of salt property rights increased the 
production and accumulation prospects for the beneficiary comunarios, but implied an 
intensification of peon exploitation as salt producers generally relied on other, often 
very poor communities such as Chipaya to fulfil the hard work. Meanwhile, ayllus 
further away from the lake were deprived from community incomes previously derived 
from the tax.16 Moreover, the official negation of the collective status of salt exploitation 
put a strain on the barter capacity of pastoralists as they became increasingly 
dependent upon monetary circuits to access a key barter product. Hence, the execution 
of caravan barter trade became conditioned by access to commercial transactions and 
seasonal labour (Molino 2006, 109). 
Wool livestock 
The trade in wool livestock had a strong and international dynamic, fuelled by the 
demands from the Tarapacá saltpetre districts (Lima 1921, 49). Although (post-1880) 
Chilean archival material suggests that the urban and industrial markets on the Pacific 
were in first place provided by south-Peru and more southern departments of Bolivia 
and by Argentina,17 Carangas was an important livestock centre too. In view of this 
potential, concrete proposals were launched to foment and modernize agriculture in the 
province. The most concrete programme was elaborated by Zenón Bacarreza who, 
inspired by the Argentinian ranches,  suggested the establishment of model farms for 
camelid production; a project that nonetheless failed because the indigenous 
communities perceived it as another fiscal trap (Pauwels 2006, 341). Some ten years 
later, Eduardo Lima criticized (even accused) the government’s lack of attention 
towards the economic potential of Carangas’s livestock wealth and even warned that its 
export, legally but most of all illegally, paved the way for its complete disappearance in 
the province (Lima 1921, 49). Just as Bacarreza had done, he recommended initiatives to 
prevent epidemics, improve production methods and yields and the organization of 
expositions and competitions (ibid, 41-9).  
Linked to these agronomic proposals, Lima commented on a “nascent development” 
of another link further up the global commodity chain of the wool industry. His 
enthusiasm was roused by the observation of the indigenous population’s proficiency in 
 
                                                     
15 Later in the 20th century, Coipasa established a cooperative that monopolized the salt extraction and whose 
members saw the strong demand on the national market for salt translated into continuous individual 
accumulation. An indication is that Coipasa was the first or one of the first villages of Carangas to dispose of a 
permanently working electricity generator and drinking water system and a high number of trucks, 1 for 
every 22 inhabitants (Rivière 1982, 309). 
16 This paragraph is based on Rivière 1982, 309. 
17 See chapter 4.2 and Castro 2004, chapter 4, s.p. 
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the production of ponchos, cloths, blankets and shawls, which were woven by hand and 
with primitive looms from llama, alpaca, sheep or vicuña wool and decorated with 
abstract and figurative designs. He detected in the manufacturing of textile fabrics the 
first steps towards Bolivia’s industrialization (ibid, 50).  However, different from the 
commercialization of wool and livestock, no marketing chain can be reconstructed and 
no data were found on the outsourcing of weaving by non-rural agents to support an 
“industrious revolution”-hypothesis.18 Neither was there a development in the 
technology and scale of production.19  
Mining  
The country’s highest estimated motor for industrialization and economic growth was 
and still is attributed to the mining sector. As Oruro figured as a vital artery in Bolivia’s 
ascendance on the world tin market, the department witnessed the development of a 
relentless market for mining concessions. However, this activity was chiefly 
concentrated  in the eastern part of the department. Nevertheless, Carangas was 
provided with abundant mineral resources,20 converting the province the home of 
numerous mining concessions.21 Yet, while mining exploitation in the provinces of 
 
                                                     
18 As has been discussed in chapter 4. See also De Vries’ ideas on the “industrious revolution” (1994). 
19 Currently we may observe something as an industrious revolution, with an increasing role of cooperatives, 
particularly of llama meat producers. It would take until the 1980s, under stimulus of European cooperation 
organizations, that a transition in the regional livestock sector really took off (Canqui Mollo 2012; and 
interview with Canqui Mollo). In more recent years, this development has been further reinforced by projects 
such as the “Plan maestro de ganaderia” (Rodas 2013) which pretend to recuperate ancient practices or 
remodel them in function of “sustainable development.” Today, several communities, such as the principal 
llama producing sectors of Turco and Curahuara, are equipped with a communal slaughter house, transferring 
the site of production from the household oriented towards family consumption to the cooperative oriented 
to the commercialization of meat, which can nowadays be bought in all supermarkets of the country. 
However, this accommodation of local production activities to the market and “development” tends to erode 
longstanding practices and human-animal-nature relationships (Rodas 2013). Regarding the textile industry, 
the local population still employs primitive looms to produce all kinds of fabrics which they sell in urban or 
border markets, mainly destined to the tourist sector. To optimize the regional expertise in textile production, 
several cooperatives have been established such as in Titiri. 
20 Principal metals and minerals include silver, tin, copper, borax and sulphur. Other locally exploited natural 
resources are salt, cinnaber, borium, antimony, platinum, pumice, plaster, china clay, peat fields, thermal 
springs, tola and yareta (Lima 1921, 63-4). 
21 Lima counted 57 registered silver and copper mine concessions in the province (Lima 1921, 56). Many of 
these concessions corresponded rather to speculation operations, as can be concluded from the swift sale and 
purchase operations of the same set of mining territories in the ADRO books (Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 
1903-1930). Also annual prefectural reports of the time give hardly any attention to the mineral exploitations 
in the province. The fact that my quest for company documents, which would give evidence of effective 
exploitation, resulted in just a couple of reports on the Turuquiri and Choquelimpie mines, passed to me by 
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Cercado, Poopó and Avaroa was booming, the incessant sale and purchase of mining 
properties in Carangas among local and foreign capitalists still left several rich reserves 
untouched and few of the registered concessions were brought in operation. Bacarreza 
stated that none of the province’s rich veins were effectively exploited (Bacarreza 1910 
in Pauwels 2006, 391) and ten years later, Lima added that apart from the exploitation in 
Yarvicoya, Turco, by the French industrialist Mauricio Mollard, all mines had been 
abandoned, which moreover risked to give free room to untrustworthy neighbouring 
nations (Lima 1921, 57 and 65). This may also explain why so little traces are found of 
the impact of the ongoing mining rush on local communities. All concessions registered 
in the Property Rights books explicitly locate the petitioned property on community 
land, which was conform the legal separation between the soil (in communal hands) and 
the subsoil (in private hands) and seemed seldom to provoke conflicts. As few of these 
mines were effectively exploited, there was apparently limited motive for conflict. 
While Bacarreza attributed this inertia to lacking technology, Lima referred to the 
unavailability of permanent and trustworthy wage labourers and entrepreneurial 
disinterest (Lima 1921, 57). The key factor, however, was infrastructure. The lack of 
passable highways between the city of Oruro and the mines of Turco and other cantons 
threw a spanner into the works of several entrepreneurs. A concrete example were the 
plans of the company of Hoschild, one of the three principal tin barons in early 20th 
century Bolivia, with Rodas and other industrialists to start up mining operations in 
Carangas and had thereto several petitions pending for the exploitation of lead and 
silver.22 To overcome the infrastructure problem, Hoschild sought in 1929 governmental 
support for his project to construct an “international road for automóviles that serves for the 
exportation of metals towards the Pacific in more advantageous and convenient conditions than 
those offered by the route of Antofagasta” (González 1929, 74). This would also foment the 
active commerce between the province and the Chilean population at the border and 
the prestación vial, which was still paid in labour, made the plan viable (ibid, 63). 
Nevertheless, Hoschild’s initiative did not get off the ground.  
Skins 
Apart from domesticated livestock, Carangas’ wildlife was also a source for a lucrative 
international trade. In the markets on the Pacific, hunted chinchilla and vicuña pelts 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Gilberto Pauwels, who almost accidentally found them in an archive in Tarija, evidences the limited weight of 
the mining sector in Carangas, at least in comparison to the vigorously exploitation in the east of the 
department. 
22  ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1920, no. 28. 
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were sold at elevated prices,23 providing dealers with fortunes of even 100.000 bolivianos 
(Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 359). This skin trade as well as the commercialization 
of ostriches, flamencos, foxes and tujos (a highland hare) was monopolized by a small 
group of hunters living close to or across the international border, where the 
population of these animals was most dense.24 Despite the legal prohibition, the 
communities’ opposition and warnings for their imminent extinction, the “reckless” 
hunting of particularly chinchillas and vicuñas continued (ibid). Ten years after 
provincial inspector Bacarreza had advised the government to declare the sites where 
chinchillas persisted State property (ibid), Lima remarked that: 
“it would be more opportune that the government would cede the exploitation of 
this fruitful industry in the capacity of leaser to any private company, so that the 
latter, protecting its own interests takes care that these animals not to become 
extinct” by employing guards (Lima 1921, 52). 
Once more, the provincial commissioners’ recommendations were not followed by 
any concrete action by the government. 
Charcoal 
From the late 19th century up to the middle of the next century, queñua wood and 
charcoal became a lucrative product on the Bolivian national market. Charcoal had been 
produced for a long time, particularly in the western part of the province, but demands 
from urban and tin mining centres25 increased its commercialization, converting 
charcoal from a subsistence asset into a source of (fast) accumulation.26 It also seems to 
have constituted a revenue source for the departmental treasury.27  
A successful charcoal company was based at the tambo of Titiri, where Juan de la 
Cruz López, vecino of the nearby village of Turco, and Pedro Dupleich, a French 
 
                                                     
23 Prices for blue chinchilla skins reached up to 300 bolivianos for a dozen and for white chinchilla up to 100 
bolivianos per dozen in the market of Tacna (Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 359). 
24 AITRI, vol.19, Subdelegados 1906, Oficio del Inspector de Mocha al Subdelegado de Tarapacá, Mocha enero 1906, 
sin fol., cited in Castro 2004. Morales 1913, 12; Lima 1921, 53. 
25 In contrast to the marketing of most other goods, not the Pacific but the mines of the Bolivian interior, 
mainly in the Oruro and Norte de Potosí area, were the main sites of charcoal trading. Bacarreza also referred 
to charcoal purchase to the mines of Corocoro, Chacarilla (south of Pica, Chile) and the city of Oruro 
(Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 357).  
26 West describes a similar process with t’ola (sage brush) which was particularly fuelled by firewood demands 
in the tin mines from the 1930s to the 1960s-‘70s. The commercialization by Pampa Aullagas pastoralists 
fuelled local entrepreneurship, truck introduction and merchant/elite formation (West 1981, 144). 
27 In 1880, the Sub-Prefect of Carangas deposited 294,40 bolivianos to the national treasury for the renting of 
the forests of Larancagua in Turco. APO, Libros de contabilidad, 1880, “Libro de diario”, f. 404, 1.02.1881. 
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entrepreneur, exploited charcoal to distribute to the mines.28 Both comunarios and 
provincial merchants thrived on the commodity;29 yet while “the entire indigenous 
population of the western part of Carangas favoured its economy [with charcoal],” it was 
“exploited (sic) under direction of some national industrialists” (Lima 1921, 53).30 Charcoal 
continued to constitute a principal local industry until the middle of the century; in 
1953 the tailing of queñua trees would have been prohibited (Rivière 1982, 302-3). 
Community land 
As the Prefect of Oruro complained, little agricultural progress was made in his 
department because it comprised the majority of the country’s least interesting 
agrarian lands and due to the regional strength  of the livestock sector (Sanjínes 1906, 
31-2). Moreover, the majority of these lands were in hands of the community, which 
kept the inalienability of terrenos de origen in place as one of the main obstacles to 
commodifying pressures, particularly in the Carangas province. The non-marketability 
of land was most explicitly expressed in cases where community lands were exposed to 
“sale transactions,” as in 1908 in the context of inter-ayllu litigation in Totora.31 When 
the judge sentenced the sale of a piece of land to resolve the dispute, comunarios 
heavily protested that tierras de repartimiento were unsaleable state property, claiming 
that a number of forty contribuyentes had access to the sayaña in question. Jilaqatas 
and caciques started to authenticate their colonial composición titles and inventoried 
their money and labour contributions to the Church and the state  to prevent the loss of 
community land. The judge eventually followed their argumentation and invalidated 
the transfer, concluding that: 
 
                                                     
28 In the 1870s, they rented the hill of Laramcagua from the caciques and jilaqata of Turco for the sum of 300 
pesos where they grubbed up and fired queñua trees. In the 1880s, Dupleich expanded his charcoal business to 
Changamoco (canton Cosapa), where he bought a trade enterprise provided with 70 tons of charcoal to be 
traded to the Atocha mine in the Potosí department. In 1889, he petitioned and was adjudicated full property 
rights over the establishment. His son acquired all the rights on the establishment from his siblings and sold 
the company in the 1920s to another merchant, José D. Arando, for 2700 bolivianos. AJC, 1878, no. 5 and 1890, 
no. 2160. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1923, no. 9, 10, 11 and 16; 1925, no. 3 and 4. See also Pauwels 
1983, 226. 
29 Comunarios themselves were also active in the charcoal trade for their own account, transporting and 
depositing amounts of over 3 tons of charcoal. AJC, Civiles, 1914, no. 15.  
30 Examples of indigenous transporters contracted by mestizo (salt) traders: AJC, Civiles, 1904, no. 5 and 1915, 
civiles, no. 14.  
31 As a means of settling a debt of 1515 bolivianos, a comunario of ayllu Lerco voluntarily ceded a sayaña to 
ayllu Aparu. This land transaction was motive to a murder. AJC, Penales, 1908, no. 3 and no. 26. 
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“it has been determined by supreme resolutions that the communities of Carangas 
are non-examinable [irrevisitables] and non-transferable because of the purchase 
or composición by the comunarios with the Spanish Crown.”32  
Despite this clear nullification of this sale, some lands were effectively sold through 
“division and partition” procedures of community lands.33 Yet in most cases, the 
adjudication of these sayañas to new proprietors, who consequently took over of the 
contribución obligation, seem to correspond to a transfer or consolidation operation 
without necessarily implying an effective monetary purchase.34 This suggests rather an 
‘underground’ or ‘virtual’ market for community lands. While data is too fractional to 
firmly avow a true privatization process, it makes clear that community land was more 
and more perceived as an asset one disposed individually of and could hence be 
transferred as a form of credit.35 How limited the number of such “sales”, several cases 
point to a subtle but impactful process of land usurpation which I label as 
“contribuyentización” (see also 7.3). In one case, the transfer even clearly went ‘in the 
other direction’, as a group of merchants ceded their private lands in the village of 
Sabaya to the community.36 Other community lands subjected to sale included the 
distant properties which some communities had managed retain into the 20th century.37 
Cut off from these “residual” lands, the residual lands within the altiplano communities 
became an increasing focus of attention that required Revisita intervention. 
 
                                                     
32 Own translation. AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 26.  
33 An example is the transfer of the terrains in Lerco-occo, seem to have effectively been privatized. ADRO, 
Propiedades Provincias, Carangas,  1910, no.1. 
34 Despite the adoption of a ‘market language’, most cases probably corresponded to normal sayaña transfers. 
Whether money involved or not, a transfer usually included the valuation of the sayaña, with recorded prices 
ranging from 100 to 2000 bolivianos, and could include several fields, an estancia, and a house. In one such 
transfer, a terrain of 5000 m² was valued at only 100 bolivianos and ceded “for free”, according to the 
transferor to prevent discussion. In another case the valuation and purchase was part of the adjudication 
procedure petitioned by the sayañero of the concerned plot. In the case of Eulogio Valdéz, a merchant from 
Huachacalla, this “sale” was the result of a lawsuit he won. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1908, no. 1; 
1909, no. 5; 1926, no. 20; 1929, no. 53, no. 57 and no. 58; 1930, no. 6.  
35 There is the example of two comunarios wanting to execute a sayaña transfer as a way of paying a debt of 
151 bolivianos, but the terrain is claimed by a member of the local vecindario. AJC, Civiles, 1903,  no. 1. 
36 The property rights over these lands were adjudicated to three comunarios of ayllu Capsaya. ADRO, 
Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1913, no. 1.  
37 In 1906, the comunarios of Totora appointed Belisario Ampuero as their representative to defend interest in 
the sale of the estate of Pisaqueri, situated in canton Paria of the Cercado province. AJC, Civiles, 1906, no. 2, f. 8-
9v. 
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7.1.2 An illegible society: the ever imminent Revisita.  
In order to upkeep the economic boost, anything that could hinder the search for land 
and resources was to be eliminated. As repeatedly stressed by provincial and 
departmental authorities, a Revisita operation would reveal the immense amount of 
fallow lands that could be allocated for agrarian, mining or industrial purposes. In 1909, 
the Prefect of Oruro explained that as lands remained excluded from all land property 
transactions, the indigenous population of his department could impossibly transcend 
“the condition of helots” (Ascarrunz 1909, 89).38 He stated that the execution of a Revisita 
in all (now) four provinces of the department was “the only way for the State to claim 
terrains that are wielded by diverse communities without any title and without aspiration for 
progress.”39 Particularly regarding the Carangas province, the Revisita was detected as an 
urgent matter in order to  
“produce a big step in the national progress, increase fiscal rents, avoid the 
bloodbath provoked by each community conflict, make known to each what is his 
or belongs to him, and allow the State to claim terrains in hands of the indigenous 
population without any legal ground and terrains that might be available, either 
to be allocated to diverse concessionaries or to serve the creation of agricultural 
or livestock farms.”40  
Another reason for implementing the Revisita and the cadastral system was the 
hindering effect of relentless inter-community conflict over land boundaries (see 7.2.1). 
Lima observed in 1921 that most disputes brought to court by apoderados originate in 
an overstepping of territorial borders and therefore considered a demarcation more 
than urgent (Lima 1921, 115-6). He launches a proposal in which such operation would 
be executed by the sub-prefect and an assisting engineer in charge of elaborating 
topographical maps while the communities would be responsible of constructing the 
boundary marks. Moreover, he argued, this topographical intervention would at once 
settle inter-communitarian land disputes and prevent abusive vecino-apoderados from 
intervening in those conflicts.41 In 1929 it was repeated by the Prefect of Oruro that 
inter-community clashes and their often bloody termination, particularly in Carangas, 
could only be prevented by including all properties in the cadastre (González 1929, 15). 
 
                                                     
38 Helot was a status for serfs in ancient Sparta and refers here to a class of outcasts. 
39 Own translation. Ascarrunz 1909, 64. 
40 Own translation. Ascarrunz 1909, 89-90. 
41 The remedy of professional maps anticipates the demands that emerged in the wake of the 1953 reform, but 
never properly executed (Cottyn 2012a). 
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While the demanded structural interventions remained forthcoming in all of 
Carangas’ communities, small-scale censuses were organized at the community level in 
order to replace the previous matrículas. These so-called empadronamientos would be the 
first registers made up in line with the 1874 legislation, executed in the first years of the 
20th century.42 Unfortunately, we are left with only sporadic data on this survey 
operation apart from oral accounts of a census completed in 1902 in Sabaya,43 and the 
reference to “the New Census that took place in the month of April of 1903” by a comunario of 
ayllu Guanapa, Andamarca, in 1910.44 The operation seems to have produced new 
contribuyentes, as was the case with the comunario in Andamarca who received a 
vacant piece of land,45 but the comunarios of Sabaya dealt with this effective 
intervention ‘in their own way’. According to the interviewees, one day the elderly were 
ordered to declare the names of their sayaña in order to replace the head tax which 
they continued to pay by a territorial tax (Rivière 1982, 257-8).46 However, once stated 
specific sayaña names upon which the surveyors left satisfied, the comunarios just kept 
cultivating where and how they pleased regardless of the land they had indicated, while 
paying the new tax. Although more complex transitions are probably omitted from this 
account, Rivière seizes this case to underscore the discrepancy in the government’s idea 
of an individual right of property and the comunarios’ vision on a shared right of access 
(ibid).  
The unviability of the Revisita was driving the successive sub-prefects of Carangas to 
despair, in contrast to the highest levels of the state administration who seemed to take 
a rather indifferent stance towards the province, which were an additional source of 
frustration for the sub-prefects.47 Given their annoyance with the success of indigenous 
 
                                                     
42 References to the “New Empadronamiento” by comunarios in Corque and Turco, both presenting an 
“Empadronamiento certificate” obtained through that operation (although it is not clear when) to confirm their 
sayaña property rights, suggest a link with the law of 1882, which established the Revisita exception for 
communities with a composición title, as well as to the financial law of 1901, although without specifications. 
AJC, Civiles,  1912, no. 2 and 1914, no. 32. 
43 Locals informed Gilles Rivière during his field work about this census and others that followed in 1920 and 
1940 (Rivière 1982, 106 and 254). 
44 AJC, Civiles, 1910, no. 14.  
45 AJC, Civiles, 1910, no. 14. 
46 In Sabaya, the documents granted during the mentioned census were called “camachos” (ibid, 254), which 
may indicate that the operation was executed under supervision of Martirian Camacho, then sub-Prefect of 
the Carangas. AJC, Penales, 1904, no. 4. 
47 Platt, however, explains that in Chayanta rather the other way around, the revisitadores felt insufficient 
support from the sub-prefects (1982, 86). As the mentioned case of Delfín Arce (6.3) demonstrates, tensions 
between the sub-Prefect and the revisitador also played their part in Carangas. Since Arce, however, the 
situation was simply that no revisitador was entering the province. 
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anti-Revisita resistance, they found themselves between two “walls”, unable to 
effectively attract  
“the industrialists who try to acquire fallow terrains, whose petitions are resisted 
by the suspicious and distrustful indigenous who cannot see in the immediacies of 
their lands people of distinct race and customs without pitting all sorts of 
difficulties to maintain their natural apathy.”48  
In order to get the exvinculación process off the ground, local state representatives 
requested a modification of the proindiviso act of 1883, which was detected as a key 
obstruction to their efforts. As discussed before, communal action had “extorted” this 
law and related regulations, providing freeholding communities with a powerful 
“loophole” which also individual comunarios knew to invoke when asserting their land 
claims.49 In the words of Prefect Ascarrunz, the concession of fallow lands was 
completely impeded because such communal privileges were being abused to extremes, 
involving the mobilization of hundreds of communities against any attempt to 
distribute lands, not to speak of the  numerous inter- and intra-community conflicts 
which further exacerbated the disturbance of the public order (Ascarrunz 1909, 89). The 
indigenous population was thus far from apathetic, yet in a much more ingenious way 
then governmental authorities dared to admit. Moreover, as the central state gave up 
the fight (by ceding the 1883 and other concessions), the comunarios directed their 
efforts more and more to the local level of encroachment (Platt 1982, 145-7). 
Thus, despite persistent pressure, no Revisita General was undertaken nor did the 
cadastral system make headway. In 1910, the head of the province explained that while 
one part of the comunarios was convinced of the Revisita’s intervention as a tool to 
guarantee their property rights, another part stubbornly resisted this, referring to the 
guarantees provided in the 1883 law (Morales 1910, 66). In Totora this led that same year 
even to an anti-Revisita (and at once, anti-vecino) rebellion. Bacarreza explained that 
anti-Revisita protest was triggered by inter-communitarian land inequality with smaller 
communities hoping that Revisita intervention would help them keeping stronger 
neighbours at bay and the latter mobilizing to keep the Revisita out.50 In 1916, the 
Prefect of Oruro suggested to appoint a Cadastre Rectifier and a Revisita Judge  in order to 
execute the decreed surveys, which had been paralyzed for years (Lemaitre 1916, 58). 
Since the first of June 1905, a Cadastre Office came into operation in the Oruro 
 
                                                     
48 Own translation. No details given on those measures. Ascarrunz 1909, 64. 
49 Comunarios in Corque and Sabaya requested the consolidation of their land rights conform the law of 1882. 
AJC, Civiles, 1914, no. 2. 
50 Bacarreza, 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 376. A similar comment had been made by the sub-prefect in 1893, see 6.3. 
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department in order to replace the old diezmo system by a rural territorial tax (Sanjínes 
1906, 21-2), but made no progress whatsoever in the Carangas province.51 As a result, the 
established nominal entry for the contribución territorial in the departmental budget had 
meanwhile been accumulating, while no increase in the real incomes was produced 
because the padrón had not been updated for the Avaroa and Carangas provinces 
(Lemaitre 1916, 56-8).52 
Similar to other regions where the new territorial (cadastral) tax system found no 
entrance, the solvency of Oruro’s treasury continued to rely heavily on head tax 
revenues, with Carangas counting as an undeniable loyal fiscal client. In 1909, the 
contribución territorial still counted as “the principal and most profitable income” of the 
Departmental Treasury, good for 94424,94 bolivianos collected with regularity and even 
a producing a surplus (Ascarrunz 1909, 66). Carangas’ share in this collection, which was 
its exclusive fiscal contribution to the department, covered 38,2 %.53 In 1913, the Prefect 
of Oruro contentedly commented that Carangas was for now the only province with no 
debts to the Treasury, thanks to its punctually delivered contribución territorial.54 In 1921, 
Carangas continued to be mentioned as “the most punctual” province of the department 
when it came to paying the indigenous head tax (Lima 1921, 182).55  
 
                                                     
51 The  Cercado province was the first area to undergo the cadastral procedure, generating substantially 
higher incomes that under the previous fiscal system. By 1909, the cadastral tax yielded satisfactory results 
despite the conflicts, petitions and unwillingness to pay by the proprietors, yet still limited to the mentioned 
province (Ascarrunz 1909, 67 and 85-6). By 1913, efforts to introduce the cadastral system in the Poopó 
province had started, however without any valuable result (Morales 1913, 25-6). All those years, nothing was 
reported on the Carangas province. In 1916 the Prefect of Oruro commented that the situation remained 
unaltered (Lemaitre 1916, 58). 
52 In spite of the law of 13 November 1914, which ordered the continuation of the cadastral operations, the 
income entry for cadastral taxes was suppressed in the departmental budget in 1916, subjecting the 
“proprietors” of Carangas to a continued payment of the territorial tax. In concrete, this meant that 
proprietors included in the cadastre paid a lower property tax which in Oruro only applied only to those in 
the Cercado province, where the cadastral operations were had been concluded. Elsewhere, the property tax 
maintained its increased rate of 10% on the profits of rural estates in addition to the inflated interests and 
prescribed surcharges of the 1894 legislation. Even with the cadastral operation only partially imposed, the 
1914 law caused a 50% drop in departmental fiscal revenues. “Ley de 2 de enero de 1894.”  
53 The sub-Prefect reported to have submitted 18025,95 bs to the departmental treasury for the first semester 
of the year (Careaga in Ascarrunz 1909, 106). The province’s annual contribution can thus be estimated at 
36051,9 bs. 
54 The communities of Carangas had deposited 36376,94 bs or 38,6% of the departmental territorial 
contribution revenues (Morales 1913, 12 and 70). 
55 In 1920, the province counted with some 21820 inhabitants and subsidizes the departmental treasury on 
yearly basis with 37481,1 bs or 42,1 % of the departmental contribución revenues (Lima 1921, 182). See also 
chapter 4.1.2 and Appendix 7.  
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Moreover, while no general, province-wide Revisita would be organized for the entire 
period up to the National Revolution, the communities not only claimed an indisputable 
fiscal position, but also managed to keep the collection of the head tax outside 
governmental intervention.56 Governmental authorities attempted to undermine this 
autonomy by suppressing the premium attributed to tax collectors,57 yet no structural 
changes were undertaken. In 1929, it was repeated that the Revisita de tierras according 
to the law of 1874, which would make community lands “exvinculado” and integrate 
them into the absolute ownership of the originarios, had still not be executed, allowing 
for the persistence of the old “deficient” situation in Carangas in which the sub-Prefect 
indicates and registers the replacers of deceased originarios.58 Neither had the 
contribución territorial, paid by all “indigenous proprietors” of the department as 
instructed by the 1874, 1880 and 1911 stipulations, been replaced by the cadastral tax 
(Gonzalez 1929, 32-3).  
By keeping the Revisita and cadastral system at bay, the communities defended their 
fiscal status, which was a key aspect in safeguarding their margin for “communal 
manoeuvring”. Despite this margin, the push for resource frontier expansion and the 
consequent reinforced (though frustrated) insistence upon Revisita and cadastral 
surveying impacted life in the communities of Carangas. In the following section, the 
contraction and expansion of this room for manoeuvre will be further discussed, 
pointing to the contribuyentes’ vulnerability to asymmetrical power relations, 
expressed in both inter-household and inter-community conflict, as well as to their 
resistance strategies, which did not abate and linked up to a political movement. 
 
                                                     
56 As a way of comparison, the province of Chayanta in the Potosí department was equally praised for its 
punctuality and still supplied the departmental treasury with one fifth of its revenues up to 1930 (Platt 1987, 
318).  
57 The alcaldes cobradores, recruited among the provincial inhabitants, had right to a 1% premium for collecting 
the head tax. The abolition of this right in 1916 provoked countless complaints and was suspected of 
complicating the tax collection. Lemaitre 1916, 56-7. 
58 This statement is included in a judicial sentence of 1929 concerning the adjudication of a sayaña to the 
children of Agustin Fernandez, a powerful comunario from Sabaya. That year, the departmental decree of 30 
July 1927 which confirmed the exemption of non-exvinculado communities from cadastral operations and the 
cadastral tax and was adopted as supreme resolution (13 June 1929). ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 
1929, no. 16. González 1929, 138 and 209-12.  
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7.2 Combat and court: signs of increasing vulnerability and 
coordinated counteraction. 
This section approaches the effects from increased pressures on land from two angles. 
First, court cases regarding disputed land rights that appeared before the provincial 
court of Corque and registered property documents at the Property Rights office in 
Oruro indicate a high level of inter- and intra-ayllu conflict over land. The (increasingly 
less and weaker) remaining “free” commoners were exposed to increasing competition, 
often leading to desperate reactions, both criminal and legal, to secure their clutch at 
their own piece of land. In the eyes of the state, these “convulsions” were a basic motive 
ánd barrier to the implementation of the Revisita. Second, a coordinated collective ayllu 
response developed simultaneously through court, through legislative action and 
through revolt. “When the indigenous do not recur to combat,” the state concluded “they 
recur to their demand for demarcation.”59 Either way, the communities were perceived as 
obstructing elements, but this obstruction was in fact based on a tactic employment of 
the “rule of law” enacted that same state. Communal leaders developed a complex 
strategy, within, beyond and on the “boundaries” of the law. Both inter-ayllu as joint-
ayllu struggles were pursued via the same juridical-archival practices through court as 
well as in ‘battle’. Moreover, by means of collective representatives, communities even 
directly pressured the Parliament to harmonize the legal framework with their 
demands.  
7.2.1 Inter-comunario land disputes. 
After 1899, things may seem to return to the order of the day, but the exvinculación 
process had established a general climate of conflict. In 1906, the Prefect of Oruro 
reassured his superiors that while his department has known little disturbance since the 
end of the revolts, “there is no shortage of turmoil provoked by discrepancies between 
comunarios and colonos of private properties.”60 While this discrepancy was little relevant to 
Carangas, life was equally troubled by land conflicts, both between the indigenous and 
mestizo population as among and within the ayllus. The “current and constant collisions 
that occur between indigenous commoners over their land possession” became the norm.61 A 
 
                                                     
59 Own translation, ministerial circular of 1920, cited in Rivera 1991, 639. 
60 Own translation. Sanjínes 1906, 2. 
61 Own translation. Prefectural report. Lemaitre 1916, 7. 
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screening of the archived lawsuits in court of Corque display a high amount of 
violations against communal property of either particular or groups of comunarios, 
which kept existing or launched new protracted histories of inter-ayllu violence and 
litigation.  
These conflicts were nothing new in se, but they tended to become more violent 
throughout the first half of the 20th century.62 Such disputes commonly started as minor 
incursions among neighbours or even within families,63 but at times could escalate into 
inter-cantonal and even inter-provincial or inter-departmental clashes,64 with boundary 
incursions occurring at all levels. Particularly in the north-east of the province, conflicts 
over land were most frequent. On these fertile, hence desired soils, the ayllus of Totora65 
as well as of Huaillamarca66 attained a strong reputation of intra-community 
belligerence, but also in, with and among neighbouring communities of the Carangas’ 
greenest corner a lively history of violence and litigation was upheld.67 At the other side 
 
                                                     
62 Corque, for instance, would have been witness of “the most bloody events executed by the indigenous population 
of Chuquichambi, Chuquicota and of its own jurisdiction” (Lima 1921, 185).   
63 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1924, no. 20. AJC, Penales, 1907 no. 11. 
64 In 1910, the sub-prefect urged the Prefect to consider the pressing need for an interdepartmental 
delimitation with the department of La Paz in order to stop the continuous intrusions by the comunarios of 
the Sicasica province (Curahuara de Pacajes and Chacarilla) into the lands of the comunarios of Llanquera, 
Chuquichambi, Huaillamarca and Totora and those of the Pacajes province (Ullona and Callapa) into 
Curahuara de Carangas (Careaga in Morales 1910, 71). Also Sabaya was involved in a complex litigation process 
with adjacent ayllus pertaining to other provinces and departments regarding their rights over the Coipasa 
mountain. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1909, no. 3 and 4; 1924, no. 25.  
65 As has been mentioned in previous chapters, land disputes had been recurrent in the previous decades 
between ayllus Lerco, Aparu and Guaraguara. In the 20th century, struggles over boundary markers and 
territorial rights continued to erupt. Particularly the Anconi family felt the need to secure its property rights 
over their sayañas, resulting in a series of petitions to register republican and colonial documents that 
supported their land claims. Also within these ayllus and with or among other ayllus, land-related violence 
regularly revived. AJC, Penales, 1903, no. 1 and no. 7; 1904, no. 3; 1907, no. 2 and 11; 1908, no. 13; 1910, no. 7 and 
13. AJC, Civiles, 1904, no. 5; 1910, no. 1 and 2; 1911, no. 3; 1915, no. 29; 1916, no. 31. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, 
Carangas, 1927, no. 26-30; see also 1910, no. 1; 1924, no. 3; 1925, no. 12 and 15; 1928, no. 27.   
66 In Huaillamarca, comunarios were embroiled in disputes amongst themselves and with their neighbours. 
AJC, Penales, 1901, 15; 1902, 12; 1905, no. 8; 1906, no. 13-14; 1907, no. 1, 13. AJC, Civiles, 1906, no. 12, 13; 1907, 1, 3; 
1908, no. 4, 19; 1910, no. 25.  
67 Also in other north-eastern districts of Carangas, inter-ayllu clashes frequently erupted. In August 1906, 
civilian and police forces were called out after “an enormous bonfire and twenty Indians with their pututus” 
walking from Llanquera in the direction of San Miguel and defying the locals to combat had been observed, 
only days after other incidents had been reported between comunarios both localities. Two years later, 
another invasion followed. The conflict related to the governmental demand that the comunarios of San 
Miguel, pertaining to the Corque canton, would deliver services to the authorities of Llanquera, which they 
probably denied. AJC, Penales, 1906, no. 12, f. 1; 1908, no. 4, 5. See on Llanquera also AJC, Civiles, 1901, no. 6, 10; 
1910, no. 6, 11, 24, 26, 35; AJC, Penales, 1902, no. 6. In later years, the comunarios of San Miguel repeatedly 
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of the province, Sabaya and Huachacalla were also hotbeds of rural unrest.68 Together 
with a rising number of violations of land property, numerous reports were made on 
illegitimate seizures of other resources, mostly livestock, and a remarkably high number 
of assassinations or attempts to murder was recorded. This contributed to a generalized 
climate of conflict, alarming the central authorities and non-communal rural dwellers 
of the province becoming a place where “the knife reigns over the law.”69  
Yet, this perceived lawlessness was exactly a key motivator behind a closer 
interaction between the comunarios and the jurisdictional apparatus. The archives of 
these institutions are not only testimony of the incessant clashes among the rural 
population, but moreover tell us something more of the way individual comunarios and 
collective communities dealt with these conflicts. Land and boundary conflicts are a 
principal ‘vein’ in this mine of juridical proceedings. Such conflicts, either between 
individuals or entire communities, were usually settled, either voluntary or sentenced, 
through boundary inspections, land partitions and demarcations and possibly transfers 
of communal land, which were then confirmed through the adjudication of property 
rights to (one of) the litigating parties. Once these procedures were documented, they 
attained the status of legal proof and at their turn might re-appear in later documents 
to serve as evidence in later litigation or demands to the government. The rising 
insecurity produced by the competition over land thus drove people to the legal 
authorities to consolidate their land rights by authenticating all documents that proved 
their legitimate (and centuries-long) possession over (disputed) land.  This explains the 
frequent reference to old (colonial and republican) judicial documents and petition for 
the validation and registration of transcriptions of these documents by the descendants 
of once (and often still) litigating parties in search of legal security.70  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
invaded adjacent cultivation fields of Chuquichambi, sometimes mobilizing the entire community. AJC, Civiles, 
1909, no. 30; 1910, no. 13; AJC, Penales, 1912, no. 25.  
68 In Sabaya, a longer violent history erupted once more after an invasion by comunarios of ayllu Sacari in 
1907, leading to an official allocation of the possession in 1908. In 1914, a delineation between  ayllus Collana, 
Canasa and Sacari was executed, based on old judicial documents. AJC, Civiles, 1907, no. 9; 1908, no. 1; 1914, no. 
2 and ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1914, no. 4. See also AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 29 and 1909, no. 2. Note 
that the ADRO includes a significant number of cases relating to Sabaya, particularly in the course of 1913-
1918. In the neighbouring community of Huachacalla, too, longstanding inter-ayllu antagonisms escalated 
again. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1914, no. 2 and 3; AJC, Civiles, 1902, no. 3, 4; 1905, no. 5; 1910, no. 
12; AJC, Penales, 1902, no. 16; 1907, no. 6. 
69 A comment by the priest of Turco about his village in 1907. AJC, Civiles, 1907, no. 6. 
70 The Property Rights registers (ADRO, Propiedades Provincias) is to large extent composed by a series of copied 
land titles and juridical resolutions over land rights and boundary allocation that can be traced back to the 
first visitas of the 16th century. These copies were submitted for verification in order to count as proof of the 
property over a sayaña or the rights of an entire community. Several comunarios of Huaillamarca requested 
the registration of lawsuits dating from 1779 up to 1892 (1924, no. 10, no. 12 and no. 14 and 1926, no. 1). Other 
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Colonial and more recent documents regarding land divisions, boundary inspections, 
juridical verdicts and sayaña adjudications were registered for the sake of collective 
interests,71 at times re-registering the documents obtained by the caciques-generales a 
couple of decades before.72 Yet, also individual contribuyentes recurred to the Property 
Rights office (or the court personnel in Corque) to obtain and register the documented 
evidence for the property rights they enjoyed over community lands.73 These petitions 
logically concerned cultivation plots as collectively used could not be adjudicated to 
individual contribuyentes.74 In case the provided documents were not considered 
sufficiently strong enough, others could easily oppose the adjudication of the concerned 
sayaña.75 While it remains hard to define where the divide and the overlap rests 
between individualistic and collective struggles, it seems that many of the petitions 
were driven by competitive inter-ayllu interests, in view of intrusive neighbouring 
ayllus or out of personal gain. In contrast to the preceding peak in land rights 
registrations (1898-‘99), when requests culminated in a clear collective demand for 
Revisita exemption supported by all communities of the province, this time there are 
less indications of how and how strongly these appeals managed to transcend 
competing ayllu or individual agendas. This observation might point to a fragmentation 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
requests regarding old documentation were made by comunarios or their apoderdos representing litigating 
parties of Choquecota and Turco (1923, no. 12 and 1928, no. 14), San Miguel (1924, no. 23), Andamarca and 
Huachacalla (1929, no. 17), different ayllus in Sabaya (1926, no. 29; 1928, no. 6 and 1929, no. 21) and Llanquera 
(1929, no. 8 and 50).  
71 Collective demands have been registered for the ayllus of Corque, Sabaya, Andamarca, Huachacalla, 
Huaillamarca, Choquecota, Totora, Turco, Chuquichambi (NO?!), either for one particular, several or all ayllus 
of the community (marka). Remarkably, no such collective request was found relating to Curahuara. ADRO, 
Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1911, no. 2 and 5-6; 1918, no. 4 and no. 9-12; 1920, no. 1-2; 1922, no. 39; 1924, no. 
2-6, 13, 15, 24-25; 1925, no. 10, 14, 21; 1926, no. 18-19, 27, 30; 1927, no. 7, 9, 12-13; 1928, no. 5-6, 8-11 and 28; 
1929, no. 10, 13-15, 22, 28, 41-43, 44, 47, 51; 1930, no. 8-12, 16, 17c, 18-20 and 34.   
72 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1918, no. 6 and 1929, no. 11 and no. 13-15. 
73 In order to consolidate the individual tenure rights over a particular sayaña, contribuyentes recurred to the 
departmental Property Rights office to register the records of previous sayaña adjudications or transfers, or 
certificates of regular contribución payment, which sometimes involved the registration of colonial documents. 
Often these property rights had been (recently or long time ago) allocated through juridical sentences 
extorted in the context of land disputes. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1913, no. 3-5; 1913 (“Libro de 
Anotaciones”), no. 1; 1915, no. 2; 1916, no. 10; 1917, no. 9 and 10; 1918, no. 3, 7 and 8; 1920, no. 29 and 31; 1921, 
no. 4; 1923, no. 13 and 14; 1924, no. 11, 17-19 and 26-28; 1925, no. 5-6 and 13; 1926, no. 2, 4, 8-10, 13-17, 21-23, 25 
and 28; 1927, no. 2-5, 8-11, 15-19, 22-24, 26-27 and 30; 1928, no. 2, 5, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 23-27; 1929, no. 
1-4, 6-8, 16, 23-24b, 26, 27, 29-39, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54 and 56-58; 1930, no. 4, 5, 7b, 12, 13, 15, 17b, 23-28, 30, 32, 33 
and 35.  
74 Hence, accusations of intrusion in grazing lands made little sense. AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 18; 1910, no. 8. 
75 See for instance AJC, Civiles, 1909, no. 11 and 1910, no. 14. 
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of the indigenous leadership, supporting a hypothesis of regional introversion in which 
ayllus were too occupied in saving their own hide. This will be further assessed below. 
The ongoing land conflicts, of which but an indicative sample is given account of, and 
their tenacity demonstrate a growing problem of “an inequality that oughtn’t to be”76 
regarding commoners’ access to basic resources. This insecurity reflects the effects of 
mounting demographic pressures and growing competition over resources. While 
hacendado pressures on land were abating from the 1920s on (Klein 1993, 133-59), the 
remaining free communities needed all their energy to prevent powerful neighbours 
from attacking their land boundaries. Thus, even though Carangas did not experience a 
real hacienda threat, its inhabitants found themselves in an insecure environment of 
“bloody conflicts, which are continuously provoked among the indigenous people competing for 
land.”77 The central administration’s capacity to contain these inter- and intra-
community conflicts remained as deficient as before, let alone its intention and means 
to neutralize the very cause of these conflicts. As a result, provincial authorities and the 
departmental police force were repeatedly called out to suppress violent clashes over 
property rights between comunarios of adjacent terrains or to prevent disputes from 
escalating, yet without producing a structural change in the situation (González 1929, 
15).  
The very cause of the conflicts is founded in the entwined problems of vagueness, 
insecurity and inequality regarding land access, property and limits. Inter-ayllu 
conflicts affected boundaries, not necessarily because they might lead to border 
changes, but for encouraging the fixation of what previously corresponded to more 
fluid demarcations.78 Because of the intensifying competition over land, communities 
 
                                                     
76 This is the testimony of a comunario wrapped in an inter-household dispute over the little livestock they 
possess. AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 8. 
77 Own translation. Careaga in Ascarrunz 1909, 103. 
78 With the intention of protecting comunarios or entire communities against further usurpations or to 
compensate the damage caused by land disputes, the juridical archives were nourished with detailed accounts 
of the revised or confirmed boundaries, increasingly registered after 1922. The following list shows that the 
procedures, mainly recorded in the Property Rights registers, covered nearly all communities of the province, 
affecting the internal boundaries of Sabaya, Totora, Orinoca, Llanquera, Huachacalla and Huaillamarca (see 
respectively ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1925, no. 9 (delineation of 1914); 1918, no. 2; 1929, no. 9 
(delineation of 1920); 1922, no. 46; 1907, no. 1 and 1918, no. 5; 1924, no. 16 and 1930, no. 22 and no. 31), the 
inter-cantonal boundaries of San Miguel with Chuquichambi and Choquecota (ADRO, 1924, no. 23), between 
Totora and Curahuara (ADRO, 1929, no. 25), and Huaillamarca and its neighbours (AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 15; 
1909, no. 32; ADRO, 1928, no. 7; 1928, no. 22; 1929, no. 19), the inter-provincial boundaries between Corque and 
Toledo, Poopó province (ADRO, 1922, no. 41) and between ayllu Cumujo (Sabaya) and Salinas de Garci-
Mendoza, Avaroa province (ADRO, 1924, no. 25), and the boundaries of an estancia on the Coipasa mountain on 
the inter-departmental border between Sabaya and the neighbouring canton of Llica, Potosí department 
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became more aware of their territorial limits and hence more open to the “modern” 
idea that land overlap was problematic. While this led to communal support for a 
demarcation that would recognize their community boundaries in force since ‘time 
immemorial’, they retained their distrust towards the state-imposed Revisita, well 
aware that this would not be executed according to their norms and interests.79  
But the real problem behind boundary disputes was one of inequality, with small 
communities in a weak position against usurpations by stronger neighbours. As Lima 
explained, some cantons enjoying favourable plots and pasture lands while others live 
on unproductive terrains (Lima 1921, 182). In line with all local government 
functionaries, he seized the observed inequality to stress the injustice of the still 
operative fiscal system in which either category was subject to the same territorial tax 
quota and to push for the implementation of fiscal and land reform plans. At the inter-
personal level, these “variations in wealth between ayllus were also matched by an increasing 
internal stratification among the Indian peasants themselves” (Klein 1993, 163). Intrusive 
players knew to exploit this discrepancy between weak and strong communities and 
comunarios to the advantage of their land base, applying the simple weight of 
numbers80 but also their purchase power and political power.81 More subtle tactics were 
also applied, seizing the absence of contribuyentes to deprive them of their land.82 Land 
access inequality had at times extreme consequences with (groups of) comunarios 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(ADRO, 1909, no. 3-4). Only in one case, regarding the division of ayllus Parco and Collana (Huaillamarca), such 
petition includes a drawn map. AJC, Civiles, 1910, no. 30.  
79 See the discussion on the Revisita demand of the caciques-apoderados in 7.2.2. In fact, until the 
implementation of the 1953 land reform, there was no clear overview of ayllu boundaries. Limits were 
indicated in situ by mojones (boundary markers) which were often moveable objects or disputed indications. 
To consolidate, amend or obtain a detailed account of these boundaries, comunarios had to travel to the 
centralized juridical institutions, where this information was not systemized but documented in the (often 
conflicting) accounts of copied colonial property titles. 
80 The recurrent clashes between ayllu Sacari and Canasa (Sabaya), for instance, included large-scale 
invasions, where it should be noted that ayllu Canasa comprised about one fourth more comunarios than 
Sacari (at least according to the last counting in 1877). See also footnote 210.  
81 In Huaillamarca a powerful Totora resident was accused for frequent attempts of land usurpation which he 
afterwards tried to resolve with a sale transaction to a comunario. Similarly, the cacique of Llanquera 
arranged a deal in which he would pay a contribuyente half of his contribución in order to cultivate part of his 
land, but eventually, the cacique was denied the adjudication over the terrain. AJC, Civiles, 1910, no. 11, and no. 
7 and 26 respecitvley. 
82 These absentees had either migrated (temporally) “in search of work for their subsistence” or, especially from 
1916 on, were contribuyentes or próximos conscripted into the army. AJC, Civiles, 1908, no. 13 and 1910, no. 14.  
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deciding to abandon their original community affiliation and/or to integrate in another 
(stronger) community.83  
The most extreme and coercive case of ayllu erosion due to a land conflict was that of 
the Urus. Because of the variations in fiscal status, their land rights were very weakly 
secured which had burdened them with a long history of land aggressions84 resulting in 
their gradual “disappearance”, most clearly evidenced in Turco’s concession of Capillu 
lands to Huachacalla (see 6.5). The long-term consequence of the extremely precarious 
land access of the Urus was (and still is) evidenced in deteriorating livelihood conditions 
and a process of aymarization, which current efforts to counter historical processes of 
territorial and cultural fragmentation.85 
As for the vecinos, the combination of their disposal over strong “usurpation tools” 
with a lack of a legal title to community land had a very  double outcome in which the 
securing of their power position not resulted in straightforward usurpation but went 
hand in hand with their intervention in communal struggles. In the following it will be 
explained how the struggle over community land in Carangas gave light to (supra-local) 
legislative as well as insurgent resistance in which inter-ethnic alliances played an 
important role. Subsequently, the reconfigurations in ethnic relations and land rights 
underlying to this alliance will be analysed by linking vecino intervention in these 
initiatives to their integration in the contribuyente class.  
 
                                                     
83 Two orphanage brothers (hence probably in precarious land access) pertaining to the vice-canton of 
Carangas switched to ayllu Collana (Sabaya) and were adjudicated sayaña lands. Their integration demand was 
motivated by the offences of the authorities and fellow comunarios of their ayllu. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, 
Carangas, 1911, no. 3 and 4; AJC, Civiles, 1910, no. 22. Also in Sabaya, ayllu Sacari decided in 1909 through 
referendum to voluntary transfer their contribución obligation (however without abandoning their affiliation 
to Sacari) to Todos Santos, which was elevated to the status of vice-canton (“Ley de 6 de noviembre de 1911”). 
In view of this new administrative division, the community lands of Todos Santos, Sacari and Canasa were 
demarcated and adjudicated to protect them against future intrusions, particularly by La Rivera (vice-canton 
Carangas) and ayllu Cumujo (Sabaya). ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1911, no. 1 and 1917, no. 4.  
84 While the Uru population in all other cantons had “disappeared” by the entrance of the 20th century, the 
two ayllus of the Chipaya of the Huachacalla canton survived despite continuous attacks by the Aymaras of 
ayllu Collana. AJC, Penales, 1902, no. 16. 
85 The divided Uru population of Chipaya, as those living on the shores of the Poopó lake, is increasingly 
pressuring the government for stronger territorial rights in order to guarantee the continuity of their specific 
culture and lifestyle as one of the oldest population groups of the entire Andes and counter their historical 
discrimination. Over the centuries, land has become increasingly important for “the men of the water,” as 
hunting, gathering and fishing have become less and less viable. Their access to basic resources is 
progressively reducing because ‘new’ land appearing due to the shrinking of the lake is categorized as state 
property (instead of being attributed to the Uru population in compensation for their historical losses). Lara 
2014. 
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7.2.2 A diversified strategy of collective struggle.  
In the following, I will dissect three lines of communal land defence that were 
developed under the cacique-apoderado movement – one “within”, one “on” and one 
“out” of the imposed limits of the law. I will link the scarce source material on collective 
struggle and community spokespersons in Carangas to insights derived from the general 
literature on the caciques-apoderados.86 My findings of communal action in the 
Carangas region during the 1900-1930 period are structured by what I discern as a 
threefold resistance strategy. Once again, the decision to close that period in 1930 is 
debatable and corresponds in the first place to a pragmatic decision in view of the time-
consuming archive work and in the second place to the impact of various nation-wide 
changes in the course of the following decade.  
Calling the law into play: in search for traces of the caciques-apoderados 
movement in Carangas . 
Despite the setback produced through the Liberal victory and the decapitation of the 
apoderado movement, the indigenous leadership revived gradually and particularly in 
the 1910s, when concrete advances were made in re-uniting all communities in one 
struggle. By 1913, a network had been formed including 96 indigenous “caciques-
apoderados”, recognized as such by the local communities they represented.87 Their 
appellation refers to the adopted strategy of combined external-internal representation 
in which non-communitarian legal attorneys (apoderados) and the colonial authority of 
the cacique (despite the abolition of this function in 1825) were simultaneously involved 
(Rivera 1991, 607-8).  
This multi-provincial and –departmental assortment of community leaders 
conjointly organized a legal and legislative strategy. The viability of their demands was 
based in the colonial land titles which the communities had obtained from the Spanish 
Crown and thus touched upon the system of checks and balances that regulated the 
state-community pact as imposed in colonial times. The decrees relating to the 1883 act 
were deployed as one of their most important weapons to defend communal land rights. 
Thanks to that law, ‘free’ communities could remain exempt from the survey operation 
 
                                                     
86 This literature mainly focuses on the public action in the La Paz region, or the Cochabamba region. Rivera 
1991; Soria Choque 1992; Condori and Ticona 1992;Ticona 2011; Choque and Mamani 2003; Choque 2005; 
Gotkowitz 2007; Choque and Quispe 2010. 
87 Among these leaders, 46 represented communities of the La Paz department, 20 of Oruro, 14 of Potosí and 16 
of Cochabamba (Choque and Quisbert 2010, 27). Assembled under the leadership of Martín Vasquez, a 
comunario from Curahuara de Pacajes (La Paz department), several “indigenous congresses” were organized 
from 1914 on (Rivera 1991, 606 and 608). 
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and the cadastral tax system as the composición titles were recognized as equivalent to 
the land titles granted through the Revisita General. However, it was not enough to 
simply “have” these documents; they had to be authenticated and ratified in order to 
function as effective legal instruments. Thus, community leaders adopted the 
registration of composición titles, often indirectly via recuperated colonial and more 
recent documents, as one of their basic tasks.88 This required preparation, starting with 
community leaders travelling to Sucre and sometimes even to Lima, on foot, often in 
company of transporters.89 The following testimony clarifies how those documents were 
then brought into circulation:  
“I copied for all: the original was only one, which was in hands of  Santos Marka 
T'ula.90 Not all caciques used originals, they simply used the copies, in order to get 
to know [the documents]. And some, who did not have [copies], limited 
themselves to the use of circulars. Other alcaldes came from all communities in 
order to obtain copies. He explained what the titles said and gave them only 
copies, which were dispatched by the alcaldes to the different estancias. The 
originals were handed to no one. That is just how it was.”91  
The search for and composition of a legal file as complete as possible thus went hand 
in hand with a globalization of what had started with individual demands. As the 
network spread, it brought several isolated struggles together, comprising by 1919 “the 
four hundred villages that compose the entire republic.”92  
Also leaders from the western part of Oruro formed part of this movement, but 
nowhere do names appear of caciques-apoderados in Carangas.93 However, the 
intensifying rivalry over land, discussed above, and the consequent rise in juridical 
procedures initiated by or against communities offers an indirect entry to the 
 
                                                     
88 In the 1910s and particularly the 1920s, the ADRO demonstrates a remarkable increase in requests to protect 
community land, with a peak in 1924 (ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1924). In 1927, the annual report 
of the Prefect even dedicated a special section to these requests (Calderón 1927, 15-6). 
89 Community leaders also performed rituals to protect and “purify” those documents (Rivera 1991, 638-9). 
90 Santos Marka T’ula was one of the most powerful caciques-apoderados of the early 20th century and leader of 
the 1921 rebellion in Jesús de Machaca (Condori and Ticona 1992).  
91 Own translation, Placido Jacinto of the community of Junt'u, interviewed by THOA, cited and translated 
from Aymara in Rivera 1991, 621. 
92 Own translation. Petition of the caciques-apoderados of 12 August 1919. ALP, EP, 1929, f. 33. Cited in Rivera 
1991, 621-2. 
93 Among the known names, the most important caciques-apoderados were Santos Marka T’ula, Francisco 
Tancara, Faustino Llanqui, Mateo Alfaro, Francisco Imaña, Dionisio Paxsipati and Rufino Willka. Powerful 
apoderados without cacique status  were Eduardo Leandro Nina Quispe and Prudencio F. Callisaya. No one of 
these leaders has a connection to the Carangas region. Rivera 1991, 608; Choque and Quisbert 2010, 28.  
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organization of communal representation in the province. On basis of the Property 
Rights books deposited at the Supreme Departmental Court of Oruro and the archives of 
the court in Corque, a long list of representatives appeared (see Appendix 11). Their 
intervention was in the first place triggered by the (re-)eruption of inter-ayllu land 
disputes. They were sent out to get the juridical evidence authenticated in order to turn 
the resolution of the conflict to the community’s advantage. Interestingly, these 
juridical moves were also oriented towards the recuperation of their private estates in 
the valleys.94 But apoderados were not only called in for strict land issues. Comunarios 
appointed apoderados to litigate against abusive mestizos, often state functionaries,95 or 
to defend their claims against intolerable fiscal exactions, particularly the tax on alpaca 
wool.96  
Despite the silences and biases in the data on the presence and actions of community 
representatives in Carangas, the high interference of members of the local vecindario is 
undeniable. This is to large part explained by the legal restrictions to community 
representation. Moreover, despite the explicit critique towards the leaders of the late 
19th century mobilization for having consorted with (corrupt) mestizo lawyers, the 
caciques-apoderado movement was equally dependent upon the input of legal experts 
in order to pursue their legal actions. However, in the case of Carangas, the ambiguous 
role of “vecino-comunarios” who had a clear personal stake in the regulation of 
communal land property, make it often hard to assess whether these attorneys 
defended individual or collective ayllu interests and if he (indeed, no she’s) figured as an 
“external” lawyers or as contribuyente of the ayllu he represented. At the one hand, the 
particular attention for and allegations against manipulative vecino-apoderados by 
government representatives and the absence of clearly identified indigenous leaders in 
both archival and oral sources further reinforces the idea of a co-opted community 
 
                                                     
94 Rivera also makes this link, commenting on petitions made in Oruro, yet not including the communities of 
Carangas (Rivera 1991, 633-4). As commented before (chapter 6.2), Orinoca and Andamarca as well as Totora 
persisted until the 1920s in their efforts to maintain control over their distant properties. The former 
communities appointed Pantaleón Arias to represent their rights over the lands in Santiago de Quitarge in the 
valleys of the Chuquisaca department. The latter sent representatives to several cities to obtain and assert the 
property documents regarding the Hacienda Chulla in the Valle Central of Cochabamba. ADRO, Propiedades 
Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 35 and no. 47 respectively.  
95 An example is the appointment of Antonio Soto Várgas, vecino and school director in Corque, to represent 
the charges brought by the Corque comunarios before the Prefectura, the national government and “if 
necessary before the Legislative Chamber” against sub-Prefect coronel Juan Bautista Lazarte for abusive 
impositions upon the comunario population. AJC, Civiles, 1906, no. 2, f. 2-3 and Penales, 1907, loose papers. 
96 In 1905, the ayllus of Turco and Corque commissioned representatives to initiate a lawsuit to get the tax on 
alpaca wool eliminated, demanding that “the state would take into account our deplorable mendicancy to which the 
indigenous race of this Province is subjected because of the drought.” AJC, Civiles, 1905, no. 3, f. 6. 
  355 
representation. Their intervention as well as comunario rivalry might have contributed 
to the fact that no inter-ayllu merger of (collective) requests materialized (as in 1899); at 
least no explicit traces were found of a single Carangas leadership. At the other hand, 
this co-optation was backed by more complex motives and power relations than a 
dichotomous comunario-vecino relation.  
Calling the law into question: A legislative line of attack. 
Because of the gaps created by differences in juridical logics and the tricks and 
corruption of (non-indigenous) intermediaries, the administrative procedures are just 
one aspect of a more diversified resistance strategy. The creation and dissemination of 
legal evidence was thus more than a mere copy-paste operation, accommodating 
indigenous demands to the reigning legal framework. Rather, regulations and archival 
discoveries were consciously selected and interpreted in line with, and inscribed into, 
an alternative plural framework (Rivera 1991, 625; Platt 1982). This framework was 
founded in the colonial outlines of a state-community pact, shaped by a constant 
dialogue between an indigenous reading and the confines of “the official law” and 
oriented towards the creation of spaces for (self-)governance. As the continuation and 
negation of the “pact” became more and more a matter of local negotiation, the target 
of communal action came to lay with the vecinos and hacendados (Platt 1982, 145-7). 
The principal claim of the indigenous leadership was the recuperation and 
recognition of the legitimacy of communal land boundaries and communal authorities 
which they had maintained since colonial times. In order to check the ongoing wave of 
land usurpations, the pre-exvinculación situation had to be restored (Rivera 1991, 620). 
Most concretely, they demanded the execution of a “general administrative 
demarcation” of community lands.97 In 1919, several individual (inter-)ayllu, cantonal 
and -provincial demarcation petitions culminated in a Revisita petition by caciques-
apoderados of the five departments before the Chamber of Deputies. However, their 
petition did not allude to the Revisita General announced in 1881, but to a general 
revision of communal property boundaries and their restoration to the pre-1881 and 
even pre-Melgarejo situation, before the very first community land sale. As Rivera has 
demonstrated, this request is important not only for concerning a conjoint supra-local 
initiative, and its diffusion to other sectors of society via the press, but also for explicitly 
addressing the national executive powers instead of the provincial ordinary jurisdiction. 
 
                                                     
97 Other concrete demands were the implementation of the proclaimed elimination of the postillonaje 
(domestic service) and other coerced labour services and the abolition of the contribución territorial for 
composición communities (Rivera 1991, 612-3). While postillonaje was abolished for the taxpaying indigenous 
population, efforts to introduce the cadastral system intensified, entailing vital threats for community lands.  
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Rather than the resolution of a concrete technical-juridical problem, this collective 
demand aimed at the restoration of general state-indigenous relations.98 At a lower 
level, the above discussed individual comunario or ayllu requests for property 
protection in fact pursued the same tactic and objective.99  
Although I did not find evidence of Carangas direct contribution to this demand, 
similar legislative petitions were launched in the Oruro department, aiming at enlarging 
the margin for communal autonomy. Thereto, the legal loopholes created by the non-
intervention guarantees established in the 1883 law were strategically employed. This 
legislative line of attack puzzled the governmental authorities. In 1928, the prefect of 
Oruro very explicitly expressed his confusion, particularly triggered by Carangas’ active 
involvement. He stated that while comunario resistance against the Revisita remained 
insuperable,  
“nevertheless, in previous years those same comunarios have petitioned the 
Parliament to pronounce a special law that stipulates the prosecution of the 
revisita operations, above all in the province of Carangas, as elsewhere in the 
other altiplano departments.”100  
At the one hand, his confusion was roused by the contradictory attitude of the 
comunarios who previously had impeded any intervention of revisitadores and 
commanded the abolition of the imposed laws in order to return to “the Incaic system of 
the communal property” while also simultaneously demanding to respect the imposed 
legislation.101 At the other hand, he pointed to the risk that the effective replacement of 
 
                                                     
98 Refusing to entrust the resolution of land disputes to the reigning jurisdictional apparatus, they demanded a 
legislative innovation to settle boundary conflicts. In doing so, the caciques-apoderados not only consciously 
circumvented the categorical counteraction of their communal interests by hacendado and other elite 
interference, but explicitly insisted on the need for a clear jurisdiction. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the 
caciques incessantly submitted the same demands to the Chamber of Deputies, regardless of its repeated 
rejection. As communal entities did not longer possess of collective representative power, the petition was 
considered as an individual demand and hence referred to the provincial courts as the indicated authority for 
the execution of land demarcations (Rivera 1991).   
99 In 1927, it was noted that more and more of these authentication requests were not formulated against an 
effective property attack, but often anticipated possible inroads, which made those requests however 
illegitimate because not corresponding to the jurisdiction of the provincial court functionaries.In a reaction to 
this high number of (often unlawful) procedures, the government issued two supreme resolutions (3 June 1912 
and 8 January 1916) to regulate the intervention of administrative functionaries (Calderón 1927, 15-6). 
100 Own translation. González 1929, 211. 
101 He refers to the “bloody events” of 20 and 25 years before (although he probably means 1893 and 1899 
instead of 1903 and 1908) which had led to respectively the departure and the murder of the revisitador. The 
laws they sometimes repealed and other times supported included the 1874, 1881, 1883 and 1888 laws 
(González 1929, 211). 
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the head tax by a rental tax would subject the ex-comunarios to fraud and coercion by 
stronger landowners and hence facilitate their deprivation of land.102  
Part of the confusion lays in the collaboration with non-indigenous apoderados. The 
manipulations of external actors strengthened the indigenous leaders in their suspicion 
towards mestizo intervention but in some cases made them more receptive to some 
aspects of the exvinculación law. The “liberal” insistence on “absolute” property rights in 
the 1919 arguments (and similar demands) demonstrates that this interference indeed 
had its price and suggests an emerging consent with the 1874 law.103 This is particularly 
observable in regions where commodifying pressures were strongest exposed and the 
tributo came to be perceived as a burden (Rivera 1991, 615-7). In contrast, in less exposed 
regions where the intermediary cacique level was still operative, such as Carangas and 
Norte de Potosí (Platt 1982), the underlying state-community pact remained the 
baseline of resistance. Distrust and opposition of fiscal change remained fierce, 
particularly against any attempt to introduce the cadastral system. After “innumerable” 
appeals and rebellious intimidations, the communities of Oruro even managed to extort 
the formal exemption from cadastral operations by strategically exploiting the vacuums 
in the law.104  
By the end of the 1920s, indigenous tactics and alliances had amplified and their 
demands clearly radicalized,  
“The indigenous people of Toledo and part of the Carangas Province, incited by a 
certain José Tordoya, tried to collect funds to acquire a printing press which, 
under the leadership of the Workers’ Federation of this city, will be devoted to 
divulge ideas that in short consist of the “land devolution to the Indian”, “handing 
over the mines to the State”, “suppression of all taxes”.”105  
 
                                                     
102 To ensure that the transfer from communal to individual property occurred without adverse mestizo 
intervention, a detailed register was needed in the first place. Second, each province needed a particular 
approach instead of imposing one uniform procedure and, third, extra legislative measures were required to 
bend indigenous insurgence into sympathy. González 1929, 211-2. 
103 The 1919 demand which was elaborated in collaboration with their apoderado Saavedra, a powerful lawyer 
who would become president in 1921-‘25. The argument was that the 1874 law would eliminate the indigenous 
tributo, but completely ignored its formal abolition of the community as such (Rivera 1991, 615).  
104 In 1927, the distribution of forms among the jilaqatas to collect all data regarding the name, proprietor, 
extension, boundaries, ayllu affiliation, canton etc of each (to-be-)exvinculated plots almost collapsed into a 
wide-spread rebellion as comunarios suspected a seizure and taxation of their land, labour and livestock 
(Calderón 1927, 74). With regard to the cadastre exemption obtained, the Prefect stressed that the 
communities were not explicitly excluded nor included in the relevant 1880 law, thus clearly pointing to a 
void in the law of which the communities knew to take advantage (ibid, 76). 
105 Own translation. Fajardo 1931, 44. 
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While these ideas clearly foreshadow the National Revolution of 1952, governmental 
powers were convinced that the snowballing legal and political communal initiatives 
could only have a trivial outcome. However, their insistence upon the established 
juridical system as the only viable way for the communities, indigenous leaders stressed 
that struggle was their only viable response towards that system (Rivera 1991, 639). In 
order to “floor” that system, they questioned who and what was included in the 
imposed legislation and under what conditions and, as discussed in the lines above, 
presented their own interpretation, implicitly alluding to an alternative, plural legal 
framework. Rivera suggests that the community leaders insisted on a gap between the 
“civilized” legislation (of the liberal regime) and their “own” legislation (of colonial 
times, which respects the state-community pact) (Rivera 1991). In so doing, community 
leaders forced the state to subject the land reform process to an intensive negotiation, 
pragmatically recurring to the existing laws to use them to their own advantage while 
consciously pushing for a redrawing of those laws. Yet, the pursuit of this strategy was 
something of walking a tightrope between conformability and insubordination to the 
law. It was a small step to the open denial those laws through revolt. 
Calling the law to a halt: Rebellion. 
In the aftermath of the Great Rebellion of 1899, the repressive reaction of the state 
paused the development of a strong united indigenous leadership. Yet, this did not quite 
convert the countryside into a place of peace and submission (Flores 1984). In 1910, the 
Prefect of Oruro reminded his superiors “that the inhabitants of Carangas are traditionally 
inclined towards uprising.”106 Two years before, comunarios had set court of Corque on fire 
in a reaction to the accumulating lawsuits initiated against their “rebellious” anti-
vecino acts in the context of the federal war.107 However, rather than corresponding to 
an impulsive reaction, such revolts and reliance upon indigenous justice practices were 
generally embedded in a broader strategy to defend their land rights. Most local 
insurrections in the department occurred in hacienda regions, and were more and more 
restricted to that region as the obtained guarantees for communities kept them out of 
the scope of hacienda expansion.108 In Carangas, violent eruptions were not so much 
 
                                                     
106 Own translation. Morales 1910, 63. 
107 AJC, Civiles, 1909, no. 17. See also Pauwels (1983, 244), who dates the fire in 1904. However all documents at 
the archive up to 1909 are partially burnt and the files for 1908 and previous years are remarkably thin.  
108 See for prefectural reports on violent clashes among colonos and between colonos and comunarios (Arce 
1924, 11). The single indication of a similar hacienda-related insurgency in Carangas was when comunarios of 
Llanquera destroyed an estate owned by an Oruro resident, after which she decided to cede part of her 
property to the comunarios to prevent worse. AJC, Penales, 1907, no.21. 
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triggered by usurping landlords as by the imminence of the Revisita. This becomes most 
visible in the rebellion of 1910 in Totora. That year, one of the community’s caciques 
warned the provincial authorities that the comunarios of ayllus Tatasapana and 
Guaraguara were mobilizing and had, armed with clubs and blowing pututus, obliged the 
corregidor to demarcate and divide the lands of their neighbouring, competitor ayllu 
Aimarani.109 But it concerned more than an isolated inter-ayllu issue.  
“their rebellious attitude contaminated (sic) the entire indiada of Carangas with a 
bad example; as nowadays the leaders [gives 24 names] are crossing all villages of 
the Province collecting money under the name of ramas in order to resist the 
revisita de tierras and stirring up the indigenous population to a general uprising as 
they create consent that the Revisita will produce the distribution of lands, 
families and livestock among the whites.”110  
The reason why this community leader reported his own people has to do with his 
personal friendship and spiritual kinship ties to several of those “whites”. His fear that 
this revolt constituted his sentence of death underscores how action and reaction 
towards land reform plans entangled with complex indigenous-nonindigenous 
networks. Such entanglements even became more complex in the course of the next 
decade as the rural-communal movement for land increasingly overlapped with 
political strife and urban-proletarian mobilization. Party politics came to constitute one 
of the main triggers for agitation, with elections converted into instances of dissidence 
and fraud, even in the distant province of Carangas.111 Although slower emerging, the 
organization of labour unions nurtured a cross-fertilization of tactics, demands and 
discourse with the indigenous communities (Fajardo 1931, 44).112 Strengthened by new 
 
                                                     
109 As previously discussed, the ayllus of Totora were constantly involved in internal strife. AJC, Penales, 1910, 
no. 7. 
110 The casique cobrador of the parcialidad Urinsaya of Totora informed the Prefect of Oruro about the 
mobilization, which originated in a “typical” plunder invasion during Carnival in the ayllus under his 
supervision. AJC, Penales, 1910, no. 7, f. 2-2v. 
111 Official correspondence from the local to the central levels of authority dedicated more attention to 
ideological quarrels and party loyalty. In 1906, the opposition candidate of the Liberals, Frederico Ballón, and 
his electoral agents were reported for rousing an indigenous insurrection in order to vitiate the elections. 
Some comunarios took advantage of the tense electoral situation to resist the payment of the contribución 
territorial, but the readiness of a police force prevented major turmoil and a Republican takeover (Sanjínes 
1906, 4). Two years later, the municipal elections were cancelled and postponed in the Carangas province due 
to electoral fraud in Corque (Ascarrunz 1909, 6, 16-7 and 103). See also Ibañez 1923, 2-4; Calderón 1927, 4 and 9. 
112 In the 1920s, when unionist strife intensified, Corque was used as a center of isolation and detention of 
union leaders (Smale 2010, 137). Smale describes the case of the transportation of arrested union leaders of the 
Salvadora Mining Company of Patiño in Uncía in the aftermath of what is remembered as Bolivia’s first 
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alliances but confronted with a revived anti-community attack and a panicking state, 
the cacique-apoderados radicalized their activities and reoriented their strategy 
towards an enforcement of the colonial indigenous-state pact, averse from any 
compromise with the ongoing hacienda expansion (Rivera 1991, 609-10). In 1920-1921, 
their hope to restore the colonial pact eroded and the violent struggle was re-launched.  
In the context of increasing mobilization, particularly among the Aymara population, 
at the national level and the Republicans’ defiance of the Liberal government, an 
indigenous insurrection materialized in Curahuara on 21 July 1920, only one week after 
the Republican Party had taken over government. Spreading rumours about the 
imminent partition of livestock, Raimundo Marca and Leonardo Vilca, the principal 
initiators of the uprising, arrived from La Paz and Oruro with the order that  
“there had to be a slaughter of the vecinos; there was an order of the Authority of 
La Paz to kill the alonsistas and those who did not participate risked the same fate 
as well as their livestock.”113  
Particularly Juan Eloy Altamirano, corregidor of the canton and of liberal stamp, was 
targeted, nor were his comunario godchildren to be informed about the order, while the 
lives of his (republican) vecino enemies had to be spared.114 The insurgents, led by one 
of the “spared” vecinos, took the hills around the village, blowing horns and burning 
bonfires. They held an indigenous “parliament” and gathered with over 200 insurgents 
from Totora and Callapa (Pacajes province) to then descend and force the terrorized 
vecinos out of the village. However, the insurrection failed as the corregidor was 
advised in time and managed to persuade the divided protestors with promises of 
guarantees and a reward as well as through military intervention. Only three days later, 
a similar insurrection took place in Totora although the apoderado of the comunarios 
denied the assembling and armament of the indigenous population ant their aligning 
with the republicans nor liberals despite the cheering by pro-republican comunarios 
who had arrived from another ayllu.115  
The next year, rural unrest reached a climax in the anti-vecino attack of March 12 
and the indigenous slaughter on 14 March in Jesús de Machaca, one of the few 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
massacre of industrial workers in 1923 (see also Rivera 1987, 143-58).  The government thought of using 
Corque as a center for long-term detention of union leaders. 
113 This is what one comunario of Curahuara overheard. AJC, Penales, 1920, no. 785. 
114 Rogelio Imaña, Gerardo Campos and Paulino Valdéz were to be spared. The latter led the insurgents 
together with a jilaqata while the first betrayed his plans to the corregidor. One comunario declared to have 
been protected by his kinship ties to several vecinos and equally protected their houses. AJC, Penales, 1920, no. 
785. 
115 AJC, Penales, 1920, Sin no. 
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communities in La Paz that maintained its “free” status up to the 1953 agrarian reform 
(Choque and Ticona 1996; see also Choque 2008). Similar to the events of the year before 
in Carangas, insurgency was triggered by the constant abuses by the mestizo 
population, particularly the corregidor, and played out on the cleavage between liberal 
and republican affiliation with some ayllus explicitly deciding not to participate. In 
contrast to the turmoil in Curahuara and Totora, the rebellion, involving over 4000 
mobilized comunarios, effectively subjected the corregidor and other despised vecinos 
to communitarian justice, answered by brutal suppression. As insurgency spread to 
other provinces and departments, the rebellion became also a national political issue.  
Despite a law in 1925 which prohibited the sale of community land (“Ley de 8 de 
enero de 1925”; Platt 1982, 144), the government’s reaction to this “incurable 
maltreatment: the revolutionary mania, which detains the triumphal advance of our 
institutions”116 was in severing its discourse, denying the comunarios’ demand for land 
recovery,117 increased militarization and litigation against the caciques-apoderados.118 
By 1926, the government prohibited all indigenous gatherings in order to prevent the 
bloody inter-indigenous clashes that keep them from their agricultural work.119 
However, the next year, another major revolt occurred in Chayanta in the Potosí 
department (Platt 1982, chapter 4; Hylton 2003). Meanwhile in Carangas, community 
lands were threatened with invasion by the indigenous population of Toledo and it was 
reported that comunarios from various cantons in Carangas as well as in Poopó were 
preparing an insurrection against the cadastral operation which was however 
prevented through armed force (Calderón 1927, 12-3). Struggles would continue until 
the constitution of 1938 which restored the legitimacy of the corporative character of 
the indigenous communities.120 As with previous achievements, this gave a boost to the 
communal struggle for secure collective land rights and materialized, particularly in the 
 
                                                     
116 Own translation. Ibañez 1923, 3. 
117 “As a result of the revolution of July 12th, the indigenous population of the altiplano believed that they would be return 
them their lands; but I do not understand on what this belief is found, even more if the indigenous population of the 
altiplano have all their lands and still their large cultivation estates.” Own translation, Convención Nacional, 1921, 
vol. III, 25-IV-1921, fs. 31-50, cited in Rivera 1991, 647-8. 
118 The attacked rural elites declared that the caciques-apoderados who led the revolts did not belong to the 
indigenous “race” and rather exploited their subjects in order to obtain and certify, but also falsify, colonial 
documents from Sucre, presenting themselves as direct (hence illegitimate) community representatives 
before the Supreme Court and instigating rebellion (Rivera 1991, 646-7). 
119 Decree issued on 23 November 1926 (Calderón 1927, 14).  
120 “The State recognizes and guarantees the legal existence of the indigenous communities.” Own translation, article 
165 of the political constitution of Bolivia of October 30, 1938, Busch 1938 in Lexivox. See also Choque and 
Ticona 2010, 29. 
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post-Chaco context, in new forms of collaboration with national politicians, culminating 
in the 1953 Agrarian Reform (Rivera 1991, 642; Gotkowitz 2007).  
7.3 The ambiguity of the vecinos.  
Platt indicates the 1920 rebellions as a sign that the mestizos came to side with the 
“national” elites, by incorporating into the cadastre, hence the mestizo-indigenous anti-
Revisita resistance was broken (Platt 1982, 145-7). However, whereas local rural elites 
such as corregidores, hacendados, etc. are generally identified as the spearhead of the 
anti-community attacks, this counts foremost when and where state modernization, 
market development and railways reach the rural districts (Medinaceli 1987, cited in 
Rivera 1991, 644). While in Carangas, local insurrection also had a clear anti-vecino 
agenda, an important part of the vecino population somehow “dissolve” in that 
dichotomous picture as they incorporated into the padrones, that is, as contribuyente. 
Bacarreza hinted at this increasing overlap by referring to the “disappearance” of the 
vecinos as they reversed into comunarios 
However, as a class of “vecino-comunarios,” rather than a hacendado class 
developed, the insecurity caused by the Exvinculación law, even without being 
implemented, fostered the consolidation of local elite groups as well (Ayllu Sartañani 
1992, 85). While vecino-comunarios gave more backing to the contribuyente reservoir 
supporting the ayllu’s fiscal-legal bonds to the departmental treasury, the political 
organization of rural life came more strongly in mestizo hands. Still, in the eyes of the 
state, the vecinos were identified as the culprit of indigenous rebellion and more 
particularly the impasse in the land reform process. In the following, the interference of 
the vecinos in the discussed resistance to the land reform, the interests behind their 
participation and the outcome of their immersion will be analysed and illustrated. 
7.3.1 “This new kind of tinterillos, apoderados and  consejeros.” Sights 
were turned to the culprits. 
When Bacarreza in 1910 drew attention to the prevalence of incursions between 
neighbouring communities in the province, he particularly warned for the exploitation 
of these conflicts by abogados tinterillos or “crooked” lawyers (Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 
2006, 373). Some ten years later, the Sub-Prefect of Carangas repeated how the juridical 
framework was manipulated by this “race of loafers who innocently pretend to occult 
themselves under the name of defenders or protectors” (Lima 1921, 110-2). Instead of 
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attempting to solve the infinite series of intra-community disputes, Lima explained, 
vecinos had found an interest in (manipulating) the numerous land disputes in the 
province. As no authority in de province ever gave attention to these –mostly minor- 
disputes, their initially easy and peaceful resolution has become ever more improbable 
and rather fostered the escalation of conflicts and violence.   
“The violations successively provoked between the litigating indigenous groups, 
whose actions seem unexpected and unforeseen, have been prepared in advance 
with great care by a new species of tinterillos [pen-pushers], apoderados [attorneys] 
and consejeros [counselors] that swarm in the villages of Carangas, instigating (sic) 
another series of criminal acts.”121 
There are few details as to why and how indigenous communities lend their support 
to provincials of influence, but only the fact that such relations existed and that these 
politicians at times even served as a community's spokesperson redraws the classic 
image of a State-building process free from indigenous participation (Irurozqui 1999, 
717). Contrary to the general discourse of national elites, the intervention of vecino-
apoderados did not simply stem from the passive subjugation of vulnerable comunarios 
to the mestizo search for short-term gains. At the one hand, the caciques-apoderados 
movement disposed of its own writers with enough knowledge of Spanish and the 
methods of editing formal petitions (Condori and Ticona 1992). At the other hand, the 
communities gradually got the vecinos “at their side”. While indigenous self-
government continued to be thwarted by obstacles of language and literacy of which 
“tinterillos” etc. knew to take advantage and by the firm persistence of inter-ethnic 
segregation and asymmetrical power relations, the consistence, autonomy and strategic 
coordination of indigenous resistant agency cannot be played down to a superficial 
understanding of mestizo-indigenous interactions (Platt 1987, 314). 
Local vecinos not only intervened as legal advisors and spokespersons in function of 
purely mestizo interests, but actively contributed to anti-Revisita resistance.122 At the 
one hand, there were the apoderados with no ‘strings attached’ to indigenous claims 
and even upholding a corrupt and exploitative reputation, who base their 
representation on their powerful position and connections to the executive and judicial 
 
                                                     
121 He continues that these protracted litigations “favour in the first place all these unqualified lawyers for its slow 
development, and also favour the qualified lawyers in the successive courts on a larger scale, while harmful and disastrous 
only for the fighting indigenous communities, whose individual and collective economy will suffer more intensively the 
longer the original litigation and the more numerous the criminal ramifications that are being detached, succeeded and 
attached.” Own translation. Lima 1921, 111-2. 
122 The list of apoderados (Appendix 11) constitutes one big tangle of powerful and competing vecino families. 
However, for many apoderados we dispose of insufficient data to speculate on, let alone reconstruct, their 
background and motives. 
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powers.123 In order to register communal property documents, communities called upon 
mestizo lawyers to whom they had no particular or intimate bond but who could give 
them access to court.124 At the other hand, the relation of many apoderados with the 
comunarios they represented transcended the ‘norm’ that regulated vecino-
comunario/mestizo-indigenous bonds. Some were even very explicitly identified as 
“protectors” (defensores) of the indigenous population.125 Vecino-apoderado alignment 
with the communities was thus backed by diverse motives and tactics in which blunt 
domination and divide and rule manipulations intertwined with more subtle 
dependency bonds. This brought them in an ambiguous position that explains how 
these people came to defend the very people from whose submission and resources they 
lived.  
The tighter their integration in communal networks, the more beneficial became 
apoderado mediation and the more controversial their position towards the central 
state. Apart from short-term profits, vecinos were motivated to represent a communal 
cause by their political and economic stake in local claims due to their own 
administrative and commercial activities.126 In a growing number of cases, this 
communal cause was internalized as very sayañeros themselves. Some of these families 
inverted their energy in enlarging and securing their own land rights without assuming 
 
                                                     
123 A clear example is Pantaleón Arias, citizen based in the city of Oruro and functioning as Intendente in 
Carangas, who was repeatedly accused by comunarios for abuses yet very powerful and hence appointed by 
several communities to defend their land rights. Orinoca and Andamarca, for instance, entrusted the 
recuperation of their estate in Santiago de Quitarge to him and Turco wanted him to register its composición 
titles. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1922, no. 35; 1929, no. 13-15. See also AJC, Penales, 1920, no. 816. 
Also Casiano Montealegre and his son Zenobio, citizens and private landowners residing in different cantons, 
acted as apoderado of several communities without displaying close attachement to the comunarios’ world. 
AJC, Civiles, 1914, no. 31; 1916, no. 31.  
124 Victor Manuel Barientos and Emilio Zuñiga are examples of lawyers who were both (separately) 
approached by several ayllus (in Totora, Turco, Sabaya, Choquecota, Andamarca, Corque, Huaillamarca and 
Chuquichambi) to authenticate and register the adjudication of individual sayañas or composición titles in the 
Property Rights office in the late 1920s. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1925, no. 20; 1926, no. 2, 20, 22; 
1927, no. 21; 1929, no. 16, 41-43, 47-49, 54-55; 1930, no. 4, 7b, 7c, 11-16, 17c, 18.  
125 Examples are Daniel Barriga, who “defended” ayllu Sacari (Sabaya) in 1903 against ayllu Canasa, 
“protected” by Juan de la Cruz Arias. More remarkable is Eloy Altamirano, who in 1920 would become the 
target of in indigenous revolt as corregidor of Curahuara, but in 1913 was indicated and auto-identified as 
“apoderado of the Indians.” ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1903, no. 6; AJC, Penales, 1913, no. 3; Civiles, 
1909, no. 15 and 1910, no. 10. 
126 Vecinos occupying an administrative function could increase (or at least feign) the legitimacy of their local 
power base when being appointed as apoderado; a form of clientelism that is observed or was attributed to 
several political officers. Commercial motives were also a reason to take up an apoderado function, as did 
merchant Ramon Funez, who probably had particular interests in the tambo of Cosapa when representing the 
communal land property claims of the comunarios of Cosapa. AJC, Civiles, 1907, no. 23 and 1910, no. 27.  
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an active apoderado role, as was the case with the Fernández in Sabaya,127 the Vargas in 
Corque128 or the Ortega’s in Turco (Pauwels 1983, 217). But several took up a stronger 
commitment in representing the comunarios of the canton where they resided and 
where they were registered as contribuyentes themselves. In chapter 6, the case of Juan 
Lascano was already discussed.129 Another typical case is Pedro Flores, a merchant, 
proprietor and resident of the city of Oruro who executed the office of corregidor in 
Sabaya, where he simultaneously was registered as originario in ayllu Sacari.130 
Similarly, in ayllu Tuaña, Andres Portillo, Juan de la Cruz Quispe and Toribio Flores were 
known as merchants pertaining to the village elite yet also registered as comunarios.131 
All three were involved in communal actions, as apoderado for their community and 
even as rebellion leaders.132 Other examples are the Rojas in Sabaya,133 the Rocha family 
 
                                                     
127 They were merchants, sayañeros and powerful residents in Sabaya, but apart from Manuel Felix, the 
members of this family do not seem to take an active apoderado role. Rather, they focused on their own 
personal commercial and estate interests through wills, transfers, dispossession, etc. ADRO, Propiedades 
Provincias, Carangas, 1913, no. 1, 2; 1914, no. 4; 1915, no. 2, 1916, no. 10, 1917, no. 11, 1924, no. 11, 1928, no. 19, 
1929, no. 16, 1930, no. 29. See also AJC, 1875, no. 1464; Civiles, 1914, no. 2. 
128 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1924, no. 1; AJC, Penales, 1900 no. 3; 1906, no. 10 and 33; Civiles, 1912 
no. 2; 1913, no. 2; 1914, no. 13; 1916, no. 28. 
129 Lascano was again appointed as apoderado in 1918, but this time restricted to the separate ayllus of Cosapa, 
Andamarca and Huaillamarca. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1918, no. 10-12. 
130 His name appears as apoderado of his community in the litigation over their boundaries with other ayllus, 
at times coinciding with departmental and international divides. To prevent confusion, he is not the same 
Pedro Flores who was assassinated in the 1899 by Turco insurgents. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 
1909, no. 2 and 3-4; 1911, no. 1 and 6; 1918, no. 4. See also AJC, Penales, 1904, no. 4. 
131 Portillo even obtained the post of corregidor around 1915. AJC, Penales, 1905, no. 14. ADRO, Propiedades 
Provincias, Carangas,  1915, no. 2 and 1916, no. 10. 
132 The name of Quispe had already appeared in 1898, together with Lascano as apoderado general in an appeal 
for Revisita exemption. After the violent clashes of 1899 and after an umpteenth inter-ayllu clash, Quispe 
defended Tuaña’s rights to compensation from Turco and from ayllu Collana to restore the mutual 
relationship. In 1926, both Portillo and Flores were, separately, appointed to procure colonial property 
documents; the former in name of Huachacalla and the latter as representative of Sabaya and Huachacalla. 
AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” fs. 20-20v. ADRO, 
Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1903, no. 7; 1906, no. 4; 1914, no. 2 and 3; 1926, no. 18, 19, 27 and 30. AJC, 
Penales, 1907, no. 6. 
133 Facundo Rojas represented ayllu Cumujo and ayllu Sacari in the defense of their land property, Manuel 
Rojas was apoderado of comunarios in Pisiga (ayllu Cumujo) and Nicario Rojas was appointed as one of 
Sabaya’s apoderados regarding the revision of community boundaries. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 
1909, no. 7; 1916, no. 8 and 9; 1917, no. 4; 1928, no. 6. See also AJC, Civiles, 1914, no. 31. This family was 
registered in the 19th century padrones, in aylllus Sacari and Cumujo. ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes 
de la Provincia de Carangas.”, 1877, fs. 147-9. 
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in Huaillamarca,134 and the López135 in Turco. The case of the Condori’s in Huachacalla136 
-clearly a native name- points to the mixed Spanish and cacique descent. 
Vecino co-optation of local struggles was motivated by the combination of a political-
economic status as vecino as their social-fiscal status as comunario. Interestingly, many 
of the vecinos who acted as apoderado or even as rebellion leaders in the first decades 
of the 20th century tapped into the 1899 events, in which strong intra- and inter-ethnic 
alliances and rivalries were rooted.137 As rivalry and assault were rife among the mestizo 
population, inter-family feuds constituted an important factor in their ‘complicity’ with 
indigenous mobilization.138 At the other hand, local elite groups handily made use of 
inter-ayllu struggles. While using the apoderado status to consolidate and legitimize 
their own power base, vecinos  accused rivals upholding that status of refutable 
clientelism.139 This involvement in community affairs and the sour inter-vecino 
relations redraws the image of clear-cut segregation. In that sense, the case of the 
apoderados adds to the argument that vecino-comunario relations were much more 
 
                                                     
134 Zacarias Rocha was apoderado of ayllu Mitma after intrusion by ayllu Tunca in 1892. The family themselves 
also became subject to land usurpation in the 1910s. In the 1877 Revisita, only three Rocha’s, including 
Zacarias, were registered as tributarios (ayllu Parco). ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1924, no. 14 and 
1928, 3-5. ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.”, 1877, fs. 62v-63v. 
135 See also references in 4.3, 6.1, 6.3 and in this chapter. 
136 The family was involved in a land sale in 1898 and later, Domingo Condori was apoderado of ayllu Camacha. 
The Condori’s appear in the 1877 Revisita in ayllus Collana, Capi and Camacha of Huachacalla. AJC, 1898, no. 
2379; ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1924, no. 4. ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la 
Provincia de Carangas.”, 1877, fs. 133v-4, 137v, 139v-40. 
137 Many vecino-apoderados were directly affected by the events of the Great Rebellion, which is again 
illustrated by Portillo, Quispe and Flores’ apoderado role. Andres Portillo and Juan de Dios Cruz Quispe were 
main actors in the 1899 conflict between Huachacalla and Turco, where they clashed with Toribio Flores, who 
led the Turco insurgents in 1899 against the ‘alonsos’ of Huachacalla. Portillo and Quispe accused Toribio 
Flores as responsible for the assassination of Pedro Flores and clashed with him in other inter-community 
encounters. AJC, Penales, 1903, no. 3; 1904, no. 11 and 1905, no. 14. See also ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, 
Carangas, 1906 and 1910. Other examples are Pantaleón Arias, whose brother was murdered by insurgent 
comunarios (AJC, 1900, no. 2434) and Esteban Vargas, who since 1899 lived at odds with the indigenous 
population of Carangas whereas in 1898 he still fiercely supported the communities’ claims (see 6.4). This 
change of hearts probably has to do with the assault on the properties and lives of other Vargas during the 
rebellion. AJC, Penales, 1900, no. 3; 1906, no. 10 and 33.  
138 The case of Quispe, Portillo and Flores is exemplary. Portillo and Quispe lived at odds with Flores; a 
sustained rivalry that can be traced back to the 1899 clash between “alonsos” and “pandos” in Huachacalla 
and was rooted in the contested property rights over terrains in Huachacalla. AJC, Penales, 1903, no. 3; 1904, 
no. 11 and 1905, no. 14. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1905, no. 14; 1907, no. 6.  
139 That indigenous mobilization served inter-vecino rivalry is demonstrated in the dispute between Juan Eloy 
Altamirano, alpaca wool trader in Curahuara, and Ricardo Montalvo, at that time corregidor of Curahuara, 
who would have instructed a group of comunarios to attack the former. Both accused each other of aggressing 
the comunarios in order to extort indigenous support for their representative power. AJC, Penales, 1913, no. 3. 
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complex and interwoven with longer histories of resistance and intimate (kinship) ties. 
This is also illustrated by the testimony of Enrique Rafael, who as cacique of Totora 
speaks from a non-vecino, usually omitted perspective. It was because of his 
compadrazgo and friendship bonds with some “whites” of the village that the 
authorities were informed about an imminent indigenous anti-Revisita and anti-white 
uprising in his community.140 This demonstrates that mestizo-indigenous 
entanglements were much more durable yet ambiguous then provisional apoderado 
nomination. 
7.3.2 “We are from Indian tributary lineage.” The “humbling” of the 
vecinos.  
As can be attested for many powerful vecino families, the management of a double 
identity was no exception among Carangas’ villages (4.3). Powerful and segregated, the 
vecinos remained nonetheless a marginal group unable to compete with the strong 
community organization. As an effect, they gradually adopted the community 
membership themselves. This transformation stems from a long trajectory shaped by 
the combination of legal and illegal strategies gain and expand one’s access to 
communal resources, including land.  
The most sincere and personal way to integrate in the commoners’ world was 
through marriage, to which Bacarreza alluded, but also the forging of symbolic kinship 
ties was beneficial in the accumulation of wealth at the expense of the community. As 
compadre (godfather), vecinos established intimate contacts with the comunario 
population, which at times was rewarded by the appointment albacea (executor) and 
hence by a privileged access to their inheritance, which may include sayañas.141 A more 
formal method was to acquire a sayaña by replacing retired or deceased 
contribuyentes,142 to convert alienable land into sayaña land,143 or –although strictly 
 
                                                     
140 His ‘sabotage’ probably influenced the later conflict between his ayllu and one of the rebelling aylus. AJC, 
Penales, 1910, no. 7; Civiles, 1916, no. 31. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1911, no. 2; 1913, no. 3 and 1925, 
no. 9.  
141 Luis Lujan and his wife Petrona Delgado, for example, acted as compadres of a poor pastoralist widow who 
possessed just a couple of animals. When she dies, her possessions are transferred to her spiritual parents who 
she had appointed as her unique albaceas and heirs. AJC, 1893, no. 2240. 
142 Belisario Ampuero was a citizen residing in Totora with sayaña rights in ayllu Sapana and had acted as 
apoderado of Totora in the sale of their estate in Pisaqueri. In a dispute between two comunarios over a 
sayaña, Ampuero claimed the land as his property which he had obtained in 1913 through the voluntary 
transfer by a comunario whom he from then on replaced as contribuyente. From then on, Ampuero started 
paying the territorial contribution but there rose protest against his rights over those lands. AJC, Penales, 1906, 
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illegal- to simply purchase the sayaña.144 However, it was not always clear whether these 
transfers involved an effective monetary sale transaction and whether communal 
governance and fiscal duties over the concerned resources were respected.145 Despite 
this confusion, vecinos were certainly not too embarrassed to manipulate their access to 
the juridical and administrative system in order to put their relationships with the 
comunarios to work more effectively, and in so doing managed to circumvent 
communitarian obstacles.146 Indeed, the emergence of a vecino-comunario class cannot 
be told without a sizeable amount of fraud, authority abuse and blatant usurpation.147 
Although there is little evidence of the apoderado role assumed by the previously 
presented López family, their history is a good illustration of how several “conversion 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
no. 2, fs. 8-9v; Civiles, 1903, no. 1; 1915, no. 25; 1916, no. 35. A similar case happened in Totora between the 
comunario Fermin Mamani and the vecino Avelino Campos, when the latter replaced the former as absolute 
owner of his sayaña, hence starting to pay contribución. AJC, Civiles, 1916, no. 24. Interestingly, both Ampuero 
and Campos never use the denomination “contribuyente”, “indígena” or “originario” as other ‘vecino-
comunarios’ did.  
143 In Sabaya, three merchants ceded their private village lands to the community and petitioned their 
adjudication as community land. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1913, no. 1 and 2; 1928, no. 19. 
144 Whereas sayañas were not marketeable, several vecinos, such as the members of the Canaviri family in 
Chuquichambi, effectively purchased sayaña lands. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1929, no. 57 and 
1930, no. 6 and 7b. 
145 An indication is Eulogio Valdéz’ relation to his claimed sayaña. Valdéz was a merchant from Huachacalla 
who acquired a piece of community land after winning a lawsuit against a fellow villager. The land had a value 
of 502 bs, which may correspond to a due payment of the defendant. However, later he was accused of having 
appropriated sayaña land on basis of his friendship with the corregidor and without paying taxes for any 
sayaña. AJC, Penales, 1906, no. 14 and ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1908, no. 1 and no. 26. Also 
Victoriano Ala claimed to be contribuyente (ayllu Sullcavi, Corque) but was nevertheless accused of seizing 
community land without paying the head tax or delivering the due services of every contribuyente. AJC, 
Civiles, 1910, no. 2. See also ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1909, no. 5. 
146 According to the comunarios of  Corque, Belisario Bernal belonged to “the white race” and hence never 
possessed a single inch of community land. However, when accused having seized an agregado’s sayaña under 
pretext of acting under orders of the authorities of Corque, the judge eventually absolved Bernal. A couple of 
years later, the comunarios of one of Corque’s ayllus even appointed him as apoderado to defend their 
territorial rights against ayllu Cupiaza. AJC, Civiles, 1910, no. 39 and 1914, no. 9. 
147 Such accusations were also flying among the vecinos themselves. An earlier incident occurred in 1873 
between Manuel Santiago Ortega, a miner active in La Rivera, and Manuel Viza, representative of Todos 
Santos. The latter community had accused Ortega of usurping community lands to which he responded by 
condemning Viza of expanding his immense lands at the border with Peru. Viza might have rightly accessed 
these lands, as his name appears in the padrón of 1871, paying an annual head tax of 7 pesos, but interestingly, 
Viza clearly pertained to the mestizo merchant class and was registered as citizen, which were probably 
important factors in obtaining his large land base. Ortega’s strategy of stressing Viza’s indigenous status to 
undermine his position is turned around by Viza, stressing the fact that Ortega cultivates community lands for 
which he does not pay tributo. AJC, 1873, no. 1293. ANB, Rv, 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de 
Carangas.”, 1871, f. 165. 
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mechanisms” were brought into play and the repercussions they had over the longer 
term. In the course of the studied period, this powerful clan of vecinos became in fully 
integrated as comunarios of ayllu Collana in Turco. Noteworthy to mention, this 
integration coincides with the consolidation of their political and economic power, 
which was a very violent process of both inter-vecino rivalry as vecino-comunario 
exploitation, as discussed in chapter 4.3. The trajectory of the López was certainly not 
an isolated phenomenon in the region, but probably the most documentable case for 
one single family. 
Their comunario roots must be traced back to their first claims over community land. 
By the beginning of the 19th century, the López possessed grazing lands called “Pampa 
López” on the border between Turco and Sabaya. However, despite several manoeuvres, 
Juan Crystósomo, first member of the family to settle in Turco, never get hold of formal 
property rights over those lands.148 In contrast, his son Juan López managed to obtain 
legitimate access to sayaña lands in ayllu Collana by the middle of the century, although 
the exact procedure of his inclusion remains unclear.149 Over the following decades, 
Juan’s sons were included into the originario class of the same ayllu as well, but in 
different ways. Being registered as próximo, Gregorio only had to wait until he turned 
18 and his father reached the age of reservado to then automatically acquire the status of 
contribuyente originario.150 Juan de la Cruz, however, appears separately in the list of 
originarios for being an illegitimate child.151 As “Spanish, adoptive son of Juan López and 
Juana Iquiqi” he had to gain sayaña access by his own means, which he probably did via 
the marriage with his wife Dominga Canqui, a mestiza descendent of a colonial cacique 
family and hence usufructing community lands.152 Their younger brother Guillermo was 
only included by the last Revisita effectuated in Carangas, in 1877, but both he and 
Gregorio were surprisingly enlisted in ayllu Sullca-salli, also in Turco, while their father 
and illegitimate brother remained registered in Collana.153 
Once included in the Revisita, both brothers directed their efforts to the expansion of 
their land base. In 1867, Gregorio requested the adjudication of vacant sayaña land  
 
                                                     
148 AJC, Legajo 1 (1679-1796), 1787-1835, no. 144, cited by Pauwels 1983, 212-3. 
149 In the padrones of 1838, the family is still excluded from the Revisita but by 1852, Juan López and his wife 
Juana Iquisi appear as originarios con tierras in ayllu Collana. ABMO, no. 391, Padron general de contribuyentes de la 
provincia de Carangas, 1838 and no. 426, Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas, 1852, f. 136v. 
150 ANB, Rv, 225. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1860, no. 226, f. 125v. and 1864, no.227, f. 128v. 
151 ANB, Rv, 225. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1860, no. 226, f. 126.  
152 AJC, 1886, no. 1920. See also Pauwels 1983, 223. 
153 ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, f. 117v, 123v and 124v. 
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“because my parents belong to the contribuyente caste I find myself registered as 
originario in the mentioned ayllu of Collana; and as up to now I do not possess a 
small plot of land for farming or the grazing of my few livestock.”154  
One year later, both Gregorio and Juan de la Cruz petitioned the sub-Prefect once 
more for vacant land in order to enable them to pay the annual head tax.155 The 
remarkable thing is that Juan de la Cruz at that time executed the office of corregidor in 
Turco.156 It was exactly this capacity to switch between both spheres according to the 
opportunities of the moment that was their most vital asset in maintaining and 
consolidating their wealth and legitimacy. Particularly Gregorio López resulted quite 
skilled in that sense, presenting himself before the state as “first class taxpayer” 
[originario] when defending his own acquired sayañas,157 and as “citizen” when 
defending his commercial158 or executor159 interests. However, while Gregorio 
apparently managed to combine these identities without too much protest –except from 
the usual slander among vecinos- his brother Celestino’s claims over sayaña land in 
ayllu Jila Pumiri (Turco) did rouse vehement comunario opposition. In response to the 
comunarios’ disapproval of his “contribuyentización”, he objected that 
“me and my brothers, we are from indigenous tributary lineage, the proof is that 
my very own brothers pay the indigenous tribute and me too I have paid already 
two years.”160 
Despite his protest, he was expulsed from the sayaña and the ayllu because  
“as his roots do not belong to the indigenous and tributary race nor is he 
registered in any [taxpayers-] list of our canton, he has no right nor option to the 
repartimiento terrains [or to] become proprietor for being strong and brother of 
the corregidor.”161  
Celestino was certainly not the only vecino facing similar objections. It demonstrates 
that the vecinos, incarnation of the exploitation of the free indigenous communities and 
 
                                                     
154 AJC, 1867, no. 993, “Documentos de posesión de la sayaña de Guaño Oco pertenecientes al indígena Gregorio 
Lopez.” 
155 AJC, 1868, no. 1026 and no. 1042. 
156 AJC, 1868, no. 1042. 
157 AJC, 1870, no. 1139. 
158 AJC, 1871, no. 1201. 
159 AJC, 1871, no. 1224. 
160 AJC, 1887, no. 1996. 
161 AJC, 1888, no. 2055. That year, his brother Guillermo López was corregidor in Turco (Pauwels 1983, 224). 
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simultaneously members of that same community, found themselves in a very 
paradoxical condition. Efforts to access a wider fan of economic resources had to be 
supported by an extension of their social networks into the community sphere which 
forced them to constantly and attentively move between two “worlds”. Constrained in 
this condition of negotiated interdependence with the comunarios, their overtures 
towards the community gave way to what Pauwels terms a process of “indianization” 
(Pauwels 1983, 213). Bacarreza seems to support this thesis by observing that  
“the mestizo (...) accommodates to his [the indigenous’] social environment in 
that he, systematically, takes care of eliminating the distinct factors of his race or 
to assimilate to his narrow and egoistic habits.”162 
In effect, the process of “contribuyentización” reinforced the disappearance of the 
vecinos, which had started with the abandonment of the mines in late colonial times. As 
a result, this produced a decline in the registration of white-mestizos and “urban” 
people “without land”, which was particularly noted by the start of the 20th century, 
while the number of “civilians” remained high and indigenous population numbers 
rose, pointing to a small but important overlap (see 4.3). As several functionaries in 
previous years had already hinted at (see chapter 6), this overlap had implications for 
the (non-)advance of the exvinculación process. To the extent that community lands 
were added to their fortune, whether through legal channels or not, the execution of 
the Revisita General became an undesirable intrusion of their interests.  
While their formal registration as contribuyente did not impede the preservation of 
their privileges, this consequential conflict of interests fostered the full vecino 
integration in the community. Their intrusions and alliances demonstrate their 
willingness to abandon their (self-)assumed racial superiority. Later, the comunarios 
would recall that “the vecinos have swallowed their pride”.163 In a sense, the imbrication of 
the vecinos with the community mitigated the segregation between those two “worlds” 
and consequently impeded the outbreak of a violent conflict as occurred in the hacienda 
regions in anticipation to and during the declaration of the Agrarian Reform. While the 
vecinos played an equivalent role to the hacendados, their strategic response to the 
local land question did not result in their expulsion but in their “fusion” with the 
community. As the remaining vecino families converted into an integral part of the 
 
                                                     
162 Own translation. Bacarreza 1910, cited in Pauwels 2006, 373. 
163 Testimony of a comunario in Turco during a workshop with the Third Age Association of Turco. Turco, 
23.11.2008. 
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community,164 a cycle of elite formation initiated decades before came to a close, 
allowing room for new emerging elites, “el nuevo vecindario”.165 
In the eyes of the central state, this gradual absorption by the Aymara comunarios, 
which they termed as assimilation, undermined the function the vecinos had been 
attributed as guardians of “modernity” and pacifiers indigenous insurgency. In the 
official discourse, the vecinos came to be perceived as the very cause of regional 
backwardness and communal insubordination – read: their excessive extortion and the 
way in which they “disappeared” hypothecated the prospects for national incorporation 
of the “savage” Indians (Mendieta 2010, 240-256).  
7.4 Assimilating “barbaric” indigenous, circumventing “idle” 
vecinos. 
While the vecinos upheld an evident monopoly at the provincial lever, they never came 
to fulfil the “assimilating” role attributed to them by the republican state. On the 
contrary, their interests gradually interwove with those of the community. The state’s 
inability to get a grip on this ambiguous local vecino-comunario interaction led to a 
reorientation in  state-community relations. White elites with no personal bonds to the 
provinces detected in the “disappearance” of the vecinos an assimilation process in the 
“wrong” direction. The “reversion” of white-mestizo presence mentioned by Bacarreza 
had been predicted more radically in 1885 by a Chilean visitor of the province on basis 
of the unalterable and strategic indigenous anchoring within the economic structure of 
the country. 
 “I believe that two races in opposition; the inferior always tends to disappear: this 
is the law of nature, the law of Darwin; but when these two races tend to match 
instead of destroying each other, it is evident that the superior will find itself in 
the situation, if it is minor in number, of adopting the language, the customs and 
 
                                                     
164 In effect, the descendants of the López family still reside in Turco yet not anymore as vecinos. Personal 
communication with Gilberto Pauwels (26.7.2012) and field work in Turco (2008-2012). 
165 Despite this opening, the division between comunarios and vecinos was only very slowly torn down, which 
explains why the same names continued to dominate the local policital posts until into the 1970s (Pauwels 
1983, 706-8). Meanwhile, a new village elite was emerging, taking over the vecino monopoly over petty trade 
and transport (the arrival of trucks and busses). Pauwels 1983, Rivière 1982, West 1981. See also Llanque 2011, 
Tassi 2012 and Spedding 2013 on the formation of Aymara elites. 
  373 
the nature of the inferior race. Or it extinguishes in struggle, or it prevails if that 
struggle does not exist: I believe this is the dilemma that time will proof in the 
elevated plateaus of Bolivia.”166  
He pleaded for a nationwide counteraction to this tendency, but the editors of the 
Bulletin who published this travel account at that time still defended the Bolivian pro-
white immigration policy in which “enlightened” state representatives would definitely 
break the local indigenous prevalence (Pauwels 1983, 234). In post-1899 Bolivia, 
however, the Liberal government adapted that discourse, fundamentally repudiating its 
former alliance with the indigenous leadership. The indigenous population, particularly 
the Aymara, was no longer portrayed as a passive victim of  colonially rooted injustice 
but became “savages” that had dragged the entire nation into a “war of races” 
(Mendieta 2010, 239-78). However, “once understood that the Indians were savage beings 
mistreated by the actions of local powers,” Mendieta concludes, “they started to redeem them 
in the sense that the true culprits of what happened were the members of the provincial elites and 
local authorities,”167 both for their abuse of as –paradoxically- for their intimacy with the 
comunarios. The post-1899 stress on indigenous savageness was nothing new as such, 
but the very cause of this indigenous danger was no longer detected with the 
indigenous themselves. Instead of disciplining the indigenous population, it was argued, 
the vecinos had mortgaged the hopes for national progress. 
Particularly the local authorities -in the first place the corregidores,168 but also the  
clergy169- were targeted, for passively neglecting the region and its population’s 
advancement and even actively instigating unrest among the comunarios. Already in 
1896, the Prefect of Oruro commented on  
“the state of barbarism in which our Indians find themselves, despite living 
between civilized people. Therefore it must be questioned why the priests and the 
municipal councils do not focus all their action and energies to establish schools 
and regenerate the new rising generation of indigenous people?”170  
Lima added that these state representatives, “performing in the centres of major native 
population, are with honourable exceptions the most pernicious elements that suck them [the 
 
                                                     
166 Own translation. Orrego Cortez, A. “Viaje a Carangas” in: Boletin de la Oficina Nacional de Estadística, 8 (1912), 
no. 73-76, 11, cited in Pauwels 1983, 234. 
167 Own translation. Mendieta 2010, 277. 
168 See for instance the Prefect’s critique in 1923 (Ibañez 1923, 23-4) 
169 See for instance AJC, Penales, 1913, no. 15. 
170 Own translation. Portal 1896, 4. 
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native population] up and degrade them, fomenting their demoralization”171 The angle of the 
vecino problem was in the double perception of their role by both the central state and 
the indigenous communities. While their intermediation was felt as an indispensable 
representation channel, or was imposed as such by legal impositions, it was at the same 
time distrusted and perceived as contra-productive. Gradually, state-community 
relations started to reorient towards a more direct interaction, encouraging the 
mestizos to detach from inter-ethnic associations. Despite the critique, the government 
nonetheless continued to stake at the white avant-garde, entrusted with the 
regeneration of the province remains dominant.172  However, by installing a breach 
between the “dangerous” comunarios and their allies, political party leaders in fact 
brought in the Trojan Horse that pushed for a national rather than a non-indigenous 
hegemony (Platt 1982, 1987), as the 1952 National Revolution would make clear. 
Guardian of the nation? Opening up the province, fencing off the border.  
Over the first decades of the 20th century, the central government pretended to assume 
a more active role in ‘civilizing’ the indigenous -and particularly rebellious- population 
and in incorporating peripheral -and particularly borderland- areas. In order to foment 
regional progress, resource frontiers were to be opened up, cross-border influences 
blocked off and mestizo-indigenous entanglements neutralized. This demanded a more 
complete knowledge of the province’s properties. This information was provided at the 
national level by the execution of a national census in 1900173 and at the provincial level 
by the elaboration of the Bacarreza report174 and Lima’s ethnography.175 These detailed 
studies were envisioned to form the basis for concrete state initiatives to establish a 
more structural and profitable link between the local and the national level. Parallel 
with the proposals and measures to develop local production systems  (7.1), a range of 
 
                                                     
171 Own translation. Lima 1921, 7. 
172 While not denying that Carangas had always been known as a “dreadful province”, Lima thought observing 
clear indications of a rosy patriotic future. The signs thereof are in the establishment of (by then) 10 patriotic 
associations (most founded in 1919) with a total of 312 members. there activities include football or shooting 
clubs, but also take up engineering projects etc. Lima 1921, 206-9. 
173 Blanco 2006 [1904], LXVI-LXXXV. However, it must be noted that the data of this census are less complete 
and liable than those presented by Bacarreza. 
174 In 1910, the Ministry of Colonization and Agriculture had commissioned Zenón Bacarreza to conduct an 
inspection in order to determine the prospects for regional progress of the Carangas province (1910, cited in 
Pauwels 2006, 350-403). 
175 Parallel to Eduardo Lima’s appointment as sub-prefect in order to execute a detailed investigation, the 
central government ordered similar “borderland” inspections in the the Caupolicán, Muñecas and Camacho 
provinces, inspired by Lima’s previous report on the Ulla Ulla area (Lima 1921, Preface). 
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initiatives were taken to create a more “legible” society. This implied that the 
achievement of a more direct access to the province’s exploitable resources had to go 
accompanied by a campaign to gain access to the hearts and minds of the province’s 
population. As the Prefect in 1916 explained, state presence had to be enhanced in order 
to guarantee the sovereignty of the Nation-State. 
 “Not only economic motives should influence our increased attention to that 
region of our border, but also considerations of nationalization of the inhabitants 
of those remote districts, which, intimately linked to the peoples of the Republic 
of Chile for reasons of commerce and frequent neighbourhood relations, have no 
affection for their fatherland.”176 
The central government’s efforts to strengthen and secure its grip on the border 
region were framed in an assimilationist state-building project, triggered to important 
extent by the repercussions of the War of the Pacific and the indigenous revolt of 1899 
and constant threats to its territorial and emotional integrity. As the Prefect of Oruro 
claimed in 1931, “given the conquering spirit of our international neighbour. The neglect of this 
region cannot subsist for more time, in order not to regret what we now deplore, having 
abandoned the Chaco region.”177 Moreover, this preoccupation was linked to the widening 
gap in the internal spatial organization of the nation, as observed between booming city 
of Oruro and the department’s immobile -“close to death”- provinces.178 As this internal 
distance seemed inversely proportional to the strength of its international connections, 
the Prefect insisted on the instilment of “a strong and compact national sentiment” (Tejada 
1921, 63). This preoccupation with patriotism particularly regarded the indigenous 
population whose indigence and “ignorance” was believed to hinder its constructive 
role in the Nation. Such paternalistic stance was rooted in the assumption that the 
corporative principles and rights underpinning the ayllu and the inequality ingrained in 
the tributo system undermined the indigenous potential for nation-building.179 
 
                                                     
176 Own translation. Lemaitre 1916, 59. 
177 Own translation. Fajardo 1931, 41. In 1928, a bloody dispute had taken place on the Bolivian-Paraguayan 
border, the territory known as the “Great Chaco”. In the following years, tensions increased and eventually 
almost the entire territory was lost through the Chaco War of 1932-1935 (Klein 2011, 168). 
178 In 1921, sub-prefect Lima emphasized this discrepancy to warn for an excessive centralization that 
overlooks the needs and potential of the provinces, as to criticize a further de-regionalization that would 
allow the political and economic intervention of “foreign elements” (Lima 1921, 1-3). That same year, the 
Prefect commented that “In Carangas, there exists a certain element that tries to influence the population and to secure 
sympathies for our neighbouring republic of the West.” (Tejada 1921, 63). 
179 As Irurozqui explains, the state’s incapacity to eliminate those principles in function of a homogenized 
nation, and its consequent dependence on the indigenous differential fiscal status and other mechanisms that 
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Accordingly, the state entrusted itself (and its local representatives) with mediating the 
indigenous access to citizenship via the implementation of adequate tools of 
assimilation such as military conscription or taxes, but in the first place schooling. 
With the installation of a representative system, education came to figure as a crucial 
state unification and civilization tool. Bolivia needed literate subjects in order to foster 
the progress of the nation (Brienen 2005, 324-5), particularly in border regions, where 
schools were conceived of as institutions to train children in fencing off the nation.180 
However, the central state was repeatedly reminded of the difficulties in this extensive 
and remote province because of the Chilean influence in the alphabetization of the 
population.181 Similarly, military conscription figured as a prominent assimilation 
instrument to apply to the indigenous population.182 But also this institution resulted 
difficult to introduce in Carangas, with several youngsters trying to escape their duty by 
immigrating to the saltpetre offices of Iquique (Morales 1910, 65). Another line of action 
was the dispatching of public health commissions to the provinces to halt the spread of 
infectious diseases.183 In order to ‘attach’ the countryside more closely to the centres of 
powers, the state underwent an administrative and juridical fragmentations in order to 
increase its local juridical184 and political-military presence.185 Ideas started to be 
expressed regarding the division of  the province (Calderón 1927,  39) and some of the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
impeded the peasantization and privatization of the comunarios, reinforced the state’s tutorship over public 
indigenous affairs (Irurozqui 1999, 738-40). 
180 Today, the same line of reasoning is followed at the border of the Pando department, as noticed by Perrier 
(2013, 14). 
181 The Prefect of Oruro expressed in 1909 that “the constant power of economy and labour provides in almost all 
cantons municipal schools destined to turn the indigenous race of Carangas into an element of national progress.” (Own 
translation, Ascarrunz 1909, 17). In 1916, it was stated the the indigenous inhabitants “have no notion at all of 
civil education, because the School has not arrived there, and, rather many of them educate their children in the 
neighbouring Republic” (Lemaitre 1916, 59), later confirmed by the Prefect’s warning that they were offered free 
education in Chilean schools (Arce 1924, 44). While schools were established in several village centres, these 
were hardly accessed by non-vecino children as they were living in the distant estancias. Moreover, the Arica 
region offered apparently more easily reachable schools in Azapa, Codpa, Poconchile, Socoroma, Belén and 
Putre (AHVD, Fondo de la Intendencia de Tacna y Gobernación de Arica, vol. 336, 23.11.1923). 
182 President Evo Morales himself admits that it was exactly in the garrison that he learned to defend the 
Fatherland (Stefanoni 2010, 7; cited in Perrier Bruslé 2013, 21). 
183 This happened particularly from the 1920s on, for instance in the context of a typhoid outbreak  (Ibañez 
1923, 37). 
184 In 1901, the office of “Rural Judges” was created with police and fast jurisdiction attributions. “Ley de 22 de 
noviembre de 1901.” 
185 Lemaitre 1916, 59. 
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smaller administrative units such as Sabaya, Todos Santos and Chuquichambi achieved 
an elevation of their status.186  
Despite governmental ambitions, Carangas did not cast off its peripheral character, 
reflected in the absence of urban, agrarian or industrial productive centres, which only 
intensified provincial authorities’ desperate complaint over governmental indifference 
toward this forgotten region and its problems. Of the several ‘development’ plans 
launched in those decades, hardly any was ever implemented. The lack of “steady means 
of communication” due to the government’s shortage of resources resulted as the greatest 
hindrance to govern the territory and include it in the “legible” society.187 The distance 
created by deficient infrastructure and the ‘escape routes’ offered by the desolate 
landscape converted Carangas in an open border and undermined its attachment to the 
national judicial, educational, fiscal, etc. system.188 Another source of frustration was the 
distrust, resistance and evasion on part of the local population wary of hidden fiscal 
agendas.189 Instead of actively resisting, the border allowed the local population -not 
only smugglers or labour migrants, but also tax evaders, deserters or criminal fugitives- 
to easily “escape” outside the government’s reach.  
 
                                                     
186 In 1911, Sabaya, vice-canton in Huachacalla, was elevated to an independent canton (“Ley de 25 de enero de 
1911.”). Todos Santos, a community of 22 contribuyentes, switched its status of parochial annex (anexo) of the 
vice-canton of Carangas for that of vice-canton of Sabaya (AJC, Civiles, 1914, no. 31). In 1914, Chuquichambi 
achieved the administrative level of canton (ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1929, no. 18). 
187 The Prefect affirmed this to “constitute a real impediment for the sub prefectural administration to control the 
entire Province, added thereto the lack of mobility, to be able to move from one point to another.” (Own translation. 
Fajardo 1931, 41). 
188 In 1898, the Prefect of Oruro pressured for a permanent patrol force, not only to survey the border, but also 
to enforce the judicial decisions, achieve the effective collection of the road provision tax and implement rural 
education (Aramayo 1898, 3 and 27-8). In 1909, the provincial representative made an argument for the 
construction of a telegraphic connection between the province and the town of Oruro “in order to avoid that 
these regions, serve as comfortable way for all the criminals and fugitive prisoners who want to fool the course of justice. 
The major part of the criminals take that road [through Carangas, from Oruro to Chile]. Several of them present 
themselves before the indigenous with such cynicism making them accept that they are national engineers, commissioned 
by the Prefecture etc. (sic), demanding their services. In that way they make their travel in all comfort to the coast, without 
being bothered” (Report by the sub-prefect of Carangas. Annex in Ascarrunz 1909, 107). Also indicted 
comunarios argumented that if they were really guilty they could have easily escaped to Chile (AJC, Penales, 
1920, no. 797). 
189 A concrete example of how many of the governmental projects failed to gain the support is Bacarreza’s 
mission in 1910. Although successful in delivering his report, his arrival to Curahuara had roused an 
indigenous revolt and his programme to establish model farms for camelid production made no headway 
because the comunarios were suspicious on the possible fiscal implications of the plans. Also in 1928, for 
instance, the planned rural census had failed due to suspicion of a camouflaged Revisita operation. AJC, 
Penales, 1913, no. 3. González 1929, 211; Pauwels 2006, 341. 
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However, it would take until the National Revolution of 1952 that the expansion of 
rural schooling and the universal suffrage managed to break through the walls that 
protected longstanding political and economic vecino monopolies (Carter 1964, 94-5; 
Pauwels 1983, 307). The fact that national inclusion remained an ambition far beyond 
the state’s capacity (and predisposition) cannot be merely interpreted from the 
perspective of its (lack of) economic means to implement required initiatives. Even 
though the integration mechanisms and their implementation were still in a very 
immature stage, indigenous openness to assimilation to the Spanish-speaking-white-
mestizo world entailed an embryonic, unexpected “boomerang” effect of governmental 
overtures. However, signs of such openness were generally downplayed by stressing the 
indigenous’ criminal inclination and infancy out of fear for an active indigenous 
leadership on the public political scenery and the persisting belief in their racial 
inferiority. From the community’s perspective, the imposition, and even active lobbying 
for access to the state and its effective appropriation did not imply a one-sided 
assimilation, but was paradoxically brought into play to keep the state at a distance.  
In or outside the shadows of the state? The “boomerang” effect of state-
indigenous overtures. 
Although indigenous response to these initiatives was to important extent marked by 
reluctance and suspicion, the state seemed -little by little- to win ground. The 
governmental concern over indigenous ‘civilization’ was increasingly met by indigenous 
pressures for inclusion. indigenous themselves found connections to the state, thereby 
“subscribing” to the aspired uniformization of the state apparatus and the imagined 
community it pretended to contain. The impression of a rapprochement was boosted by 
the discourse circulated by the indigenismo movement that pretended to voice the 
needs of powerless Indians while silencing (yet not nullifying) the power of indigenous 
resistance and leadership. It was triumphantly stated that “the indigenous population of 
the provinces of the Department aspire their incorporation into the civilized life, enjoying the 
rights that our laws  awards to all people without social class distinction.”190 However, as with 
the apoderados, these self-proclaimed pro-Indio white and mestizo spokespersons 
vowed “stark binary discourses of race and space that tried to secure the racial and political 
order in a dramatically changing society” (Baud 2009, 23). 
Thus, the suggestion of a straightforward merger of top-down and bottom-up 
demands is misleading. As national elites were busy discussing the possibility and 
 
                                                     
190 It was further reported that “several indigenous people have informed the Prefectura about their will to organize 
indigenous associations in order to safeguard their interests and improve their current culture” and that a pro-Indio 
Liga was being formed. Own translation. Calderón 1927, 14-5.  
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desirability of including the indigenous population as citizens, the latter were actively 
constructing their own citizenship ánd –as demonstrated in the Liberals’ ascendance 
after 1899- helping those elites in power (Brienen 2005, 344). What happened was that 
the indigenous population knew to convert state-imposed assimilationist policies, 
envisioned by the central state as conditioned by the abolition of ‘anti-modernity’ 
institutions of the ayllu and the tributo into political leverage to exactly support such 
communal structures (Mendieta 2010, 280-9; Brienen 2005, 327).  
Such appropriation was in the first place the case with education. While in former 
decades still reported as rejected by the local population,191 primary schooling became 
an explicit local demand which the Bolivian State apparently did not manage to meet. 
Alphabetization was an essential requisite in the granting of civil rights and, as the 
government and the communities both drove at, would neutralize the intervention of 
distrusted non-indigenous attorneys (Rivera 1991, 638). Yet it were exactly non-state 
initiatives by local elites that would provide in what the state claimed to monopolize.192 
The same tension surfaces regarding conscription. While evasion of military duties 
was rife during the first years, the indigenous population eventually entered the 
army.193 Their compliance was rebounded by the claim for a corresponding inclusion as 
first-class citizens; an argument that became undeniable after the Chaco war. Moreover, 
their consequent familiarity with fire arms  and war techniques would serve them in 
intimidatingly underpinning that claim.  
“Absolute” property rights (in the sense of validated by the central state, both for 
community and private lands) can be classified in the same range of “tokens of 
citizenship” that pushed comunarios’ struggle for communal and indigenous survival 
within the sphere of the state. Pressured by the heightened stress on commoners’ land 
rights security, local courts were filled with comunario petitions for formal 
adjudications, sayaña transfers, ayllu demarcations and property title registrations 
which at their turn served to defend the tenure of land in comunario hands. The 
entanglement of land rights and civil status is illustrated in how the comunarios of 
 
                                                     
191 In 1898, obligatory instruction for the rural population was found unfeasible as state schools “to date have 
not been established, because those indigenous are completely reluctant to the civilization and persistently refuse to send 
their minor children to a campus.” Own translation. Aramayo 1898, 3. 
192 Here, Brienen points to an interesting parallel in both education and other, particularly agrarian, reforms. 
On both lines, the result was quite different from what the republican regimes had aimed at, with hacienda 
expansion dwarfing individual proprietorship and  ‘autonomous’ schools outnumbering ‘civilizing’ state-
controlled schools (Brienen 2005, 344). 
193 In contrast to preceding years, 1913 witnessed the registration of a striking number of conscripts, including 
-to the surprise of the governmental authorities- predominantly youngsters of indigenous origin from the 
Carangas province (Morales 1913, 51-2). 
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Chuquichambi interpret their land rights security “trajectory” in terms of a road 
towards citizenship: 
“Since the time of colonialism we have been known first of all as the anexo 
[sub-parish] of Choquicota, with all obligations inherent to the service of the 
governors of those times, as there were the payment of the tax, to the crown 
of Spain, delivery of personal services to the authorities and the worst of all 
was, then,  the peregrination to the City of Potosí, in quality of mitayo and 
give our life in the mines of that City, all just to keep the land that had been 
distributed by the different Spanish authorities in our power. Afterwards, 
when we already entered the Republic, services were equally imposed on us 
in more or less human ways, but always approaching us as real outcasts, until 
we have been declared masters and proprietors of our lands by the law of 
October fifth of thousand eight hundred eighty four and its regulations of 
December 20th of the same year [proindiviso concessions], and thanks to these 
protecting laws we currently enjoy all rights and guarantees which 
correspond to all citizens of the Republic.”194 
The “culmination” of this trajectory and the simultaneous advancement towards the 
central state was in the community’s achievement of a higher status within the 
country’s administrative division, which came together with schooling, drinking water 
and embellished public spaces.195 While bottom-up demands for an increased 
administrative status may seem less controversial, they foreshadow the effective 
disintegration of the province and a thorough process of “cantonization” in the second 
half of the 20th century which, as the case of Todos Santos and Chuquichambi 
demonstrate, had serious repercussions on community cohesion.196  
The idea of a boomerang is founded in the paradox that while institutions as the 
school and the army at the one hand effectively immersed indigenous peasants in the 
 
                                                     
194 Letter to the Sub-Prefect, July 28th 1929. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1929, no. 18, f. 110v. 
195 ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1929, no. 18. 
196 As the literature on the changes on the Bolivian countryside of the second half of the 20th century points 
out, the competition for a more independent access to the central administration fuelled inter-community 
conflict and the erosion of communal structures. In Todos Santos, a comunario petitioned the sub-Prefect in 
1913 to remove Andres Visa and his son (próximo) from his sayaña as they refused -“advised by some bad men”- 
to move from the vice-canton of Carangas to the jurisdiction of Sabaya. If remaining with Carangas, Visa lost 
their rights on his sayaña because he did no longer pay contribución to the community of Todos Santos. 
According to the plaintiff, it concerns an extensive plot of land that could be ceded to two newly registered 
contribuyentes in Todos Santos, which moreover would mean an increase in taxpayers for the Treasury. AJC, 
Penales, 1913, no. 33. In 1929, Chuquichambi requested the Sub-Prefect for a formal recognition and 
dissemination of their administrative status as other cantons continue to approach them as “ayllu”. ADRO, 
Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1929, no. 18. 
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Spanish speaking world, they also provided the indigenous population with useful 
“arms”. Acquired literacy and military skills allowed them to mould their struggle for 
secure communal rights and emancipation into a struggle on equal terms. The following 
testimony of a community leader in the aftermath of the Jesús de Machaca revolt of 
1921 clarifies the drive behind this indigenous strategy to fight the state with its own 
weapons: 
“for crimes we did not even think of, they imprison and chase us relentlessly. That 
is, the inflexibility of  the laws only exists when petitioned by our enemies. This 
inequality has its origins in having legislated identically for the whites as for the 
Indians. We can read nor do we know the language in which the legislation of the 
fatherland is written, and nonetheless we need to abide by her”197 
As particularly court constituted an important battle ground for that struggle, the 
reinforcement of the caciques-apoderados movement in the 1920s went hand in hand 
with increasing indigenous pressures for rural school expansion schooling. But by 
achieving a closer access to government institutions and the laws that ruled them (as 
well as the treasury that depleted them), indigenous-state relations were subject to a 
commodification process. This double dynamic is recalled by the caveat that “by fighting 
European civilization on its own turf, indigenous peoples have had to accept some of the premises 
of that turf” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 10). Reading this assertion the other way round, the 
suggested boomerang effect also implies that assimilation tools can be appropriated to 
develop “strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm’s length” (Scott 2009). Thus, 
the tension between great state ambitions and discourse versus limited resources and 
capacity allowed for an expansion of the “room for manoeuvre” for communal action. 
Through the achievements obtained in 1952-’53, the ambiguous outcome of 
“emancipation-as-incorporation” policies, mechanisms and pressures and the 
consequent tension between inclusion and distance in quite autonomous regions such 
as Carangas would become even clearer. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
197 Own translation, ALP, EP, 1923, cited in Rivera 1991, 648-9. 
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Concluding remarks to Part III. How communal 
struggle cut the ground from under the law’s feet.  
Explanations on Carangas’ “exclusion from” exvinculación usually stop with pointing to 
the lack of privatization incentives due to ecological and demographic factors and the 
role of external pressures that remained beyond the control of indigenous communities. 
However, the presented case study evidences that the vital role of pastoralism and the 
apathy and absence on part of the (white and mestizo) landlord class has indeed 
contributed to the safeguarding of a remarkably high level of regional autonomy, which 
has favoured the persistence (and strengthening) of communal land rights. However, a 
close reading of the dynamics generated by the announcement and arrival of the 
Revisita demonstrates that exemption did not stem from mere oblivion towards remote 
grazing lands, but implied the active mobilization of the Carangas population to keep 
things that way.  
First, I have demonstrated in chapter 5 that the ambition of the law, defined in its 
first “phase”, was set on an anti-corporatist reorganization based on the principal of 
individual private property in function of a capitalist transition of the country. 
However, whilst this purpose and the consequent reform process would eventually 
determine the outlook of Bolivia’s land tenure system and its further evolution, the 
law’s implementation did not correspond to its purpose. Financial 
incentives/constraints played an elementary role in the ambitions, timing and 
implementation of Bolivia’s first land reform. This factor relates to the treasury’s limits, 
inter-elite struggle and fiscal bonds to the indigenous population, which curbed the 
capacity of the state to proclaim and implement the law. This created a legislateion that 
was easily “floored” with loopholes and political elite-indigenous alliances.  
Thus, the land reform process converted into a process of delay and incomplete 
execution. Chapters 6 and 7 illustrate the limited scope of the law with the case of the 
Carangas province, demonstrating a tacit –though temporal- retreat on part of an 
illiquid and bureaucratically weak state in view of a territory’s uninviting ecological 
resources and its fiscal bonds to that territory’s people. However, these chapters also 
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demonstrate an increased level of violence and competition, indirectly triggered by the 
land reform. The pushes for state-organized land intervention triggered protest and at 
times violent uprisings against the exvinculación’s agents. Meanwhile, “typical” 
boundary disputes proliferated and quite frequently erupted into violent inter- and 
intra-ayllu clashes, creating a highly conflictive climate that exacerbated as village 
elites seized their monopoly position to encroach on community lands and that resulted 
particularly dramatic for the Uru population (of Turco). On a broader scale, the land 
reform completed the amputation process that since early colonial times had cut the 
altiplano communities off from their valley lands. While the push to open up strategic 
resource frontiers within the province made no headway mainly due to the absence of 
modern transport infrastructure, an enclosure operation can be noted, regarding what 
we could call Carangas’ “salt frontier”. 
 The growing insecurity over land rights provoked a “rush on the archive”, in search 
for legal documents that asserted comunarios’ hold over their sayaña in view of 
competing or intruding fellow comunarios. However, in critical moments, requests 
driven by competitive benefits but were overruled by collective interests through inter-
community collaboration, backed by an inter-community network of community 
representatives which in Carangas left its first traces in the late 1890s, forming the 
organizational basis of the indigenous mobilization of 1899. This indigenous leadership 
adopted a threefold strategy, a diversified response based on a combination of lawful, 
law-making and unlawful tactics. In other words, they made use of the official legal 
framework, they lobbied to adapt that framework and they openly defied that 
framework. This ‘legal-legislative-illegal’ strategy was deployed at several ‘fronts’ 
simultaneously, in courts where land titles were registered, in demands towards the 
national executive power to challenge the law itself, and in  violent rebellion. However, 
compared to the 1899 unified community response, and although Carangas kept its 
rebellious reputation alive, there is hardly any indication that this potential went 
together with the formation of a unified apoderado movement throughout the 1910s-
20s, although ‘individual’ community revolts in the 1920s were connected to rebellious 
mobilizations outside the province.  
It is clear that many questions still remained to be answered regarding communal 
mobilization in Carangas. What is clear, however, is that, in order to represent 
communal interests before the state, this mobilization was dependent upon support 
from other sectors of society which –at first sight- had little to gain from a strong 
community. Alliances between indigenous and non-indigenous groups and individuals 
are reflected in the modifications that have been made to the legislation over the 
decades and in the military cooperation between the Liberals and the indigenous 
leadership during the Federal War of 1899. At the  more local level, there was an 
important degree of vecinos-comunario collaboration, founded on a common interest in 
halting the Revisita. These shared interests and manipulations explain the involvement 
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of local non-indigenous elites in the networks of indigenous (anti-Revisita) 
representation. By looking into the power base,  legitimacy and motivation they acted 
upon, my modest attempt to reconstruct the role of vecinos-apoderados reveals that 
they acted upon either opportunistic or more intimate community interests, a relatively 
strong political and economic power base, and a contested legitimacy. 
The result of this complex mobilization pattern was that the new legislation was 
inserted with “loopholes”, contributing the eventual ‘retreat’ of the central state. As it 
gave up the fight, the process was appropriated by local power groups, but weaker than 
in Platt’s terms, as an effect of the process of vecinos-comunario conversion. This 
fomented the state’s growing critique towards the latter. While the execution of Revisita 
was obstructed by indigenous resistance, that obstruction –and all the disorder it 
caused- was more and more blamed on the vecino-apoderados and the vecinos-
comunarios: The central state got increasingly irritated by what was defined as an 
“illegal usurpation” by vecino-comunarios and the “crookedness” of vecino-apoderados. 
Meanwhile, the adoption of an inclusion policy on part of the central state and the 
overtures on part of the communities made way for a gradual “reconciliation” that, 
instead of ‘neatly’ giving way to indigenous assimilation (that is, “evaporation”), it 
would “boomerang” back in the form of reinforced (yet ambiguous and vulnerable) 
indigenous emancipation over the decades to come. 
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Conclusions. A thwart frontier zone? The 
(re)creation of autonomous spaces for communal 
control. 
Soy,  
soy lo que dejaron,  
soy toda la sobra de lo que se robaron.  
Un pueblo escondido en la cima,  
mi piel es de cuero por eso aguanta cualquier clima.  
Soy una fábrica de humo,  
mano de obra campesina para tu consumo  
Latinoamérica – Calle 131 
Oruro, 15 February 2012. About two thousand people, all members of the nine markas of 
the Native Council of Jach’a Karangas (COAJK), arriving from their estancias and villages, 
or from their urban dwellings which has replaced or come to complement their (former) 
rural residence, are stirring the streets of the city of Oruro with the sounds and dances 
of the tarqueada, which evoke their rich pastoralist culture and history. It is the time of 
the Jallu Pacha, when the communities celebrate the “fertilization” of the Pachamama, 
announcing the harvest season. Since several years, this ancestral celebration is brought 
to the city, mobilizing all communities in a long procession and ritual offerings that 
unite all communities on a main ritual site, the Condor Mallku, in the heart of the city.  
The enthusing energy of their dancing, playing, singing and drinking made it to the 
cover of this dissertation. However this cultural manifestation represents more than an 
innocent cheerful folkloric event. The vigorous taking of the city streets can be seen as a 
sign of recuperated pride as well as of the increasing urban-rural interlinkages that 
 
                                                     
1 I am / I am what they left, / I am all what’s left of what they stole / A village hidden on the summit, / my skin is made of 
leather that is why it endures any climate. / I am a smoke factory, / peasant labour for your consumption. 
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structure communal life. It is a way of “claiming” their place in an increasingly faster 
restructuring world. It is a way of renegotiating participation in that world, yet without 
simply adopting the cultural or other standards that such participation seems to 
require.  
 
Figure 26 The head of the Jallu Pacha procession, here passing through the main street of 
the city of Oruro. The bottom of the banner reads: “Towards indigenous originario 
autonomy” (Own picture, Oruro, February 2012). 
The tension between securing communal autonomy by consenting with nationally 
imposed margins for that autonomy, and between accommodating to changing 
economic impulses and conditions for livelihood production without giving up the 
“pillars” of that system has recurrently challenged the adaptive capacity of 
communities and inserted dynamics of differentiation, elite formation and 
discrimination. While migration and economic integration have established ever 
stronger bonds to urban spaces of production and exchange. Llamas, now in the form of 
dry-frozen charque meat, are given a new function in interregional commercial circuits, 
reflecting comunarios’ ability to combine locally adapted production modes with 
changing market conditions. Although llama meat commercialization has an significant 
differentiation dimension, it sustains the importance of llamas and hence the need for 
grazing lands. Most lands in the now fragmented and re-claimed Carangas territory 
continue indeed to be accessed through the framework of the community. Yet, the 
concessions obtained to secure this communal control throughout the cycles of land 
rights redefinition have not saved them from demographic, ecological and extractive 
pressures on that land, nor neutralized the effects of protracted powerful processes of 
inter-ethnic (including inter-indigenous) discrimination and marginalization (the Uru 
claims seem to be pushed out the renegotiation renewal). 
This concluding part of the dissertation does not aim to closely analyse the current 
revival of communal renegotiation in the face of changing state structures and an 
expanding market sphere, but seizes this powerful process to point to the underlying 
implications of that renegotiation. These implications point to the 
doubleness/unevenness of incorporation processes that sustains longstanding and 
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constantly renovated patterns of fragility and inequality in the region’s history; 
patterns that have come to the surface throughout this dissertation. In other words, the 
assessment of a particular instance of “communal autonomy renegotiation” presented 
over the past pages can be instructive to understand ongoing processes of rural 
transformations and indigenous revitalization. The results of this research and the 
insights into how world-systemic processes and local dynamics of rural change 
interweave, thwart ánd fuel each other and the double effects they have upon the room 
for communal manoeuvring will be subjected to a recap.  
This final review is structured along central concepts that have enabled me to 
capture this dynamic entanglement. First of all it points to the communities’ double 
drive (and capacity) to participate and meanwhile secure a margin for communal modes 
of production and governance, which converts rural Andean incorporation zone into a 
negotiated ‘frontier’ process. Second, this double drive underlays my interpretation of 
the dynamics and long-term effects triggered by processes of land reform in terms of a 
renegotiation process; a process that involves active community participation but that 
equally comes  at a cost. Third, the outcome of this process is related to the inherent 
paradoxes of world-systemic expansion. 
Negotiated incorporation. 
A frontier perspective enables to counter the dichotomist idea of the community versus 
“the system” and instead reveals how communal agency taps from the overlap of 
multiple spheres. By applying that perspective to the incorporation trajectory of the 
rural Andes, the outcome of colonial encounter and its postcolonial reproduction is 
unmasked as a process of negotiated incorporation in which pre-existing community 
structures and imported forms of organizations co-existed neither in black-white 
separation nor in a grey blend. Incorporation materialized in hybrid and negotiated, yet 
asymmetric power relations, reflected in the deepening dependence and hence 
increased vulnerability of Andean spaces and societies. Since early colonial times, 
Andean rural households have been increasingly drawn into the capitalist sphere of 
production and governance. This implied the identification of their spatial and social 
structures of organization as to-be-incorporated, and led to increasing 
peripheralization.  
It has been demonstrated that Carangas is an intrinsic part of that periphery, but that 
this peripherality entailed an important margin for autonomy, founded on comunarios’ 
capacity to simultaneously engage in overlapping exchange circuits and on to uphold a 
reciprocal yet asymmetrical political-symbolic pact with a consolidating state. These are 
the mechanisms that enable them to ‘trespass’ presumed economic, political and 
cultural boundaries and provide in the clue to what has been defined as negotiated 
 390 
peripherality, that is, the ability of peripheral actors to set their terms of participation 
ánd autonomy within broader frameworks for regulation, exchange and representation. 
Access to land, also communally controlled land, was conditioned by a national system 
for land regulation that determines the comunarios’ fiscal and legal bonds to the state. 
However, access to land in the Andes is also essentially a matter of inter-ecological 
complementarity, hence not only dependent upon legal-fiscal guarantees to maintain 
customary land regulations “at home,” but also on the freedom to move and exchange 
resources across market/off-market divides. Moreover, access to land is a matter of self-
determination, requiring an accredited access to the state and its institutions to defend 
and represent local demands and civil rights. In the late 19th century, these interrelated 
mechanisms became the object of a threefold policy shift enacted by the Bolivian 
government. The Bolivian regime opted for the privatization of collective lands, the 
adoption of pro-export economic policies and the containment of indigenous identities 
through a mix of inclusion and marginalization.  
Land access under negotiation the state. The formation, modification and defines of a 
margin for autonomous land administration as upheld in Carangas is embedded in a 
particular, asymmetric relation to a tributary state. That relation was created in the 
aftermath of the Spanish conquest, where the start of a land commodification trajectory 
and of the formation of an Andean/Bolivian land system can be detected. Property 
titles, taxes and inspections were the elements that defined indigenous communities’ 
landholding attributions and integrated them as landholding, taxpaying and 
representative units within a centralized land system were hence determinant in 
setting the parameters for communal land control. The late 19th century governments 
revised those bonds and enacted a new land legislation that ignored the legal-fiscal 
principles and subtleties underpinning this state-community bond, which was answered 
by intense indigenous protest. Thus, the 19th century reinterpretations of the reciprocal 
state-community pact forced communities to renegotiate the terms of participation in 
the republican state.  
Tied to community structures and intermediaries, the pastoralists of Carangas 
became increasingly linked to -hence structured by- larger spaces of production, 
consumption, circulation and regulation. Most households participated in that link as 
providers of minerals and wool (livestock) and as a labour reservoir for the transport 
sector, including their livestock as an activated labour class. While converting them in 
vital ‘connectors’ between local resources and distant markets, this transporter role also 
provided in a hedge against both ‘full-blown’ incorporation in those markets as well as 
against the effects of their marginalization from those markets when their connector 
role was displaced by new interregional transportation means and routes. This hedge 
refers to the way in which pastoralists households secured their access to 
complementary subsistence means through inter-ecological barter travels. This Andean 
pastoralist mode of mobility and exchange provided in a mechanism to maintain that 
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access despite the confiscation of complementary territories which they previously 
directly controlled. In the context of a protracted regional marginalization process, the 
Andean pastoralist ability to “activate” complementary circuits in order to secure a 
minimal margin for household income-pooling was constrained by petty bourgeois 
merchants who hierarchized the access of indigenous barterers, traders and 
transporters to overlapping zones of circulation. 
In order to convert the countryside into “governable”, that is “uniformized”, terrain, 
government pressures to curb the autonomous sphere and the representative 
attributions of communities and their leaders increased. This created space for the 
settlement and monopolization of power by a new elite group, the vecinos. However, 
their minority position in a hacienda-immune region compelled them to develop more 
complex, political, economic, personal and inter-ethnic bonds to the indigenous 
population. An assessment of the ‘accumulation trajectory’ of the vecinos has 
demonstrated that the constitution of this minor yet powerful sector is backed by a 
much longer chronology that traces the Spanish roots of nowadays “humbled” 
indigenous tributaries. It has demonstrated that their consolidation as locally very 
powerful (yet nationally marginal) elites motivated them to transcend the segregation 
of comunario and vecinos worlds, however without completely giving up their 
monopolistic position. The effects of that gradual shift became particularly visible from 
the late 19th century on, after vecinos presence in the province had reached its 
culmination. This double identity generated an ambiguous effect in that their 
registration as indigenous taxpayers camouflaged a process of community land 
usurpation that meanwhile supported vecino collaboration in the active anti-land 
reform protest. As this collaboration supported the efforts to secure a margin for 
communal land control without state intervention, the ascendance of the vecinos 
cannot be straightforwardly related to the erosion of communal land tenure structures. 
However, their anchoring was informed by a deliberate tactic to expand their resource 
base, motivating them to integrate in the community sphere, yet without abandoning 
their economic and political monopolistic position. 
Communal land control, liberal land reform and the ‘cost’ of 
renegotiation. 
The case study of this research presents a close-up analysis of enclosure pressures and 
counter-pressures provoked by the “settling” of an internal juridical/fiscal frontier in 
the context of post-independence capitalist state-building in the high Andes. In frontier 
terms, land rights commodification progresses as communal rights are encapsulated 
within a standardized legal framework. My case study however provides empirical 
evidence of how this frontier movement is thwarted as communities manage to keep 
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their customary land system in place in the face of an anti-community land reform. In 
view of the dominant role of external factors such as ecology, market connectedness 
and state power, my assessment interrogates what the room for renegotiation over the 
implementation of that reform and in what way that room was ‘seized by the 
comunarios of Carangas.  
The described trajectory suggests a tacit –though temporal- retreat on part of an 
illiquid and bureaucratically weak state in view of a territory’s uninviting ecological 
resources and its fiscal bonds to that territory’s people. However, my close-reading of 
this retreat unmasks in the first place what seems an external decision, regardless of 
any responsiveness of the Carangas communities, as an extorted withdrawal, forcing the 
state into a coordinated renegotiation. The push to “settle” a (new) (land tenure) order 
got bogged down in a highly debated, strongly contested and largely frustrated 
incorporation process. In the second place, it unmasks this renegotiation from what 
seems a sharp line between commoners determined to keep any non-communal 
intervention out versus a state and private landholders determined to open new 
resource frontiers as a rather puzzling tangle of interwoven community-elite-state 
relations. By disentangling those relations and their implications, I have come to assert 
that the ‘exemption’ of the communities of Carangas from the land reform and the 
related enclosure movement cannot be simply assumed, but involved an active 
renegotiation process. In other words, the impression of a stagnated enclave in a sea of 
incorporated people and places conceals a more dynamic picture; that of an (internal) 
frontier zone where local communities manage to exploit their marginality as a tool to 
keep expanding frontiers of incorporation ‘at bay’. 
However, the efforts of forcing state actors into a renegotiation over the enacted law 
and its broader implications came at a cost. While the guarantee for communal land 
control was safeguarded, the comunarios’ “space of manoeuvre” was seriously 
challenged. As the land reform came knocking at the door, rebellion spread and internal 
violence increased. Thus, this renegotiation may have unlocked vital breathing room, 
often concreted in legal concessions, but it could not halt the increasing pressures on 
resources, thereby nurturing inter-comunario competition and conflict, the 
interference of local power groups and the marginalization of powerless groups.  
The strong link between communal anti-land reform resistance strategies and inter-
community inequality demonstrate that communal land rights security and hence the 
communities’ relative margin of subsistence was undercut by internal asymmetric 
power relations. This indicates that the imminence of incorporative forces, whether 
eventually thwarted or not, reinforces local competition over resources and hence 
reinforced the local negotiation over frontier movement. Moreover, the decisive role of 
shared interests between indigenous demands and pragmatic rural elites in deviating 
the direction of the process points to a puzzling reconfiguration process of ethnic 
boundaries, marked by reinforced Aymarization, nurtured by the “evaporation” of 
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mestizos and the discrimination of the Urus. In assessing the largely unrecorded -
though not isolated- story of how the emergence of a vecinos-comunario class both 
strengthened communal resistance as it encroached on their land base, a hypothesis can 
be posited on the powerful links between (and hence a plea for explicit attention to) the 
movement of (global) “resource frontiers”, and the implied spatial reorganizations, and 
the reconfiguration of (local) ethnic boundaries, and the underlying social power 
struggles. 
Thwarted frontier processes and margins for communal autonomy.  
The fact that, up to date, the Bolivian state still counts with an incomplete 
understanding of communal land tenure systems and cannot rely on any proper 
experience in intervening in internal procedures, such as the transfer of land, is an 
outcome of this renegotiation process and explains to an important degree the 
continuing complexity of this legalization process. In fact, it was not so much the idea of 
private ownership (as the Bolivian land question has sometimes been interpreted) as the 
new policy’s underestimation of the complexity and vitality of the ayllu’s land 
controlling system that lays at the basis of Bolivia’s first land reform thwarted 
trajectory. Current renegotiations by indigenous organizations and communities over 
the revision and “communal reorientation” of Bolivia’s land system indicates that this 
“thwartedness” is most likely to be renovated rather than neutralized.  
The thwarting of commodification processes points to the feedback loops inscribed in 
the world-systemic expansive course. This feedback has been detected in the trajectory 
of the land reform in the way communal action knew to “floor” the endorsed legislation. 
Comunarios and their leaders embarked upon a renegotiation process along different 
lines of “attack”, justified by their insistence on the reciprocity of fiscal bonds with the 
state and reinforced by the creation of alliances with other sectors of society. The result 
was the creation and exploitation of several “loopholes” in the legislation, which 
contributed to the “hedging” of the land reform process.  
When linking this renegotiation process to the “ultimate” question of this research, 
how the diversity in trajectories of rural change has “nourished” the course of world-
systemic expansion, communal agency emerges as an unavoidable factor in answering 
that question in relation to the incorporation trajectory of the Andean rural zone. The 
erosion and renewal of autonomous spaces (or frameworks) for communal control has -
sometimes deliberately, other times involuntarily- fuelled the course of capitalist 
expansion, yet not in an unambiguous way.  
They operate as channels for complex feedback processes. The enclosure of these 
spaces has opened new resource frontiers, but meanwhile triggered a negotiation 
process that has resulted in the renewal of these spaces. This process has a double 
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geographical dimension. While global processes push for the creation of controllable 
spaces for accumulation, renaming indigenous territories as terra nullius, local 
pressures actively create pluralist spaces which allow the preservation and reinvention 
of indigenous territories as alternative geographies. This discord points to the dialectics 
of homogenizing (fixation, formalization, privatization) and heterogenizing 
(recuperation, reinvention) pressures. 
Yet, the strategies deployed to obtain guarantees for communal autonomy and the 
implication of obtaining these guarantees point to the vulnerability of communal 
autonomy, reflected in processes of accommodation (to standardized supra-local 
frameworks which concedes these guarantees), of social differentiation and elite 
renovation (that mediate the negotiation process, including powerful external actors 
while excluding powerless community members), of territorial reconfigurations (as 
these autonomous spaces urge for a delineation and internal organization), and of 
ethnic reconfiguration (as the assertion of those spaces reinforces the imaginaries of 
belonging). While these subtle processes may sustain the impression of a homogenizing 
world, they simultaneously add texture to that world, reinforced by the constant 
assertion and reinvention of alternative spaces for and modes of production, exchange 
and regulations. Thus, in creating and reinforcing spaces for autonomy, communal 
“renegotiation” highlights and adds to the paradoxical nature of the rise of a capitalist 
world-system. In that sense, the resilience of comunarios and of their modes to organize 
rural life is not the sign of a last convulsion, but a trigger for pluralization, ensuring the 
continuous recreation of alternative spaces for social (counter-)action. 
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Archives 
Archivo y Biblioteca Municipal de Oruro (ABMO). Casa de Culturas, Oruro, Bolivia. 
Padron general de contribuyentes de la provincia de Carangas, 1838 (no. 391). 
Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas, 1852 (no. 426). 
Archivo de los Derechos Reales de Oruro (ADRO). Corte Superior de Distrito, Oruro, 
Bolivia. 
Propiedades Provincias, 1894-1930. 
Archivo Histórico Vicente Dagnino Oliveri (AHVD). Universidad Técnica de Arica, Arica, 
Chile.  
Fondo de la Intendencia de Tacna y Gobernación de Arica, 1880-1929. 
Archivo Judicial de Corque (AJC). Corte de Corque, Corque, Bolivia. 
 Archivo Histórico, up to 1900. Legajo 18 (1860-1862) to Legajo 44 (1898-1900).  
 Archivo Semi-Histórico, 1900-1950. Civiles (1900-1930); Penales (1900-1930). 
Archivo Judicial Histórico de Oruro (AJHO). Corte Superior de Distrito, Oruro, Bolivia. 
 Sección “inactiva”, 1606-1899. 
Archivo Nacional de Bolivia (ANB). Archivo y Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre, 
Bolivia. 
Serie Padrones y Catastros, 1773-1902. Revisitas (Rv.), Carangas.  
 Ministerio del Interior (MI), 1825-1899. Oruro, departamento y provincias. 
Archivo de la Prefectura de Oruro (APO). Casa de la Gobernación, Oruro, Bolivia. 
Libros de contabilidad, 1860-1930. 
Archivo Regional de Tacna (ART). Tacna, Perú. 
 Fondo Histórico. Serie Corte de Apelaciones. Sub serie Causas Civiles. 
Biblioteca Arturo Costa de la Torre (CDLT). Oficialía Mayor de Culturas, La Paz, Bolivia.  
Gazetas judiciales. 1895-’96. 
Archivo Regional de Tarapacá (ART). Universidad Arturo Prat, Iquique, Chile.  
Fondo de la Intendencia de Tarapacá Archivo Regional (ITAR). 1903-1969. 
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Documentation in personal possession: 
 
Copy of Nicolás Rafael, A. "Razón De Los Derechos Obencionales Y Fiestas Que Se 
Celebran En Cada Año En La Iglesia Parroquial De Juachacalla Cobrados Por El 
Actual Cura Doctos Don José Andrés Fox Que Otorgamos Los Indios Actuales 
Originarios Tributarios De Otro Pueblo Cuyo Monto Sumado Y Expresiones Que Se 
Aclaran Son Como Siguen." 1810. Obtained from the Archivo del Cabildo 
Eclesiástico de Sucre (ACES), Sucre, Bolivia. (copy in possession of G. Pauwels). 
Copy of "Expediente N° TCO-0403-0001." Submitted by the community leaders of COAJ-K 
to the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Unidad de Coordinación de Tierras 
Comunitarias de Origen. La Paz, 2001. (copy in possession of M. Flores) 
Copy of "Informe Para La Certificación De La Identidad Étnica Y Asentamiento Actual De 
La Tco Corque Marka." Submitted by the community leaders of Corque to the 
Ministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Pueblos Originarios. La Paz, 2005. (copy in 
possession of M. Flores).  
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Interviews and field work 
This is a small sample of the conducted field work, including the most important interviews, in 
chronological order. 
  
Alejandro Gómez, Turco, 13 October and 15 November 2008.  
 
Association of the elderly, Turco, 23 November 2008. (Workshop). 
 
Dr. Soria, INRA officer, La Paz, 5 March 2009.  
 
Máximo Reinaga, head of the Jach’a Karangas Council, March 2012.  
 
Dr. Acapa Calle, INRA officer, Curahuara de Carangas, 10 March 2012. 
 
Mario Flores, Corque, 4 April 2012. 
 
Sabino Acevedo, Turco, 25 March 2012.   
 
Muyta, several villages in the Jach’a Karangas territory, March 2012. (a series of community 
consultations to prepare the general assembly of all member communities of the 
Western Council of Ayllus of Jach’a Karangas). 
 
Village and community assemblies, Turco, 3 and 16 November 2008.  
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Appendix 1: A cartographic first aid kit. 
The following maps are indispensable tools in visualizing and explaining the following 
story. They will help readers unfamiliar with the world of the carangueños to navigate 
through the Andes, Bolivia, the Oruro countryside and the regions of Arica-Parinacota 
and Tarapacá in nowadays Chile. In the chapters of the dissertation, specific maps will 
be included to illustrate the respective themes. 
 
 
Ecoregions of the Andes (WWF, Global 200 ecoregions map and legend) 
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The Plurinational State of Bolivia (UN) 
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The Oruro department, 1929 (annex in annual Prefect report, González 1929) 
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The Carangas region (own elaboration, GIS) 
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The nation of the Qaranqa (Carangas people) around the middle of the 16th century. 
(elaboration by Ximena Medinaceli, on basis of Rivière, in Medinaceli 2006, 267). 
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1882 map of the Bolivian tableland (Reconstruction of the map elaborated by 
Minchin, a rich miner. Minchin 1882, 673-6). 
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Proposed routes for the regional integration of Tarapacá (1864-1937). (Source: “Las rutas 
de la integración” in Castro 2005, chapter 4, s.p.) 
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Appendix 2: Demographic evolution in the Carangas region, 1500-2000. 
Based on the Revisitas (ANB, Rv), Rivière 1982, chapter 2, INE Oruro 2002. 
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Appendix 3: Administrative divisions of the 
Carangas territory (pre-Hispanic to 1951). 
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PRE-HISPANIC COLONY REPUBLIC 
 suyu Karangas  corregimiento of Carangas Province of Carangas 
parcialidad sub-zone 
(principal) 
village no. canton / vice-canton (v) / anexo (a) parcialidad ayllu 
Orqosuyu 
Colquemarca-
Samancha 
Corque 1 San Juan de Corque 
          
Uravi Mallconaca, Puma Ayocota, 
Tanga Sullcavi, Catasa, 
Quitaquita, Collana 
          
Coro (from exclusive to 
including  Urus) 
          
Samancha Caracollo, Cala, Cupiasa, 
Collana Camata 
       Hueco (Uru) 
         San Miguel (v) Mallconaca 
Umasuyu 
Choquecota-
Sabaya 
  Choquecota   2 
Nuestra Señora de la Consepcion de 
Choquecota 
  
  
          Urinsaya Lerco, Julo, Saijasi, Jilanaca 
          
Aransaya Chapita, Mitma, Sullcamallcu 
Mallconaca 
        
 San Sebastian de 
Chuquichambi (v) Collana 
          (Pumiri) Jilanaca 
  
Totora 
  Huayllamarka   3 Santiago de Huaillamarca     
          
Aransaya (Sullcatunca) Parco, 
Tunkajaque, Mitma 
          Hacha-
Urinsaya 
Urinsaya, Jisca-Urinsaya 
        San Francisco de Llanquera Llanquera (1838 Revisita: 
  441 
(v) Llanquera y Casilla) 
          
 Sullcatunca (since 1852 
Revisita) 
         
 (Pampa)parco (since 1860 
Revisita) 
    Totora   4 San Pedro de Totora     
          
Aransaya Aparu, Collana, Parco, 
Pachacama, Lerco 
          
Urinsaya Guaraguara, Aymarani, 
Tatasapana, Lupi 
      
Curahuara 
  
5 Santiago de Curahuara Aransaya Collana, Macho Collana / 
Mallconaca, (Sullca-uta) 
Chipana, Taipi(hoco) Collana, 
Sullca-uta (since 1852 
Revisita), Sullca(tunca) 
          Urinsaya Jila-uta Manasaya 
          Sullca-uta Manasaya 
          Jila-uta Choquemarca 
  
  
        Taipi-Uta Choquemarca 
          Sullca-Uta Choquemarca 
        Sajama (1910: v)  Sajama (1910) 
      Turco   
6 San Pedro de Turco Aransaya Collana, Jacha Salli, Sullca-
Salli (since 1860 Revisita)  
            Chilligua-Salli (Uru) 
            Urinsaya Pumiri, Jilanaca 
  
 Choquecota-
Sabaya        Cosapa (a) Cosapa 
      Huachacalla   7 Santiago de Huachacalla     
  
  
          
Aransaya 
 Collana, Tuaña 
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            Urinsaya Capi, Camacha 
          Santa Ana de Chipaya (a)  Manasaya, Aransaya (Uru) 
    Sabaya     San Salvador de Sabaya (v) 
 Collana, Canasa, Sacari, 
Cumujo 
              Todosantos (mineral refinery) 
          
Espiritu Santo de Carangas 
(v) 
 
Carangas (mining district) 
            
 San Juan de La Rivera (mineral 
refinery) 
Orqosuyu 
Andamarka-
Orinoca 
  Andamarka   
8 Santiago de Andamarca Aransaya Collana Pintaro (since 1860 
Revisita), Collana (Belén) 
(Pampa)parco (marca) 
          Urinsaya Guanapa, Yuruma/Turuna 
  Orinoca     San Francisco de Orinoca (v)  Collana 
          
 Micayani (estancia; until 1840s 
incl. in Collana; disintegrated 
by 1910) 
           Jinchura 
          
 Habana (Uru, disintegrated by 
1910) 
          Calavillca 
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Appendix 4: Categorization of the population. 
National census 1900.1 
 
                                                     
1 Blanco 2006 [1904], LXVI-LXXXV. 
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 total M F rural urban white mestizo indigenous black 
    %  %  % M F total % M F total % M F total % M F 
CARANGAS 18811 9464 9208 49,0% 17217 91,5 1594 8,5 458 352 810 4,3% 842 764 1606 8,5% 8178 7518 15696 83,44 0 1 
Corque  4629 2253 2237 48,3% 4373 94,5 256 5,5 388 285 673 14,5% 566 545 1111 24,0% 1450 1308 2758 59,58 0 1 
Choquecota 1200 597 603 50,3% 959 79,9 241 20,1 0 0 0 0,0% 26 22 48 4,0% 540 550 1090 90,83   
Chuquichambi 490 237 253 51,6% 490 100 0 0 0 0 0 0,0% 0 0 0 0,0% 220 240 460 93,88   
Huaillamarca 698 428 270 38,7% 444 63,6 254 36,4 2 0 2 0,3% 20 33 53 7,6% 368 221 589 84,38   
Llanquera 745 368 377 50,6% 745 100 0 0 0 0 0 0,0% 112 18 130 17,4% 533 333 866 116,2   
Totora 2231 1155 1076 48,2% 2231 100 0 0 6 3 9 0,4% 38 42 80 3,6% 1049 968 2017 90,41   
Turco 1267 657 610 48,1% 946 74,7 322 25,3 16 16 32 2,5% 17 12 29 2,3% 592 552 1144 90,29   
Cosapa 173 99 74 42,8% 173 100 0 0 0 0 0 0,0% 3 2 5 2,9% 91 68 159 91,91   
Curahuara 1504 702 802 53,3% 1192 79,3 312 20,7 23 27 50 3,3% 46 75 121 8,0% 597 645 1242 82,58   
Sajama 227 118 109 48,0% 227 100 0 0 14 12 26 11,5% 4 6 10 4,4% 94 81 175 77,09   
Huachacalla 1574 769 805 51,1% 1365 86,7 209 13,3 0 0 0 0,0% 3 3 6 0,4% 717 726 1443 91,68   
Andamarca 2351 1225 1126 47,9 2351 100 0 0 4 3 7 0,3% 6 4 10 0,4% 1127 1057 2184 92,9   
Orinoca 1722 856 866 50,3 1722 100 0 0 5 6 11 0,6% 1 2 3 0,2% 800 769 1569 91,11   
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Appendix 5: Livestock in Carangas 1910-1921. 
Sources: Bacarreza 396-403; Lima 1921, 45; González Flores 1929, 214. 
 
 1910 1921 1929 Principal location 
 Amount % of total Amount % of 
total 
Amount % of 
total 
 
llamas 225957 46,7% 166629 41,5% 257560 44,3% Everywhere, chiefly Curahuara, 
Totora, Turco, Andamarca 
alpacas 48163 10,0% 53784 13,4% 57560 9,9% Curahuara, Sajama, Totora, Turco 
sheep 178854 37,0% 151572 37,7% 212543 36,6% Corque, Choquecota, Totora, Turco 
asses 21903 4,5% 19162 4,8% 25225 4,3% Corque, Turco, Sabaya, Huachacalla, 
Andamarca 
horses 2499 0,5% 2876 0,7% 12978 2,2% Curahuara, Sajama, Turco, Totora, 
Corque 
mules 155 0,0% 1253 0,3% (incl. in 
horses) 
 Dispersed; Corque, Huachacalla, 
Sabaya 
cows 4500 0,9% 4589 1,1% 5580 1,0% Totora, Curahuara, Totora, Turco 
pigs 1857 0,4% 1522 0,4% 9413 1,6% Chipaya 
goats 21 0,0% 233 0,1% unknown  Dispersed 
Total 483909 100% 401620 100% 580859 100%  
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Appendix 6: Livestock property and status 
Based on wills and inventories in the archive of Corque ( AJC) and Derechos Reales in Oruro (ADRO). 
 
no. year sex canton status profession female llamas 
and lambs 
male 
llamas 
alpacas sheep and 
lambs 
asses mules cattle horses pigs 
1 1861 f Corque rich p. 60 20 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 
2 1861 m Corque rich p. 22 30 0 100 43 1 7 1 30 
3 1861 f Sabaya average p. 48 10 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1861    / poor p. 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1861 m Totora rich p. 60 0 10 10 2 0 5 4 0 
6 1862 f Huachacalla poor p. 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1862 f Turco rich p. 460 0 0 200 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1864 m Huaillamarca rich m. 0 0 0 180 0 4 0 0 0 
9 1866 m  / rich p. 60 50 0 50 2 1 3 0 0 
10 1867 m Corque poor p. 0 7 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
11 1870 m Changamoco average p. 70 25 0 100 8 0 2 0 0 
  447 
12 1873 m Corque rich p. 151 50 41 52 0 0 0 1 0 
13 1875 m Corque poor p. 31 0 0 40 6 0 0 0 0 
14 1875 m Sabaya rich m 100 100 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 
15 1888 m  / poor p. 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1888 m  / rich m. 55 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1889 m Turco rich m. 300 130 0 0 80 0 1 10 0 
18 1889   Andamarca average p-m 58 27 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 
19 1897    / average p. 53 0 10 32 0 0 0 0 0 
20 1898   Andamarca average p. 62 31 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 
21 1901   Llanquera average p. 40 0 0 150 9 1 0 0 0 
22 1901    / average p. 66 10 0 33 3 0 0 0 0 
23 1903 m Choquecota rich p. 160 50 7 30 8 2 12 0 0 
24 1904 m Choquecota rich m. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
25 1904 m Carangas rich m. 24 8 0 70 15 21 35 11 0 
26 1906   Corque average p. 33 20 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 
27 1907 m San Miguel average p. 30 0 0 30 4 0 2 0 0 
28 1908 f Huaillamarca rich m. 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 
29 1909   San Miguel average p. 17 0 0 90 0 6 4 2 0 
30 1910 m Sabaya rich m. 4 0 42 0 0 7 0 8 0 
31 1910   Corque poor p. 8 7 0 9 3 0 0 0 0 
32 1911 m Choquecota rich p-m 88 59 0 72 0 0 0 0 0 
33 1914 m Corque rich p. 52 30 0 14 0 2 0 0 0 
34 1914 m Corque rich p-m 146 29 0 5 48 0 0 0 0 
35 1915 m Llanquera average p-m 14 0 0 198 5 0 0 0 0 
36 1915 m Turco average p. 155 43 0 59 8 0 0 5 0 
37 1915 m Sajama rich p. 202 40 284 100 0 0 0 1 0 
38 1916 m  / average p-m 122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 1923 m  / average p. 55 10 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 
40 1925 f Huaillamarca poor p. 19 0 0 48  1 7 0 0 
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 AVERAGE   73 20 10 47 10 1 2 1 1 
6 poor   27 pastoralists (p)  
14 average  4 pastoralist-merchants (p-m)  
19 rich   9 merchants (m) 
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Appendix 7: Reconstruction of annual head tax 
revenues.  
 
This table relates the revenue from Carangas to the national and departmental head tax 
revenues, 1827-1930.1 
  
 
                                                     
1 There are however some problems and insecurities with these data as it is not always clear if the estimated 
revenue corresponds to the tax of one semester or a complete year. Often, an amount between 73000 and 
75000 bolivianos is annoted, while in other years half of that amount, around 36000 bolivianos. The grey cells 
indicate the amounts for which it is not clear whether the amount corresponds to revenue of one year or of 
one year and a half year (3 semesters). Taking Barragán’s note on the fact that contribución revenues made up 
about 60% of all departmental incomes (Barragán 2009, 108), and taking into account that budget calculations 
in prefectural  reports often included (expected) incomes for one and a half years, it must be concluded that 
Carangas’ annual contribution based on the head tax fluctuated around 36000 to 38000 bs. The sources for 
these numbers are: ABN, Rv, no. 225-229; ABMO, no. 426, Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de 
Carangas, 1852. APO, Libros de contabilidad. 1860, “Libro mayor”, f. 6; 1899, “Libro mayor”, f. 39; 1900, “Cuentas 
Corrientes”, fs. 7-11. Aramayu 1898, xxiii; Ascarrunz 1909, 106 and 212; Bacarreza 2010 in Pauwels 2006; 
Morales 1913, 12 and 70; Lemaitre 1916; Ascarrunz 1919, xxx; Lima 1920, 182; Tejada 1921; Calderón 1927, 50; 
González 1929, 115-6; Rivière 1982, 102-3. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 head tax 
revenue 
submitted 
by 
Carangas  
total 
head tax 
received 
by nat. 
treasury 
proportion 
Carangas 
(1) to nat. 
head tax 
revenue 
(2) 
total 
head tax 
received 
by dept. 
treasury  
proportion 
Carangas 
(1) to dept. 
head tax 
revenue 
(4) 
proportion 
nat. head 
tax 
revenues 
(2) to 
overall 
nat. 
revenues 
proportion 
dept. head 
tax 
revenues 
(4) to 
overall 
dept. 
revenues 
 
absolute 
value 
absolute 
value 
% 
absolute 
value 
% % % 
Paid in pesos to the national treasury2 
1827  618115    41% 
1830  717920    47% 
1838 24031,5 759695 3,2%   (40-50%) 
1840  745237    45% 
1849  637474    33% 
1852 29733,2 664156 4,5%   30% 
1859 24113,7      
1860 35612,5 650000 5,5%   37% 
1864 36151,7 835658 4,3%   38% 
1867 38893,1 425557 9,1%   17% 
1869  305444    8% 
1871 42008,2 339779 12,4%   20%   
1877 45183,7     
1880  723995    25%   
Paid in bolivianos, now collected by the departmental treasury 
1898 36147,1   46012,83 39,3% 79,5% 
1899    98977,58   
1900 18679,68   97205,78 19,2%  
1909 36051,9   94424,9 38,2%  
1910 73158,8   94318,94 77,6%  
1913 72753,88   94320,94 77,1% 32,1% 
1915     98931  43,6% 
1918    92303  43,1% 
1920 37481,1   88985,65 42,1%  
1922     88985,6   
 
                                                     
2 Note that the amounts in pesos are written with in a decimal style, while the peso corresponds to an octal 
system, 1 peso being divided into 8 reales. Thus the numbers after the “,” indicate the amount of reales 
received/deposited. I did not recalculate the amounts to a decimal system. 
3 This amount corresponds to one semester, the period of January-April, while the amount registered for the 
Carangas province gives account of 2 semesters (Aramayu 1898, xxiii). 
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1923    88985,6  39,7% 
1926    89985,6  40,7% 
1929     89511,6   
1930    41269  
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Appendix 8: Indigenous fiscal categories, 
distribution among the eight cantons of the 
Carangas province, 1838-1877. 
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  1838   1852   1860   1864   1867   1871   1877   
Andamarca   
originarios 294 60,6% 332 51,6% 465 51,6% 474 52,8% 502 50,5% 571 49,8% 634 51,2% 
agregados 188 38,8% 307 47,7% 432 47,9% 419 46,7% 486 48,9% 568 49,6% 596 48,1% 
urus 3 0,6% 4 0,6% 4 0,4% 4 0,4% 6 0,6% 7 0,6% 8 0,6% 
Choquecota                             
originarios 170 89,0% 216 86,7% 272 85,8% 262 85,3% 303 87,8% 329 87,5% 362 87,4% 
agregados 21 11,0% 33 13,3% 45 14,2% 45 14,7% 42 12,2% 47 12,5% 52 12,6% 
urus 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Corque   
originarios 295 47,5% 328 40,9% 416 43,9% 429 42,6% 468 43,2% 493 44,1% 538 45,3% 
agregados 299 48,1% 425 53,1% 484 51,1% 526 52,3% 562 51,9% 564 50,5% 589 49,6% 
urus 27 4,3% 48 6,0% 47 5,0% 51 5,1% 53 4,9% 60 5,4% 60 5,1% 
Curahuara                             
originarios 320 100,0% 365 95,5% 372 97,4% 370 99,5% 384 99,7% 408 99,8% 428 100,0% 
agregados 0 0,0% 17 4,5% 10 2,6% 2 0,5% 1 0,3% 1 0,2% 0 0,0% 
urus 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Huachacalla   
originarios 261 60,6% 291 60,9% 328 56,8% 326 55,6% 337 55,6% 356 57,4% 375 58,7% 
agregados 127 29,5% 131 27,4% 186 32,2% 189 32,3% 193 31,8% 189 30,5% 187 29,3% 
urus 43 10,0% 56 11,7% 63 10,9% 71 12,1% 76 12,5% 75 12,1% 77 12,1% 
Huaillamarca                             
originarios 233 76,9% 286 75,7% 317 76,4% 321 77,2% 342 74,7% 386 73,9% 421 73,3% 
agregados 70 23,1% 92 24,3% 98 23,6% 95 22,8% 116 25,3% 136 26,1% 153 26,7% 
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urus 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Totora   
originarios 224 90,7% 294 87,2% 323 90,0% 342 91,9% 378 92,0% 417 91,4% 457 91,8% 
agregados 23 9,3% 43 12,8% 36 10,0% 30 8,1% 33 8,0% 39 8,6% 41 8,2% 
urus 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Turco                             
originarios 200 70,9% 282 87,6% 360 90,9% 371 90,9% 383 91,6% 394 92,7% 440 96,3% 
agregados 62 22,0% 27 8,4% 23 5,8% 26 6,4% 23 5,5% 19 4,5% 5 1,1% 
urus 20 7,1% 13 4,0% 13 3,3% 11 2,7% 12 2,9% 12 2,8% 12 2,6% 
CARANGAS   
Total 
originarios 1997 69,3% 2394 66,7% 2853 66,4% 2895 66,3% 3097 65,9% 3354 66,1% 3655 67,2% 
Total 
agregados 790 27,4% 1075 29,9% 1314 30,6% 1332 30,5% 1456 31,0% 1563 30,8% 1623 29,9% 
Total urus 93 3,2% 121 3,4% 127 3,0% 137 3,1% 147 3,1% 154 3,0% 157 2,9% 
 
 

  457 
 
Appendix 9: Carangas and the hierarchic world 
wool market, 1880-1930. 
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At the start of this chain, price quotations from 
Europe (1) were transmitted to the firms and 
merchants based in big commercial cities who 
organized the export (2). These firms guaranteed 
their position by speculating on and manipulating 
wool price and stock fluctuations (Caro 1994, 30). 
Next in line were the wholesale agents who 
represented the international trade houses in wool-
producing zones (3). They were provided by a 
network of petty purchasers (4a) who met small-
scale pastoralist producers on weekly rural markets 
(5) or obtained the wool from local retail buyers 
who frequented the pastoralist estancias of the 
most remote areas (6). Another provision line 
skipped the purchasers and the rural markets but 
went via the hacendados (4b) who sold wool 
directly to trade agents of the Arequipa firms, and 
hence constituted hindering competitors for the 
provincial merchants. A particular dynamic is 
added to this chain by the supply demands of the 
saltpeter industry (*). 
(adapted from Caro 1994, 23-41). 
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Appendix 10: List of compensativo revenues 
collected in the Carangas province (1866-1867).1 
Revenues 18.10.1866 by A Vargas, imposed at the expense of the 
compensation 
400 $ 
 31.10.1866 “ “ “ “ “ 100 $ 
 31.12.1866 “ “ “ “ “ 100 $ 
 09.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ in “Melgarejos” coins  650 $ 
 09.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 234 $ 4 rs. 
 13.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ in “Melgarejos”  327 $ 
 13.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “  1567 $ 4 rs. 
 18.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ in “Melgarejos” 417 $ 
 18.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 1283 $ 
 20.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 200 $ 
 20.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 215 $ 4 rs. 
 26.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ in “Melgarejos”  690 $ 
 26.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 1386 $ 2 rs. 
 26.01.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 147 $ 
 04.02.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 455 $ 
 08.02.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 1147 $ 
 18.02.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 300 $ 
 19.02.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 1700 $ 
 19.03.1867 “ “ “ “ “ 4024 $ 4 rs. 
 19.03.1867 Remuneration of Vargas for the payments to the 
leaders and official of the border of Carangas for 
salaries to the sub-Prefect Pantaleon Romano, 
2510 $ 3 rs. 
 
                                                     
1 ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 2 April 1867, 2nd attached letter. 
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Intendent and other employees of the province and 
the claimants of Vargas and his assistant of the 
recovery commission  
  There is  a reduction of 521 pesos, that is 25% (a 
quarter) of the amount paid in “Melgarejos” (2084) 
- 521 $ 
 TOTAL  17333 $ 3 rs. 
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Appendix 11: List of identified apoderados in 
Carangas, 1870-1930.2  
 
Name Represented community  Year Appeal 
Juan de la Cruz Arias ayllu Collana, 
Chuquichambi 
ayllu Canasa, Sabaya 
(defensor) 
1870 
 
1903 
 
Representation in boundary 
demarcation with Pumiri Jilanaca 
Represents comunarios in dispute 
over the course of river Sabaya 
Domingo C. Zubieta ayllu Pumiri Jilanaca, 
Chuquichambi 
1870 Representation in boundary 
(river) demarcation with Collana  
Manuel Sempértegui  Todos Santos 1873 Representation in dispute against 
miner Manuel Santiago Ortega 
Marcelino Vazquez Choquecota  
 
ayllu Sapana, Totora 
1883 
 
1884 
Representation of interests in 
possession hacienda Caranguillas  
Leads revolt against demarcation  
Luis Lujan ayllu Sapana, Totora 
Jisca-Urinsaya, 
Huaillamarca 
1884 
1886 
Leads revolt against demarcation 
Representation in dispute with 
Totora 
Meliton Delgado ayllu Lupi, Totora 
 
ayllu Aparu, Totora 
1886 
 
1925 
Representation in dispute with 
Huaillamarca 
Representation comunario in 
inter-ayllu dispute 
Guillermo López Turco  1887 Land dispute with Choquecota  
Andres Nicolas 
Rafael 
cacique Huachacalla 1891 
19183 
Requests composición titles 1720 
(visita Domingo Atocha y La 
Reinaga) 
Zacarias Rocha  
 
Luis Rocha 
 
ayllu Mitma, 
Huaillamarca 
1892  
 
1897 
Represents ayllu in demarcation 
and adjudication with ayllu Tunca  
Petitions colonial and republican 
 
                                                     
2 On basis of documents from the AJC, AHJO and ADRO archives. The list gives all identified names of people 
who took up the function of “apoderado” between 1870 and 1930 in Carangas to defend comunarios or defend 
their plaintiffs in relation to land rights. However, it is not always possible to define whether the cases in 
which the apoderados appeared corresponded to communal or inter-individual issues. 
3 In 1918, the registered titles of 1981 were requested once more. ADRO, Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1918, 
no. 1. 
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(apoderado) 
 
demarcation and adjudication 
documents 
Mariano/José Maria 
Laime4   
Carangas province 
(apoderado general) 
1894 Requests composición titles visita 
José de la Vega Alvarado 
Francisco Parrado  ayllus Quitaquita and 
Ayocota, Corque 
1897 Requests composición titles visita 
José de la Vega Alvarado 
Hilario Cáseres  
 
Corque 1898 Appointment Juan Lascano as 
apoderado general 
Melchor Marca5  Totora and Curahuara 1898 Appointment Juan Lascano as 
apoderado general 
Juan Nicolas Huachacalla 1898 Appointment Juan Lascano as 
apoderado general 
Manuel Manuelo6  Huaillamarca (cacique) 1898 Appointment Juan Lascano as 
apoderado general 
Juan Tangari Andamarca (cacique) 1898 Appointment Juan Lascano as 
apoderado general 
Tomas Colque Choquecota (cacique) 1898 Appointment Juan Lascano as 
apoderado general 
Juan Lascano Carangas province 
(apoderado general) 
 
Cosapa, Turco 
Huaillamarca 
Andamarca 
1898 
 
 
1918 
1918 
1918 
Requests composición titles 1640s 
(visita José de la Vega Alvarado) 
Petitions Revisita exemption  
Requests composición titles 1720 
Requests composición titles 1563 
Requests composición titles 1543  
Esteban Vargas Carangas province 
(apoderado general) 
1898 Petitions Revisita exemption 
Juan de Dios Cruz 
Quispe 
ayllu Tuaña, 
Huachacalla  
(caciques-apoderado) 
1898 
1899 
1900-
1906 
1914 
Petitions Revisita exemption  
Leads insurgents against Turco 
Representative in compensation 
by Turco 
Representative in compensation 
by ayllu Collana (Huachacalla) 
 
                                                     
4 José Maria Laime, who was being replaced in 1898 by Juan Lascano as representative of all communities of 
the province, probably refers to Mariano Laime (or the other way round), who in 1894 performed that role 
when requesting the registration of composición titles. 
5 He is mentioned by Mendieta as one of the apoderados-generales of Carangas in the mobilization period 
running up to the 1899 rebellion (Mendieta 2008,388). 
6 This might refer to Manuel Alanoca, whom Mendieta mentions as one of the apoderados-generales of 
Carangas in the mobilization period running up to the 1899 rebellion (Mendieta 2008,388). 
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Andres Portillo Huachacalla  
(cacique-apoderado) 
1899 
1904 
 
1926 
Leads insurgents against Turco  
Representative in transaction 
“Capillos” terrain by Turco 
Requests composición titles 1543 
(visita José de la Vega Alvarado) 
Toribio Flores 
 
Turco 
Sabaya and Huachacalla 
1899 
1926 
 
 
Leads Turco insurgents  
Requests composición titles 1651 
and 1593 (visita José de la Vega 
Alvarado) 
Daniel Barriga  ayllu Sacari, Sabaya 
(defensor) 
1903 Represents comunarios in dispute 
over the course of river Sabaya 
Juan Bautista 
Camacho 
Curahuara de Carangas 1905 Accused of abusing the indigenous 
population as apoderado 
Juan Mollo  
Domingo Marca  
ayllus of Turco 1905 Representation in lawsuit against 
the government about the tax on 
alpaca wool 
Antonio Soto Várgas Corque (apoderado) 1906 Accuses sub-Prefect Lazarte of 
abuses  
Belisario Ampuero Totora (apoderado) 1906 Representative in sale estate 
Pisaqueri 
Pedro Flores ayllu Sacari, Sabaya 
(apoderado) 
1909- 
1911 
Registration adjudication 
particular sayañas; demarcation 
and transaction with Llica; 
integration in Todos Santos; 
registration composición titles 
Manuel Rojas 
 
Facundo Rojas 
 
 
 
Nicario Rojas 
 
 
 
Sabaya (apoderados) 
 
 
 
1909 
 
1916 
 
1928 
 
1917 
Represents Pisiga (ayllu Cumujo) 
in sayaña adjudication 
Represents ayllu Cumujo in salt 
concession adjudication 
Registration verdicts land division 
ayllu Sacari 
Petitions demarcation 
Ramon Funez Cosapa, Turco 
(apoderado) 
1910 Requests consolidation land rights 
Hermenigildo 
Verasqui 
vice-canton Carangas 
(apoderado) 
1911 Demands boundary inspection 
ayllu Canasa 
Fermin Colque ayllu Collana, Sabaya 1911 Registration of integration 
Carangas contribuyentes 
Enrique Rafael 
 
 
ayllu Aimarani, Totora 
(apoderado) 
 
1911 
 
1916 
 
Requests republican land title 
documents  
Represents comunarios in land 
dispute against ayllu Guaraguara 
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1925 Requests (with jilaqata Julian 
Rafael) demarcation documents  
Faustino Mollo ayllu Jisca-Urinsaya, 
Huaillamarca 
(apoderado) 
1912 Represents one of the litigating 
parties in intra-ayllu land dispute 
Juan Eloy Altamirano Curahuara de Carangas 
(apoderado) 
1909 
 
1913 
Represents comunarios in inter-
ayllu land dispute 
“Apoderado de la indiada”  
Ricardo Montalvo Curahuara de Carangas 
(Corregidor) 
1913 Accused of leading indigenous 
attack against Altamirano 
Raimundo Marca Curahuara de Carangas 1913 Instigated the rebellion 
Leonardo Villca Curahuara de Carangas 1913 Instigated the rebellion 
Paulino Valdéz Curahuara de Carangas 1913 Leads rebellion 
Cupercino Cruz  
 
Curahuara de Carangas 
(jilaqata) 
1913 Indicated as rebellion leader 
Vicente Huarachi 
Marcelino Paxsi 
Mariano Cruz 
Eusebio Cruz  
P. Chuquichambi 
C. Condori 
Felipe Mamani 
Geronimo Colque 
Ramon 
Chuquichambi 
José Maria Apata 
Pedro Chura 
Benito Mamani 
Remigio Bautista 
Romualdo Cruz 
Raimundo Guarachi 
Curahuara de Carangas 1913 Indicated as rebellion 
leader/participant 
Avelino Campos 
Tomas Anconi 
Angelo Ala 
ayllu Guaraguara, 
Totora (apoderados) 
1914 Represent comunarios in land 
dispute with ayllu Aimarani 
Belisario Bernal ayllu Cala, Corque 
(apoderado) 
1914 Represents comunarios in land 
dispute with ayllu Cupiaza 
Manuel Felix 
Fernandez 
Sabaya 1914 Requests inter-ayllu demarcation 
and adjudication 
Casiano Montealegre  
 
ayllu Canasa, Sabaya 
(apoderado)  
1914 
 
Requests sayaña demarcation, 
registers delineation documents  
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Sabaya and Todos 
Santos (apoderado) 
1914 Represents ayllus before 
government 
José L. Mamani Todos Santos 
(apoderado) 
1914 Represents comunarios in lawsuit 
to evict ex-contribuyente 
Zenobio 
Montealegre7 
ayllu Guaraguara, 
Totora (apoderado) 
Andamarca 
1917 
 
1920 
Represents comunarios in lawsuit 
against Aimarani 
Apoderado of rebellion 
community leader Aurelio Villca 
Gabriel Villca Andamarca 1918 Registration petition Lascano 1899 
Luciano Villca ayllu Canasa, Sabaya 
La Rivera 
1918 
1920 
Registration composición title 1504 
Registration verdict dispute 1827 
Sergio Sierra Totora (apoderado) 1920 Represents the community 
against accusation of rebellion  
Luciano Quispe Andamarca (apoderado 
general) 
1920 Indicated as leader of invasion 
Huachacalla 
Aurelio Villca Andamarca (apoderado 
general) 
1920 Indicated as leader of invasion 
Huachacalla 
Pantaleón Arias Orinoca and Andamarca 
(apoderado) 
Turco (apoderado) 
1922 
 
1929 
Requests 1898 documents 
restitution lands in Chuquisaca 
Requests composición titles 1543, 
1692, 1720. 
Domingo Condori Ayllu Camacha, 
Huachacalla 
(apoderado) 
1924 Requests registration composición 
titles (granted under Toledo) 
Daniel Aguilar Cosapa (apoderado) 1924 Requests registration composición 
titles (granted under Toledo) 
Victor Manuel 
Barientos 
Totora and Turco 
(lawyer) 
1925-
1930 
Registration of particular sayaña 
adjudications 
Emilio Zuñiga Several cantons 
(lawyer) 
1926-
1930 
Registration of particular sayaña 
adjudications; composición titles 
E. Chambi Villcaraña ayllu Tatasapana, Totora 1927 Registration land titles 1843 
 
 
                                                     
7 Zenobio is the son of Casiano Montealegre. 
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